


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THE LIFE OF
MIR JUMLA
THE GENERAL OF AURANGZEB

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With a Foreword

by

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DEDICATED
TO
THE SACRED MEMORY
OF
MY PARENTS



FOREWORD

The author is to be congratulated on a first-rate contribution to Indo-Muslim History. By patient and deep research extending over seven years, he has produced a book which will stand as the authoritative life of Mir Jumla and a worthy supplement,—in some points a corrective also—to my voluminous *History of Aurangzib*. It would, indeed, be wrong to consider this book as superfluous after that work of mine. The two books have, no doubt, a certain period in common, namely the years 1647-1663; but this *Mir Jumla* does not merely repeat the earlier *History of Aurangzib*.

The present author has used the microscope where I had to apply the telescope; and, in addition, he has dealt with many things not at all touched in my work on Aurangzib. Hence, this book has an independent value of its own. To take a few illustrations, there is nothing in my *Aurangzib*, except a dozen of pages, relating to the subject-matter of the first eighty pages of this book. And I have said nothing whatever about Mir Jumla's administrative arrangements, commercial activities, and dealings with the European traders, to which the present biography has devoted many erudite and very informative pages. Again, Mir Jumla's campaign against Shuja in Bihar and Bengal is here painted on a wider canvas with much fuller amplitude of detail than I judged to be proper in my general history of Aurangzib's entire reign.

Mahmud Gawan, Malik Ambar, and Mir Jumla were the three noblest gifts of Persia to India, (if I may be permitted to comprehend the entire Shia world in the term Persia). On the Indian stage these supermen found the fullest opportunity for displaying their extraordinary genius for war and diplomacy, civil government and business management. Of these "kings of men", the first two were happier than Mir Jumla in this that they were practically masters in their respective kingdoms, though nominally holding the office of ministers. Mir Jumla never enjoyed such supreme power in the state; he was always a servant, subordinate to a higher authority. Moreover, his achievements were cast into the shade by the superior splendour and far wider range of the feats of Aurangzib, his contemporary

and co-worker in the same regions. The truly memorable achievements of Mir Jumla, so carefully elaborated in this volume, were compressed into seventeen years only, 1646-1662. But if a man's character is best judged by the force of the obstacles he has wrestled with and the manner in which he has faced unforeseen difficulties and misfortunes, then Mir Jumla stands out as the greatest among these three foreign immigrants in India.

Mir Jumla was also more fortunate than these two in the extent and value of the surviving historical records about him. His biographer has been able to draw upon the day to day accounts of the European merchants who had dealings with him, the detailed histories of his career in the Golkonda and Mughal services written by the Persian historiographers of the Deccan Sultans and the Delhi Emperors and many contemporary letters; and above all the long masterly diary of his Kuch and Assam expeditions written by Shihab-ud-din Muhammad Talish, a writer nowise inferior to Akbar's famous chronicler Abul Fazl. The factory records of the English and Dutch East India Companies give accurate dates and details about his movements and the economic development of the country, such as we do not find in the case of any other mediaeval Indian hero.

All this wealth of information has been utilised in the present biography. The author has mostly worked in my library, using Persian manuscripts not to be found elsewhere in India. In its critical and exhaustive synthesis of all the available materials, this life of Mir Jumla leaves nothing to be desired. I do not know any other research work in Mediaeval Indian History which shows even half the meticulous care of Dr. Jagadish Narayan Sarkar in tracing every place-name, however obscure, with the help of district Gazetteers and the quarter-inch Survey of India maps.

Mir Jumla was one of the greatest characters of mediaeval India, and now at last a biography truly worthy of him has been produced.

June 6, 1951

JADUNATH SARKAR

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INTRODUCTION

From the earliest times India has offered a favourable field for adventurers and fortune-seekers of different lands. Persians have come to India as saints, scholars, soldiers, conquerors, administrators, adventurers and founders of principalities during successive periods of Indian History from the 6th century B. C. to the 7th Century A. D. in the pre-Muslim ages, and more frequently later on, when Persia became included in the general movements of Islamic peoples as a principal co-sharer. During the medieval period Persia was admittedly a major centre of Asiatic civilisation, and she naturally sent many of her sons to India to play conspicuous rôles in Indian History. Such were Mahmud Gawan, Malik Ambar, Mirza Ghiyas Beg, Itimad ud Daula, Mirza Rustam Safavi, Mir Jumla and many others. In the Deccan, where there was community of faith and friendship between its Sultanates and Iran, Persians often rose to the highest positions in the State. In Hindusthan, however, Persians, while finding employment in the army and the civil government, could not hope easily to rise to the topmost rung of the ladder. The career of Mir Muhammad Said Mir Jumla, who rose to be the *Diwan-i Kul* of the Mughal Empire, is an exception to this rule.

Mir Muhammad Said Mir Jumla was one of the remarkable personalities in the 17th century history of India. The author of the *Qutbnama-i Alam* significantly observes, "What he did was written on the page of Time." An enterprising, ambitious and self-made man, he passed through various vicissitudes of fortune, which enabled him to bestride the sub-continent of India and influence its history from the Karnatak to Delhi and from Khandesh to Assam and even to get a share of the maritime commerce of India. Son of a Persian adventurer, migrating to Golkonda as a fortune-seeker, he rose, by dint of his unrivalled abilities, and through successive stages

from the post of the keeper of records to that of the Governor of Masulipatam and finally to the exalted office of Wazir of the Golkonda State. Deputed by its Sultan to conquer the Karnatak on his behalf, the Mir practically enjoyed "regal independence" in his conquests, and became in effect the first Nawab of the Karnatak. Then he transferred his allegiance to Shahjahan, who appointed him the *Dewan-i Kul* of the Mughal Empire. For some time, under Aurangzeb, he acted as Governor of Khandesh and finally as Viceroy of the important province of Bengal.

Mir Jumla's active career in India, extending for well-nigh thirty years, synchronised with the rapid dissolution of the Vijaynagar Empire. Though it had survived the shock of the so-called battle of Talikota in 1565, it failed to overcome the process of disintegration and fast crumbled to pieces in the 17th century. Torn by repeated wars of succession in which its nobles and *nayaks* participated and enfeebled by the growing weakness of the central government, the rise of the several *Nayaks*, chiefly those of Madura, Jinji and Tanjore, the lack of union due to mutual jealousy and bad faith, the conflict between the Tamil and Kanarese elements in its population, the kingdom of Chandragiri could not present a united front to the Muslim invaders; and the Rayal, in spite of continued resistance, found his dominions slipping away from his grasp one after another. The combination of all these forces rendered the course of political history extremely complicated, and the kaleidoscopic changes in the relations of the Rayal and the *Nayaks inter se* and in their system of alliances with one or another of the invading forces which were determined purely by temporary or transient considerations of self-interest, were further confused by the intervention of the European trading companies in the troubled affairs of the Deccan.

Mir Jumla undoubtedly was responsible for accelerating the decline of the Vijaynagar Empire. Barred in their northward advance by the Mughal partition treaties of May-June, 1636, the two Deccani Sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda could find a free outlet for their aggressive instincts only in the southern and eastern directions across the Krishna and the Tungabhadra

at the expense of the numerous, petty and warring fragments of the moribund Vijaynagar Empire which covered the Karnatak from the Krishna to Tanjore beyond the Kaveri. In this Muhammadan conquest of the Karnatak Mir Jumla played a very important rôle on behalf of his master, Sultan Qutb Shah of Golkonda.

Aurangzeb, the ambitious Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan, was not the man to remain as an idle spectator of this scramble for the rich heritage of Vijaynagar. He was waiting for an opportunity and a pretext to swallow up the Karnatak. These came with Mir Jumla's rebellion against his first master. By inducing the Emperor Shahjahan to offer protection to the rebel vassal against the revenge of the Sultan of Golkonda, Aurangzeb paved the way for the absorption, at one stroke, of Mir Jumla's Karnatak dominions in the Mughal Empire.

Both Shahjahan and Aurangzeb wanted to utilise Mir Jumla's unrivalled qualities of military leadership and unsurpassed knowledge of the Deccan affairs for their own imperialistic purposes. The loss of Qandahar to the Persians in 1649 and the failure of three expeditions to recover it from them during the next three years had left a rankling sore in the mind of Emperor Shahjahan. He hoped to retrieve his own prestige and to tarnish the military fame of Persia, then at its height, by deputing this peerless Persian general to the task of recovering Qandahar. Mir Jumla might succeed where Sadullah, Aurangzeb and Dara had failed. But Mir Jumla diverted the Emperor's attention from the North-West to the Deccan, and induced him to give up the Qandahar expedition and to sanction the plan of conquering Bijapur. Mir Jumla's counsel was considered worth acceptance; as he was conversant with the ins and outs of the Deccani Courts. Thus it was Mir Jumla who was the principal instigator of the Bijapur Campaign of 1657-8. Further, as the ally, confidential adviser and General of Aurangzeb during the War of Succession, the Mir was largely responsible for securing the throne for Aurangzeb. Again, it was solely due to Mir Jumla's generalship and through his conquest of Kuch Bihar and Assam that the north-eastern push of the Mughal empire reached its logical culmination.

If Mir Jumla's military contributions to the Mughal Empire were substantial and solid, his influence on contemporary Mughal court politics was significant. At that time one of the principal factors which influenced Delhi politics was the long-standing rivalry between the liberal and pacifist Dara, favourably disposed towards the Shia States of the Deccan, and the orthodox and militant Aurangzeb, intent on their annexation to the Empire. Consequently, Mughal policy under Shahjahan often vacillated between the two extreme points represented by these two princes. He was swayed sometimes by the one and sometimes by the other. Thus the Golkonda campaign of 1656 owed its inception to Aurangzeb's diplomacy. But the conclusion of peace was effected as a result of Dara's machinations. Aurangzeb eagerly clung to Wazir Mir Jumla after the death of Wazir Sadullah, one of his adherents. Indeed, Mir Jumla's appointment as Wazir meant the victory of the aggressive policy of Aurangzeb and the discrediting, for sometime at least, of the peace policy of Dara in the Emperor's council. The Bijapur campaign of 1657-'58, sanctioned by the Emperor under the influence of Mir Jumla, was abruptly concluded at Dara's intercessions.

The career of Mir Jumla is significant not only for the student of political and diplomatic history but it is also of absorbing interest to the student of the economic history of India. His mining activities made him the owner of twenty maunds of diamonds. His economic system was based on the monopoly of the articles of food and clothing, both in the Karnatak and in Bengal. Master of a growing mercantile marine, he carried on overseas trade with Western Asia and the East Indies. The importance of his activities in the commercial history of the period,—marked by the fall of Vijaynagar, the decline of the Portuguese maritime empire, and the advent of the Dutch and the English in the Asiatic Seas,—lay in the fact that before the last two could displace the Portuguese as the carriers of India's oceanic trade, Mir Jumla, the Persian, grasped a large share in the maritime trade of Vijaynagar and became a keen competitor first of the Dutch and subsequently of the English. They dreaded his influence but courted his favour.

Mir Jumla's association with the East Coast lasted till his end.

The career of such an important personality in its different aspects was not studied before by any other scholar on a full scale with adequate utilisation of relevant evidence in varied documents. I have tried, in my own humble way, to prepare a biography of Mir Jumla, after about seven years' patient study of the following classes of original sources.

- (i) Contemporary historical works in Persian, published or unpublished.
- (ii) Contemporary correspondence in Persian.
- (iii) The Ahom Buranjis.
- (iv) European records, mainly English and Dutch.
- (v) Works of contemporary European writers and travellers.
- (vi) Accounts in Tamil, Telugu and Sanskrit.
- (vii) Archaeological, Epigraphic and Numismatic sources.

The book has been divided into eight chapters, subdivided into several sections and sub-sections. The early life of Mir Jumla has been dealt in Chapter I on the basis of Nizamuddin Ahmad's *Hadikat-us-Salatin*, Tabrezi's *Golkonda Letters*, and other contemporary Persian works and European factory records, besides the writings of foreign travellers on which mainly Sir J. N. Sarkar's account is based. This chapter is wholly original, containing new details as regards Mir Jumla's ancestry, date of birth, his reasons for leaving Persia, the stages of his gradual rise to power in Golkonda and his influence in that State.

Chapter II, dealing with Mir Jumla's activities in the Karnatak, and subdivided into three sections, is also entirely original. The stages of the gradual conquest of the Western Karnatak by Bijapur are fairly well-known. But the story of the conquest of the Eastern Karnatak by the forces of Golkonda under Mir Jumla awaited reconstruction from different classes of sources. The account of Colonel Mackenzie published in JASB. 1844 is now out of date. Sir J. N. Sarkar's masterly account, given in his *History of Aurangzeb*, is

necessarily very brief. Dr. S. K. Aiyangar's articles are mainly based on European records. This task of reconstruction has been attempted by me for the first time, in Section A, after a synthetic use of contemporary Persian chronicles and letter books and European factory records and travellers' accounts. The details regarding the deputation of the Mir to the Karnatak, the conclusion of a contract between the two Sultans for its partition, the struggle over the possession of Jinji and the conquest of Gandikota are new. For the first time an attempt has been made here to examine the working of the partition scheme,—the causes of friction between the two Sultans, the growing strain and finally the war resulting in the defeat of the Qutbshahis under Mir Jumla. The ultimate allocation by Bijapur of Gandikota and Kokkanur to Mir Jumla was highly intriguing and sowed the seed of his rebellion against his master. The treatment of Mir Jumla's administration of the Karnatak (Section B), describing the territorial results of its conquest, his civil administration, his internal and overseas commerce, his military organisation, is original. So also is Section C, wherein his relations with the Europeans from his appointment as Governor of Masulipatam in 1635-36 till his absorption in Mughal imperial service in 1655 has been traced.

Chapter III of the present work is an attempt to tell the story of Mir Jumla's entry into Mughal imperial service from a new angle and a fuller study of older sources and also on the basis of some new Persian sources not utilised by Sir J. N. Sarkar for the purpose. Fresh light has been here thrown on the causes of Mir Jumla's friction with Sultan Qutb Shah, on Mir Jumla's rôle in planning Aurangzeb's Golkonda campaign as well as on his diplomatic intrigues, especially with Persia and Sri Ranga Rayal. It was the Mir who induced the Rayal to seek Mughal protection in return for apostacy to Islam. Again, Mir Jumla's diplomatic relations with the celebrated Maratha leader Shahji Bhonsla will be of interest to students of Maratha history. The arrest of Muhammad Amin was not primarily due to the latter's haughty behaviour as is generally

believed, but to the leakage of Mir Jumla's intrigues with the Mughal Court.

The activities of Mir Jumla as Mughal Wazir (Chapter IV) have been studied under five sections, of which the first two and the last one are absolutely original. Section A portrays the Grand Wazir Mir Jumla as an agent of Aurangzeb in diplomacy and administration alike. Section B, dealing with the fate of Mir Jumla's Karnatak Dominions, is of interest not only to students of Mughal Court politics but also to those who wish to have an idea of the death-pangs of the kingdom of Chandragiri. Section E traces the changes effected in his relations with the Europeans by his appointment as Mughal Wazir.

The subject-matter of the two other sections of Chapter IV (Section C—the Bijapur campaign, 1657-'58, and Section D—Mir Jumla hurled from office) has been discussed in Sarkar's *History of Aurangzeb*. But the details here given regarding the diplomatic activities of Mir Jumla are wholly original. It has been shown here how the initiative in launching Aurangzeb's Bijapur campaign was taken by Mir Jumla, how he seduced the Bijapuri officers and how he counteracted Dara's moves during the War of Succession, especially the order of recall of the Mir. It is indeed significant to know that Aurangzeb completely depended on Mir Jumla in these matters, and that he appointed the latter Governor of Khandesh for this purpose.

Chapter V delineates the rôle of Mir Jumla in Aurangzeb's war against Shuja on a different plan and in greater detail than what one gets in Sarkar's *Aurangzeb*. The chapter has been divided into 6 sections, each bringing to light some original facts. Section A corrects the date of Mir Jumla's arrival at Kora, describes his part in minimising the adverse effects of Jaswant Singh's desertion of the imperial army at Khajwa, and throws new light on the causes of Aurangzeb's victory. Section B contains new details regarding the movements of the imperial army in its march from Patna to Rajmahal, as well as Mir Jumla's activities especially regarding the administration of Monghyr and Rajmahal. In Section C Mir Jumla's naval enterprises at Suti, his preparations for a fresh offensive after

the failure of the frontal assault scheme of 3rd May, 1659, and his efforts for the establishment of Aurangzeb's authority in Orissa, are absolutely original. Again, it has been proved here that it was Mir Jumla and not Aurangzeb who was the originator of the plan of encircling Shuja. Fresh light is also thrown on the flight of Muhammad Sultan and Mir Jumla's able handling of the situation. In Section D, the discussion of Mir Jumla's activities in South West Bengal, especially the occupation of Hugli, and Daud Khan's advance from Patna towards Malda are completely new, while as regards the battle fought on a spot between Belghata and Giria, the version of Aqil Khan has been reconciled with the *Alamgirnama* and the *Tarikh i Shah Shujai*. Section E gives new details as regards Mir Jumla's plans for protecting the western bank of the Ganges, his activities at Samdah, and the return of Muhammad Sultan to the imperial army. Mir Jumla's relations with the Europeans during the War of Succession form the theme of Section F.

Chapter VI, describing Mir Jumla's administration of Bengal, is original in all respects. The contents of Aurangzeb's *farman* appointing him Governor of the province have been given here for the first time.

Chapter VII deals with Mir Jumla's last and crowning military campaign,—the invasion of Kuch Bihar and Assam. This subject has been discussed by Mr. Blochmann, Sir E. Gait, Sir J. N. Sarkar and Dr. S. N. Bhattacharya. But here it has been approached from the point of view of Mir Jumla, and the treatment has been more detailed and analytical than what the previous works contain. The old and known sources have been thoroughly examined and certain recently published Ahom Buranjis have been utilised. This chapter has been divided into 5 sections. Section A, dealing with the conquest of Kuch Bihar, throws new light on the genesis of Mir Jumla's eastern campaigns and his war preparations. Section B describes Mir Jumla's triumphal march to Garhgaon: sub-section (c) of Section B, describing Mir Jumla's administrative and military arrangements in Kamrup and Assam is fully original. Section C gives full details of Mir

Jumla's activities to overcome the difficulties in Assam caused by the rains, famine, and pestilence. Section D deals with his resumption of offensive, the beginning of his fatal illness and the conclusion of peace. Section E describes his retreat from Assam, and the administrative and military problems arising during it.

The concluding Chapter VIII is an attempt at forming a general estimate of Mir Jumla's character and achievement,—as a man, a statesman, a general, and a diplomat, — and analysing the reasons of his failure to contribute any constructive force to history.

The materials have been arranged in such a way as to clearly indicate the landmarks in Mir Jumla's career. For the sake of this analysis, each chapter or section has been further divided into sub-sections. Foot-notes have been consolidated, sometimes for one whole paragraph or a sub-section. Several appendices deal with the more controversial points. The topic of Mir Jumla's relations with the European Companies has been studied chronologically under different phases of his career and not in a single chapter, for the sake of better understanding of his policy towards them in the light of his current problems and preoccupations. Quotations from European records have been given in their original form, sometimes with modern equivalents of unfamiliar words within brackets.

In the preparation of this work I have received generous assistance from some scholars, for which I am profoundly grateful to them. The pride of place must go to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Kt., C.I.E., D. Litt., who suggested the subject to me, permitted me to utilise his rare Persian manuscripts, besides books, maps and atlases in his valuable library, guided me in writing this book with great zeal and love, and wrote the Foreword. 'Mir Jumla' has, indeed, grown up under his eyes. Dr. S. C. Sarkar, M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon), former Head of the History Department of Patna College, and Dr. K. K. Datta, M.A., P.R.S., Ph. D., its present Head, have laid me under a deep debt of gratitude, by going through the work and offering their valuable comments. Khan Sahib S. H. Askari of the same department lent me some manuscripts of his own and helped

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JAGADISH NARAYAN SARKAR

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	From Akbar to Aurangzeb by Moreland.
AB	Assam Buranji (1648-81), ed. by S. K. Dutta.
Adab	Adab-i-Alamgiri.
ADM	Akhbarat-i-Darbar-Mualla.
AN	Alamgirnama.
ARADND	Annual Report of the Archaeological Department of His Exalted Highness the Nizam's Dominions.
ARSIE	Annual Report on South Indian Epigraphy.
AS	Amal-i-Salih.
ASB	Asiatic Society of Bengal.
ASI	Atlas of South India by Pharaah & Co.
ASR	Annual Report of Archaeological Survey of India.
Aurangzib	History of Aurangzib by Sir Jadunath Sarkar.
Ball	Travels in India by Jean Baptiste Tavernier, ed. by Ball.
BDR	Batavia Dag Register
Bernier	Travels in the Mogul Empire by Francois Bernier, ed. by Constable.
BI	Bibliotheca Indica.
BKK	Buranji from Khunlung and Khunlai.
BM	British Museum.
B.MS.A	Buranji Ms. A.
B Ms.B	Buranji Ms. B.
B. II b	Buranji Bk. II (b)
BVIII	Buranji VIF.
Bowrey	A Geographical Account of Countries round the Bay of Bengal.
BPP	Bengal : Past and Present.
Bruce	Annals of E. I. C.
BS	Basatin-us-Salatin (Litho Edn.).
CM	Chingleput Manual.
COM	Court Minutes of the E. I. C.
Cont.	Continuation of Fathiyya-i-ibriyya. (Bod. Lib. MS. 589).
CR	Calcutta Review.
Danvers	The Portuguese in India by F. C. Danvers.
Dow	History of Hindustan by Dow.
DUS	Dacca University Studies.
EAEB	The Early Annals of the English in Bengal by C. R. Wilson.
EC	Epigraphia Carnatica.
E & D	History of India as told by its own historians, ed. by Elliot and Dowson.
EFI	The English Factories in India. The volumes are indicated as follows :— Volume 1634-36 - V

Tabrezi	Abdul Ali Tabrezi's Golkonda Letters.
TG	Tinnevely Gazetteer by Pate.
Thevenot	Travels of Thevenot.
TM	Tarikh-i-Mufazzali.
TMu	Tarikh-i-Muhammadi.
TS	Tarikh-i-Shah-Shujai.
TU	Tazkirat-ul-Umara.
VSCV	Vijaynagara Sexcentenary Volume.
Waris	Padshahnama by Waris.
Wilks	Historical Sketches of the South of India, in an attempt to trace the History of Mysoor by M. Wilks.
ZNA	Zafarnama-i-Alamgiri.

CHAPTER I

EARLY LIFE OF MIR JUMLA : PERSIA TO GOLKONDA

1. Mir Jumla Leaves Persia.

Mir Muhammad Sa'id Ardistani known to history by his more famous surname Mir Jumla and entitled Mu'azzam Khan, Khan-i-Khanan, Sipahsalar, Yar-i-wafadar was a Persian by birth. Born at Ardistan about 1501, he was son of Mirza Hazaru, an extremely poor Sayyid oil-merchant of Ispahan, for long the capital of Iran.¹ In spite of the poverty of his parents, Mir Muhammad found an opportunity to acquire some knowledge of letters. Probably this helped him to secure the office of a clerk to a diamond merchant, who was in frequent touch with Golkonda. This early experience about the diamond trade stood him in good stead in his subsequent career and proved to be the corner-stone of his future prosperity.

On reaching the age of discretion Mir Muhammad Sa'id, tormented by his growing economic wants, due to a large extent to the financial exactions of a grabbing Shaikh ul Islam, and lack of governance in Persia, left the land of his birth, like many other Persian Shiahs, in search of fortune. Mir Muhammad himself observed in one of his letters to Nawab Khalifa-i-Sultan, Wazir of Persia, that he had to leave his native country (i) to make his living easy, (ii) to send some help to near relations, and the aged and the infirm members of

¹. We get the name of Mir Muhammad's father in PB (IHQ. V. 474 : IsC. 1928, p. 558). The exact date of his birth is not stated anywhere. While conducting the war with Shuja' (1070/1659) Mir Jumla says that he was 70 years old. *Poem*, 172. This is corroborated by Assamese Sources. On his way to Bengal, Mir Jumla speaks of "these seventy years of my life." IsC. July, 1929. p. 394 ; IHQ. V. 473. Assuming these to be lunar years, we get the date of his birth to be 1000/1591.

the family, and (iii) to escape from the oppressions of the Persian Shaikh ul Islam.²

Mir Muhammad joined the service of a Persian merchant, who was carrying some horses from Persia for sale to the King of Golkonda, which, in those days, was a refuge and an El Dorado for men of West Asia, and specially Persia. The date of his arrival in Golkonda is uncertain; but most probably it was earlier than 1630.³ We are also in the dark about the exact position of Mir Muhammad immediately after his arrival there. Whether he only continued as the personal attendant of the Persian merchant, in charge of the horses, already brought, as Bernier and Manucci both say, or whether he even went through the streets of Golkonda from door to door selling shoes, as Manucci further writes, there is no doubt that his arrival in Golkonda, where his propitious stars had led him, proved to be a turning point in his career.⁴

². Tabrezi, 70a-72b.

Mir Jumla's admiration for the justice, trade and religion of Persia shows that he very naturally retained a soft corner in his mind for the land of his birth and, during the formative period of his career as minister in Golkonda, he maintained harmonious relations with the Court of Iran. This is clearly illustrated by his letters to Khalifa-i-Sultan, *Mir Jumla-Iran correspondence* in *JBORS*, June, 1942. This cordiality was profoundly helpful to him and was dictated by high political wisdom and foresight, as we shall find later on. At the same time he maintained commercial relations with Persia throughout his active career, and we read of one Haji Muhammad Shaf'i, his agent in Iran (Tabrezi, 33b-34b).

³. The date of his arrival is stated to be 1630 by Gribble, I. 270 and Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, I. 193. If he arrived at Golkonda in 1630, he must then have been about 40 years old, i.e., past youth. This seems unlikely. The approximate period of arrival might be c. 1615-25. Tavernier's statement (Ball, I. 165) that Mir Muhammad helped 'Abdullah Qutb Shah in his accession (1626) indicates that the former arrived before 1630.

⁴. Early life in Persia in *Storia*, I. 226n, 231-2 and n; Bernier, 16 & n; Dow, III. 182; Thevenot, 102; Stewart, 319-20; Gribble, 269-72; Sarkar, *op. cit.*; MU. III. 530; Love, I. 99n; HS. 475-92 (Persian penetration into Golkonda); IsC. *op. cit.* Persian horse trade, Mandelslo, 13.

2. *Mir Jumla enters Golkonda service.*

Mir Muhammad became the darling of Fortune. Wise and talented, and possessing business experience, he set himself assiduously to the task of amassing wealth, the source of material power and independence. He soon established himself at Golkonda as an apprentice to a diamond merchant. Subsequently he gave up this service and traded on his own account. He farmed some diamond mines under feigned names and ran them with indefatigable industry. His diamonds were usually counted in sacks. Extensive commerce with various parts of the world was another source of his prosperity. Engaged in commercial transactions, specially maritime, he gradually rose to be "a great merchant of much fame in the kingdom," owning numerous ships. Anxious to rise in life, Mir Muhammad endeavoured to "purchase a place" at the court of Qutb Shah and utilised his fortune, amassed through mining and commerce, to realise his political ambition. By wise and well-placed generosity, he gained for himself many friends in the royal court who looked after his interests there.⁵ But it is clear from English factory records that till 1634 he did not rise to importance in Golkonda, and even in 1635-6 we find him an ordinary *Sillahdar* holding the office of *Sar-i-daftar-Shahi*.⁶ His eventual appointment in higher service in the Golkonda state was due to the kind patronage of Nawab 'Allami Fahmi Shaikh Muhammad, entitled Mir Jumla, who then held the exalted office of the Peshwa in the State. Nawab 'Allami was an able officer and was doing his utmost to evolve order out of the chaos then reigning in the internal administration and army of the Kingdom. His career in Golkonda shows that in that atmosphere of inefficiency, nepotism and corruption, a really able person was sure to gain the confidence of the Sultan and be invested with unlimited power, but that at the same time his very eminence was bound to lead the

⁵. Bernier, 16-17; *Storia*, I. 232; Dow, *op. cit.*; Love, I. 99-100n; Thevenot, 98, 102, 105; Gribble, 270.

⁶. There is no reference to him in connection with the mission (1633-34) of Thomas Joyce & Wyche to the Golkonda Court. *EPI*. V. xxxiii, 47; HS. 374.

jealous and disaffected elements in the Court to make allegations against him to the too credulous Sultan in order to undermine his influence. This is well illustrated in the career of Mir Muhammad too.⁷

Having virtually the sole power to dispose of all governmental affairs, Nawab 'Allami Fahmi was instrumental in appointing many persons to the State service, elevating many *Sillahdars* to the *Majlis* (Council) and placing some others in charge of *mahals* as their *'amils* and *hakims*, in recognition of their merit. Mir Muhammad, holding the office of the *Sar-i-daftar-Shahi*, was one of these favoured *Sillahdars* and during 1535-6 he was placed in charge of the port of Masulipatam as its *havaladar*.⁸ Masulipatam was the centre of the East Coast cotton manufactures specially in chintz, and, as the 'principal port' of the Golkonda Kingdom, it had extensive commercial intercourse with Pegu, Bantam, the Far East, Surat, Gombroon, and other western settlements, besides the ports on the Coromandel Coast. Referring to this place, Nizamuddin Ahmad wrote that from there "ships proceeded to the countries of *Zerbad* (down country) and *balabad* (up country), and the ports of 'Arab and 'Azam. Throughout the year ships used to come to and go from here in all directions. That was the special feature of this port". But for several years past the affairs of this jewel of a port were not properly administered. Corruption was rife, and heavy exactions were made on the merchants by its Governor for purely personal and selfish reasons without an eye to the economic interests of the Kingdom.⁹

Mir Muhammad must have played an important part in bringing the affairs of the port well under control and in endeavouring to replenish the coffers of the State. Nizamuddin Ahmad writes that the record of service of Mir Muhammad as the *havaladar* of Masulipatam was excellent. His qualities, indeed, befitted him for a higher position. After about a year

⁷. 'Some Aspects of the Qutbshahi Administration of Golkonda', JBORS March, 1944; 'The Rise of Mir Jumla' in Pr. IHRC. (Trivandrum), 1942. 105-8.

⁸. HS. 397-446. An entry in BDR dated 31st Oct. 1636 refers to Mir Muhammad as "Moorschen Gouverneur Mirmameth Sahij (p. 267).

⁹. Pr. IHC (1 99), 919-23; JBORS, *op. cit.*; Thevenot, 104-105; EFL. V. 277; VI. 261.

(c. 1637) he was also appointed *havaladar* of the *Mahal* of Mustafanagar (Condapilly), a big fort of Telingana. He made commendable efforts to manage its administration properly and to develop its resources. His speeches and actions were to the liking of all officers in the capital. He began to bask in the sunshine of the Sultan's favours and to ascend the ladder of fortune stage by stage. The *havaladari* of Masulipatam and Mustafanagar became a stepping-stone to the office of the *Sar-i-khail*.¹⁰

The term *Sar-i-khail* literally means 'head of the horse', but in practice the incumbent of the office had to discharge, like Mir Jumla, civil and revenue functions besides military duties. The office was a highly important one, inasmuch as the well-being of the kingdom depended, to a large extent, on the ability of its holder. Under a weak and incompetent one, the officers of the *mahals* and the Brahmans (employed in revenue department) were likely to go out of control, speculation and embezzlement would increase and collections of revenue would fall. On the death of Mir Jumla Mansur Khan the Abyssinian in 1628, Mulla Muhammad Taqi Taqrishi, the officiating diwan, had been appointed *Sar-i-khail*, in effect Mir Jumla. But the temporary arrangements made since his death in May, 1631, never worked well. *Sar-i-khail* after *Sar-i-khail* was changed till the Sultan's choice fell on Mir Muhammad. In obedience to a royal *farman* summoning him to Court, Mir Muhammad arrived at the capital on 21st June, 1637, with presents probably including several well-bred elephants and various European and Chinese fabrics. The Sultan received him well, and discerning "the signs of wisdom and ability in him," appointed him *Sar-i-khail* in succession to Sayyid 'Abdullah Mazandarani (23rd June, 1637). Mir Muhammad assumed charge of his new duties, leaving the administration of his old *mahals* in the hands of his *Wakils*.¹¹

¹⁰ HS. 389-98, 446-8. Mir Jumla's relations with the Europeans since 1635-6 have been discussed in Ch. 2, Sec. C. *infra*.

¹¹ For the history of the post, JBORS, *op cit*; HS. 446-8, 449 (chronogram); *Storia*. I. 231f. This appointment of Mir Muhammad as *Sar-i-khail* was temporary (HS. 517). Later on he received the epithet '*Omdat ul Nuqaba*' (Ibid, p. 602).

3. *Mir Jumla as the Wazir of Golkonda.*

Applying the epithets *Asaf Jahi* (wise as Asaf), *Asaf-manzilat* and *Asaf-martabat* to Mir Muhammad, Nizamuddin Ahmad observes: "The affairs of the Sultanate and duties in respect of religion and royal prosperity were all discharged (by him) with great wisdom and care, and he was ascending the stages of nearer approach to the Sultan. By virtue of his fortune and wisdom, he soon came to possess (in fact) supreme authority in the task of administration. He removed all sources of oppression and illicit profit on the part of the collectors. He realised a huge sum from the subordinates and the Brahmans and deposited it in the treasury." The Sultan rewarded him with a jewelled pen-case and granted him one *pargana* with an annual income of 30,000 *huns*, so that he might keep at his beck and call strong, young Arab retainers.¹²

Next, Mir Muhammad Sa'id earned a great reputation for having completed (by July, 1638) within the brief space of a year the construction of the four-storied Palace Hayat Mahal, as desired by the Sultan's mother, with the help of Malik Almas, *havaladar* of the masons. With his characteristic thoroughness of detail, Mir Muhammad set himself to the task, and, summoning many geometricians and expert artisans of the state, remained engrossed in this work, "morning and evening and always." A summer-room together with a *Ghuskhana* built on the topmost story between four lofty towers was decorated by the expert designers of Iraq and Hindustan with paintings of scenes depicting the court, hunting and war, and came to be so beautifully designed as to be compared by Nizamuddin with the Eram or "Eden."¹³

Mir Muhammad displayed his remarkable powers of organisation, by effecting in a befitting manner all arrangements

¹² HS. 449-50.

¹³ Garden built by Shaddad. It is a fine example of Indo-Moslem architecture and painting in Golkonda. HS. 503-508. Thevenot's description of the royal palace (p. 95) suggests that it was the same as that built by Mir Jumla. In MM. a palace built by Asaf Jahi Amir Muhammad Sa'id Mir Jumla Shahi is praised (7a-10b). The Chronogram is for 1031/1641. This seems to be a different palace.

in honour of the royal visit to this palace amid scenes of great pomp and splendour. The lawn (in front of the building) was cleaned "like a mirror". The *Sarnaubats* arrived there for display of their forces. Mir Muhammad, assisted by special agents of the Queen-mother, had velvet carpets and gold brocade spread over the entire way, 1,000 yards long, intervening between the first gateway and the palace, there being altogether eight lofty gateways. Provision was made for distribution of victuals in charity. The stationing of elephants, horses and camels, and of domestics and the *Ohdudars* and *maliks* of 12 harems with handsome trays of gold and jewels and cloths added grandeur to the whole show. Possessed of immense wealth, Mir Muhammad Sa'id presented to the Sultan one gold bedstead together with its accessories, using up in all about 12 maunds of gold, besides gold wire, utensils, fine cloths and other choicest presents. In recognition of all these recent services, the Queen-mother honoured him with special presents.¹⁴

Certain other favourable circumstances brightened the prospects of Mir Muhammad. The opposition and intrigues of his enemies proved to be a blessing in disguise for him. His wisdom and ability had excited the jealousy of Mulla Wais, *dabir* and *munshi-ul-mamalik*. The latter had outstepped the bounds of his own authority and propriety and had begun to interfere in the affairs of the *Sar-i-khail* and even of the Peshwa and also to look down upon all other *mansabdars* as his subordinates. Mir Muhammad, the acting *Sar-i-khail* and a favourite of the Sultan, discharging 'the duties of the diwani' very well, naturally resented Mulla Wais's intervention and made "allegations of disloyalty" against the latter. Unable to brook the consequent curtailment of his own influence, Mulla Wais sent in an application for leave, which highly incensed the Sultan. Finally, in July, 1638, the Sultan dismissed Mulla Wais and ordered Mir Muhammad to look after his retainers, and pay them out of the proceeds of the former's jagirs. The office of the *dabir*, held by Mulla Wais, was conferred on Mirza Taqi Nishapuri on 20th February, 1639. The vacant wizarat of Wais Khan

14. HS. 508-13.

was later on filled by Mirza Rustam, who was summoned from Qasimkota. The retinue of the dismissed Mulla Wais which had been kept in the custody of the force of Malik Ambar was now entrusted to Mir Muhammad.¹⁵

Soon Mir Muhammad added new feathers to his cap. For having skilfully organised a parade of his Iraqi contingent in the *maidan* of *Dadmahal*, he was granted a fine robe of honour and for him "with the high post of *Sar-i-khail* was combined the dignified office of the wizarat."¹⁶

4. *Quth Shah's Journey to Masulipatam.*

The good opinion of the Sultan about Mir Muhammad was further confirmed by the latter's performance of extremely useful services during a tour of the Sultan from the capital to the sea coast. (October 29—December 27, 1639.) Mir Muhammad spared no pains to collect certain goods of the *Karkhanas* and other requisites for the journey, and to settle the consequential administrative problems. He sent directions to the officers of the *mahals* on the highway to Masulipatam for keeping the articles of food and fodder ready and endeavouring to stock them to a maximum. The foreign ambassadors, including those of Iran and Delhi, were requested to accompany the Sultan, and Mir Muhammad was despatched with a *farman* to fetch back Imam Quli Beg, *hajib* of Iran, who had already left the capital.

Nizamuddin Ahmad Shirazi, an eye witness, pays a high testimony to the organising skill of Mir Muhammad by observing that at Hayatabad (Hayatnagar, Nov. 1-9) every one of the vast concourse of soldiers and people (about 5,000) had his wants satisfied through his endeavours. Leaving Moonagalah (Nov. 15-16) where its *havaladar*, Sayyid Mir Rustam supplied provisions to Mir Muhammad, the Sultan proceeded to the mountain fort of Anantgiri and reached its top along with the Mir.

At Mustafanagar (Condapilly, Nov. 19), then within his own jurisdiction, Mir Muhammad's services were highly commendable.

¹⁵. *Ibid*, 516-19. For fate of Mulla Wais, *ibid*, 530-1; 535, 594, 596ff.

¹⁶. *Ibid*, 531; *Storia*, I, 231; *Love*, I, 14, n, (before 19th July, 1639).

He had to climb to the citadel perched on the rock, to inspect and cleanse the big royal palaces and make lavish preparations for the royal reception. He got down in the evening and next day the Sultan ascended the hill together with the ladies, and made a circuit round the fort along with the intimate courtiers. Mir Muhammad had to remain alert day and night to meet all the needs of the occasion and to arrange adequately for night defence against carnivorous animals with the assistance of a contingent of *Khassa-i-kharil*, bondmen, *naikwars* and musketeers.

At Bezwada (Nov. 23), the captains of the three European companies--the English, the Dutch and the Danish,--accompanied by their respective retinue, came from Masulipatam and interviewed the Sultan.

Reaching Weyoor the next day, the Sultan ordered Mir Muhammad to go, along with Chatur Khan, the *Ohdadur* of *farashkhana* and other *Karkhanas*, towards the port and Ingondoor (Engodour) and set up the tents. The Mir had also to frame rules (? for the procession) from the gateway of the port to the bankshall. Entering the port, the shops and houses of which were decorated by the traders with fine cloths and other articles, the Sultan, riding an elephant, proceeded towards the bankshall, with the Mir by his side, replying with due courtesy to his queries. After the conclusion of formal ceremonies in a *majlis* convened in the bankshall building, the Sultan inspected the port and started towards Dubighat (Point Divy).

On 27th November, the Sultan again went to the port and expressed his intention to visit the European factories the next day. On December 3, Mir Muhammad entertained the Sultan and his family by a demonstration of fishing at Point Divy.

The next day, on the occasion of offering *peshkash*, Mir Muhammad Sa'id acquainted the Sultan with the condition of the port and its inhabitants. The Sultan showed great favours to businessmen and traders of diverse countries, residing there, by remitting (i) the *Zakat*, payable on every article, "at the gate of the port," by all merchants, native or foreign, and, (ii) the brokerage, realised from traders in jewellery, which yielded a huge revenue. At the same time he relieved the merchants importing rubies from Pegu from the exactions of

the brokers. Many deserving persons, *Sayyids*, *Alims*, and others, living in the port, whether new comers or old residents, received grants of pensions, land or cash for subsistence.

On the day of departure (7th December), the Sultan honoured Mir Muhammad by rewarding him with the *Chadar* (wrapper) from his own neck together with the *char-kob*, an essential article of dress of honour pertaining to the office of the *Sar-i-khail*, and with some other costly presents. Through his mediation the European captains, who deserved presents for their various services, were duly honoured.¹⁷

5. Influence of Mir Jumla in the Golkonda state.

Thus, Mir Jumla held various dignified offices and "in all of them," as Manucci observes, "gave a good account of himself."¹⁸ He gradually came to wield enormous political influence in the State. It would appear that Mir Muhammad Sa'id succeeded Shaikh Muhammad as Mir Jumla, though the exact date when *Sar-i-khail* Mir Muhammad became Mir Jumla is not yet definitely known.¹⁹ Nizamuddin Ahmad says that in every task Mir Muhammad proved himself to be a well-wisher of the Sultan and became his favourite. Waris remarks that Mir Jumla came to have the power of "*ralk o fatk*", that is to say, all the affairs of Qutb Shah passed under his control. Nothing could be done without his knowledge and approval. He became the intermediary between the Sultan and the European factors. Tavernier, wishing to sell some pearls and jewels to Sultan 'Abdullah Qutb Shah at Golkonda, had first of all to go from Masulipatam to Mir Jumla at Gardikota, because "the King would buy nothing rare nor of high price which Mir Jumla had not first seen" (July 1652 N. S.).²⁰ As

¹⁷ For the Sultan's journey, HS. 533-80; EFL VI. 221. On the return journey there is no mention of Mir Jumla's activities. Probably he remained behind. The Sultan's *farmans* of exemption were ordered to have been engraved on stone-slabs and hung in the Jama Masjid of the port and that of the *Zakat* in the way of an imprecation.

¹⁸ *Storia* I. 231-2; Bernier, 17.

¹⁹ The title 'Nawab' is applied to Mir Jumla in an English factory record dated May 28, 1638. EFL VI. 76-77.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 260, 162-3; Ball, I. 259.

he was "all in all in the Golkonda State",²¹ and had widespread commercial activities, foreign nations came to feel the weight of his influence. Thus, in the English factory records of December, 1639, he is spoken of as "the Chief Governor under the King," who "governed the whole kingdom." Andrew Cogan, an envoy of the English E. I. C. to Golkonda, observed that the *Sari-i-khail* "indeed commanded the whole Kingdom".²² The Swally Marine-factors put the whole thing succinctly, when in 1643-44 they described him as the "all ruling *Sar-i-khail* or Vizier" who governed "the king and consequently the country."²³ Efficient in administration and influential in government, Mir Jumla also possessed remarkable military abilities which were well displayed in the conquest of the Eastern Karnatak, where he was deputed by the Sultan a few years later.

²¹ HS. 517-18; Waris. 102a; ZNA. 12; MU. III. 530.

²² EFL. VI. 200, 220-22.

²³ EFL. VII. 88, 207-8.

CHAPTER II

MIR JUMLA IN THE KARNATAK

Section A

ROLE OF MIR JUMLA IN THE MUHAMMADAN CONQUEST OF THE KARNATAK

1. The Karnatak Country and previous Muhammadan penetration into it.

The Karnatak-desa properly implies the Kanarese country, the uplands or the Balaghat, including Mysore and part of Telingana. But, as Vijaynagar receded to the east, the term Karnat also came to be applied to the plain country or Payanghat in the East.

The Kanarese country has been famous from the earliest times for its fertility of soil, richness in minerals, elephants and accumulated treasures. But the Eastern Karnatak (Payanghat), the plains lying between the Eastern Ghats and the sea coast of Madras were infinitely richer and more populous than the Western Karnatak. Its diamond mines, fertile valleys and hoards of buried treasures of old Hindu dynasties subsequently excited Aurangzeb's lust for the occupation of that rich and large province. It was, as he once wrote to Shahjahan, "equal to the Kingdom of Golkonda itself in wealth and extent." Thus both the divisions of the Deccan, Malnad and Karnatak, constituted a rich and fertile country. Zahur ibn Zahuri writes that the climate there was delightful and the air refreshing. Rains were sufficient for a plentiful harvest in the 17th century, when it surpassed even Egypt and Syria in agriculture, and the "stores of grain kissed the sky." Even the small *gasbas* were well-populated, and ordinary citizens were fairly well-off. Indeed, as Thevenot also remarks, the region was "exceedingly fruitful" and provisions were very cheap there. Important towns on

the coast like Negapatam, Tranquebar, Mylapur and San Thome testified to a flourishing commerce of the region.¹

Such a rich country naturally aroused the cupidity of the neighbouring states of Bijapur and Golkonda, and, later on, of the Mughal Empire too, particularly when it could no longer be effectively defended. The Adil Shah of Bijapur, desirous of unfurling the banner of Islam in "*darul harb Karnatak*," conquered first Malnad and then (Eastern) Karnatak. Within a short span of 6 years (1638-'44), his generals, Randaula Khan (Rustam-i-Zaman), Afzal Khan and Khan Muhammad succeeded in absorbing the Kanara country of Bednur (Ikkeri and Basavapattan) and parts of Mysore (Sera, Bangalore, Srirangapatam, Chik-Nayakanhalli, Bellur, Tamkur, Balapur, Kulihal or (?) Kunigal and Sagar.²

As compared to the rapid succession of victories secured by Bijapur in the Western Karnatak before 1645, the initial attempts of Golkonda to conquer the Eastern Karnatak did not meet with striking success. True, before the end of 1642, the Sultan of Golkonda succeeded in overrunning the coastal regions to the north of Pulicat and even occupying a part of the territory round Armagon.³ But the tables were soon turned when Sri Ranga Rayal, who succeeded Venkatapati, determined to pursue a vigorous policy of checking the Muhammadans by focussing all Hindu forces in the south and, if possible, by securing the assistance of the Dutch. He was successful in checkmating the hostile machinations of an influential court-party and the Velugoti brothers of Kalahasti (Damarla Venkatadri and Aiyappa), who had intrigued with

¹ Description based on IG. ix. 301-2; JAHRS. X. 89-99; JMCN. ii. 183-190; iii. 90, 103, 201; Wilks. I. 5-10 and n; MN. 180-90 (diamond mines at Nandiyal and 8 other forts); *Adab*, 46b; Thevenot, 105; *Aurangzib* I. 220, 221; HSh. 9; for mineral resources and forest products (esp. Red Sanders tree of N. Arcot, Cuddapah & Kurnool dts.) and fragrant flowering trees and conditions in modern times, See NAM. ch. 1 and 4; SAM. pt. 2.

² For Bijapuri conquests, see MN. 155-188 (Pact between Bijapur and the Rayal); BS. 316-8; JASB. XIII (1844), 420-39; HSh. 13-16 *Aurangzib*, I. 190-2, 228-9; HG. 154ff; NM. 20ff, 129-36; JIH. IX. 181ff; HTi. II. ch. 17, 18; E C. V. Intro. xxxv.

³ EFL. VII. 76, 80; Pr. IHRC. (Dec. 1938). 23, 25.

Golkonda. A defensive league was organised by Tirumala Nayak of Madura together with the Nayaks of Tanjore and Jinji. But when the allies were betrayed by the Nayak of Tanjore and Sri Ranga marched against the nearest rebel, the Nayak of Jinji, Tirumala, "swayed only by fury and desire for vengeance" and "regardless of the claims of a larger patriotism," secretly corresponded with the Golkonda viceroy on the frontier to induce the Sultan to attack Vellore from the north. The Rayal turned back from Jinji, and assisted by the rising power of Ikkeri, expelled the Qutb Shahi force from his capital. A Qutb Shahi contingent under "Casy aly" (Ghazi 'Ali) failed to occupy the well-fortified Dutch settlement of Pulicat in July, 1644, and was driven beyond Armagon up to Udayagiri (September) by the Hindu general Kistappa Nayak.¹

2. *Deputation of Mir Jumla to the Karnatak.*

So far, Golkonda's attempts to gain a substantial footing in the Eastern Karnatak ended in smoke, and Kambam, on the north-east side of the Cuddapah district, remained the limit of her advance in the south-east. It was at this juncture that, Sultan 'Abdullah Qutb Shah deputed his able prime Minister, Mir Muhammad Sa'id, to conquer the Karnatak. As Waris observes: "No *Nayak* of Qutbulmulk could capture even a small part of it, but Mir Jumla conquered it with a few big fortresses."² Karnatak was then "full of wars and troubles." The Rayal had attacked Pulicat (since 12th Aug., 1645), as the Dutch were apparently trying to reconcile Golkonda. There was also a civil war between the Rayal on the one hand and the three Nayaks of Tanjore, Madura and Jinji on the other; and the Nayaks had inflicted a severe

¹ BDR. 1643-4 in EFL. VII, 63, 80, 81 n; Pr. IHRC. XV. 24-26; *Mission*, III. 42-3; HG. 157-159, 162-3; HSh. 20-21; HT. Series I, Vol. XIV. 431 & BDR. 1644-45, 325, in EFL. VII. 81n, 193-4 & n; Fort. St. George letter of Sept. 8, 1644; Report of Dutch Govt. of Pulicat, Gardenijs 15 July, returning to Pulicat from Masulipatam, HSI. 278 (Ghazi Ali).

² *Aurangzib I.* 193-4; Waris 102 a, b; JASB. XIII (1844), 439; EFL. VII. 193-4 & n; Kambam in dt. Cuddapah, 79° 1'3E. 15° 32'N.

defeat on the Rayal's forces in December, 1645. Consequently the latter could only despatch an army of 4,000 soldiers to blockade the fort of Pulicat.⁶ To add to the difficulties of the Rayal, the Bijapuri general Muzaffaruddin Khan Muhammad Khan-i-Khanan advancing from the west (autumn of 1646), gained a rapid succession of victories in the Karnatak Balaghat, while early in 1646, he had captured Nandiyal in the Kurnul district and 8 other strong forts of that region.⁷

At this opportune moment Mir Jumla came at the head of a well-organised, well-equipped and efficient army, to "oppose" the Rayal and attack his territories from the north and east.⁸ Before the middle of February, 1646, the Muhammadan general captured three of the Rayal's castles, of which one was the "strongest hould (hold) in that kingdom." He won over Mallaiya, the Hindu Commander-in-Chief, to whom the Rayal had entrusted the task of defending the country and who had repulsed a Dutch sortie at Pulicat. The latter treacherously surrendered the famous fortress of Udgir (Udayagiri), the capital of the eastern portion of the kingdom of the Rayal, to Mir Jumla "upon composition for himself and all this people to go away free." Sidhout, east of Cuddapah, was also occupied.⁹

It became quite clear to the two Sultans that the conquest of the Karnatak could never be achieved and "the tree of the infidels" could never be "rooted out" except through their mutual co-operation. Adil Shah realised that without Qutb Shah's help, a successful war with the Rayal was not possible and the two became co-sharers in the destruction of the Rayal and other *Zamindars*. Hence they made (c. March-April, 1646) a mutual agreement by which the

⁶ EFI. VIII. 24-6, xxv: A diary kept at Pulicat found among HT. (I. O. Series). I. XV. No. 484. *Ibid*, 25n; Love, I. 73, 76; *Mission*, III. 41-42.

⁷ MN. 244, 245-50.

⁸ *Aurangzib*, I. 123-4; EFI, *op cit*; Bernier, 17 & n.

⁹ HISI. 279; EFI, *op cit*; HT. *op cit*; Love I. 73, 192; Pr. IHRC. XV. 27. The fort of Udgir (Udayagiri, 79° 21' E, 14° 52' N) was the biggest of all the forts of Vijayanagar, and very high and its circumference was 6 farsakhs. HA. 226; chronogram in *Fatehnamah* in MM. 6b; HG. 164.

territory, spoils of war, goods, jewels and cash of Sri Ranga Rayal, were to be amicably partitioned between Bijapur and Golkonda in the proportion of two to one, 2/3rds falling to Adil Shah and 1/3rd to Qutb Shah.¹⁰

The immediate results of the partition-agreement proved highly satisfactory to the Muhammadan Sultanates. The victorious progress of the Adil Shahi Wazir, Nawab Mustafa Khan, in the Kanarese country came to be paralleled by the successes of the Qutb Shahi Wazir, Mir Jumla, in the Eastern Karnatak. In June, 1646, the Bijapuri general started and was joined by many *Nayaks desais* and others. Highly alarmed, the Rayal immediately attacked the three rebellious *maniwars* (Nayaks), now intriguing with Mustafa Khan. Rup Nayak of Jinji submitted, but Vijayaraghava of Tanjore and Tirumala of Madura, who controlled hundreds of mines of jewels and the port of Kahlpatam (Kayalpatnam) persisted in the war against the Rayal. Mustafa, refusing "to be dissuaded from his purpose by the deceitful words of the Rayal's envoy," hastened towards the pass near Vellore, then the seat of the Rayal, deciding first to conquer the Jagdev country.¹¹

About the same time Nawab Mir Jumla was busy overrunning the entire East coast south of Nellore and occupying the territory round Fort St George. Tirupati and Chandragiri in North Arcot district were captured. When, on 11th December, 1646, Mir Jumla began encircling Pulicat, the Dutch opened negotiations, professing submission. Mir Jumla entered the fort and was highly impressed with the strength of its fortifications. After protracted negotiations, during which war seemed imminent, he agreed to the terms of the *qaulnama* of the Dutch with the Rayal, ratified the arrangements for peace and appointed Muhammad Qasim Mazandarani as *Thanadar* of that place. He took over the government not only of Pulicat but of San Thome as well,

¹⁰. Tabrezi 28a-b, 20 a-b, 5a-7a, 21a-b, 19a-b; HSh. 25; Thevenot. 102. For the date see App. A. Col. Mackenzie is wrong in placing the agreement in 1636. JASB. XIII, 431.

¹¹. MN. 276-85; 286-327; BPP LX. Pts. I & II. 38; HSh. 16-19, 300n; JMCM. III. 459.

"setting the country all in order," as he proceeded, and making quick headway against the Hindu power. Chingleput, "which, in strength and impregnability, was equal to the seventh heaven," fell before his irresistible march. It was reported (letter of January 4, 1647) that Mir Jumla was only within two days march of the king's court (Vellore), nobody opposing him as a severe famine had depopulated the country.¹²

The subsequent siege of Vellore, following the decisive defeat of the Hindu general, thus seems to have been conducted by the combined strength of the Bijapuris and the Qutb Shahis. The Rayal submitted, promising the payment of 50 lakhs of *huns* and 150 elephants as war indemnity (c. April, 1647), but Bijapur's appropriation of the entire amount proved to be a cause of its discord with Qutb Shah. The rebellious Nayaks were now sobered into restoring their allegiance to the Rayal, and promised to assist him in maintaining the independence of the country.¹³

In June, 1647, the English presented the Mir a brass gun and had their privileges confirmed in return. In October, the English factors reported that the general of the King of Golkonda had "almost conquered this kingdom" and begun to reign "as king under the title of Annabob" (Nawab).¹⁴

3. Jinji.

After securing the allegiance of the English in Madras, Mir Jumla led the advancing Qutb Shahi troops from the north towards Jinji during the winter of 1647-'48. The Nayak of Tanjore, "fearful of the near approach of so redoubtable a

¹². For Tirupati, Ball, I. 272; for Chandragiri, EC. VI. Intro. p. 24; SVH. 309; for Fort St George, EFL VIII. 70, xxvii; for Pulicat, Tabrezi, 150b-151b (date 12 Zikada, evidently of A. H. 1056); 35b-36a; for Chingleput, *ibid.*, 69b-70a; Love, I. 79, 80; ASR. XXIII. 40; EC. *op. cit.*

¹³. MN. *op. cit.*; EFL. *op. cit.*, xxii. Vellore was subsequently recovered for the Rayal by Sivappa, the Nayak of Ikkeri, SVH. 347.

¹⁴. EFL. VIII. 106-7, xxvii-xxix, xxv, 70; 213-4; X. 4; CM. 141.

foe," threw himself at his mercy, and made a treaty with him. Mir Jumla's plan was probably to attack Jinji from north, east and south. He conquered Tandivanam in the country of Tanjore together with Asiur (? Aliyur) in South Arcot district.¹⁵ Tirumala Nayak, once betrayed by the Nayak of Tanjore, and harbouring a mortal revenge against him, now appealed to Adil Shah for help. Adil Shah also wanted to invade Jinji, the Nayak of which appeared to have now sought Golkonda's assistance in self-defence. Thus Qutb Shah wrote to Shah Jahan that the *Zamindars* of Jinji and Tanjore had solicited and got his protection. To Adil Shah this united front appeared foreboding. He came to know of these machinations of Mir Jumla with the Nayaks of Jinji and Tanjore directed against himself, and being mightily angry, swore vengeance on Qutb Shah. To chastise him, Muzaffaruddin Khan Muhammad Khan-i-Khanan, was called to the court and ordered to plunder the country of Golkonda and raze its forts to dust. But his march was delayed, as Hakim Muhammad Hussain, envoy of Shahjahan, represented before Adil Shah that Mir Jumla was only acting on the orders of Qutb Shah and that he (envoy) would see that the latter should be made to give adequate compensation. Thereupon Qutb Shah prayed to Shahjahan for enforcing the 1/3 : 2/3 division of the *Ahdnama* and despatched presents to Adil Shah, without any further delay.¹⁶

But evidently this did not satisfy Adil Shah, for on 10th January, 1648, he commissioned Mustafa Khan from Kulbarga to conduct, together with Tirumala Nayak, the siege of Jinji. Mustafa advanced through Jagdev country with 17,000 horse and 20-30,000 foot which were combined with Tirumala's

¹⁵ Tandivanam is about 16 m. east of Jinji in S. Arcot dt. SAM. 435. The identification of Asiur is doubtful. It may be Aliyur in S. Arcot dt. (ASI. Sh. 2) or Arrilur or Attoor on Gingi-Trichi road in S. Arcot dt. (ASI. Sh. 11). Can it be Aspoor of Mackenzie MS. II. Sec. IX. 36, 37, 47?

¹⁶ A Dutch account, in JIH. (Dec. 1941). 312. *Mission*, III. 45-6; MN. 362-79; Tabrezi, 5a-7a; 25a-b; 151b-153a (Pr. IHRC. XVIII. 207); HSh. 21-2.

30,000 soldiers. Probably these menacing developments obliged Mir Jumla to return to Conjeeveram during the rainy season of March, 1648. But he succeeded in forestalling an Adil Shahi contingent, heading for Wandiwash. Supported by his formidable artillery, Mir Jumla occupied it himself and reached Jinji even before Mustafa, so as to prevent its capture by the Bijapuris.¹⁶ Zahuri, the Bijapuri historian, naturally writes that Mir Jumla "wanted to create some disturbance". The Raja of Jinji, in pursuance of his promises, came out of the fort to see Mir Jumla and reiterated his agreement not to prove disloyal. When only about 10 miles intervened between the two Muhammadan armies, the Raja with a well-equipped army encamped two miles ahead of Mir Jumla; but the latter too advanced with his troops and joined the Raja. Mustafa, considering the combined strength of his and Madura troops to be inadequate to meet the hostile coalition of Mir Jumla and the Karnatak rajas, did not mobilise and appealed to Sultan Adil Shah for reinforcements. It was expected that the Sultan would send Ikhlas Khan (Khan Muhammad Khan-i-khanan), together with 7 to 8,000 cavalry, Rustam-i-Zaman, Afzal Khan and other renowned wazirs and amirs. On the other hand, Qutb Shah, who regarded the despatch of Mustafa Khan to extricate Jinji and Tanjore from his hands as a violation of the agreement, and had made many representations to Mir Muhammad Tahir, appealed to Shahjahan and instructed Mir Jumla to await favourable imperial orders, of which he was confident.¹⁷

¹⁶a. cf. Mir Jumla's observation: "I have conquered almost all *zamindars* of the Karnatak, especially that of Jinji who possessed a large army and was more powerful in many respects than the others". Tabrezi, 69b.

¹⁷. For Conjeeveram and Wandiwash, JIH. *op. cit.*; Tabrezi, 74a. For the siege of Jinji, MN. 364-403; BS. 328; Tabrezi, 5a-7a, 20a-b, 25a-b, 69a-b. *Mission*, III. 46; HSh. 22-27. According to BS. (320-4), the Adil Shahi Van under Shahji Bhonsla and Asad Khan was scattered by the Rayal's general and Krishna Tupakki of Jinji. Reinforcements drawn from the besieging force at Gandikota were rushed to Mustafa. As the Rayal pressed on his victory by advancing towards Balaghat, Malik Raihan was ordered to join Mustafa at once, and Mustafa was

The two armies thus remained face to face without any engagement. A clash between them, in which alone lay the hope of salvation of Jinji, now seemed inevitable. But the delay in the arrival of reinforcements, coupled with internal quarrels in the Adil Shahi army and Mir Jumla's promptness in securing the allegiance of many Bijapuri braves led Mustafa to think of negotiating with the Qutb Shahi general. The latter, too, learning of impending arrival of the Adil Shahi reinforcements, thought it prudent to negotiate for peace.

But the rift between the two Sultans, which thus manifested itself over the race for possession of Jinji, widened gradually with the passage of time. For the moment, it was temporarily bridged over by a formal agreement of peace, a treaty or contract between the two generals, who were led "to ignore other points of view" on account of the "community of faith". It was settled that after the conquest of Jinji, Mustafa Khan would remain there and Mir Jumla would stay at Gandikota, and each promised to help the other. The Khan-i-Khanan returned half way and halted at Raichur, while Mustafa conquered the forts of Changam and Trinomai, advanced towards Jinji and besieged it. Mir Jumla returned to his camp at Swarigonta, a dependency of Vellore, and 30 miles from Jinji, from where he had been governing, on Qutb Shah's behalf, a part of the territory on that side that had come into the latter's possession.¹⁸

ordered to defer the battle till the arrival of Malik Raihan. The victory over the Hindus near Vellore was followed by a quarrel between Malik Raihan and Mustafa; but subsequently Malik Raihan (conquering Chittarkul and going to Sera) joined Mustafa in his siege of Jinji. There was also a quarrel between Mustafa and Shahji and the latter was arrested (25th July, 1648). MN. 372.

¹⁸ MN. 365-66, 370; Tabrezi, 79a; *Mission*, III. 46; HSh. 21-22; BS. (Litho). 326-28; OPL. MS. 150a-151a. A Dutch account states that Mir Jumla returned to Wandiwash in October, 1648. JIH. (Dec. 1941), 312.

According to Manucci, a small river falling into the sea near Merkanam (64 miles S. S. W. of Madras) in Tandivanam taluk of S. Arcot district was the dividing line between Bijapur and Golkonda. *Storia*, III. 241-2, n; Madras Manual of Administration, iii, 474. in *ibid*.

The death of Mustafa Khan (9th November, 1648), subjected the partition to fresh strain. Before the arrival of his permanent successor, Khan Muhammad, the siege of Jinji was entrusted for some time to Malik Raihan. This was regarded by Mir Jumla as a favourable opportunity for realising his ambitions and occupying Jinji himself. He thought that with Mustafa Khan dead, his army scattered, and Shahji in a state of mental depression and despair, Malik Raihan alone would not be able to resist him and would probably raise the siege. But Malik Raihan sent a strong and effective remonstrance to Mir Jumla. "Your stay so near (the fort)", he wrote, "is prejudicial (to our interests). Its inhabitants are expecting your help. It would be better if you go away to a distance. The control of Adilshahi troops is not in my hands. If anything untoward happens, I will not be responsible. Mustafa Khan may be dead, but I am alive ; and I will fight to the last." At this strong attitude of Malik Raihan, Mir Jumla, "not finding any remedy except silence", and possibly apprehending danger from the impending arrival of Khan Muhammad went away to a distance, halted at Rachootee, 42 miles distant from Vellore, and carried on his conquests further north in the Cuddapah district. Khan Muhammad arrived from Tadpatri to Jinji in obedience to royal order and stiffened the rigour of the siege.¹⁹

But Mir Jumla could not but make another endeavour to capture Jinji. In the beginning he had already made an *entente* with its *Nayak* and now he tried to incite him against Bijapur, in spite of the contract with Mustafa (1648). Zahur bin Zahuri, the official historian of Bijapur, complains that "the ungrateful Abdullah,—whose forces had been defeated by the Rayal and who could not have won an inch of the Karnatak without Bijapuri support,—had formed a secret

¹⁹ MN. 365, 369, 373-5; BS. 326-9; Tabrezi. 5a-6a, 6a-7a, 21a-b; HSh. 21-2, 25; EFL IX. pp. xxiv-xxv; Cf. HG. 165, 173; Tabrezi, (80b-81a) probably gives Mir Jumla's reply to Malik Raihan. Mir Jumla sent some oral messages to him through Dadaji Pandit. We read (*ibid.* 75a-76a) of an *ahdnama* from Mir Jumla to Khan Muhammad, which seems to be a confirmation of the agreement between Mustafa and Mir Jumla about the partition of the Karnatak.

alliance with the infidel and sent his general, Mir Jumla, to assist the Hindus in the defence of Jinji and incite the Hindu rajas". But Mir Jumla with his formidable army arrived too late at a distance of 2 *farsakhs* to be able to render the promised help to the Raja. On hearing that the Khan-i-Khanan had conquered Jinji in a day, he became so alarmed that, instead of redeeming his pledge, he fled away towards Golkonda.²⁰

The fall of Jinji^{20a} was followed by the continued successful operations (1649-50) of the Bijapuri army against the Nayaks of Tanjore and Madura, who submitted and agreed to pay tribute, and by the plunder and devastation of their territories including the seaboard round Tegnapatam. The unhappy Rayal took refuge with the Nayak of Mysore, then at war with Bijapur. There is not the slightest exaggeration in the following observation of the Jesuit missionaries: "The Adil Shahi forces returned to Bijapur after conquering a vast country, subjugating two powerful kings and gathering treasure beyond calculation, without having had to fight one battle and almost without losing a single soldier."²¹

While Bijapur was thus busy with fresh conquests in the south, Mir Jumla, "as general of Golkonda forces was busy consolidating his position in the north." Thus we find that though strained almost to the breaking point, the principle of partition continued to work satisfactorily for a time. Qutb Shah sent a letter of congratulation to Adil Shah along with a present of 4 lakh *huns* and 4 jewels on the occasion of the fall of Jinji. He suggested therein that the forts of Karnat and

²⁰. MN. 379-80; HSh. 22; Cf. Mackenzie in JASB. XIII (1844), 439-440.

^{20a}. The litho. edn. of BS. (328-9) gives the date 22 Zilhijja, 1058 (28th Dec. 1648). But 2 MSs. (OPL. and Allahabad) give the year in figures, and words as 1059 (17th December, 1649). According to a Dutch account Jinji fell in February, 1649 (JIH. Dec. 1941, pp 307-13).

²¹. Thevenot, 92; *Mission*, III. 47; HSh. 27; NM. 265-6. HT. series I. Vol. 17, no. 532; 518; Vol. 18. no. 539 in EFI. IX. xxiv-xxv.

Malnad, still unconquered by Adil Shah, might be allowed to be conquered by Qutb Shah for being used as suitable bases against enemy attacks. Adil Shah, too, agreed, and thus the fort of Gandikota and the country of Kokkanur were left to be occupied by Qutb Shah.²²

4. Gandikota.

The country round Gandikota and neighbouring towns in the modern Cuddapah and Anantapur districts of Madras then belonged to Timma Nayar, a raja subordinate to Vijaynagar, and to the Reddi, related to the famous line of the Reddi kings and owing Jillala. Gandikota itself was a very important stronghold, commanding the valley of the Pennar. The fort stood on the summit of the Yerramalai mountains of the Cuddapah district at an elevation of 1,670 feet above sea-level. The town was alongside the hill, and access to it was difficult. Both the Sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda coveted it on account of its strategic importance. The latter had several times besieged it, but could not overpower its ruler.²³ Sometime after the Bijapuri annexation of Ikkeri (1638-9) the fort of Gandikota had been besieged by Khan Muhammad and Malik Raihan and other Bijapuri Wazirs. But the siege had to be given up under Adil Shah's orders so as to reinforce the van (of Mustafa Khan), led by Shahji Bhonsla and Asad Khan, when they were defeated by the Rayal's troops. Probably it was about this time that Bijapur captured Jillala and imprisoned the Reddi; but the latter escaped and reoccupied it, and with the help of Timma Nayar invaded 2 or 3 villages of Nandiyal. Khan Muhammad made a treaty

²² *Mission*, III. 47; HSh. 27; Dutch records in EFL IX. xxiv-xxv; MN. 403-4; Thevenot, p. 102.

Kokkanur (15° 27'N. 76°E) is a village in Lingasugur district in Moodgul circar, Haidarabad, with very ancient temples, 15 miles n. w. of Kopbal, and the seat of Hussain Miana (ASL sh. 30); HSh. 63; ARADND, 1929-30, p. 5.

²³ Tabrezi, 151b-153a; Pr. IHRC. XVIII. 206-8; JBRS. (March, 1944), 181-2; Thevenot, 102; Ball. 1. 284 and n; HA, 220-21. 224, 226-8 (for Golkonda's efforts to conquer Gandikota). ASR. (1930-34), pp 42-43.

with Timma Nayar, and the Reddi had to pay compensation for the villages, which he evidently retained.²⁴ But Bijapur continued to regard these places as lying within the ambit of its expansion till the partition agreement, by which Gandikota with its adjacent territory was allocated to Qutb Shah.

Mir Jumla started for Gandikota with a large force. The only means of access was by a very difficult road, cut in the mountain, whose width ranged from 20 to 25 feet at some places to only 7 or 8 at others. On its right there was "a fearful precipice", with a large river running at its base. On the mountain there was a small plain sown with rice and millet and watered by many small springs. Tavernier describes the place as follows: "At the level of the plain to the south, where the town is built on a point, the limits are formed by precipices, with two rivers which bound the point at the base; so that, in order to enter the town there is but one gate on the plain side, and it is fortified in this direction with three good walls of cut stone, with the ditches at their bases faced with the same stone" Hence the defenders had only to guard "a space of 400 or 500 steps wide." They possessed only 2 iron guns, one being a 12 pounder, placed on the gate, the other being a 7-8 pounder placed on a bastion-like projection. The Raja of the place, Timma Nayar, was considered to be "one of the best and bravest commanders" among the Hindu Rajas and he seemed to have been assisted by the Reddi. As many were killed by vigorous sorties, made by the besieged, Mir Jumla ultimately realised the necessity of carrying the guns up to the heights. This he did by seducing the Raja's Frank gunners, to each of whom he promised "4 months wages more than their ordinary pay." With the four guns thus mounted, the fort was bombarded, and even the gun on the gate was "rendered useless" by a direct hit. When half the gate of the town was battered down, the defenders capitulated, evacuating the fort under honourable conditions. Tavernier ascribes Mir Jumla's success at Gandikota

²⁴. BS. 319-21 (raising of siege); Tabrezi, 151b-153a; JBRS *op. cit.*: Pr. IHRC. *op. cit.*; JIH. XVIII. 28; Jilala (78° 23'E. 15° 23'N), 14 miles s.w. of Nandiyal on Nandiyal-Guti road. ASI. sh. 21. Epigraphic details, dated 1569 Saka or 1647 A.D. supply valuable corroborative evidence. ARSIE. 1937-38. p 107.

to "the aid of some Frenchmen who had quitted the Dutch service," on account of bad treatment but he also refers to the "great" assistance rendered to Mir Jumla by many English and Dutch gunners and 2 or 3 Italians. He is said to have lost not less than 3,000 men by the sallies of the defenders.²⁵

The capture of this rock fortress, hitherto deemed impregnable, has been regarded as the "crowning feat" of Mir Jumla in the Karnatak.²⁶ The account of the Bijapuri official historian, Zahur, is clearly biased and it minimises the importance of Mir Jumla's victory. According to him, the raja of the fort, being proud of his wealth and numerical strength of his army, underrated the danger of the invasion and looked down upon Mir Jumla's army as "a mirage in the desert"; and though he began the encounter, he did not consider it necessary to emerge out of the fort. Mir Jumla strained himself to encircle it. The raja could have been successful, but he was shaken by awe of Adil Shah, and, considering that the defeat of Mir Jumla would be of no avail, in face of subsequent retaliation and extermination of all neighbouring rajas by Adil Shah, and having regard to his own welfare, deemed obedience to Sultan's orders expedient. In these circumstances he left the fort and Mir Jumla captured it. This account also militates against the following evidence of Thevenot: "Mir Gemla being unable to force it, made use of his cunning and Money and managed those (whom the Naique sent to him to negotiate a Peace), that he wheedled out the governor, under pretext of entering into a League with him for great Designs: but no sooner was he come to the place of meeting, but the Omra made sure of his person, contrary to the Promise he had given, and kept him constantly with him till he put him in possession of Guendicot."²⁷

For his victory Mir Jumla was honoured by the present of a *Nauroz-i-Khilat* by Qutb Shah. He now petitioned to the Sultan for permission to go to Mecca, as before the expedition

²⁵ MN. 404; Thevenot, *op. cit.*: Ball, *op. cit.* 284-85; Tabrezi, *op. cit.* EFL IX 22-23n.

²⁶ *Aurangzeb*. I. 194.

²⁷ MN. 404-5; Thevenot, 102.

Qutb Shah had promised it to him as a reward for his feat, and also as he was showing signs of debility and exhaustion. In fact, Mir Jumla required some rest to recuperate his health after the arduous strain of the past five years. An illness for about 20 days, accompanied by painful vomiting and inability to take food or to sleep, greatly affected his health, made him very weak and necessitated a standing treatment.²⁸

Mir Jumla's capture of Gandikota was quickly followed by that of Chandraguti (Guti). On the 26th August, 1652 (N. S.), when Tavernier halted at Tirupati, he found "several companies of military passing, some with handpikes, others with guns and others with sticks, who were going to join one of the principal captains of Mir Jumla's army, on a hill near Courua, where he had pitched his tent.....". "We set out.....", adds he, "to salute him and found him in his tent with many nobles who were chiefs of the country, all being idolaters".²⁹ Evidently, Mir Jumla's captain was settling military and political affairs of the locality with the Hindu Rajas.

5. *War over the partition of the Karnatak.*

The partition scheme worked to the disadvantage of the Raja of Chandragiri, and apparently more to the advantage of Qutb Shah than of Adil Shah,—at least Adil Shah thought it to be so. By its very nature the agreement turned out to be impermanent. The Deccan politics ran along too shifty a course to be harnessed into a definite channel; the mutual jealousies of the two partners were too deep-seated to be compromised in this way. Each side began to express distrust of its partner. During the siege of Jinji, Abdullah wrote

²⁸. Tabrezi, 67a-68a, 68a.

²⁹. Zahur (MN. 406), as usual, attributes the conquest of Gutti to the influence of Adil Shah's might, the defenders thinking it was he who had despatched Mir Jumla. According to *Radha Madhava Vilasa Champu* (Patwardhan, 23-4) Shahji fought against the Mir at Gutti. For Tirupati Ball, I. 273, and for Courua (? Ontimon Koorna, about 12 miles n.w. of Tirupati), *ibid.*, 272n.

whining to the Emperor³⁰ that Adil Shah would not, according to his nature, follow the imperial order and would consider that "the country of the *Zamindars* was more than $1/3$ and $2/3$." Hence Qutb Shah instructed his Delhi Agent, Fasihuddin Muhammad, to appeal to the Emperor for appointment of two *amins*, one on behalf of Bijapur and another on behalf of Golkonda or pray to the Emperor for writing to Mir Muhammad Tahir (Aurangzeb's envoy at Golkonda), for settlement after due enquiries. Qutb Shah also appealed to the Emperor for sending an *amin* before the actual war (i.e. before siege of Jinji), so that Adil Shah might not create any difficulty. In another letter to the Emperor Qutb Shah complained that Bijapur had violated the agreement, as already known to Islam Khan,^{30a} and had been "outwardly and secretly" trying to fan the flame of animosity as much as possible. Qutb Shah, therefore, proposed to the Emperor a modification of the terms of the partition-agreement :

(i) Regarding their respective shares in cash, jewels, elephants and other articles of plunder and whatever was seized by Adil Shah from the Rayal and the *nayaks*, Qutb Shah was willing to allow Bijapur to appropriate everything, but (ii) the Qutb Shahi conquests in the Karnatak were to be divided in the proportion of $\frac{1}{2} : \frac{1}{2}$. This modified agreement does not seem to have been sanctioned by the Emperor or ever followed by the Sultans. Qutb Shah further complained that, by taking advantage of the death of Islam Khan (Nov. 1647), who knew of the initial agreement, Adil Shah had sent many wazirs under Shahji to help the Hindus in the Karnatak, that the Rayal and other *Zamindars* invaded Golkonda dominions with their own troops, though Mir Jumla defeated the enemies and drove the Bijapuris to the frontiers of Bidar ; that Adil Shah himself came to Bidar, the mutual frontier, and that he had broken his promise and was forcibly taking away Qutb Shah's portion of spoils. Adil Shah was also accused of overhastiness in getting his own share ($2/3$) and withholding payment of Qutb Shah's share. It is

³⁰- Tabrezi, 5a-7a ; 25a-b ; Pr. IHRC. XVIII. 202-3;

^{30a}- Governor of the Deccan, 1645-7. Life in MU. I. 162-7 : Tr. ASB.I. 694-6.

corroborated by the English records that after the siege of Vellore (1647), Bijapur got the entire indemnity.³¹

Active hostilities between the two Deccani Sultans were not long to begin. The previous crack caused by the struggle over the possession of Jinji had only been papered over by the contract between Mustafa and Mir Jumla, but the feeling of jealousy was too fundamental to be effaced, and fresh causes of ill-feeling now arose. Khan Muhammad, the Bijapuri Wazir, made allegations against Golkonda of changed relationship. Adil Shah reported to the Emperor that Qutb Shah had conquered Gandikota "against his order and without his knowledge". He also complained that Mir Jumla, flushed with his newly-won victories, had turned hostile to Bijapur without the knowledge of Qutb Shah. Zahur says: "After these two or three victories (due to misunderstanding) which were worse than a thousand defeats, Mir Jumla's actions affected the good name of his master. The news of his evil deeds.....spread rapidly in the dominions of Adil Shah. The latter smiled at Qutb Shah's leaving the control of affairs to such a dangerous man, and attributed it to his folly.....". In fact, to the Bijapuri historian, Mir Jumla's crime was that he "was creating disturbances in Malnad and Karnatak," forgetting that his recent conquests, specially that of Gandikota, were due to Adil Shah's sufferance. Further, Qutb Shah was accused by Bijapur of non-reciprocity of the kindness shown by Adil Shah, of violation of the agreement regarding the ownership of Jillala and two or three villages of Nandiyal and also of mal-treatment of some messengers and spies of Bijapur, while the siege of Guti was regarded as a definite cause of rupture of friendship with Golkonda.³²

³¹. Tabrezi, 20a-b, 19a-b, 21a-b; Pr. IHRC. *op. cit.*

³². *Ibid* 27a (changed relationship); 19a-b (Mir Jumla hostile); 156b-157a (Guti, Qutb not reciprocating); 76a-77b (Messengers & spies); 151b-153a (Jillala & Nandiyal). Syed Chand Muhammad, havaldar of Nandiyal, demanded surrender of 2 or 3 villages from Narsu Pundit of Jillala, then under Mir Jumla. For Mir's reply and details see Pr. IHRC, (1942). 206-8, & JBRS (March, 1944). 181-2; MN. 406-8.

On the other hand, Qutb Shah asked his envoy Mulla Abdus Samad at Delhi to represent to the Emperor that Adil Shah's accusations were false, that his objections to the capture of Gandikota were not justified as it was Qutb Shah's lawful share, and that Adil Shah's constant complaints against Mir Jumla were encroachments on his personal honour. Qutb Shah also directed his envoy to inform the Emperor that he had always shown due deference to Adil Shah and even instructed him to seek advice from the imperial court regarding his own future conduct. Further, he levelled counter charges against Adil Shah of abetting the "nefarious activities" of Siddi Jauhar of Kurnool, e.g. the latter's invasion of Gandikota and Guti and their adjoining territories. To prevent them Qutb Shah even sought the mediation of his sister, the Bari Saheba (Queen of Adil Shah). Qutb Shah instructed his Bijapur envoy, Haji Nasira, to impress on the Sultan that Jauhar should be properly advised and, if need be, threatened—he must be warned at any cost. He evidently regarded these signs of friction with Adil Shah to be highly prejudicial to their common interests, as they would embolden the powerful enemies, far and near, who were anxiously awaiting such events. He was in a fix and urgently exhorted his envoy at Bijapur, and also Khan Muhammad to endeavour to settle these matters amicably. Mir Jumla on his part, also tried to clear up misunderstandings by writing letters to Khan Muhammad and to Siddi Abdul Wahhab, *Subahdar* of Kurnool.³³

Soon came out of the clash of words a clash of arms between the erstwhile allies. This is referred to significantly in the Fort. St. George letter of January 14, 1652. "Wars being commenced between the Moores of Golkonda and Vizapore, who, having shared this afflicted kingdom, are now bandying against each other, whilst the poor Gentue (the Rayal), hoping their destruction, watches opportunity to break off his miserable yoke...."

³³ Tabrezi, 20a-b, 19a-b (Qutb Shah to Mulla Abdus Samad; seeking advice); 25b-27a, 30a-31b (activities of Jauhar; mediation of Bari Saheba; friction with Bijapur prejudicial), 27a, 36a-37a (countering Khan Muhammad's charge); 76a-b; 76b-77b (Mir Jumla to Ikhlas Khan), 77b (to Abdul Wahhab). ARSIE, 1935-6, p 93 for Abdul Wahhab.

Adil Shah sent Khan i Khanan Khan Muhammad against Mir Jumla to wrest the conquered forts from him. On his way to Gandikota, Khan Muhammad besieged the fort of Chandraguti, 4 *farsakhs* distant from it. The Adil Shahi artillery-men took a heavy toll on the defenders by their terrific cannonade. The Khan i Khanan then decided to abandon the siege in order to attack Mir Jumla at Gandikota.

Mir Jumla, having at his disposal immense wealth and a large army, prepared to oppose him. He went round the fort and divided his troops in batches at different places. His trustworthy general, Muhammad Khan Lodi, known for his courage, was put in command of the van with a large following. He was met by Baji Ghorpare (of Mudhol), commanding the Bijapuri van. During the encounter, the Bijapuri lancers attacked Mir Jumla's forces from both sides and killed many by their pointed arrows. Muhammad Khan Lodi fell down under the feet of horses and his severed head was hurled in the midst of Mir Jumla's troops, while many soldiers were also slain. Baji Ghorpare expelled Mir Jumla from Gandikota, and its inhabitants fled away in consternation to mountains and jungles. The Bijapuri historian exultingly exclaims : "Mir Jumla, who was a powerful officer of Qutb Shah, with a strong personality unrivalled even by a crowned head, suffered defeat at the hands of an ordinary Wazir, Baji Ghorpare, and became scattered like dust thrown out of hand." The Madras factors observed (letter of January 14, 1652) : "In the interim many bickerings have been within two days' journey of this place, and it is reported that the Nabob with his army is besieged among the hills of Golkondah, whither he retired for the more safety, by the Vizaporis." In such a humiliating situation, Mir Jumla opened negotiations for peace, with Khan Muhammad, through a *wakil* on the following terms : (i) an indemnity of two lakhs and fifty thousand *huns* was to be paid by him, several officers being detained as hostages till its complete realisation, (ii) the fort of Gandikota and the country of Kokkanur which Adil Shah had suffered Qutb Shah to conquer would be given to Mir Jumla, who was to be forgiven and whose life was to be spared.

The victorious Khan considered peace to be in the interest of Adil Shah, duly welcomed and honoured Mir Jumla's *wakil*,

and in forwarding his petition to the Sultan, recommended that these terms be accepted because the punishment of Mir Jumla and the destruction of the fort and the Qutb Shahi army would mean the loss of the unlimited reserves of accumulated wealth of the fort. Adil Shah agreed to the terms of peace, concluded sometime between January 14, and February 12, 1652 : (i) Mir Jumla was "restored to possession of his late conquests"—the fort of Gandikota and the country of Kokkanur ; (ii) Khan Muhammad got from him 5 lakhs and 50 thousand *huns* and 4 pieces of diamonds, which were sent to Adil Shah's court.³⁴

After defeating Mir Jumla the Bijapuri commander, Khan Muhammad, advanced to effect the conquest of Penukonda, the capital of the Karnatak uplands, and for a time encamped in the *Kasba* of Rud. Though the sons of Siddi Raihan Sholapuri had rebelled in Sera, and had entered into a hostile league with the local rajas, especially the Raja of Mysore, Khan Muhammad refused to be distracted and pressed the siege of Penukonda. Its Raja begged for terms, ceded the fort (c. March, 1652) and removed to Kandarpi. Penukonda was named Takht-i-Mubarak.³⁵

There was no immediate cessation of the war in the Karnatak. During Khan Muhammad's rest at court and consequent absence from the Karnatak, Sri Ranga Rayal recovered a portion of his lost dominions with the help of the Raja of Mysore.. He also repulsed an invading Qutb Shahi force. To check the growing menace from Mysore, Khan Muhammad started from the Court, conquered the Jagdev country, captured the fort of Krishnagiri and besieged the fort of Mysore and ultimately occupied four forts of its raja.³⁶ Next, on his way to Jinji, the Bijapuri commander-in-chief solicited

³⁴. MN. 406-15 ; EFL IX. 99, 111. See HSh. 162, 27n. The letter of Feb. 12, 1652 gives the amount of the indemnity as "6,00,000 (some say 9,00,000) pagodas". In 1651 Shahji is said to have defeated Mir Jumla. HG. 175 ; VSCV. 121

³⁵. MN. 416-31. Tabrezi, 153a.

Kasba of Rud is evidently Ruddum (77°30'E, 14° 8'N) about 11 miles W. of Penukonda. Kaadarpi Fort (77°7'E, 14°18'N) is in Bellary district, east of the river Pennar (ASI. Sh. 19).

³⁶. *Mission* III. 47 ; MN. 431-53 ; HSh. 28.

Mir Jumla's permission to pass through the districts, then under the control of the Golkonda troops. But this was refused by Mir Jumla, who, alarmed at the rapid succession of victories of the Bijapuris, was "animating the Nayak of Mysore against them and also making overtures to the Carnatic Raja." The Rayal, depending on Mir Jumla's promises, returned to Vellore and raised a large army, with the hope of driving the Bijapuris out of the country.³⁷

Mir Jumla's diplomacy compelled Adil Shah to leave Mysore for the time being, to concentrate his attention on Sri Ranga and conquer Vellore. The Sultan ordered Khan Muhammad to attack the Rayal, who was trying to conquer the Vellore district with secret Qutb Shahi help and to prevent his junction with Mir Jumla.³⁸ After a long siege, the Bijapuri general captured Vellore (1653). The Rayal was forced to conclude a treaty with him, by which Chandragiri and the revenues of certain districts, were left to the former. Chandragiri now formed the sole remnant of the great empire of Vijaynagar. The Rayal fled to the forests of the robber tribes situated north of Tanjore (Akal Nayak's wood). Abandoned by his courtiers, he lived there in great poverty and hardship, and finally took refuge with the ruler of Mysore, who had once been his vassal.³⁹

The two rulers of Chandragiri and Mysore now invaded the tracts covered by the recent Golkonda conquests. But instead of helping the Rayal to recover his territories, Tirumala, the Nayak of Madura, begged Khan Muhammad to expel the

³⁷ Dutch records and HT. Series I. vol. XIX. no. 550 (i) in EFL. IX. xxxiii; HSh. 28n; MN. 453.

³⁸ MN. 453-58; HSh. 28, 21.

³⁹ Zahur says that Sri Ranga, on hearing the news of the impending march of Khan Muhammad, did not think it safe to remain in the fort of Vellore and after strongly defending it left it with a few followers before the arrival of Khan Muhammad. MN. 458-59; Batavia letter of Nov. 7, 1654 (NS). HT. series I. vol. xix. no. 551 in EFL. IX. p. xxxiii; Proenza (*Mission* III. 47) records the rumour that Sri Ranga was expelled from Vellore by a second and stronger Golkonda force. But Zahur and Dutch records state that the Bijapuris achieved this conquest. HSh. 21, 28n. See I.G. XXII. 285.

invading Mysore troops and by opening the mountain passes, enabled the Bijapur army to "carry the war into Mysore". From Atur, belonging to Madura, he plundered Mysore. Its raja sent Balaji Haibat Rao, late general of Bijapur, against Khan Muhammad. The latter in his turn, sent Siddi Masaud with the van against Balaji. In the battle that ensued Balaji was defeated and ultimately beheaded. The Raja sued for pardon, promising a large annual tribute and was reinstated (1653). The Raja of Madura sent a befitting present, including cash, goods and 50 war elephants, to Khan Muhammad for curbing his enemy, the Raja of Mysore. Sri Ranga thus lost his last ally.⁴⁰

⁴⁰. MN. 460-66; *Mission* III 43; HSB. 25, 26; EFL IX. 299.1.

Section B

MIR JUMLA'S ADMINISTRATION IN THE KARNATAK

1. *Mir Jumla's virtual supremacy over the Karnatak conquests.*

By dint of his remarkable bravery, untiring energy, and profound diplomatic skill, and with the help of his efficient army, drilled by European artillery-men, Mir Jumla succeeded, not only in overrunning a vast tract of the East coast, known as the Madras or Eastern Karnatak, but also in driving a wedge into the Bijapuri Karnatak. In theory, this rich land, 300 miles long and of breadth varying from 40 to 200 miles, yielding a revenue of 43 lakhs of rupees a year, possessing several diamond mines and many strong and well-defended fortresses, now fell like a ripe fruit, into the hands of Abdullah Qutb Shah. Naturally he exulted over his new gains and hastened to reward his minister-general by bestowing on him a *Naurozi khilat* after the conquest of Gandikota and conferring on him the hereditary *mutwalliship* of several *wakf* villages in the Karnatak.¹

Mir Jumla, too, acted, for sometime at least, as if he were merely the "*Sar-i-Lashkar*" or general of the Sultan. As he wrote to the latter: "Almost all *wazirs*, *zamindars*, *maniwars* and *sardars* and middlemen have done their best in this expedition. They have all received the special presents sent by you and offered their grateful thanks for the same. Every one expects to get your favour, according to his merit, and I expect that these dependents engaged in fighting would secure your favour. As far as I know, I do not waver in the discharge of my duties regarding the administration of territories and provisions, securing the goodwill of the great and the small, reconciling soldiers and subjects and defeating the enemies. In all these I am doing my level best. I pray that your Majesty would always advise me." In their report to the English E. I. C. dated 17th January, 1651, Walter Littleton and Venkat Brahman, who had been sent by the

¹. Waris, 102a; Tabrezi, 67a-68 (*khilat*); 42a-43a (*mutwalliship*).

English Agent on a mission to the Nawab, observed that the latter annually sent to the king a revenue of 20 hundred thousand pagodas.²

With his characteristic thoroughness Mir Jumla had set himself to the task of establishing complete and effective control over the conquered country, as he advanced. The Fort St. George factors observed (January 4, 1647) : "The warres (wars) and fammine doth furiously rage in these parts, and we thinke that there wilbe a period sett unto the former before the latter ; for the Anna Bobb (al Nawab) Mir Jumlah hath taken the government of Pullican (Pulicat) and St. Thome, setting the country all in order as he goeth along....". This is corroborated by an order (*Hasb ul hukm*) of Qutb Shah to the Dutch captain of Pulicat, confirming the agreement which Mir Jumla had made with the captain for "capturing the *gasba* and the fort and the port of Pulicat and the country and territories" adjacent to it.³ Again Mir Jumla also confirmed the rights of the English at Madras, granted by the Damarla Brothers in 1639 and confirmed by Sri Ranga Rayal in 1645.

With the growing estrangement of the Sultan from his victorious general, the latter began to look upon his conquests in the Karnatak as his own independent kingdom. In his letter to Khalifa-i-Sultan, the Wazir of Persia, Mir Jumla noted : "The entire body of rebels and rajas of these parts (i.e. the Karnatak) have all been brought within the fold of my control."⁴ It would thus appear that the sovereign rights of the Raja of Chandragiri were acquired at first by Sultan Qutb Shah and later on usurped by Mir Jumla himself.

2. *Mir Jumla's civil administration.*

It is not, however, possible to give a detailed and comprehensive account of Mir Jumla's administration in the Karnatak. The duration of his authority was not so long as to enable him to introduce any innovation in the system of government. Moreover, he found his hands full, first owing to the continued warfare, necessary to conquer the country, and

² Tabrezi, 66a-67a (methods of consolidation) ; EFL IX. 12.

³ EFL. VIII. 70 ; Tabrezi, 35b-36a.

⁴ Tabrezi, 70a-72b ; MU. III. 530-1 ; *Aurangzib*, I. 195, 216.

then to his preoccupations during the period of his strained relations with the Golkonda court, and finally his departure from the Karnatak after his appointment in Mughal imperial service. It is thus reasonable to infer that he maintained the system which he had inherited from Vijaynagar or from the Nayakan rule, though the change of masters caused a change of spirit in the administration.

Mir Jumla must have continued the village organisation of the Vijaynagar empire, as in the contemporary European records we find references to the designations of some old village officials, e.g., the *Natwar* or headman of a *nadu*, a circle of villages, the *Karnam* or *Kanakkapillai* or accountant, the *Taliyari* (*stahwar*) or tukri, or the village policeman, and the *poligar*, the police officer, responsible for safety and peace of a circle of villages.⁵

Gandikota was the headquarters of Mir Jumla's government. The scattered references in some English factory records show that the country conquered by Mir Jumla, especially the region round Madras, was divided into some administrative units, each being placed in charge of a Governor.⁶

In English records we read of Mallappa, Sayyid Ibrahim, Timmaji, Bala Rau and Mir Sayyid Ali as connected with Nawab Mir Jumla's government of Poonamallee or having relations with the English at Madras during 1655-58. Sir William Foster and Mr. Love describe Mallappa and Timmaji as the Nawab's Adigar or representative at the choultry of Madras, but it would appear that Mallappa was not only the Nawab's Adigar at Madras, but also acted as his governor of Poonamallee. For, after confirming the privileges granted to the English by Sri Ranga in June, 1647, Mir Jumla sent Mallappa along with the English Agent to Madras "to look after" its government, and he remained there for seven years, "governing after the manner of the former governors". Sayyid Ibrahim succeeded Mallappa as Governor of Poonamallee and he sent

⁵ CM. 228, 244-47; TG. 103-4; NAM. ch. 3, 90 ff.

⁶ The Fort St. George records of 1670 indicate a similar system and officers were stationed at Conjeevaram, Pulimella (Poonamallee), Palavaram and Chingleput. CM. 227.

Timmaji as the Nawab's *Adigar* at Madras.⁷ In 1653 Rustam Beg, son of Zulfikar Astarabadi, was the *havaladar* of Poonamallee.⁸

Mir Jumla placed the financial administration of the Karnatak in charge of a class of Brahmans who became distinguished as "Golkonda Neyogees" (employed). The total revenue obtained by Mir Jumla from the Karnatak was 43 lakhs of rupees a year.⁹ His principal sources of income were (i) land revenue, (ii) the 'Carnatic plunder', (iii) diamond mining, (iv) commercial activities, including control of internal production and monopoly, (v) customs, (vi) octroi duties, (vii) slavery licenses, (viii) presents, and (ix) impositions.

In his land revenue administration, Mir Jumla appears to have followed the system of farming the revenue. With the establishment of Muhammadan rule, there was a change in the nomenclature and classes of persons connected with land and abridgment of the privileges of village proprietors and increase of assessments on land.¹⁰

He made a vast fortune by acquiring the wealth of the captured forts, "hoarded treasures" at various places and other spoils of war, and by plundering the many old temples in the Karnatak and seizing all precious stones of their idols. According to Catrou "he compelled the inhabitants of the Karnatic to surrender to him whatever they possessed of gold and jewels; and he caused those, who, according to the custom of the country had buried their treasures, to expire under the severity of the lash." Thevenot observes that Mir Jumla "had the wealth of a prince", possessing 20 maunds weight of diamonds, all got from the 'Carnatic plunder'.¹¹

⁷ Chamber's Narrative : Love I. 189. EFL XI. 236, n.

⁸ EIM. 1937-38, pp. 52-54 ; EFL XI. 262.

⁹ Cf. JASB. XIII (1844), 440-1 & n ; Waris, 102a, b speaks of 43 lakhs (see ante p. 35.). Littleton and Venkat Brahman reported (Jan. 17, 1651) that the revenue taken by Mir Jumla from "the Jentue" was 40 hundred thousand pagodas a year. EEI. IX. 12.

¹⁰ CM. 215-6, 227-8 ; ch. 5 ; Hemingway, 210f ; NAM. 91-92.

¹¹ *Adab*, 385 ; Waris, 102b. *Storia* I. 232. Bernier, 17-18n ; Catrou, 207 ; Manucci (*Storia* III. 242) says that in the Karnatak much treasure was buried by men of old times ; Mir Jumla got some coins, the type of which was not definitely known. See *infra* the para on cannon founding. *Aurangzeb* I. 194. Thevenot, Ch. 8. 102.

Diamond mining was one of the principal sources of revenue. Getting information that there were diamond mines in the Karnatak, Mir Jumla sent 12,000 conscript agricultural labourers to work them for one year prior to his conquest of the country, and came to possess 5 small bags of diamonds, but as their quality did not compensate for the trouble involved, he forbade "further mining" and "sent all these poor people back to tillage."¹² Besides diamonds, Mir Jumla's Karnatak dominions also abounded in bezoars, iron, steel, and saltpetre, and Mir Jumla could manufacture and procure a large quantity of the last mentioned article every year.¹³

The proceeds of Mir Jumla's extensive and well-organised commercial enterprises, both inland and foreign, formed another source of his revenue. The basis of his economic system was monopoly. He charged monopoly prices and tried to control internal production. He established a monopoly of the trade in all 'brown' or unbleached cloth in his "new conquests"; and they were sold at 20% profit. Again, sale of grain seemed to be a strict state monopoly. Paddy and other necessities coming to Madras through his jurisdiction had to pay customs, while paddy was sold to the townspeople at 25% more than the market price. The English at Madras could not sell anything except the articles purchased from the men of Nawab's farmer at prices 50% higher than those prevailing in the neighbourhood. He wanted to establish a monopoly on "all imported goods". His articles were carried to Pegu and Persia customs free, as if they were the goods of the English E. I. C.¹⁴

¹² Tavernier's report dated 10th September, 1652. Ball, I. 287. It is not clear from Tavernier how Mir Jumla could send men to work the diamond fields before occupation of the country, unless it is assumed that he acted only as the lessee for one year, but the question of ownership is not settled.

For location of the mines, see Ball, I. 287n (and a map); II. Ch. 17; App. 1 & 2, & II. 86. Irving Brook's Translation of Bernier, p. 24: MN. 248-50; *Modern Review*, Sept. 1942.

¹³ EFL. IX. 12: for Bezoars, see Thevenot, ch. 6. p. 99.

¹⁴ Vide the section on "Mir Jumla's commercial activities", for details. For monopoly, Love I. 189, 165-66; EFL. X. 41, 93; IX. 22-23, 235, xxv; for customs free goods, EFL. IX. 262-3; Pr. IHO. 1939, 934-36; JIH. (Aug. 1941), 157; AA. 148-9.

As successor to the Hindu Raja Sri Ranga, by virtue of his conquest, Mir Jumla had inherited the suzerain's claim to half the customs and revenues of the port and the city of Madraspatam respectively. For the collection of his share of customs and revenues, the Nawab had his officers stationed at Madras, San Thome, Mylapore and other places. The services of such officers were indispensable to him, for attempts to deprive him of his due share were probably not infrequent. Mallappa, the Nawab's Adigar (*adhikari*) at Madras, constantly attended the choultry to see that his master's share of the customs was duly credited.¹⁵

Mir Jumla also endeavoured to increase the customs on articles of common consumption, sold in the market at Madras, e.g. provisions, betel, herbs, in violation of the Nayak's grant of Madras dated 22nd August, 1639, and Sri Ranga's grant (Oct-Nov., 1645) which he had confirmed.¹⁶

An Octroi or transit duty was also levied on the English factors to their great annoyance.¹⁷ The Nawab used to get half of the fee for licensing slaves. John Leigh, a factor at Pettapoli, who was ordered to sit at the Madras choultry as judge on alternate weeks, observed: "They will venture their necks for 9d, for the custom is but 18 d., and the Nabob hath 9 of it."¹⁸ Presents from different companies formed another

¹⁵ The claim to customs is an ordinary right of a suzerain power. By the Naik's grant of Madras (22nd Aug. 1639), the English were to receive half the customs and revenues of the port and perpetual exemption from customs on Company's import and export trade. It was confirmed with some additional privileges by the grant of Sri Ranga (Oct.-Nov. 1645). Records of 15th Aug. 1649 and 10th Nov. 1679 show that an *ad valorem* duty of 4½% was levied at Madraspatam on all imports and exports irrespective of ownership. The entire receipts were credited to Fort St. George treasury, except only half of such amount as was received from traders, who were not inhabitants of the place. That half was payable to the native government. Love, I. 68-70 & n; 17 & n; FFSG. 8, 33, 34, 42; Mir Jumla confirmed these privileges in June, 1647.

¹⁶ EFL. IX. 235-6; Love I. 123, 130, 18, 68; FFSG. 8, 33.

¹⁷ Fort St. George records of 1670; CM. 227,

¹⁸ Love I. 131 & n, 128, 71 & n.

source of income to Mir Jumla. Possibly additional contributions were realised in times of urgent need.¹⁹

Mir Jumla's administration of criminal justice was severe but quick. Referring to his conduct in connection with the trial of some criminals on 14th September, 1652 (NS), Tavernier says: "It is the custom in this country not to keep a man in prison; but immediately the accused is taken he is examined and sentence is pronounced on him, which is then executed without any delay. If the person whom they have seized is found to be innocent he is released at once; and whatever the nature of the case may be, it is promptly concluded". Next day when informed that four prisoners, "who were then at the door of his tent" had arrived, Mir Jumla remained silent more than half an hour, "writing continually and making his secretaries write, but at length he suddenly ordered the criminals to be brought in; and after having questioned them and made them confess with their own mouths the crime of which they were accused, he remained nearly an hour without saying anything continuing to write and to make his secretaries write." Then many army officers entered his tent and to their salute Mir Jumla replied only by nodding his head. One prisoner, "who had entered a house and had slain a mother and her three infants was condemned forthwith to have his feet and hands cut off, and to be thrown into a field near the high road to end his days." The Nawab ordered another, who had committed theft on the high road, "to have his stomach slit open and to be flung in a drain." The heads of two others, whose crimes were not mentioned by Tavernier, were cut off.

The above details from an eye-witness's account give us some idea of the methodical way in which Mir Jumla transacted administrative work. We come to know of his profound industry and his capacity for efficient discharge of duties from the following events also recorded by the same foreign traveller: "On the 15th September at 7 o'clock in the morning, we went to the Nawab, and immediately we were announced he asked us to enter his tent, where he was seated with two of his secretaries by him. According to the custom of the country—

where one goes with naked feet in slippers, without stockings, because wherever you enter you walk on a carpet and sit in this country as in Turkey, and as our tailors do here,—the Nawab had the intervals between his toes full of letters and he also had many between the fingers of the left hand. He drew them sometimes from his feet, sometimes from his hand, and sent his replies through his two secretaries, writing some also himself." He made his secretaries read out their letters, and then taking them, sealed them himself, "giving some to footmen and others to horsemen".²⁰

For facility in transmission of news, Mir Jumla set up a *dakchouki* from Haidarabad to the Karnatak. Its working has been thus described by Tavernier: "At every two leagues there are small huts, where two or three men employed for running live and immediately when the carrier of a letter has arrived at one of these huts, he throws it to the others at the entrance and one of them takes it up and at once sets off to run. It is considered unlucky to give a letter into the hand of the messenger: it is therefore thrown at his feet, and he must lift it up." The system helped quick transmission of news. Mir Jumla ordered 16 horsemen to escort Tavernier and his party and provide them with any requisites of journey on the way leading to the frontier, which was a river 13 leagues from Gandikota.²¹

3. Military Organisation.

At the time of his deputation by Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah to the Karnatak, the Mir's own personal army, apart from the Qutb Shahi forces, was fairly considerable; for Aurangzeb tells us that Mir Jumla sent "the major part of his army" to the Karnatak. There his huge wealth enabled him to build up and maintain a vast soldiery. According to Walter Littleton and Venkat Brahman (17th January, 1651), Mir Jumla had 300 elephants, 400 or 500 camels and 10,000 oxen. In the campaign against Bijapur in 1652, he brought into action a large army,

²⁰ Ball, I. 290-91.

²¹ Ball, I. 291-2, 293; MM. 92b-94. See *Adab* 87b, 83b-83a and GD (Sultan Md. to Qutb); For transport in Haidarabad see Thevenot (1688 ed), 104.

consisting of Mughals, Afghans, Pathans, and Rajputs, recruited with great efforts and of which he was proud. As he felt himself strong and firm in those regions, he won over many Qutb Shahi generals and soldiers by "fine treatment and favours" and collected together an army as efficient as the old Shahi army.²² Muhammad Mumin, who was sent by Aurangzeb to report on the affairs of Mir Jumla (1653-'54) observed that his army probably numbered 9000 cavalry—of which 5000 were his own servants and 4000 Qutb Shahi deserters,—and 20,000 infantry, that his resources consisted of cash, fine jewels, artillery, good elephants, Iraqi and Arab horses and that all articles of pomp, and dignity had reached perfection.²³

There were many Europeans,—Franks, Englishmen, Portuguese and Italians, in Mir Jumla's army, chiefly in the artillery, as gunners, gunner's mates, armourers and sometimes as troopers. During 1650-2, there were six gunners lent by the English to Mir Jumla—Jeremy Root, Hugh Dixon, Richard Emerson, John Cowhill, Robert Bringbourne and Richard Hall. The services of Jeremy Root, gunner of Fort St. George, were highly valued by Mir Jumla. In 1653 two more gunners deserted the Fort St. George garrison and were employed by Mir Jumla. The latter readily afforded protection to any runaway from Fort St. George garrison.²⁴ An English gunner and "his Italian comrade", belonging to the Nawab's army invited to a dinner Tavernier and his companion (M. Du Jardin) when they visited Mir Jumla at Gandikota in September, 1652. A French gunner, gunfounder and surgeon named Claude Maille of Bourges was then engaged in casting 20 pieces of cannon (10 of

²². *Adab* 38b; *Storia* I. 232; *Waris*, 102b; *EFL*. IX. 12; *MN*. 411 (1652 campaign): The Rajputs of N. Arcot district claim to have come from Rajputana with Muhammadan armies. *NAM*, 267.

²³. *Adab* 39a.

²⁴. *EFL*. IX. 17, 43, n; 94, 100, 154; *Love* I. 99, 106; *Hedges*, III. 196. It was difficult for such men, lent by the E. I. C. to Mir Jumla, to get leave. *EFL*. X. 91. Bowrey (p. 111) says that the high salary offered by Mir Jumla tempted many to desert Fort St. George colours and join his army. *COM*. 1650-54, p 152; *Catrou*, 208 (Portuguese.)

48 pounds, and 10 of 24 pounds), which Mir Jumla wanted to place inside the fort of Gandikota as it was difficult to carry them up. Copper flowed in "from all quarters" and many idols, removed from "the pagodas" by the army, were collected together. Maille succeeded in melting all metals and idols, "except the 6 large idols of the famous pagoda of Gandikota". But as he could not manufacture a single cannon, he gave up the work and subsequently left the Nawab's service.²⁵ Mir Jumla had several Hindu generals in his army. Damarla Venkatappa joined him after being dismissed by Sri Ranga. Tupakki Krishnappa Nayak of Jinji played a very important part as Mir Jumla's General during the Hindu revolt in the Karnatak.²⁶ Another Hindu commander was Chinnatambi Mudaliyar.²⁷

Mir Jumla had to be naturally cautious about maintaining an effective control over such a heterogeneous body, having in it deserters from armies of the neighbouring powers. Tavernier says that no one was permitted to cross a river 13 leagues from Gandikota "without having the Nawab's passport."²⁸

There were occasional reviews of the army. On Sept. 1, 1652 (NS), Tavernier found "the whole army" encamped at Gandikota near the base of the mountain on the plains of the Pennar river, and the cavalry, whose review Mir Jumla was just finishing, struck Tavernier as "very smart". A second review of "the greater part of the army" was fixed for 14th September.

Soldiers were sometimes paid in cash. Tavernier notes that "all the Frank gunners" went (11th September, 1652) to the tent of Mir Jumla, "clamouring for payment of the promised four months' wages," and they even threatened to desert him in case of non-payment. The Nawab

²⁵ Ball (1. 288-90) says that the difficulty in melting the idols was due to the fact that they were made of iron and not of copper. See *Aurangzib* 1. 194. For Claude Maille, gunfounder and surgeon of Mir Jumla, see Ball, *op. cit.* 1. 286, 116; 289, 301 n.

²⁶ EFL. IX. 240. n.

²⁷ EFL. X. 176. Is he to be identified with the Madura accountant of the same name? SVH. 325.

²⁸ Ball. 1. 239.

asked them to come the next day, when they were paid for three months and assured of the payment of arrear of one month at the close of September. The Frank gunners immediately spent their wages in amusements and entertainments, "the baladines (dancing girls) carrying off more than half of it."²⁹

4. *Mir Jumla's overseas commercial activities.*

Absorbed as Mir Jumla was in his political activities, he never lost sight of commerce, the perennial source of his wealth, prosperity and power. From slight beginnings the volume of his commerce, internal and external, swelled mightily by the end of 1650. Early next January, Mir Jumla had 4,000 horses, 300 elephants, 400 or 500 camels and 10,000 oxen which used to transport his goods to several countries like Golkonda and Bijapur and even into different regions of the Mughal Empire. Everywhere he had his agents and merchants stationed. Moreover, he had trading relations with (i) Burma—Arrakan, Pegu, Tenasserim (Mergui Archipelago), (ii) Acheen, Peruk, Macassar and the Maldives, (iii) Persia and Arabia, and (iv) Bengal. His mercantile marine then consisted of 10 ships and he gradually increased their number by building more ships, especially at Narsapur on the East coast. There a junk of 800 tons had been built in July, 1638, for being sent to Persia or Mocha and it was referred to in factory correspondence as the "great" junk of the *Sar-i-khail*.³⁰

Unwilling to employ Vijaynagar sailors under apprehension of their treachery, Mir Jumla asked both the English and Dutch companies to lend him pilots and sailors for navigating his junks, viz. Roger Adams (1642), Richard

²⁹ Ball I. 285-6, 288-289, 291.

³⁰ For range of trade, Report of Walter Littleton and Venkata Brahman (Jsn. 17. 1651) in Love, I. 100, EFL. IX. 12; for shipbuilding, EFL. VI. 79-80; 168; VII. 88, 55. One of the agents of the Mir was named Virappa, EFL. IX. 262.

Peruk was to the South of Queda in Malay Peninsula and subject to the king of Acheen. Bowrey, 260n, 275n.

Walwyn (1647), John Gayton (1646); Thomas Bostock (1650).³¹ There were some Muslim pilots also, for example, Muhammad Beg in charge of the *Mubarak Tukli*, sailing to Pegu, Nakhuda Nura, sailing to Acheen, Nakhuda Mulla Hasan Ali sailing to Gombroon.³²

In spite of his growing mercantile marine, Mir Jumla suffered from naval weakness and had to depend for passports on the European Companies. In 1651, the Sultan of Golkonda and Mir Jumla ceased to ask the Portuguese for passports for their vessels, yet during the siege of Madras (September, 1657—April, 1658), the English were asked to give "passes" (passports) for Mir Jumla's sea-going junks. But they refused.³³

Mir Jumla wanted to get a share in the profitable trade with Burma. It was the home of "perfect Rubies and Sapphires," prized in different parts of the world. Its gumlack was of the finest quality and superior to Indian lac. Martavan jars, some gold, copper, tin, quicksilver, ganza (bell-metal) and benzoin were also available there.³⁴ As minister in Golkonda he sent Hasan Khan to Pegu to open commercial relations with its ruler, famous as 'the Lord of white Elephants.' Subsequently the Mir asked the latter to permit Muhammad Beg, the captain of a Golkonda ship, to trade annually with his own ships to Pegu.³⁵ Mir Jumla sometimes employed English private traders (e.g. Richard Cogan in 1647) to conduct commercial operations on his behalf to Pegu, which were more profitable than those of the English. Mir Jumla's junks laden with his own freight goods sailed regularly from Masulipatam to Pegu, while his servants and agents used to constantly journey to and from Pegu, sometimes on Dutch ships (e. g. 1653). The political disorders

³¹ EFL. VI. 76-77, 51n, 56n, 255; Dutch sailors in EFL. VII. 89; 81, 234; VIII. 98, 139, 273; Dutch pilot, EFL. IX. 14, 256-7, 268-9. See. Pr. IHC (1939). 927-29, n.

³² Tabrezi, 147b; EFL. VI. 167-8 and n; 260, 71.

³³ Danvers IL 301 (Portuguese); EFL. X. 175.

³⁴ Hall, 87 ff; Purchas V. 1004; Moreland, RKG. EFL. II. 338; V. 16; 146; VI. 94; Bowrey, 290, 275n.

³⁵ Mir Jumla's letter to the Wazir of Pegu. Tabrezi, 147b.

in Pegu due to the invasion of the Chinese adversely affected the trade of Mir Jumla as well as of the Dutch about 1651. About 1653 the king of Pegu prohibited the sale of tin and tusks to strangers and the export of *Ganza* and organised guards on the way to Martaban to implement his order.³⁶

Arrakan was famous for wild elephants. Mir Jumla prayed to Dharmaraja, the ruler of Arrakan, for grant of trade facilities to his men. At his special entreaty, the Raja released from prison seven Iraqis suspected to be Shahjahan's agents. He also requested the Raja to release several Mughals long imprisoned in Arrakan and to grant free trade facilities so that Arrakan might be the meeting place of traders from different lands. Mir Jumla purchased 4 elephants sent by the Raja to the East Coast and received one as a reward.³⁷

In return for the East Coast calicoes, Mir Jumla procured the spices of the East Indies, slaves and rice from Macassar, tin from Peruk and *couries* from the Maldives.³⁸

³⁶ Cogan affair, EFL. VIII. 98-99, 198; IX. 260, 263, 206-7 (using Dutch ship), 19. Mir Jumla secured the release of Richard Cogan, when the latter was imprisoned by the English Agent of Madras.

Burma was under the Toungoo dynasty (1531-1752). After 1628 the monarchy became weak and Upper Burma was twice overrun by the Ming and Manchu Chinese and five times by the Manipuris. Harvey, 192-99. *Encyclo. Brit.* (14th ed.) IV. 430.

³⁷ For Arrakan trade, Bowrey. 73, 245n. 222; *Cont.* 153a. SAR. 178; Manrique, Ch. 23. For Mir Jumla's 2 letters to the Raja and proposal to send Kamran Beg, Tabrozi, 148b, 149a. This Mir Jumla-Arrakan correspondence is undated, but most probably it belonged to the period of the Mir's stay in the Karnatak. Probably the 23rd king of Arrakan Tsan da thu damma (acc. 1652) is referred to here as Dharmaraja. Vide Capt. A. P. Phayre's article, "On the History of Arrakan" in JASB. XIII (1844), 23-52. Harvey, 145.

Tenasserim was also famous for elephants, Bowrey, 73, 179, 245n (customs taken).

³⁸ For Acheen trade, EFL. VI. 167-8n; Bowrey, 288-9; for Bantam, Macassar, EFL. IX. 99, 290-1; Bowrey, 291 (slaves). Macassar was a free port and ships paid no customs, Ball's Tavernier. I. pt. II. 191. For Peruk, Bowrey, 283n, 252n, 267n, 280n; for Maldives, *ibid.* 104, 79.

Persia figured prominently in his commercial enterprises. Every year he used to send a large quantity of goods in his junks of all sizes from the East Coast of India to Persia. Other ships were not allowed to load themselves till those of Mir Jumla, the "all ruling Sar i khail or Vizier" were filled up. His power and influence as the minister of Golkonda enabled him to utilise the ships of the English E. I. Company also in transporting his articles (e. g. sugar in 1637 and '40) to Persia without paying any freight and any customs. In 1651-2 Mir Jumla's junk reached Gombroon *via* Gwador on the Makran coast and about 200 *tumans* were remitted as the Company's share of customs due on his goods from Masulipatam. In 1653 the Gombroon factors apprehended troubles if the landing and transporting customs-free of two bales of Mir Jumla's goods became known to the Shahbunder as the latter claimed the right to open bales, suspected to belong to "the Moors". But they were advised by the Madras factors that if they were "to continue in this country", they must not deny the privilege and must be prepared to suffer in case of denial.³⁹ The practice of sending goods customs-free continued when Mir Jumla became the Governor of Bengal.

Mir Jumla regularly sent his junks to Mokha, pilotted by Englishmen in 1642, 1646 and 1647.⁴⁰

Through his commercial activities Mir Jumla the Persian became one of the principal inheritors of the maritime trade of the Vijaynagar Empire with Arrakan, Pegu, Tenasserim, the Malay Peninsula and the Archipelago, and with Persia and Arabia. In the 16th century the Portuguese had displaced the Arabs as the carriers of that trade. During the first half of the 17th century Mir Jumla endeavoured to step into the void, created by the decline of the Vijaynagar

³⁹. EFL. VI. 30, n. 260, 71 (freight free); VII. 88, 67, 207-8 (customs free), 55; IX. 262; 220-22; for remission IX. 67, 117-118, 125-26; Shahbunder's strictness, *ibid.*, 157 & n. 206; also Hague Tr. series, I. Vol. 18, no. 549 in *ibid.*; opinion of Madras factors, *ibid.*, 228, 282; opinion of Surat factors, *ibid.*, 256-257, 268-9.

⁴⁰. EFL. VII. 69, 81, 234; VIII. '98, 138, (*Darya Daulat*); for Mokha trade, Bowrey 103, 152n, 245n.

empire and the Portuguese. The situation was favourable, as the English trade had not been securely established and as there was acute rivalry between the Dutch and the English, each trying to outbid the other in securing the favours of the Mir. Mir Jumla also became a keen competitor of the English E. I. Company especially in the Burmese and Persian trade. The English not finding any opportunity of getting freight on goods sent from Masulipatam to Persia, endeavoured not to lose any freight in the Bay of Bengal ports. They also tried to prevent the extension of his commercial ascendancy in Pegu and the Burmese waters.⁴¹

5. *Religious effects of Mir Jumla's conquest of the Karnatak.*

In one of his letters to Mir Jumla, Qutb Shah wrote : "The territories of Hindu Karnatak have come under my possession with its villages and forts. The banner of Islam has been unfurled there. The shrines of idols and places of pilgrimage have been converted into mosques and places of worship of the Muslims and the practices of Islamic religion have been widely diffused. Three *qitas* of villages under a town, are set apart according to the rules of the Shariat, for the inhabitants of Najf. As these territories were conquered through the energy and efforts of Mir Jumla, the Mutwalliship of these villages is now conferred on him and his family indefinitely. The total income of these places should be sent to Najf. My successors are hereby ordered that no interference should be made in this arrangement."

Speaking of his victories in the Karnatak, Mir Jumla wrote to Nawab Khalifa-i-Sultan, Wazir of Persia : "By God's grace and Padshah's luck, the banner of Islam has been flown in the infidel country of the Karnatak and that of Hinduism has been brought down.....The voice of Islam and the

⁴¹ Vijaynagar trade in Ramanayya, SHTDV. ch. X; SVH. 67; VSOV. 229-24; *Stories*, III. 242; Commercial position of the English in India, Pt. IHC. (1939), 918-920; competition with the English, EFL, VI. 79-80; VII. 88, 55, 87; VIII. 98-99, 198.

practices of our saints have been manifest here."⁴² As an instance of the conversion of temples into mosques it may be noted that in 1653, Rustam Beg, the *havaladar* of Poonamallee fort, built a mosque by demolishing the upper part of a temple.⁴³

Mir Jumla pillaged the temples, by plundering their wealth and collecting together the idols, whether of gold, silver or copper and melted some of them for casting cannon.

6. *Strong Position of Mir Jumla.*

Even neutral observers, like the foreign merchants, were impressed by Mir Jumla's power and great resources, and came to show him the deference due to crowned heads. Walter Littleton and Venkata Brahman, who had been sent by the English Agent on a mission to the Nawab, observed (Jan. 1651): "The whole kingdom of Gulcundah is governed by him, of whome the people stand in feare and subjection unto as to the kinge himself." Even Aurangzèb wrote to the Emperor in 1645 that "Mir Jumla had got hold over a populous country containing forts, ports and mines Possessing a pleasing countenance, a medium stature, wisdom and quickness of apprehension, and well-behaved to others, he had under his control many worthy officers". "In short though Mir Jumla's rank was that of a noble, he possessed the power, wealth and grandeur of a ruling prince."⁴⁴ The rebellion of Mir Jumla, the Mughal invasion of Haidarabad and Mir Jumla's appointment as Mughal Premier,—all follow logically as the sequel to his conquest of the Karnatak,

⁴² Najf, the site of the tomb of Ali, is a place of pilgrimage for Shias. Tabrezi, 42a-43a, 70a-72b; *Mir Jumla-Iran Correspondence*, JBORS, June, 1942.

⁴³ EIM. 1937-38. pp. 52-54. English factory records refer to Rustam Beg's plunder of a pagoda at Triplicane. Love I. 142 & n; EFI. IX, 262.

⁴⁴ EFI. IX. 12 (Littleton and Brahman's report); *Adab*, 39a; Thevenot, *op. cit*; *Aurangzèb* I. 195.

Section C

RELATION WITH THE EUROPEAN COMPANIES'

(Till 1655)

1. *Mir Jumla's diplomatic use of his own position.*

As Governor of Masulipatam since 1635-'6, Mir Jumla viewed with jealousy the commercial concessions enjoyed by the English. By the Golden *Farman* of 1634 the English had secured complete exemption from all customs in the Golkonda kingdom on certain conditions, and the farmers of the Masulipatam customs had been allowed to pay 800 pagodas (about £ 400) less a year to the royal treasury by way of compensation for resultant loss. The *Farman* was to become invalid if the duties payable by the English exceeded that amount. Concerned at the loss of customs revenues, owing to unlicensed practices on the part of the English East India Company's traders, Mir Jumla took steps against them, in co-operation with the Dutch, and acquainted the Sultan of their violation of the Golden *Farman*. Matters proceeded so far that the *Sar-i-Khail* (Abdullah Khan Mazandarani) and the *dabir* (Mulla Wais) of the Golkonda court demanded from the English the excess over 800 pagodas, the stipulated yearly abatement.²

As *Sar-i-khail* of Golkonda since 1637, Mir Jumla continued his efforts to prevent the loss to customs revenue

¹. Further details on this topic are contained in my articles on (i) *Early Relations of Mir Jumla with the English (up to 1650)* in Pr. IHC. (1939), 918-949; (ii) *English Missions to Mir Jumla (1650-2)* in IHQ. XVI. 773-82; (iii) *The English in Madras and Mir Jumla (1652-55)* in Pr. IHC. (1940), 257-63, JIH (Aug. 1941).

². Bruce, 315-6, 325, 342-3; EFL. IV. 84-5, xi; V. 14-21, 325-6, xxxiv; FFSG. I-4; Pr. IHRC (1942), 106, for identification of 'Sar-i Khail' and 'Malliveece' of the English factory records.

of the state, arising from the illegal profits of the English by insisting on the strict application of the Golden *Farman*. His outlook seems to have been legal and rational. But he moulded his policy as suited his own interests even at the cost of those of the State. Evasion of the *Farman* continued in spite of the protests from Golkonda officials. In these circumstances, some sort of rapprochement, however unholy and unjustifiable, was considered to be necessary for mutual advantage. But it was Mir Jumla, who profited most by it. By the undue exercise of his virtually supreme authority, he threatened the English, who, however, did not fail to realise (May 18, 1638) that his threats were mere pretences for exaction of money.³

During September-December, 1641, the Governor of Masulipatam imposed an embargo on the lading of an English ship, in retaliation of the Danish seizure of the *Sar-i-kha'il* Mir Jumla's junk on the principle of seeking satisfaction from one Christian nation for the capture of Masulipatam junks by another. Early in January, 1642, when the Danes released the junk on the satisfaction of their demands, the English also were granted liberty to lade their goods. The Dutch, in order to avoid such seizure of their own ships, and to have their goods always ready for shipment, employed small ships continually to fetch their goods. The Fort St. George factors suggested to the Company (Sept. 1642) the adoption of the same expedient for prosecution of their trade.⁴

Consequently as Mir Jumla became the most influential man in the State, whose friendship and aid were invaluable but displeasure feared, the European factors perceived the political and commercial advantages of keeping him appeased. In 1642 Mir Jumla closed the warehouses of the Dutch, forbade their sale of spices and subjected them to further "affronts" resulting in a great loss to them. Nevertheless they lent him 9 men and 2 pieces of ordnance to sail his junk for Persia and arranged to give a present

³. EFL. VI. 79-80, 75-76 ; V. 325-6 ; FFSG, 14, 4.

⁴. FFL. VI. 316 ; VII, 42, 48.

worth 10,000 rials of eight to the Golkonda court.⁵ As regards the English, while they offered him presents, lent him men (pilots, sailors, gunners) and traded on his behalf by taking his goods in their own ships without charging freight and customs, Mir Jumla, in his turn, helped them on various occasions, by lending money, confirming their privileges, allowing them to use his ships and pilots and endeavoured to increase the sense of their obligation to him.⁶ Thus he tried to use them as an instrument for the realisation of his commercial and political ambitions.

2. *Financial Relations with the English.*

Mir Jumla occasionally borrowed money from the English factors, possibly with a view to financing his business enterprises (like farming of diamond mines, commercial ventures, building ships), furthering his political designs or creating an army of his own. The attempts of the English factors to recover the outstanding debts of Mir Jumla were not always successful. A sum of 3,000 pagodas (Rs. 10,500) was due from him by the beginning of 1638. In August, 1639, Andrew Cogan at Golkonda was asked by the Masulipatam factors to recover all debts but Cogan expressed his confidence that if it was a due debt, it would be "paid on demand". However, by November, 1640, Mir Jumla denied his liability for 1919 *pagodas* out of 2099, while acknowledging receipt of three jewels which he agreed to pay for or return.⁷

On the other hand Mir Jumla often assisted the English

⁵ BDR. 1641-'42, p. 306, in FFI. VII. 80-1.

⁶ EFI. V. 325-6; VI. 43 (Mir Jumla's property not to be detained, 1638), 220-22, 142-3, 76, 77; VII. 81.

The English acquiesced in the practice of taking Mir Jumla's goods without freight or customs out of considerations of some practical advantages accruing therefrom. EFI. VI. 71; VII. 55. Mir Jumla pretended that the goods belonged to the Sultan and should be landed free of customs in return for the immunities and privileges enjoyed by the English in the Golkonda ports (Swally Marine letter, Nov. 28, 1644). EFI. VII. 207-8.

⁷ EFI. VI. 49, 52, 146-8, 147n, 72, 266, 256; II. 221n.

by loans of money when his funds were satisfactory. In 1642-'3 borrowing in other ways being difficult at Masulipatam on account of the desertion of moneyed men due to Mir Jumla's attempted monopoly of trade there, the English factors decided to borrow 4 or 5 thousand *pagodas* from the Mir at Golkonda at an interest of $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ for 4 or 5 months. He also lent the English in Madras 10,000 (new) *pagodas* (or 16,000 rials of eight), possibly a part of his Karnatak plunder, for six months with effect from 9th March, 1646. The amount was not repaid before 29th June, 1647, and Mir Jumla waived all claims for interest on receiving some presents, including a brass gun valued at 641 *pagodas* 8 *fanams*.⁸

3. *Friction between Mir Jumla and the English.*

The relation between Mir Jumla and the English was not simply the usual one of a debtor and a creditor. As the former was the highest officer of the Golkonda State, the English had to feel the weight of his influence in their transactions regarding the recovery of debts from local people, and they thought of combating it, if necessary, by force. Holding Mir Jumla responsible for the delay in realising their dues (10,000 *pagodas*) at Golkonda and Viravasaram in 1640, the English factors at Masulipatam thought of ensuring recovery by putting indirect pressure on him like seizure of his junks.⁹

Beneath the outward endeavours of the English to placate Mir Jumla, who might otherwise be led to adopt stringent or adverse measures against them, ran a current of deep internal hatred towards him. Friction with the Golkonda officials, who prevented the English from receiving from the local merchants and manufacturers the goods for which they had contracted, was "frequent and bitter." Mir Jumla was accused (Feb. 1638) of treating the English factor "at

⁸. EFL. VI. 77, 220-1; VII. 69, 79; VIII. 166-67, 213-4, xxvii-xxix; Love, I. 78n, 97-98; FFSG. 1-2, 37.

⁹. EFL. VI. 146, 162-3, 255, 190-191.

Golkonda in a "base way" and of dealing unjustly with the English factors of Masulipatam in matters relating to the town of Malloule (Mallovol) near it.¹⁰ All the complaints of the English factors were not, however, justified. Mir Jumla was accused (July, 1638) of instigating the Governor of Masulipatam to adopt measures of reprisal against Captain Weddell and Mountney of the Courteen's Association. But it was they who unjustly claimed that exemption from customs granted to the East India Company should be extended to them and opened artillery fire on the city of Masulipatam on being denied access to the shore by the local officials.¹¹

4. *The Company's efforts to improve their position.*

The Company tried to escape from its embarrassing position at Masulipatam by selecting a safer station on the coast further south, within the Vijaynagar dominions, and by endeavouring to get a new *farman* from the Sultan for grant of fresh commercial privileges to the English. The first attempt led to the immediate foundation of Fort St. George, and the second to the mission of Andrew Cogan from Surat to Golkonda.

During the mission of Andrew Cogan, *Sar-i-khail* Mir Jumla helped him in various ways and showed him respect. This struck Andrew Cogan as very unusual in view of the different descriptions previously given to him about his character by the Masulipatam factors. Cogan

¹⁰ Epithets used against Mir Jumla, EFL. V. 325-6; VI. 49, 75-6, 78-9, 163, 142-3, 200 and n; friction in Bruce, I. 360; FFSG. 4; Complaints, EFL. VI. 49; xxxi-xxxii. Mallovol had been rented by the English from May, 1634, but they were ordered by the Sultan to surrender the lease (c.1636-7) and as they objected to do so without compensation, the English factor at Golkonda was dragged out of his house, by order of the Sultan's 'Secretary', well beaten and imprisoned (BDR. 1637, p. 94, in *ibid.* 52-3).

¹¹ EFL. VI. 78-9, xxxii-xxxiii; FFSG. 4n; for Weddell, Bruce, I. 340-2, 350; 357 ff; COM, 1635-9, pp. 337-38, 127-29; RBPE. 38-9; Morse, I. Ch. 2.

presented a piece of ambergris to Mir Jumla and exultingly wrote (to Bantam, Sept. 3, 1639) that if any occasion arose for the Company to use the *Sar-i-khail*, the present would certainly "be repaid a thousand fold." Mir Jumla also gave a special letter to the Governor of Masulipatam commanding him to receive and use Cogan with respect.¹²

5. *Effects of the conquest of the Karnatak on Mir Jumla's relations with the Europeans.*

The conquest of the Karnatak by Mir Jumla profoundly influenced his relations with the Europeans on the East Coast. The English found their erstwhile commercial rival and governor gradually transformed into almost their overlord. Fear of Mir Jumla, the necessity of checking the pretensions of his ministers and the need of protection during a period of wars contributed to the rapid strengthening of the Fort St. George fortifications.¹³

But Mir Jumla then wisely refrained from manifesting any hostile designs against the English and showed an inclination to be on friendly terms with them. The latter also, in their turn, were anxious to get the favour and protection of the Mir and to obtain from the new government confirmation of all the old privileges granted to them by the Hindu power. Thus, realising that the Karnatak must inevitably pass from Vijaynagar to Golkonda, Ivy, the English Agent at Madras (Aug. 1644-Sept. 1648), hastened to make an *entente cordiale* with the stronger power. In 1646, when Mir Jumla formed a camp in the vicinity of Madras for the siege of San Thome, Ivy lent him a gunner and several soldiers, assisted him in many ways and presented him with a brass gun. In return, Mir Jumla confirmed, on behalf of the

¹² Company's position, Bruce, I. 360, 368-9; FFSG, 4; for Cogan's mission, EFL VI. 143-4, 145, 148, 162-4; 200; Love I. 13-14, u; See Pr. IHC. 1939 for Cogan's attributes bestowed on Mir Jumla (pp. 944-45).

¹³ EFL VIII. 70, xxv, 25, 26; Love, I. 192, 76, 127, 105; Bruce. I. 377, 378, 424-5, 430, 454-5; FFSG. 15, 16, 18-20, 25.

Sultan of Golkonda, the existing *gaul* (regarding the grant of Madras) and privileges of the English (June, 1647).¹⁴

The Dutch at Pulicat also had their privileges confirmed by the Mir and even secured some financial concessions from him. The Portuguese also obtained better financial privileges from him than from the Hindus.¹⁵ About 1648 a ship of Mir Jumla was driven by storm to Masulipatam, and he wanted to utilise the Dutch or English ships for his commercial journeys.¹⁶

6. Missions of the European Companies to Mir Jumla

About 1650-1, Mir Jumla being displeased with the Dutch, wanted to frustrate their commercial aims by trying to become a monopolist himself in cloth trade, and to enter into a commercial agreement or contract with the English East India Company, by which they would get their supplies of piecegoods from his agents and "share with him in the profits of voyages made to Persia and other parts."¹⁷

¹⁴ Bruce I. 415; EFL VIII, xxvii-xxix (braas gun), 25, 166-7 (confirmation); X. 4; Love I. 75-77, 79.

¹⁵ EFL IX. 238.

¹⁶ Tabrezi, 69a.

¹⁷ EFL IX. 232, 133, xxv; Love, I. 100-101; Cf. Bruce, I. 454-5. The English factory records state the following to be the reasons for Mir Jumla's hostility towards the Dutch:

(i) The Dutch aimed at monopolising the whole trade of India (EFL IX. 13).

(ii) They interfered with the Mir's trade at Queda and Achin. Formerly he used to buy spices from the Dutch at his own prices and prevented other merchants from coming to them. But the Batavia authorities ordered that the goods should be stored in their godowns till the Mir himself would or allow others to purchase them at the high rates prescribed by the Dutch. The Mir was thus deprived of the profitable spice trade (*ibid*, XXV. 22-24).

(iii) Mir Jumla's letter to the Dutch Governor-General had remained unnoticed for three years (*ibid*, XXV. 13). The Governor of Pulicat had insolently boasted that the Dutch could easily acquire this country. As the Mir prohibited the Dutch from trading within his own jurisdiction (*ibid*, 13), they tried to induce the Mir to reopen the trade and sent a mission to him in the autumn of 1650.

Mir Jumla refused to meet a Dutch mission at Gandikota in September, 1650, but courteously received an English mission under Venkata Brahman. He represented to the English that by joining him they would profit immensely, and would even "enjoy the whole trade" i.e. just as he would monopolise the production, control the prices, and be the sole stockist, the English would become the sole distributors of articles of trade available in the Coast. He also tried to incite the English against the Dutch by explaining to the former that the latter wanted to exclude the English from any share in the Coromandal trade by "overbuying and underselling" the English. Agent Greenhill responded to Mir Jumla's offer by sending the same broker, Venkata Brahman, with Walter Littleton on another mission in December, 1650. In their joint report (Jan. 17, 1651), they testified to Mir Jumla's "real affection" towards the English, his desire to form a longterm agreement, and assist the Company's business operations by a free loan of money (50 or 60,000 pagodas). They also held that the conclusion of the agreement would be highly beneficial to the Company's trade and would lead to the frustration of the aims of the Dutch. The Mir delivered to the brokers, a letter addressed to the English East India Company, together with some presents consisting of "3000 pieces of long cloth and Sallampoores."¹⁸

Having so far maintained friendly relations with the Dutch, Mir Jumla now wanted to strike at them by winning over the English to his side. It was quite natural for him to offer generous loans to the English, for he now acquired the immense Karnatak plunder, which he and tried to put to a profitable investment in this manner. At the same time he sought to pose as a real benefactor of the Company and thereby earn its gratitude and sense of obligation which could be used in an emergency.

But the Agent and his council, in consultation with the Masulipatam factors (Feb. 19, 1651) became sceptical of the wisdom of the agreement. They held that it would be safest to accept that proposal of Mir Jumla by which he agreed to

¹⁸. EFL. IX. xxv, 22-23, 12-13 (Mir's representation), 44, 261; VIII, xxxii; Love I. 99, 100-101.

take all their goods from Europe in return for cloth and other articles of the Karnatak at rates to be fixed later. They deferred their final decision till the arrival of President Baker, and hoped that, if the Company decided to entertain Mir Jumla's offer, they would empower the President, Agent &c. "to treat and conclude (an agreement) with the Nawab." Meanwhile in January, 1651, Venkata Brahman was again deputed to the Nawab at Gandikota to learn what goods might be expected for the next shipping and what price was to be fixed for those already supplied to them by Mir Jumla.

The Company's reply came about a year later. They avoided "any pledge to make all their purchases from Mir Jumla's agents," but agreed to give "preference" to them, though this would not cover any concession regarding freight. In the summer of 1652, Littleton and Venkata again went to Mir Jumla, probably with the Company's reply, and "met with a seemingly friendly reception." The Company disapproved of the concessions already given to Mir Jumla by the factors, But as his request was as good as command, the Company suggested to the latter to rectify the mistake in future and to endeavour to secure the usual rate if possible.¹⁹

During 1651-2 a Dutch mission under Dirck Steur praying for enlargement of privileges and permission to rent some towns and to trade without payment of customs in return for a large sum of money, was received by Mir Jumla, but he referred the question to the Sultan, then at Gandikota. Moreover, he refused to allow the Dutch to fortify Pulicat, though he renewed their privileges. On the other hand he allowed the English factors to strengthen the defences of Fort St. George. But he was careful to see that the English did not become too strong to defy his authority. Thus the English Agent of Fort St. George, who insisted on building a *bankshall* with lime and stone instead of straw as permitted by Mir Jumla, had ultimately to submit

19. Pros and Cons of the offer, EFL. IX. 22-24, 261 (arts 35-37) 262 (art 56), 44; Mission of Jan. 1651, *ibid.*, 48-9; Company's reply, 232-33; *vide* IHQ (Dec. 1940), 779-82. COM, 1650-54, p. 159.

The Court of Committees for the United Joint Stock decided to spend £ 100 on a present to Mir Jumla and requisitioned 'a very rich saddle' from one Mr. Greene (Dec. 23, 1651). *Ibid.*, 142.

to the payment of a heavy fine of 200 pagodas.²⁰ As the Dutch began to suffer reverses in Europe during the first Anglo-Dutch War, their position became unfavourable in Persia, Bengal and other places; they were also reported to be turned out of their trade with Japan. About 1654 Mir Jumla resented the Dutch refusal to grant passes to Indian ships trading with Ceylon, Achin and other places where the Dutch were seeking to establish their own trade monopoly. They even captured a ship of Mir Jumla sailing to Macassar under Portuguese portection. This strained the relations of the Dutch with Mir Jumla and the king of Macassar almost to the breaking point (April, 1654). Mir Jumla threatened to attack Pulicat if the ship was not restored. He was not completely pacified, even though the Dutch promised to do so and also to grant passes to ships sailing to Achin and some other places.²¹ The English factors in Persia requested the Company to send a strong fleet to cause greater embarrassment to the Dutch.²²

Mir Jumla's attitude towards the other Europeans was not so bitter. Tavernier and his party visited Mir Jumla at Gandikota in September, 1652 (NS) in order to sell some jewels to the Sultan. The Mir enquired of them whether his personal jewels (lasques) contained in 5 small bags were vendible in

²⁰ HT, Ser. I, Vol. 18, no. 539, 542, 543; in EFL IX, xxviii-xxix. pp 99, 156 ff, 261, 290-1, 204-5, n. 96; Love I. 112, 114-116, 141, 154, 104-5, n; Bruce, I. 451-99 (occasional references); see my article on *The English in Madras and Mir Jumla 1652-55* in Pr. IHC. 1940 and JIH. Aug. 1941.

²¹ HT. Series I. vol. 18, 550(i), EFL IX. xxxiii-xxxiv.

²² EFL IX. 269-70, In December, 1655, the English E. I. Company petitioned to the Protector and his Council "for licence to transport to the Coast of Coromandel for the use of the Nabab or Governor there ten suits of armour, thirty sword-blades, twenty blunderbusses, and fifteen pair of horsemen's pistols, and for directions to be given to the Commissioners of Customs to allow these to pass". (COM. 1659-59, pp 70, 72). This may be regarded as an endeavour of the Company to secure Mir Jumla's goodwill and thereby take advantage of his displeasure with the Dutch. The East Coast factors must have pressed the authorities in England for these when he was still formally in the Golkonda state service.

Europe and agreed to write to his son at Golkonda on behalf of the party.²³

During the critical period of Mir Jumla's rebellion²⁴ against the Sultan of Golkonda (1653-'5), the former did not want to be embroiled with the English. However, he had necessarily to endeavour to augment his financial resources and secure commercial and economic advantages in relation to the East India Company. Moreover, he was anxious to engage the attention of the Company in their internal preoccupations, by abetting the caste disputes (c. April, 1655), by refusing to decide them, even when they were referred to him, and by utilising the dissensions in the Madras Council for his own advantage so as to prevent them from sending any help to the Raja of Chandragiri, whose dominions he was consolidating as his own or to the Sultan of Golkonda. These are but faint beginnings of a rupture between Mir Jumla and the English, which widened subsequently.²⁵

7. *Relations with the Portuguese.*

While in the Karnatak Mir Jumla was on terms of "great friendship" with Dom Philippe Mascarenhas, the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa (1645-51). There was an active correspondence and exchange of presents between them. The Mir highly prized the "armes blanches"—a breast-plate, a morion and a sword, sent by the Viceroy, and used them for necessary purposes in battle. In return, he sent many jewels and diamonds procured out of the Karnatak mines, and sometimes he sold his best diamonds to the Portuguese. Thus did Mir Jumla endeavour to remain on good terms with the Portuguese, with a

²³ Ball, I. 259, 261, 286-7, 293; EFI. IX. xxxvii-xxxix. Tavernier and his party were kindly received by a Captain of Mir Jumla at Tirupati (Aug. 1652, NS), when he learnt that they were not Dutchmen. Ball, I. 273.

²⁴ Discussed in Ch. 3.

²⁵ Caste disputes (1652-3), Love. I. 118-21, 123; for details, See JIH. 1941 (Aug.).

view to utilising their assistance, if required in some future contingencies.²⁶

But Mir Jumla did not spare the Portuguese settlement of San Thome during his conquest of the Karnatak. His blockade of it and its sequel produced considerable damages on the Portuguese and his officers seized their "grounds and gardens" outside the town and appropriated their revenues on behalf of their master. In January, 1651, they were, however, restored except the revenues of a Church valued at 2,000 rials a year. The Fort St. George factors believed that this was a fine imposed on the Portuguese padres for disallowing, in violation of an old custom, the procession of a Hindu God before their Church outside the City.²⁷

²⁶. The presents of the Viceroy included different kinds of brocade and porcelain from China and curios from Japan. *Storia*, I. 232 n; Bernier, 17 and n; for Dom Filippe, Danvers II. 287, 302; Catrou, 207.

²⁷. HT. Series I, Vol. xvii, no. 530 in EPL. IX. 18.

CHAPTER III

THE REBELLION OF MIR JUMLA

1. *Causes of friction between Qutb Shah and Mir Jumla.*

The conquest of the Karnatak had at once transformed the status of Mir Jumla from that of a courtier of a powerless Sultan to one of an almost independent and strong ruler, secure at a long distance from his master's capital. Following Bernier, who writes that the jealousy of the Sultan was "naturally awakened" at this, European historians have generally supposed that Qutb Shah grew suspicious of his Wazir's strength and position. But it is doubtful if the Sultan himself had at first foreseen the potential dangers to his own power on account of Mir Jumla's conquest of the Karnatak and his consequent influence there. For, as we have seen before, the Sultan, flushed with Mir Jumla's success, had lavished all possible favours on his victorious minister-general. Moreover, the Sultan had nurtured,—as he wrote sometime afterwards to the ruler of Persia,—the sapling of the adventurer Mir Muhammad Said into the mighty tree of the Mir Jumla or Wazir of Golkonda, and expressed surprise that the latter should have chosen to betray him. In fact, the Sultan's subsequent feelings of suspicion and distrust regarding his Wazir were not born of his spontaneous consciousness of the latter's ambitions. They were the outcome of the persistent machinations of a section of his Deccani courtiers, jealous of Mir Jumla's wealth and very eminence and angry at the consequent exclusiveness in the Mir's attitude.

These malevolent enemies of Mir Jumla endeavoured to undermine the influence of the Wazir in his absence by diligently inciting the Sultan against him. Some contemporary European travellers have referred to rumours of "the improper intimacy" between Mir Jumla and the Queen-Mother and have hinted that the Sultan could not brook this violation of the honour of his family and became alienated from his Wazir. Nizamuddin Ahmad Shirazi, the author of *Hadīqat us Salatin*, observes that Mir Jumla, as the *Sar-i-Khail*, had performed many

services on behalf of the Queen-Mother, and that exchange of presents between them became frequent. But the public nature of such exchanges precludes the possibility of any illicit relation between them. Again, Mir Jumla was away from the Court. Moreover, the general trend of Mir Jumla's character does not warrant the story. So, in the absence of any corroborative evidence in any other class of contemporary sources, it must be regarded as a figment of the imagination of scandal-mongers. As a matter of fact, the estrangement between the two was due to the evil machinations of the jealous courtiers. According to Tavernier, the courtiers told the Sultan "that the power of Mir Jumla should cause him to be suspected; that all his actions tended towards dethroning him and securing the kingdom of Golkonda for his son; and that he must not wait till the evil had grown beyond remedy; and that in order to rid himself of an enemy—the more dangerous because he concealed himself—the shortest way was to poison him."

This view of the brewing of Mir Jumla's rebellion is supported by a letter written by Emperor Shah Jahan to Qutb Shah, after the Mir's appointment as the Mughal Wazir. Herein the Emperor administers a veiled rebuke and casts a satiric fling at Qutb Shah's folly in alienating such an able officer as Mir Jumla and expresses a corresponding elation at his own wisdom in harnessing his services to the cause of the Empire. The Emperor writes: "A useful and experienced official is rare these days, especially a man of the type of Muazzam Khan, who can hold a candle to any able and skilful Wazir of my court. His merit should, therefore, be adequately recognised." Shah-jahan continues: "It is inadvisable to pay heed to the words of the enemies and self-seeking persons, who cannot be expected to perform any duty and do not look to the well-being of their masters, and only have an eye to their own interests and turn our friends into enemies; the protection of one's own life, family and honour is the bounden duty of all".

Signs of friction between the Sultan and his Wazir probably manifested themselves after the Mir's conquest of Gandikota (1650). The war between the two Sultans over the partition of the Karnatak (1651-2), ending in the defeat of Mir Jumla and Adil Shah's subsequent restoration of Gandikota to him and not

to Qutb Shah, might very well be regarded as the beginning of friction between the Sultan of Golkonda and his Wazir. Mir Jumla, disappointed in getting the preferment from the Sultan in return for his services, intended to retain the territories he conquered. If he could accomplish this desire, he would, as the English factors observed, "soon be as great a king as his master." The enraged Sultan then endeavoured to sap the foundations of Mir Jumla's independent or sovereign pretensions by treating the latter's conquests as his own and so dispossessing him of his riches. Inscriptional evidence indicates that down to September, 1653, there was no open rupture between the Sultan and Mir Jumla as the latter was described therein as the former's "agent."

Growing suspicious of Mir Jumla, Qutb Shah began to regard the Wazir "as a dangerous rival rather than an obedient servant" and "eagerly but silently sought an opportunity" to destroy him or remove him from his presence. The unceasing admonitions of his courtiers that the evil must be nipped in the bud before it was too late, added fuel to fire. Though, being surrounded by persons devoted to the Wazir, the Sultan "felt the prudence of concealing his intentions," yet in an unguarded moment he gave vent to his feelings of vengeance against him. The latter, then in the Karnatak, was soon informed of the impending danger by "his own and his wife's relations and friends", who filled every important office at Court.¹

2. *Mir Jumla's Diplomatic Intrigues.*

Aware of his master's wrath, Mir Jumla, a cautious and far-seeing man, felt the need of self-protection even before the

¹ Causes of friction in Bernier, 18; *Adab*, 30a; Waris, 102b; MU. III, 531 (haughtiness); SHN (E. D. VII, 108); Ball's Tavernier, I, 165; *Awangzib* I, 195-6; Gribble, 273;

For Qutb Shah's letter to Persia, Tabrezi, 141b-144a (Pr. IHC, 1941, 606-609); Intimacy with the Queen-Mother, in *Storia* I. 233, Cetrout, 206, Bernier, App. II; Shahjahan's letter to Qutb Shah, GD, (JBORS, Dec, 1940, p. 276); Opinion of English factors (18th Sept, 1654), EFI, IX, 290, xxxiv; Love I, 115; inscriptional evidence, EIM, 1937-38, pp. 52-54.

actual crisis and was not at all willing to pay court to Qutb Shah, "whom he no longer regarded as his master but as the greatest of his enemies". Probably his first natural impulse on becoming aware of the Sultan's suspicions was to be prepared to return to his home country and to forestall Qutb Shah in an endeavour to secure the goodwill of the Court of Iran. About 1653 he wrote two letters of friendship to Khalifa-i-Sultan, the Wazir of Persia, referring to the cultural bonds of affinity existing between them and to the services he had rendered to the Shah. Pinning his hopes on those services, he also sent a petition to Shah Abbas II of Persia, professing sincere attachment and offering to enter the Persian royal service, so that he might safely go back, together with all his accumulated wealth in case the situation in the Karnatak became too hot for him. In reply the Shah expressed his appreciation of his "sincere services," and gave formal assurance of help "at the right moment". But, in reality the Shah, not deeming it politic to openly espouse the cause of a rebellious vassal of a brother-king, advised him at the same time to strengthen the friendly relations with Qutb Shah.²

But this gesture of help from the Shah of Persia came too late, and was too vague to be of any use to Mir Jumla. Moreover, he could not have been under any illusion about the arrival of timely help from Persia. Hence he had to look for shelter nearer his sphere of activities. He first considered the Rayal, his or his master's erstwhile enemy, but the nearest ruler to be the most suitable man to be approached, and so he tried to purchase his support by promising him immunity from invasion. At the same time, as a counterpoise to Qutb's hostility, Mir Jumla had already won over some of his generals and soldiers in the Karnatak. He also offered to transfer his allegiance to Adil Shah of Bijapur and to hold the Karnatak as his gift.³

It was by these "arts of finesse and tricks of diplomacy", that Mir Jumla was defending himself against his master till a completely new turn was given to his policy by the cautious

² *Adab*, 30a; Ball's Tavernier, I. 166; Tabrezi, 70a-73a; RSAS. 154-156; JBORS. XVIII. 190-197; XIX. 87-93.

³ *Adab*, 36b, 39a, 195b-196a; Waris, 119; *Aurangzeb*, I. 197.

and secret overtures of Aurangzeb. Indeed, if he himself had so long approached various powers far and near, in and outside the Deccan, he now came to be courted by the Mughals. To Aurangzeb the co-operation and counsel of the able prime minister of Golkonda was invaluable for the realisation of his secret ambition of conquering that rich state. He had tried to win over Mir Jumla even as early as the capture of Wandiwash. Mir Jumla, too, had probably realised the potentialities of this move and expressed to Aurangzeb's ambassador the hope that "the door of correspondence, friendship and love would always remain open".⁴ Keeping himself informed of the growing estrangement of the Sultan from his minister, Aurangzeb began a secret correspondence with the latter, through Abdul Latif (brother of Muizzulmulk), the Mughal *hajib* at Golkonda. Mir Jumla, so long on the defensive, could now think of taking an offensive against all his recent foes. Smarting under the humiliation of defeat at the hands of Adil Shah, and being forced to receive Gandikota as a gift from him, Mir Jumla had naturally desired to retrieve his lost honour through diplomacy. His refusal to grant a right of passage to Jinji to the Bijapuri general, Khan Muhammad, his intrigues with Mysore and overtures to the Rayal might well be regarded as measures of this diplomacy. But the masterstroke of his policy was his proffered mediation with the Mughals on behalf of the Rayal through correspondence with Aurangzeb. Zahur writes that "Sri Ranga had created trouble in the fort of Vellore, and through correspondence, made Mir Jumla his own *Wakil* and for his own self agreed to pay.....*peshkash* to" the Mughals. Mir Jumla had also taken the responsibility in this affair and he was tempting the Mughals by all means to help the Raja."⁵ About 1653, the Rayal, evidently persuaded by Mir Jumla, sent his confidential Brahman agent, named Srinivas, to Aurangzeb, with a petition addressed to the Emperor, professing willingness to embrace Islam and to remit to him, besides an annual tribute in cash and kind,

⁴ Tabrezi, 74a. There is a letter of Mir Jumla to Khwaja Muinuddin, late Diwan of Dara in reply to Dara's (*Ibid.*, 73a-74a), but the date of it is not certain.

⁵ MN. 453.

50 lakh *huns*, 200 elephants, and some costly jewels, in return for protection of his territories from the aggression of the Sultans.⁶

By such a course of policy Mir Jumla would not only win over the Rayal to stand by him in an emergency, but would gain a diplomatic victory over Adil Shah and avenge himself on his own master, Qutb Shah. To Aurangzeb, Mir Jumla's mediation revealed a vista of new possibilities. The appeal of the Rayal offered him an excellent opportunity to serve the cause of Islam and to put pressure on the two Sultans to disgorge a share of their abundant spoils of war in the Karnatak, in the form of a suitable *pashkash*, which they had not yet paid to the Mughals in return for the imperial sanction of its conquest. Thus the acceptance of the Rayal's offer would mean immense spiritual and material gains for the Empire.⁷ Moreover it increased his chances of seducing Mir Jumla over to his side.

Aurangzeb instructed his *hajib* to ply Mir Jumla, who "had always displayed devotion and submission to the imperial court", with offers of imperial munificence, to persuade him to join the imperial service, and to send a report of his resources and military strength to the Emperor. At the same time it was necessary for Aurangzeb to induce the Emperor to agree to win over Mir Jumla as the Emperor's hands were tied by the 'ahd (or treaties) of 1636, according to which he could not seduce the officers of the Sultans, and as Dara, opposed to Aurangzeb, was trying to persuade the Emperor not to offer any assistance to Mir Jumla. But Aurangzeb pleaded that, though Mir Jumla scrupulously insisted on secrecy, he was sincere in his profession of devotion to the imperial service. Imam Wardi Beg, probably an agent of Mir Jumla, had also previously spoken to the Emperor of his good faith. Finally, convinced of Mir Jumla's "faith in the imperial court", the Emperor became desirous of conciliating him and instructed Aurangzeb to order whatever he considered necessary for the welfare of Mir Jumla and his family, though as yet the Emperor

⁶. *Adab*, 33b, 33b-34a, 54b-55a, (petition); MM. 81a-82b.

⁷. *Adab*, 34a, b.

did not commit himself to appointing him in the imperial service. Aurangzeb therefore offered to send to Mir Jumla a strong imperial squadron so that fears of a hostile combination of the Sultans might not deter him from joining the Mughals.⁸

In the meantime events had moved apace in Golkonda, precipitating quick action on the part of Aurangzeb. When Mir Jumla, in deference to Qutb Shah's summons, once went rather reluctantly to Golkonda, the Sultan conspired with some malicious courtiers to kill the Wazir. Mir Jumla, forewarned by his son, extricated himself with great artifice from the clutches of the Sultan and repaired to the Karnatak, resolving never to visit him again. The Sultan, "learning of his secret resolve", continued calling him back with increasing persistence. But all this only enhanced the Wazir's suspicions and proved unavailing. At last "the curtain was removed from the face of the affair." Qutb Shah openly undertook to imprison and crush his rebel Wazir, who retained the Karnatak conquests, and the Shahi army there.

Believing that Mir Jumla had not been properly approached, the Emperor enquired of Aurangzeb why he had gone to the Karnatak. Aurangzeb reviewed the whole situation and explained that the Mir was compelled to go to the Karnatak, because Mughal support was not yet forthcoming. No body could have hindered him from joining the Mughals, if he had first been assured of it. Mere professions of conciliation, without effective help, proved futile. Aurangzeb evidently felt that the time for quick action had arrived, and sent a letter to Mir Jumla through his officer, Sayyid Ahmad, asking him to openly join the latter and assuring him that he would intercede with the Emperor for

⁸. *Adab*, 30a, 31b, 35a (Dara's allegations), 72a-b, 36b; *Aurangzeb* I. 198-9. Qutb Shah was in a sense justified in his complaint against the Mughal Emperor before the Shah of Persia (1656), "Placing confidence on the *ahdnama*, I did not believe that the Padshah of Hindustan.....would violate it and help this villainous wretch. Outwardly adhering to the pact letters of his *wakils* arrived, calling upon me to drive him away, so that he might not combine with Adil Shah." Tabrezi, 141b-114a, Pr. IHC (1941), 607-8.

saving him from his enemies. On his own initiative Aurangzeb commissioned Muhammad Mumin, who was then, according to the imperial mandate, going to Sri Ranga Rayal, to visit the Mir as well. Mir Jumla now sent a petition to the Emperor for an imperial messenger and it was forwarded by Aurangzeb.⁹

3. *Mission of Muhammad Mumin.*

The news of the appeal of the Rayal to the Emperor, his willingness to accept Islam and the deputation to him of a sagacious Mughal ambassador, Muhammad Mumin Safdarkhani, in 1653-4, caused a flutter in the minds of the Sultans. They feared that they would lose all their recent conquests in the Karnatak. Adil Shah was alarmed into hurrying with his conquests and became fully prepared to take Mir Jumla in his pay. Qutb Shah now tried his best to appease Mir Jumla by restoring to him his posts and *mahals*. But it was too late now. The astute Wazir, already approached by the Mughals, avowed that, after the expiry of two years, he would either attend on Qutb Shah or resign his posts and go on pilgrimage to the holy sanctuaries. But Mir Jumla, as his son and deputy at Haidarabad, Muhammad Amin, assured Aurangzeb sometime afterwards, did not really feel safe under Qutb Shah and had made the above agreement only as it was "good and proper for the occasion." Therefore Aurangzeb suggested to the Emperor that an open gesture of protection would make him join the imperial service now.¹⁰

But it did not prove to be so easy as Aurangzeb had expected. Mir Jumla adopted towards him the same dilatory tactics as towards Qutb Shah. Aurangzeb had exhorted Muhammad Mumin to discuss matters with him, and ply him with hopes and encouragement by all the arts he commanded till he felt satisfied about his willingness to join the Mughals.

⁹. *Adab*, 30a-b, 36b, 72a-b, 72b-73a; Waris, 102a; GD (Alamgir to Qutb Shah), *Aurangzeb*, I. 196.

¹⁰. *Adab*, 34b, 35a, 44a, b; GD (Alamgir to Abdullah). So eager was Aurangzeb to win over Mir Jumla, that even before the arrival of imperial order, he sent a *nishan* and *Khilat* to Mir Muhammad Amin and assured him of royal favours (*Adab*, 44a, 35b, 34b).

Aurangzeb had already endeavoured to prepare the ground by sending Sayyid Ahmad to him and writing to Mir Jumla, flattering him on his 'good faith' and condemning the Sultan's unjust treatment of him. He expected that "after the outward obstacle" was removed Mir Jumla would "not give up the skirt of the Empire," because of the expected benefits. In short, Aurangzeb urged upon him "to open his mind unreservedly" before the ambassador and not to lose the chance of getting a high post in the imperial service. But the shrewd Wazir, apprehending a coalition of the two Sultans against him in case he joined the Mughals, did not commit himself irrevocably without receiving definite terms from the Emperor. He, therefore, after his interview with Muhammad Mumin, decided to submit a secret petition to the Emperor, which Muhammad Mumin sent to Aurangzeb. In forwarding it to the Emperor, Aurangzeb stated that Mir Jumla had not yet accepted any offer of his and begged the Emperor to state the terms of appointment, e. g., his rank, time of bringing him under a suitable escort and the possibility of receiving additional troops for the purpose. But Shahjahan's hesitation in replying to Mir Jumla alarmed him and made him sceptical of the Emperor's intentions. Aurangzeb had therefore to endeavour to lessen Mir Jumla's suspense. Secret messages were exchanged between them by active couriers. An agent of Aurangzeb, carrying his *nishan* to conciliate the Mir, returned after 20 days, together with the latter's reply and 2 footmen. Aurangzeb sent it to the Emperor for orders and replied to Mir Jumla by assuring him of the greatest imperial favours.

At long last, in 1654, the Emperor, yielding to Aurangzeb's repeated importunities, agreed to take Mir Jumla under his protection, only if he would come to the imperial court. He proposed to send a confidential agent with a *farman* to bring Mir Jumla and another, to forbid Qutb Shah to prevent the Wazir and his son from entering the Mughal service.

Mir Jumla now hung back and prayed for a year's respite and that for some very cogent personal reasons. He had to collect his property still lying scattered at different ports. He had to redeem his pledge to his old master. He must feel secure from the fear of reprisal from the Sultans who wanted

him and whom he evaded ; and the secret of his understanding with the Mughals must not be disclosed.

On learning of Mir Jumla's objections, Aurangzeb requested the Emperor not to send any agent with *farmans* and suggested that it would be advisable to await the return of Muhammad Mumin to hear from him the reasons for Mir Jumla's procrastination. He also urged the Emperor to keep these intrigues secret, because if the two Sultans came to know of Mir Jumla's intention, they would "not desist from any pretence or fraud to prevent him from getting this high honour" (i. e. kill him) and it would be difficult to chastise the Sultans, who were combined in this matter. At the same time he advised Mir Jumla (13th Jan. 1655) to quickly dispose of his pending tasks and not to forsake his resolve to come under imperial protection.¹¹

On Muhammad Mumin's return Aurangzeb wrote to the Emperor on the strength of his report : "The truth about Mir Jumla is that he outwardly professes that he has no shelter except the imperial court and that he would start for it, after collecting his property, but from his actions and demeanour it appears that this intention is not from the core of his heart. As he has got hold over a populous kingdom containing forts, ports and mines (besides a strong army, ample resources and able, officers), he has not reconciled himself with his old master and has disgusted the Sultan of Bijapur by declining to enter his service. His profession of submission to the imperial court is just a matter of policy and so long as he can dexterously avert the hostility of the two Sultans, he will not leave that country and turn to any other place Having won over the *Zamindars* of the Karnatak with courtesy and beneficence, and making friendship with *Ikhlas Habshi* Mir Jumla is passing his days with much care and caution."¹²

¹¹. *Adab*, 34b, 35a, b, 44a, 38a, b ; 72a-b ; 72b-73a ; GD (Alamgir to Abdullah) ; MM. 81a-82b, 84a-85b.

For 2 letters of Aurangzeb written to Mir Jumla about this time, see *Adab*, 73a-74a.

¹². *Adab*, 39a ; Cf. *Aurangzeb* I. 200-1. "In fact three kings were now bidding for his services, and he wished to make the most of the circumstances."

In fact Mir Jumla was in a strong diplomatic position. Aurangzeb fully realised it and tried to explain matters to the Emperor. But the conciliatory tone of his correspondence with Mir Jumla even after the return of Muhammad Mumin shows that Aurangzeb could not afford to alienate the shrewd and tactful *Wazir* in spite of his lukewarm attitude. "Remain more steadfast in your desire to serve (the imperial court)", Aurangzeb now wrote to him, "and consider it a means of eternal fortune."¹³

4. *Mir Jumla's intrigues with Ikhlas Khan,
Shahji Bhonsla and the Rayal.*

To neutralise Mir Jumla's strong diplomatic position, the two Sultans counter-intrigued with the Mughals. In Shawwal, 1064 (15th August-12th September, 1654) Aurangzeb asked Mumin to assure Qutb Shah of favours as the Shah had expressed the intention of renewing the old agreements. The Sultan of Bijapur also continued his intrigues. The result was that the Emperor, heavily bribed by the two Sultans, refused to extend the hand of protection to the Rayal. The growing success of the Sultans' counter-intrigues menaced Mir Jumla's safety. These circumstances compelled Mir Jumla to cast his diplomatic net wider. To counterpoise the enmity of Adil Shah, he had already won over Ikhlas Khan, the Abyssinian governor of the Bijapuri Karnatak, and carried on an interesting correspondence with him. He now endeavoured to win over the Maratha leader, Shahji Bhonsla, who had a grievance against Adil Shah, by interceding on his behalf with Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb, hoping to use him against Bijapur, approved of Mir Jumla's assurances of favours to him as "highly proper" and wanted to know from the Mir what Shahji's intentions were, so that he might duly consider them.¹⁴ Again, Mir Jumla had once mediated on behalf of the

¹³. *Adab*, 73b-74a,

¹⁴. For intrigues with Ikhlas, *Tabrezi*, 75a-76b; *Adab*, 39a, 36b; for intrigues with Shahji, *Adab*, 76a-b. Probably Mir Jumla began negotia-

Rayal with the Mughals to feed fat his ancient grudge against Bijapur and Golkonda, and secure his position. But the Emperor, as noted above, had refused to help the Rayal. Mir Jumla, probably to create a second line of defence, now wanted to win over the Rayal again; and so he informed Aurangzeb that the Rayal was sincere in his promises, and requested him to reconsider his case. Aurangzeb replied that though Mir Jumla's earlier reserve about the Rayal had previously prejudiced his case, he would put it up anew before the Emperor.¹⁵

But with all his diplomatic manoeuvres, Mir Jumla could not prevent the contingency he most dreaded. His closely-guarded secret of successful intrigues with the Mughal Emperor leaked out. Aware of his true intentions, the two Sultans determined to combine and send an army against him. Neither of them wanted him to enter the imperial service, together with his vast resources, as he was familiar with the ins and outs of their territories. "It was now Mir Jumla's turn to be as eager as he had been lukewarm before in joining the Mughals." In great alarm he despatched a secret petition in cypher to Aurangzeb, declaring himself as one of "the well-wishers of the court, and seeking the support and help of the nobles of the powerful Empire by fine stratagems." He confessed that he alone was unable to set his own affairs in order and solicited imperial help against the Sultans. In forwarding the translation of his petition, Aurangzeb pressed the Emperor for granting him quick favours.¹⁶

ting with Shahji, even when Muhammad Mumin was in the Karnatak and Aurangzeb wrote to him, approving of the conduct: "To conciliate a person, who, in fear of his own master, expresses a desire to serve in this (imperial) court is necessary for you". (*Adab*, 73b-74a). For Shahji's first rupture with the Bijapur Court in 1644 and subsequent disloyal intrigues, see HSh. 85-87, 16-23.

¹⁵ *Adab*, 44b (Sultans bribing the Mughals), 76a-b.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 40a, 36a, 49a; *Aurangzeb*, I. 201. Re: Qutb Shah's reasons for deferring punishment of Mir Jumla, see Tabrezi, 141b-144a, (Pr. IHC. 1941 *op. cit.*).

5. *Planning of Aurangzeb's Golkonda Campaign.*

The leakage of Mir Jumla's negotiations with the Mughals strained the patience of the Sultan to the utmost limit. He arrested (21st November, 1655) Muhammad Amin, the son and deputy of the absent Wazir, imprisoned him in the fort of Golkonda with his mother and sister and seized their cash and goods.¹⁷

Aurangzeb at once reported it to the Emperor and solicited his permission to take "immediate action as the news was likely to make Mir Jumla alarmed and as the shortsighted Qutbul Mulk might even hurt his son." Indeed, to Aurangzeb, the incident supplied the long-awaited opportunity and a very plausible plea for annexing the rich state of Golkonda. But Golkonda alone was not to satisfy his cupidity. He wanted to absorb the Karnatak as well. In persuading the Emperor not to let slip the opportunity, Aurangzeb wrote to him : "Golconda, together with what Mir Jumla had occupied in the Karnatak, which was not less rich or vast than Golkonda itself and together with the choicest, and rare articles in abundance, jewels, limitless wealth and hidden treasures and numerous world-famous mines, would come into the possession of the Emperor and a total victory would thus fall to the lot of the nobles of the eternal empire contributing to its material and spiritual benefits".¹⁸

On 3rd December, 1655, Shahjahan, on hearing of Mir Jumla's appeal and in accordance with Aurangzeb's request, despatched through Qazi Muhammad Arif (second bakhshi of the *ahadis*), a handsome *Khilat* and a letter-patent to Mir Jumla appointing him a commander of 5,000 *Zat* and 5,000 *Suwar* and his son a commander of 2,000 *Zat* and 2,000 *Suwar* in Mughal imperial service and asking them to come to Court. A letter was also sent to Qutb Shah forbidding him to prevent Mir Jumla and his son from coming to the imperial court, to detain any

¹⁷. *Adab*, 45a ; Ball, I. 166 ; Waris, 109a ; Tabrezi, 12a ; GD. (Alamgir to Qutb Shah) ; see Appendix D, Arrest of Mir Jumla's son.

¹⁸. Ball, I. 166 ; MU. III. 531 ; Waris 102b, 107a ; *Adab*, 45a, 46a.

portion of their property or to interfere with their dependents. These letters were brought to Aurangzeb by Muhammad Sharif Yasawal on 18th December, 1655. Aurangzeb was ordered to send a note to Qutb Shah that as Mir Jumla and his son had been included among imperial servants, Qutb Shah must either release his son or be prepared to meet the invasion of an imperial army.¹⁹

Indeed, the two conspirators, the ambitious Mughal viceroy of the Deccan and the revengeful Persian Wazir of Golkonda, formulated their grand strategy in collaboration with each other. Aurangzeb assured the Mir that "due chastisement would be meted out to that double-dealer (Qutb Shah)..... by rooting him out at the right time in consultation" with him. Mir Jumla was asked in the meanwhile to excite and seduce the *Sar-i-Ishkar* and other officers of Qutb Shah, as their alliance would be a 'valuable asset' and was further instructed to win over the Rayal at the time of his departure from the Karnatak.

The conspirators' plan of action was fixed as follows :—

- (i) Qutb Shah was to be asked to release Mir Jumla's son, and in case he did not,
- (ii) Muhammad Sultan would go to Haidarabad, and release the captive by force, if necessary, and await the arrival of Mir Jumla there.
- (iii) Aurangzeb was to go personally, if Adil Shah came to help Qutb Shah in opposing the release of Muhammad Amin.
- (iv) Mir Jumla was to quickly dispose of his unfinished work in the Karnatak; and after making suitable arrangements for its administration through his trustworthy agents there, he was to start towards Golkonda with his army, artillery and other resources to accomplish the "real motive" i. e. the conquest of Golkonda.

¹⁹ Waris, 102b, 109a; *Adab*, 53b, 76b, 138a, 45a; G.D. (Aurangzeb to Qutb); MU. III. 532; EFL. X. 62-3, 64-5, 46; *Aurangzeb* I. 202-3.

Thus the strategy of Mir Jumla and Aurangzeb lay in the plan of a double attack on Golkonda,—the former marching from the south and the latter from the north. Aurangzeb wrote to Mir Jumla : "I wish not to miss this opportunity of snatching away his kingdom." Indeed, as Aurangzeb pointed out to the Emperor, the advance of Mir Jumla from the Karnatak with a well-equipped army and an excellent park of artillery and numerous elephants presented "a golden opportunity," the like of which might not repeat itself. As the success of the plan doubtless depended on the simultaneity of attack on two fronts, Aurangzeb repeatedly urged on Mir Jumla to keep in view "the time-factor and circumstances," to advance without further delay and to inform him of the progress of his journey, even of the exact date of his arrival in Haidarabad.²⁰

The execution of the plan was the work of Aurangzeb. On 20th December, 1655, he sent a *nishan* to Qutb Shah, rebuking him for having arrested Muhammad Amin "against all principles of fidelity" and ordering him to release immediately the captive and his relatives, restore their confiscated properties and send him along with Mir Abdul Kasim (inspector of the artillery) and Sayyid Ali, the bearers of the *nishan*. The Sultan was warned that Prince Muhammad would invade Golkonda in case of his non-compliance. Qutb Shah, emboldened by Adil Shah's co-operation and as if in utter negligence, left unheeded the imperial *farman* of the 3rd December and Aurangzeb's *nishan* of the 20th. Moreover, he had created disturbances in the country between the frontier of Indur and Haidarabad. So Aurangzeb despatched Muhammad Sultan on 26th December, 1655, against Golkonda and ordered Hadidad Khan, deputy governor of Telingana, to join him with 10,000 men at Nander. He also sent Asadullah, son of Mir Fazlullah, with 500 cavalry to the *zamindar* of

²⁰. *Adab*, 72a, 76b ; 76b-77a ; 79a-b , 79b-80a ; 46b ; Waris, 109a-b ; Tabrezi 141b-144a (Pr. IHC. 1941, *op. cit.*). Tavernier (I. 166.7) refers to the plan of double attack but his statement that the two combined armies surprised the Sultan is not correct. HLR. I. 38-9. (Mir's letter), criticised in Gricble, 273-81.

Chanda, with directions to arrive at that frontier with him and his army, to escort Mir Jumla to the imperial court if he came along that way. Aurangzeb hoped to dispose of the affair quickly if Adil Shah did not create any difficulty. But as Adil Shah was busily engaged in preparing to assist Qutb Shah, Aurangzeb requested the Emperor to approve of his plan of invading Golkonda on the plea of excursion and hunting in case of Qutb Shah's delaying to send Muhammad Amin even after receipt of Aurangzeb's note.

Meanwhile, learning of Muhammad Amin's arrest (24th December) Shahjahan had despatched an express letter to Qutb Shah, to release Muhammad Amin and his family within 2 or 3 days on pain of punishment. On 29th December the Emperor intimated to Aurangzeb his strong belief that Qutb Shah would now release him ; but that taking all points into consideration and also "in order to gratify Aurangzeb", he would sanction the invasion of Golkonda, in case Qutb Shah defied the imperial order. Both these imperial letters reached Aurangzeb on 7th January, 1656. "He now employed finesse to ruin Golkonda. Without giving Qutb Shah time to receive and follow Shah Jahan's letter of 24th December, which explicitly ordered the release of the captives, he declared that the king's refusal to set them free in spite of the Emperor's letter of 3rd December amounted to that flat disobedience of imperial orders which had been laid down as a necessary condition for the invasion of Golkonda." He postponed his own march and commissioned his son to advance towards Haidarabad and to immediately release the prisoners, in case they were still detained.²¹

6. Release of Mir Jumla's son and property.

Qutb Shah, who had not released Muhammad Amin even after getting the news of the arrival of Prince Muhammad

²¹. Aurangzeb's *nishan*, *Adab*, 56b-57a, 45b, 76b-77a ; 'GD (Prince Aurangzeb to Qutb) ; his military arrangements, *Adab*, 45a-b, 76b-77a, 45b-46a, b, 47a, 49a, 50b-51a, 152a-b ; Waris, 109b ; MU. III. 532 ; Tabrezi, 141b-144a ; *Aurangzeb*, I. 203-4 ; Qutb Shah's disturbances, *Adab*, 101b ; Emperor's order, Waris, *op. cit.*, *Adab*, 46a, 79b-80a.

Sultan at Nander (7th January), was at last "roused from the sleep of neglect" on receiving the stern imperial *farman* of 24th December, and after the arrival of the prince within two stages of Haidarabad. He now released Muhammad Amin together with his family, entrusting them to Abdul Latif, Mughal *hajib* at Golkonda, and Abdul Kasim and Sayyid Ali, the ambassadors of Aurangzeb, and sent his submissive explanation to the Emperor through Niyaz Beg and Aziz Beg. Muhammad Amin interviewed the Prince, "his helper," probably on 21st January, at a distance of 12 *kos* from Haidarabad. But as his property had not yet been restored by Qutb Shah, the prince advanced towards the city of Haidarabad. The frightened and unnerved Sultan saved his life by a hurried flight to the castle of Muhammadnagar i. e. Golkonda (22nd January). The Prince arrived at the Husain Sagar Tank on the morning of 23rd January and, as instructed by Aurangzeb, intended to halt there for Mir Jumla to come. As the Bijapuri general Afzal Khan had massed an army within 40 miles of Haidarabad, Aurangzeb, considering delay to be dangerous, started from Nander to Golkonda. He intended to wait there till the arrival of Mir Jumla, so that he might easily annex Golkonda if the Emperor approved of it and if not, he might recover the confiscated property of Mir Jumla, now virtually imperial property and exact the unpaid *peshkash* and a handsome present from Qutb Shah. Qutb Shah, too, in utter helplessness, tried to save himself by appealing through his agent, Mulla Abdus Samad, to the Emperor, Dara and Jahanara. Aurangzeb feared that the Emperor might save him and allow him to occupy Mir Jumla's "spacious kingdom (of the Karnatak) with its forts and riches". But any clemency on the part of the Emperor would take away the plank from beneath Aurangzeb's feet. The march of Mir Jumla would lose all significance. Aurangzeb dreaded such a prospect of letting the "golden opportunity" of accomplishing his "great design" pass away. So he begged the Emperor not to answer Qutb Shah's appeals till the arrival of Mir Jumla's son, especially as Mir Jumla was likely to reach Haidarabad before its agents arrived at the imperial court.

During the Mughal plunder of Haidarabad, Mir Jumla's

son, among others, was deputed by Prince Muhammad Sultan to inspect and guard the furniture and property of Qutb Shah. The latter's envoy, Hakim Nizamuddin Ahmad, was detained in the Mughal camp, evinently as a surety, for the Sultan's delay in restoring Mir Jumla's property. Finally, on January 29, 1656, Qutb Shah restored 11 elephants and 60 horses and other confiscated goods of Mir Jumla to Muhammad Sultan.²²

7. *Arrival of Mir Jumla in Aurangzeb's camp.*

During all these months of siege of Golkonda Aurangzeb was eagerly looking forward to Mir Jumla. Confidential messenger after messenger was sent to him, asking him to advance, lest the opportunity would pass away. But Mir Jumla could not come without first setting his own house in order—that is, providing for the administration of his Karnatak dominions and collecting his scattered goods together. Early in January, 1656, Mir Jumla explained to Aurangzeb the reasons of his delay and requested him to communicate them to the Emperor. Aurangzeb at once (10th January) informed him of the future programme,—that Muhammad Sultan would reach Haidarabad on 18th and that he himself would start on 20th January. He added: "My whole endeavour is that just as Qutbul-mulk had detained Mir Muhammad Amin in Golkonda, we will also do the same to Qutb-ul-mulk. So if you have arranged for the protection of forts and collection of your goods, well and good; otherwise, without caring for any article, and keeping an eye to the time-factor, start for Haidarabad and inform me when you reach there." Even after Qutb Shah had released Muhammad Amin, Aurangzeb urged him to come quickly for "the fulfilment of his real motive" and sent Muhammad Mumin to fetch him holding out promises of securing imperial favours. "Do not be negligent towards the final result of the matter and do not

²². For release of Muhammad Amin, *Adab*, 49a, 48a, 47b, 80b, 105b; Ball, I. 167; Waris, 109b-110a; MU. III. 532; Qutb Shah's plight, Waris 109b, *Adab*, 47a-b, 48b, 49a-50a, 187; Tabrezi 141b-144a; GD. (Dara to Qutb Shah); for interview of Abdus Samad (13th March, 1656) with the Emperor; Restoration of property, Waris 109a, 110a, *Adab*, 49, 50a, 105b; EFL. X. 91; Tabrezi, 141b-144a, Pr. IHC. (1941) *op. cit.*

lose even a single second", he wrote to Mir Jumla. At his own request, again, Aurangzeb sent Mir Abdul Latif to escort him on 11th February. But Mir Jumla's journey, considerably hampered by his artillery, was slow. Days wore on and Mir Jumla did not come. In the meantime as Aurangzeb was gaining victories, Qutb Shah was vigorously pushing on negotiations with the Emperor for peace and sending offers to Aurangzeb too. Exasperated and almost driven to desperation at the prospect of his ambition being frustrated at the time of highest hopes, the impatient Viceroy wrote to his coadjutor early in March: "I want to extirpate him (the Sultan). I trust you are on the way.....Qutb Shah is now craving pardon.....But I wish to hurl him to the wilderness of annihilation.....My longing knows no limit.....You may have patience, I cannot afford to wait further."

At last Aurangzeb's period of eager expectancy ended. Mir Jumla crossed the Krishna on 8th March. On 18th March, Mir Jumla came out of his camp, 8 miles distant from the Husain Sagar tank, to welcome the imperial *farman* and *Khilat* sent through Khwaja Arif on its bank. Then, returning to his camp, Mir Jumla proceeded to meet Aurangzeb, accompanied by his army, consisting of 6,000 cavalry, 15,000 infantry, 150 elephants and an excellent park of artillery together with his goods, cash, materials of furniture, gold-embroidered weapons, diamonds, rubies and other acquisitions, and escorted by Maloji, Nasiri Khan and Mir Shamsuddin, whom the Prince had sent to him. Indeed he came "more as a prince than as a noble." At an auspicious hour on 20th March, a day chosen by the astrologers as lucky for a first visit, he waited on the Prince in his camp at Golkonda, presented a handsome *peshkash*, including 3,000 *Ibrahimis* and received some gifts in return. Aurangzeb took him to his *khilwatkhana* and Mir Jumla received, as it were, "a new lease of life". About a fortnight after the conclusion of peace with Golkonda, Aurangzeb visited Mir Jumla (14th April). The latter's presents to him and his sons (Sultan Muhammad and Muazzam) were worth several lakhs.²³

²³. *Adab*, 49b-50a, 80a-b, 80b-81a, 81a, b, 121b, 101b ; GD (Dara to Qutb) ; Waris 111. a, b, 112a-b (Presents) ; Tabrezi, *op. cit* ; Ball, I. 167 ; MU. III. 534 ; ZNA, 14 ; *Aurangzeb*. I. 214, 217.

CHAPTER IV

MIR JUMLA AS MUGHAL WAZIR

Section A

THE WAZIR AS AN AGENT OF AURANGZEB

1. *Mir Jumla's journey to Delhi and appointment.*

Leaving Haidarabad on 16th April, Mir Jumla accompanied Aurangzeb up to Indur (May 2). A fortnight's close association was necessarily attended with exchange of ideas and formulation of plans for the future, especially in view of a struggle for the imperial throne. Mir Jumla gave a secret pledge of goodwill and concord to Aurangzeb at Indur and was permitted to advance towards the imperial Court, together with his son, escorted by Qazi Arif (3rd May). Here Muhammad Beg, the mace-bearer, brought to Mir Jumla the imperial *farman* of 10th April, conferring on him the title of Muazzam Khan (Exalted Peer).

In deference to an imperial order, summoning him to Delhi, Mir Jumla left Indur for that place on 7th May. During the journey he maintained an active correspondence with Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb congratulated him on his recent honours, and asked him, in compliance with the Emperor's urgent call, to expedite his march to Delhi, and stated that Khwaja Muhammad Arif would meet him at Nander. He also wanted to know whether Mir Jumla had taken Muhammad Amin along with him or left him at Indur and whether he had won over the *Zamindars* of the Karnatak. Mir Muhammad Amin, on coming to Burhanpur, could not start for the imperial *Darbar* owing to excessive rains. On learning (27th June) that Mir Jumla had got a personal letter from the Emperor, Aurangzeb became highly pleased, and wrote to the Mir: ".....My mind's desire came out of the curtain of Fate. I am always eager to see your plans fulfilled and I am not fully satisfied at your present lesser honour. I wish to try for the conferment of further favours on you and I hope

it will materialise in no time, even if it will be the cause of jealousy of enemies. (Verse) Wait till the dawn of your prosperity comes. For this is but the last quarter of the night."¹

Indeed, Aurangzeb, losing one adherent in Sadullah Khan's death, was keenly interested in Mir Jumla's appointment in imperial service, as he wanted to utilise him as a buffer against, and counterpoise to, Dara. Dara, too, endeavoured hard to prevent this preferment of Mir Jumla. But all opposition of Dara's party was overborne by the Emperor's resolve to retrieve his honour in the North-West Frontier with the help of Mir Jumla, and his conviction that he was undoubtedly the right person to recover Qandahar from the Persians.²

Mir Jumla's journey to the capital was as grandiose as it was significant. "Wherever he passed," writes Manucci, then at Delhi, "the Governors of the places came out to greet him, doing him great honour and giving him presents, all by order of the King....(Near Delhi) the greatest commanders were sent out to greet and escort him. Orders were given that all along his route the streets and shops should be decorated in the same manner as done for the king's passing." On 7th July, 1656, the Emperor, hearing of his approach, ordered Qasim Khan *Mir Atish* and Danishmand Khan *Bakhshi* to go to the

¹ For journey and title, Waris, 112b; Tabrezi, *op. cit.*; MU. III. 534-5; *Adab*, 82b, 121b, 122a; *Storia* I. 236-7. (agreement between Aurangzeb and Mir Jumla); EFL. X. 64-5, 68-9 (Army and treasure coming behind with Muhammad Amin). Aqil Khan's statement (p. 14) that Mir Jumla reached Aurangabad along with the imperial army is wrong. For correspondence with Aurangzeb, see *Adab*, 82a-b, 82b, 83a.

² *Adab*, 117a (to Shah Nawaz), 122a (to Mahabat); Manucci's remark (*Storia* I, 237) that the Emperor summoned him to court in order to utilise his services in reconquering Qandahar finds corroboration in a letter of Qabil Khan written to Mir Jumla on the eve of the Bijapur campaign: "It is known from a letter of Ruhullah that if it is decided to come to this side (Bijapur), the march of the imperial army to Kabul will be postponed." (*Adab*, 194b-195a). Letter of Jesson at Agra to Surat, 4th December, 1656. EFL. X. 73. (Qandahar expedition abandoned in favour of Bijapur War). See also HLR. I. 44.

outskirts of the town and escort Mir Jumla. On that "lucky day" he had his audience with the Emperor, who received him well and honoured him by giving him the highest place for sitting in Royal Presence.³

Mir Jumla presented² to the Emperor 1,000 *mohurs* as *nazar* and some precious jewels, including some diamonds of his Karnatak mines. The Emperor gave him a special *khilat*, and a sword studded with gems and increased his rank by *hazar i hazar Suwar* so that he now became a commander of 6,000 *Zat* and 6,000 *Suwar*. The Emperor appointed him the Diwan-i-kul or Diwan-i-Alam i.e. the prime Minister or Diwan of the whole empire, in place of Sadullah Khan, who had died on 7th April, 1656. When Mir Jumla informed Aurangzeb of the imperial favours, the latter expressed pleasure and wrote: "Let God give you the power to please the Emperor, which would mean satisfying God."⁴ Shahjahan himself wrote to Qutb Shah: "Mir Jumla's dignity was daily on the increase through fresh favours." The Emperor was pleased to bestow the Karnatak, as a reward on Mir Jumla, free of tribute for seven years.⁵

In short, the year 1655-'56 formed an important landmark in the career of Mir Jumla. Setting at naught the authority

³ *Storia* I. 236-7; GD. 6b-9b; Tabrezi, 141b-144a (Pr. IHC. 1941. 606-9); MU. III (date wrong).

Mir Jumla arrived at Agra on or about 20th June, and left it for Delhi on 28th. English factory records place his interview with the Emperor on 8th July. EFLX. 68-71.

⁴ Waris, I. 114a, 118a. On Sadullah's death, Rai Raghunath, who was in *daftar-i-Khalsa o tan* officiated as High Diwan for 3 months and given the title of Rai Rayan. Waris, II. 108a; Tabrezi; *op. cit*; GD; ZNA, 14; MU. III. 535; Tavernier I. 170; *Storia* I. 237; TU. 60; QN. 87; *Adab*, 117b, 144b, 190b; 83a-b, 190a. The letter of Jesson (7th May, 1656) to Surat (EFLX. 66-67) states that on the death of Sadullah (8th April) the office of the High Diwan was reserved for Mir Jumla; but that if he was considered unfit for the post, Shaista Khan was to be selected for it. (Agra to Surat, 15th Aug. 1656). EFLX. X. pp. 69-71 and n. See Ball, I. 395-6 (for stone presented to Shahjahan).

⁵ Tabrezi, *ibid*. Letter of Thomas Symonds, August 2, 1656, EFLX. X. 91.

of his feeble master of Golkonda, he was not only able to obtain the possession of the Karnatak as his personal *jagir* with the help of the Mughal Emperor, but was also safe under the latter's sheltering wings against any reprisal from his old and naturally indignant master. Indeed, Mir Jumla's period of apprenticeship or preparation for a successful political career was over. Destiny now raised him to an even more exalted station in a much more secure but wider political sphere.

2. Administration of Revenue and Financial matters.

*Mir Jumla held the office of the diwan for nearly fifteen months,—from his appointment on July 7, 1656, till his dismissal towards the end of September, 1657. Of this period he spent barely five months at Delhi, leaving for the Deccan on 1st December, 1656, and during the remaining ten months he remained busily engaged in the campaign against Bijapur. Throughout his tenure of office as Wazir, whether at the imperial capital or in the field of battle, whether away from Aurangzeb or near him, Mir Jumla was playing the same rôle, the rôle of Aurangzeb's instrument and mouthpiece, his friend, philosopher and guide, safeguarding his interests, both in diplomacy and in war.

About Mir Jumla's handling of administrative problems as *diwan* we know next to nothing. The incidental references gleaned from the *Adab-i-Alamgiri* about a few revenue and financial matters, relate only to the Deccan. Aurangzeb requested Mir Jumla to state before the Emperor, that the income of the district of Ramgir, ceded to the Mughals by Qutb Shah in 1656, was not more than 80,000 *huns* so as to prove the allegations of Qutb Shah, that Muhammad Nasir had agreed to pay 1,20,000 *huns* as its revenue to the government, to be false.

In the administration of the Deccan, Aurangzeb had to face serious financial difficulties, which were increased by his wrangles with the Emperor. The *jagirs* yielded only a fraction of their nominal value. There was an annual deficit, which hit the *jagirdars* hard and rendered the strength of the Deccan army

precarious. Aurangzeb's one suggestion, that *jagirs* in part should be given to him and the higher officers in other provinces, was accepted by the Emperor. But his second proposal that the cash portion of his salary should be paid from Malwa and Surat was not approved. Again, agriculture had been ruined by mis-government for the last few years and prolonged warfare, causing depopulation and ravage. Shahjahan had therefore exhorted Aurangzeb to improve the condition of the peasantry and extend cultivation.

Now Murshid Quli, the diwan of the Deccan, wrote to the Central Government that the *pargana* of Bir yielded only two-thirds of its annual income in 1655 and that an increment was expected next year. The Emperor enquired of the Mir why, if Murshid Quli's report about Bir was true, Shah Beg Khan had preferred to it another *pargana* yielding lesser revenue and even doubted the honesty of Murshid Quli in this matter. So Mir Jumla asked Aurangzeb to explain the reasons of Shah Beg Khan's refusal to take Bir.

In reply Aurangzeb sent separate sheets containing the statistics of the income of the place in the past and the present, so that Mir Jumla might form a correct idea of the whole position; and he stated at the same time that the reason for Shah Beg's refusal to take Bir was not its devastated and uncultivated condition (*Kharabi o birani*) but something else. Shah Beg Khan, summoned from Ahmadnagar to join Aurangzeb in invading Golkonda, had petitioned for one *pargana* for suitable accommodation of his family, instead of several scattered *jagirs*. Again, Aurangzeb found on his return from Golkonda, that the increase in his *mansab* by the conferment of Bir on him was not approved of by the Emperor; so he did not think it advisable to take it away from Shah Beg. In trying to remove the doubts of the Emperor regarding Murshid Quli, Aurangzeb wrote to Mir Jumla: "Murshid Quli Khan is a truthful officer. How can he write an untruth? The good efforts which he is making here do not require special praise. It is a matter of regret that the previous diwans of this province did not perform even hundredth part of what he is doing. He is a very serviceable officer. It will be better if he is not taken to task without cause but is retained in his

post....." Aurangzeb suggested that, if Murshid's conduct was still suspected to be questionable, an officer might be sent by the Emperor to enquire into his actions.

It is further known that Wazir Mir Jumla fixed the salary of Iraj Khan and his brother till the month of Khurdad (3rd Persian month) and Aurangzeb informed Nasiri Khan that this arrangement would continue in future.⁶

According to the Emperor's orders, intended to cope with the deficit budget of the Deccan, "Mir Jumla Jumlat-ul-mulki" wrote to the clerks of the Deccan that any one there whose *mansab* was to be increased or who was to get a new *mansab*, would have half of his salary in *jagir* and the entire amount of his pay only on arrival of the imperial *Sanad*. Since the promulgation of the order, the diwans of the Deccan acted up to it. But the *mansabdars* of the Deccan, hit hard by the order which necessarily delayed payment, repeatedly petitioned to the Emperor, as they were too poor to send their *Wakils* to him. Aurangzeb, conscious of their hardships, had included their complaints in the news-letters. The Emperor was pleased to revise the order, saying that it would not be necessary to await the imperial *Sanad*. The simplified procedure was that the revenue officer of the Deccan would be informed of the Emperor's approval of the (general) recommendation of the *Bakhshi*, and then the balance of half-salary would be paid and the *Sanads* issued locally.

Now, with regard to those *mansabdars*, who were either appointed for the first time or whose ranks had been increased since Aurangzeb's taking charge of the Deccan, and whose names were sent by *Bakhshi* Safi Khan to Aurangzeb's *Wakil* at Delhi, Aurangzeb requested Itiqad Khan, *Bakhshi* of Shahjahan, to verify the names from the records and issue *sanads* after putting imperial seals on them without sending them for imperial confirmation. In future, Aurangzeb proposed to send a separate statement of consideration every month in this way, so that, after being approved of by the Emperor, it would be handed to the

⁶ *Adab*, 82a-b (Ramgir); 86a (Murshid Quli); 153b-154a (Iraj Khan); *Aurangzeb* I. 157-183 (for Deccan administration). *Life of Iraj Khan*, MU. I. 268-72; Tr. I. 685-7.

Wakil (of Aurangzeb). So Aurangzeb asked Itiqad Khan to "try hard in this matter, as it was conducive to the interests of the soldiery and the empire" and as "it relieved men from vexation."⁷

3. *Mir Jumla's patronage.*

As the Prime Minister of the Empire, Mir Jumla came to possess extensive powers of patronage. Aurangzeb wanted him to intercede before the Emperor on behalf of certain officers, whom he specially liked. The Emperor, being displeased with Safi Khan, the Bakhshi of the Deccan, had called him to court and punished him. In recommending his case for reinstatement, Aurangzeb held that the Emperor's displeasure was baseless and his punishment of him unmerited and wrote to the Mir that "the knot might be cut only through your efforts." Aurangzeb also recommended to Mir Jumla the cases of Murshid Quli Khan, the experienced and able diwan of the Deccan, and of Multafat Khan (son of Azam Khan), late diwan of Payanghat, and "a sincere officer", then holding charge of Ahmadnagar (1656).

Munshi Qabil Khan also recommended to the Wazir the case of Adam Khan Kheshgi, a tactful young man and a good soldier. After serving Murad for long, he had joined Bijapur government and discharged his duties efficiently. Aurangzeb summoned him but offered him only a *mansab* of 500 *zat* and 100 *Suwar*. Not satisfied with this, he wanted to go to the imperial court.⁸

4. *Mir Jumla the invaluable ally of Aurangzeb.*

The rise of Mir Jumla to eminence in the imperial court was an index to furtherance of Aurangzeb's own ambitions and plans. Hence Aurangzeb was anxious to know of Mir

⁷. Adab, 127b. Itiqad Khan was the son of Itimad ud Daula and brother of Asaf Khan and the last Bakhshi of Shahjahan. MU.I. 180-82. Tr. I. 714-15.

⁸. Adab, 83a-b (Safi Khan); 193b-194a (Murshid Quli and Multafat); 190b (Adam Khan). Details about Murshid Quli and Multafat in *Aurangzeb* I. 168 ff and fn.

Jumla's affairs and developments in his fortune, which, Aurangzeb assured him, would increase his love for him. Indeed, in letter after letter, written since Mir Jumla's departure from Aurangzeb's camp, the Viceroy of the Deccan gave expression to feelings of deep love and friendship. Aurangzeb advised the Mir to confide in him as his best well-wisher in every matter. That the latter reciprocated these feelings is clear from Aurangzeb's reply to Mir Jumla's letter of September 6, 1656(?) wherein he observed " love and true friendship spring from heart and cannot be expressed in black and white. The sincere intentions which you have expressed and are expressing these days are inspired by your faith in me. I can feel it in my heart of hearts, even though you may not write of it. I know it for certain that all your resolutions are prompted by gratitude. Let God grant you more power (for gratitude)".⁹ This exuberance of feeling proves only one tangible fact that the Wazir Mir Jumla was an invaluable ally of the Viceroy of the Deccan.

5. *Wazir Mir Jumla pitted against Crown-Prince Dara.*

Aurangzeb's object was clearly to utilise the Wazir in furthering his own interests. Shrewdly realising that success in his plans depended on curtailing the influence of Dara in the imperial Court, where Mir Jumla was just a new-comer and as yet without friends, Aurangzeb requested Jahanara to show kindness and consideration for Mir Jumla and help him in every matter. When Jahanara agreed to do so, Aurangzeb advised Mir Jumla that it was imperative for him to secure her support by approaching her through Isa Beg and by thanking her for her "invisible" acts of kindness, and representing to her that he had "no refuge in the imperial court except her favours" and that he had thrown his honour under her care. Besides, Aurangzeb advised him to behave with the nobles there in a seemingly good manner.

The effect of Mir Jumla's presence at Delhi on the course of diplomacy was quickly felt by all. We have seen before, that,

⁹ *Adab*, 81b-82a, 82b, 83a, 84a.b.

while in the Karnatak, Mir Jumla had started negotiations with Shahji Bhonsla, who, having a grievance against his master, the Sultan of Bijapur, had expressed a desire to join the Mughals. Aurangzeb had approved of the assurances given by Mir Jumla to Shahji. Now, after his appointment as the Mughal Wazir, Mir Jumla tried to induce the Emperor to support Shahji as against Bijapur, much to the mortification of Dara. Aurangzeb approved of Mir Jumla's actions and advised him to dispose of the matter quickly by continuing false negotiations with Shahji.

Mir Jumla's defence of Aurangzeb in private discussions with the Emperor against Dara's accusation of having misappropriated the tribute from Bijapur was a pleasant surprise for Aurangzeb. Learning of it from the report of his own *Wakil*, Aurangzeb praised Mir Jumla before his *munshi* Qabil Khan. "My expectations from Mir Jumla are more than this. I know for certain that he would leave no stone unturned for my good, and he will not fail in endeavouring to act even better than what I would say."¹⁰

6. *The Wazir as arbiter between the Emperor and the Deccan Viceroy.*

Mir Jumla's rôle as the agent of Aurangzeb is best illustrated during the latter's wrangles with the Emperor about the Golkonda booty (Zikada, 30th Jalus). The way in which Aurangzeb writes complaining against Shah Jahan's lack of confidence in him, justifying his own conduct, and asking Mir Jumla to plead his case before the Emperor, suggests as if the Wazir was an arbiter in the quarrel between the Emperor and his Viceroy. It was to Mir Jumla that Aurangzeb protested against the Emperor's charge that he and his son had taken costly presents from Qutb Shah without duly reporting the fact. It was at the Mir's suggestion that certain presents, too insignificant to be mentioned and unfit to be offered to the

¹⁰. *Adab*, 84a (Jahanara), 84a-b (Shahji); 190b-191b (support against Dara).

Emperor, had been withheld from the entire *peshkash* worth 1 crore and 15 lakhs of rupees. It was the knowledge of the Emperor's wrangling which had made the Sultan unwilling to remit a handsome *peshkah* in spite of Aurangzeb's pressure. Aurangzeb further explained to the Wazir how he could not carry out his own plan of sending a befitting *peshkash* to the Emperor himself because of the "indecent haste" of the Emperor in having the entire indemnity remitted to him, how the two Sultans had become highly elated at the news of Aurangzeb's discomfiture, and how he finally sent to the imperial court everything, including even the presents to himself (the diamond with a black stain and a ring of ruby not even worth Rs. 4,000/-, seen by Mir Jumla) and to his son. "If I had anything to conceal," he wrote to Mir Jumla, "why would I have shown them (presents) to you..... Why should I grudge to give a few jewels to His Majesty when the jewel of my life itself is at his service?"

To evoke Mir Jumla's interest in the case, Aurangzeb also complained to the Wazir that the Emperor's appropriation of the entire indemnity, including Aurangzeb's due share of the cash, had left him indebted to the extent of 20 lacs of rupees. The Deccan army was clamouring for their 6 months' arrear pay. Any depletion in the army owing to mutiny would render it extremely difficult for Aurangzeb to discharge "the responsibility for imperial service, not to speak of the control of the provinces," including Mir Jumla's Karnatak dominions, especially as Adil Shah was busily engaged in defensive preparations (in anticipation of a Mughal invasion), and as Mir Jumla himself was well aware of the relative strength of the imperial army in the Deccan and that of the armies of the two Sultans. Observing that "the Golkonda campaign had caused only humiliation" for him and his sons, Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to present the whole matter, of which he was aware, to the Emperor as he thought fit.¹¹

¹¹ Adab, 84b-85a, 85a-86a, 90b, 190a-b, 191b-192b (Qabil Khan inducing Mir Jumla).

7. *Discord between Mir Jumla and Aurangzeb.*

The harmony between the two allies was disturbed by certain unpleasant episodes. Aurangzeb was much worried over Mir Jumla's showing to the Emperor a copy of the Secret *ahdnama*, containing Qutb Shah's written promise to make Muhammad Sultan his heir. Again, when Mir Jumla became displeased at Aurangzeb's not holding public or private audiences and at his giving vent to vexation, Aurangzeb hastened to explain to Mir Jumla (through his munshi) that he had plenty of reasons to be mortified (with the Emperor), but that as Mir Jumla "was interested in big affairs, it was not befitting (of him) to look into these private affairs." He did not attend the court because it was then the day of fasting and the building of the *diwan i khas o am* was still incomplete.

Further, Aurangzeb was incensed on learning that Mir Jumla had spoken of Omdatul Mulk Khan Jahan (Shaista Khan) to the Emperor in a slighting manner. For one thing, complaint against a relation of the Emperor was highly unbecoming. For another, if Shaista Khan was transferred from Malwa, a province contiguous to that of Aurangzeb, it would not be beneficial to him. Subsequently, however, when Mir Jumla arranged the matter amicably to Aurangzeb, the latter was pleased to remark : "Though Mir Jumla (*Rukn us Sultanat*, Pillar of the Empire) committed some negligence, it was only human. Now God has crowned him with success in his object. It is not proper to take vengeance on him. He endeavours to strengthen the foundation of our friendship. Both of us should try to keep friendship and develop it."¹²

These incidents were of course sources of a temporary discord, but the Karnatak proved to be a more serious cause of friction, as Mir Jumla even suspected Aurangzeb of being negligent in looking after his *jagirs* there.

¹². *Adab*, 190b-191b (Secret *ahdnama*); 193a-b (Aurangzeb not holding court); 193b-194a and 192b-193a (Shaista Khan).

Section B

FATE OF MIR JUMLA'S KARNATAK DOMINIONS

1. *The Karnatak conferred on Mir Jumla as jagir under the Mughal Empire.*

The rebellion of Mir Jumla against Qutb Shah was over, the Mughal invasion of Haidarabad was suspended, but the question of the ownership of the Karnatak, the root cause of these events, remained undecided, even after the conclusion of a formal peace between Qutb Shah and the Mughals. The Sultan justly wanted to retain that rich and spacious country, as it had been acquired by his servant with his own resources. But, as we have seen before, Aurangzeb coveted it. As early as March, 1656, he had informed the then Wazir Sadullah Khan: "As regards the Karnatak where there are several mines of diamonds and seaports, still under the *gomastas* (agents) of Mir Jumla, and which has been declared imperial territory, action will be taken according to the needs of the situation." By securing the cession of Ramgir (between the Painganga and the Godavari—modern Manikdrug and Chinoor) from Golkonda, he had brought the Mughal province of Telingana closer to the Northern Karnatak and could thus move his army from the one to the other without the need of a long march through Golkonda territory. So Aurangzeb tried to baffle every move of the Sultan to retain the Karnatak.

Even before the arrival of Mir Jumla at Delhi, Qutb Shah intrigued hard to keep possession of it. He petitioned to Shahjahan for favour of his restoring to him the Karnatak and the ancestral fort of Ramgir. He hoped that Aurangzeb would recommend his case before the Emperor and even tried to influence the Emperor through his own daughter. But Aurangzeb asked the Sultan to wait, as consideration of the matter had been deferred till the appointment of Muazzam Khan. Qutb Shah's Delhi ambassador, Mulla Abdus Samad, appealed to the Emperor through Dara. The importunities of the Sultan, sponsored by Dara, melted the heart of the Emperor,

who became inclined towards admitting his claim over the Karnatak "as a supplement to his old territories." Highly incensed at the Sultan's direct appeal without reference to himself or his *Wakil*, Aurangzeb accused him of impertinence and reminded him that the matter would not be taken in hand by the Emperor before the arrival of Mir Jumla at Delhi.¹

Mir Jumla was not the man to permit the Sultan to swallow up his own morsel. Aurangzeb, too, depended on him in counteracting Qutb Shah's intrigues before the Emperor. In letter after letter Aurangzeb instructed the Mir to wean the Emperor over to his side. Immediately on his arrival at Delhi, he was advised to take from the Emperor a *farman* granting the Karnatak to him, and to undo the manoeuvrings of the Sultan, aided by Dara. During the invasion of Haidarabad, Aurangzeb had endeavoured to persuade the Emperor to acquire that fine country, by pointing to its limitless resources and riches. Evidently that had left the Emperor unmoved. But now Mir Jumla kindled the Emperor's cupidity by his speeches and presents, which confirmed Aurangzeb's report. The Emperor, allured by the jewels of Mir Jumla procured from the Karnatak, decided to hold it within the Empire, and conferred it as a reward on Mir Jumla (July, 1656) as his personal *jagir*, held directly from the Emperor, and free of tribute for seven years. Too late did Qutb Shah beg the Emperor to grant the country to him in return for the payment of 15 lakhs of rupees as *peshkash* every year. Aurangzeb now refused to forward his petition to the Emperor, adding sarcastically that he might send it direct. In explaining how the Karnatak was lost by Qutb Shah and gained by Mir Jumla, he wrote to the crest-fallen Sultan. "At the time of the arrival of the imperial army at Haidarabad, I had urged you to present to the Emperor all your choicest jewels and precious things for placating him and fulfilling your objects. But you did not pay heed to it. Mir Jumla, on the other hand, saw the Emperor and presented diamonds, rubies and other jewels and rare curios to him and informed him of every matter...If you had acted according to

1. *Adab*, 102a ; 58a-b, 58b, 58b-59a, 190a ; *Tabrezi*, 2b, 4a ; *GD*, (Bond of Qutb Shah) ; *Aurangzeb*, I. 220. Ramgir circular in the Nizam's dominions. Town 79° 30'E, 18° 47'N (*ASL*. Sh. 40).

my advice, matters would not have come to such a pass. It is useless to say anything on them when they have passed out of control."² Thus at last Mir Jumla got from the Mughal Emperor a confirmation of what he had secured by force.

2. *Reaction on the Deccani Powers.*

The departure of Mir Jumla from the Karnatak and the reduction of his armed forces there gave the signal for all Deccani powers, smarting under feelings of jealousy, frustrated ambition and vengeance, to make a bid for getting a munch out of the rich spoils of the absent owner. The two Sultans, probably in concert, at once began preliminary movements of their respective armies. While Qutb Shah despatched a force to the Northern Karnatak under his general Abdul Jabbar Khan with the professed object of administering and guarding the old territories, Adil Shah asked the *qiladar* of Jinji to nibble at the southernmost part of Mir Jumla's Karnatak territories as early as June, 1656. The Raja of Chandragiri, too, desirous of regaining his lost territories, started his preparations.³ An understanding among all these erstwhile dupes of Mir Jumla, dictated by self-interest and vengeance, was only a question of time, but it was hastened by the bestowal of the Karnatak on Mir Jumla by the Emperor.

The power most vitally affected by it was Qutb Shah. with the final disposal of the question of the ownership of the Karnatak, he realised that the days of pure intrigue were over and that the time for resorting to effective action, to be supplemented by intrigues, if necessary, had come. Emboldened by the machinations of Dara, Qutb Shah now defied Aurangzeb's repeated warnings and persisted in coveting the Karnatak including Kambam and hoped to nullify the imperial grant in practice by adopting a policy of obstruction and subterfuges. Far from recalling his men

² *Adab*, 83a, 190a, 60a, 60b-61a; *Tabrezi*, 141b-144a; Thomas Symonds to Surat (2 August, 1656), EFL. X. 91.

³ Madras letter (7th July, 1656), EFL. *op. cit.*; *Adab*, 88b. (Qutb Shah's activities); 82a-b (Jinji).

from the frontier, he instructed his general, Abdul Jabbar, to hinder the *dakchauki* of Mir Jumla and to pick a quarrel with his agents, causing considerable disorders in the internal administration of the Karnatak. Again before the arrival of imperial officers in the Karnatak, Qutb Shah's men collected the revenues of some *mahals* there.⁴

Much more serious than these pin-pricks of Qutb Shah was the concerted insurrection of the disaffected Hindu *Nayaks* or *Zamindars* and the *Vizadores* or *talliaris* at Pulicat, Poonamallee and San Thome, the *sardars* of the sepoys of the Karnatak under the leadership of the Rayal against their Muslim masters. They "raised the dust of rebellion, closed the roads and interfered with the postal messengers", as Haji Sulaiman, *qiladar* of Gandikota, observed. Whatever might have been the degree of success in Mir Jumla's efforts at consolidation of his power in the Karnatak, his conquest of it did not completely crush the spirit of the Hindus there, while their sentiments were outraged by his plunder of the idol-temples and his oppressions on the people to snatch away their gold. While the movement was instigated by both the Deccani Sultans, the main part of inciting the Rayal and the *zamindars* against the Nawab's officials seems to have been taken by Qutb Shah. It was the presence of his army under Abdul Jabbar in the locality which encouraged the Rajas and largely contributed to the "tumult and commotion" there. Aurangzeb rebuked the Shah: "You have sown the seed of a new disturbance and have made the country over to a group of *zamindars* who came to you at Haidarabad for encouragement and you have sent several officers of yours You have also won over the unfortunate Rayal, and taken some *mahals*, from the *gomastas* of the Khan. You have thus disorganised the country which had been brought under order." The *Chamber's Narrative* also significantly refers to the report that "the King of Gulcondah had lett the country of Carnaticum again to the Roylaes."⁵

⁴ *Adab*, 86a-b, 59b-60a, 87b, 63a-64b; EFL. *op. cit.*

⁵ *Adab*, 192b-193a, 87b, 59b-60a, 69a-b, 62b-63a. Fort St. George to Company (10 Nov. 1656), Love I. 165, 166 and n; Madras to Surat (21 Oct. 1656) and Madras to Bantam (5 Nov. 1656), EFL. X. 91-93, 95, 97; Pr. IHRC. XV. 31-32;

The initial efforts of the Hindus were marked with quick success. By October, 1656, they recovered the whole country round Madras, except the castle of Poonamallee, thanks to Vengum Raja, the father-in-law of Sri Ranga, who even invaded Peddapollum. Mir Sayyid Ali, Mir Jumla's governor of Poonamallee, hastened to Pulicat, where most of the Nawab's riches had been stored. Such reverses adversely affected the morale of the Nawab's party. Collecting the *Talliars* together, Vengum Raja marched towards Pulicat and advised Koneri Chetti, Sri Ranga's general in the regions round Poonamallee, to "gather people together", and seize that country. Koneri captured Bala Rau, the Nawab's Governor of San Thome, Mylapore and Poonamallee, who was betrayed by the *Talliars* near San Thome. The Hindus "pillaged him to his clothes", seized 20 elephants of Mir Jumla and 16 of other Moslem merchants, and brought all of them to Madras as prisoners.

On hearing of these disasters, Tupaki Krishnappa Nayak, the Nawab's general, sent Lingum Nayak, with a party of cavalry and infantry to capture Koneri Chetti, with whom the Nawab's forces had several skirmishes for two or three days near Poonamallee. The failure of the Hindus to capture the castle of Poonamallee was due to the treacherous delay of their general Koneri Chetti, who failed to strike till Mir Jumla's party "had united their forces and formed a body to overpower him." It is probable that after Koneri Chetti had been beaten by the Muhammadans, he was reinforced by Vengum Raja, who had so long besieged Pulicat. But their combined forces proved unable to encounter Lingum Nayak and so the Hindu generals of the Rayal fled to Peddanaikpetta near Madras and sought protection in the fort of Madras with their army, being hotly pursued by the Muhammadans.⁶

Qutb Shah also planned a large-scale assault on Mir Jumla's *jagirs* with the help of Bijapur. As Aurangzeb rebuked him: "You are endeavouring to cause destruction to Bijapur ... Do not persist in such actions. Do not

⁶ EFL. X. 95-98; Love I. 190-1 and n; 166, 167, n; 168, n. Vengum Raja of factory records is to be identified with Pochiraju Venga. SVH. 311.

lead the Bijapuris astray. Open the eye of foresight and clear the haze which shrouds the mirror of mind....."

3. *Attitude of Mir Jumla with regard to the new arrangement.*

Mir Jumla was determined to maintain his conquests, now incorporated in the Mughal empire, but given back to him as *jagir*. We have already seen how he had delayed in joining Aurangzeb in his invasion of Golkonda to make suitable arrangements for the administration of his territories and collecting his goods scattered there. Even after his appointment as Mughal Wazir, he remained deeply concerned about the Karnatak affairs. But, being away from the theatre of action, where the late rivals in ambition and diplomacy had become comrades in arms for partitioning his own dominion among themselves, he was obliged to depend on Aurangzeb for exercising a general supervision, and safeguarding them from his covetous neighbours, while trusting the internal management of his territories to his own lieutenants. In fine, he felt that the dominion, now included within the frontiers of the 'eternal empire,' must be under the protection of its army. From Qabil Khan's assurance to Mir Jumla also it appears that Aurangzeb on his side was fully conscious of his responsibility. So the Mir repeatedly exhorted Aurangzeb to look after his *jagirs* properly, even by sending him directions about all important matters. Mir Jumla was especially very keen about the *dakchauki* and asked the *hajib* of Aurangzeb to arrange it carefully. Aurangzeb, in his turn, complied with his ally's requests often against his own opinion,⁷ and assured him not to be worried. But the growing aggressiveness of Qutb Shah enhanced Mir Jumla's anxiety; and he began to harbour feelings of suspicion that probably Aurangzeb was not taking adequate care of his *jagir*.

⁷. *Adab*, 63a, 64a

⁸. Aurangzeb wanted Muhammad Ishaq, probably an officer of Mir Jumla, to remain with him in the Deccan and discharge the affairs of his master. But he sent him to Delhi, according to the Wazir's request, recommending that a proved and loyal officer like him should be amply rewarded by Mir Jumla (*Adab*, 83 b).

4. *Aurangzeb tries to remove Mir Jumla's suspicions.*

Therefore, Aurangzeb had to try hard to clear the doubts of his ally. It is significant to note that the Viceroy, who often adopted a tone of rude indignation in his dealings with his suspicious father, the Emperor, was courteous and conciliatory beyond measure in his letters to his suspicious but masterful ally. The tone of Aurangzeb's letters of assurance to Mir Jumla was the same. He complained of the perfidy, malevolence and falsehoods of his enemies, instigated by evil counsellors, described the actual disorders and set out in detail the steps adopted by him to set matters a right. To allay Mir Jumla's anxiety, Aurangzeb sent copies of the reports of the spies and petitions of officers and of other well-wishers, copies of his own letters to various persons concerned and copies of his petitions to the Emperor, praying for orders.⁹ But each letter contained a peculiar personal note of supplication, which clearly shows that Aurangzeb could not afford to be haughty in his relations with Mir Jumla. In August, 1656, we find Aurangzeb pathetically taking exception to the attitude of the Wazir as follows: "Keeping your mind in peace through imperial favours, do not think that I am not wishing your good."¹⁰

In some letters Aurangzeb showed how, in spite of being handicapped in the discharge of his duties by the Emperor's lack of confidence in him, he did his best, by raising an army in this province, and urging the "keepers of forts and the frontier officials to be conscious of their duties and responsibilities and be ever vigilant and cautious." Repeatedly did Aurangzeb assure the Wazir that he had never neglected the management of his jagirs in the Karnatak or ceased to administer the necessary dose of threat to the enemies.¹¹

⁹ *Ibid*, 86a-b (Reply to Mir Jumla's letter of 24th July, 1656); 87b, 193b, 194a.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 87a-b. This suggests that Aurangzeb thought that Mir Jumla, now risen to eminence, was forgetting his friendship with Aurangzeb; and a man like Aurangzeb was not likely to forget this, though for the present he had to put up with it. ¶

¹¹ *Ibid*, 88a, 88b-89a, 192b-193a. Munshi Qabil also wrote personal letters to the Wazir assuring him of Aurangzeb's sincerity, *ibid*, 190b-191b, 193b-194a, 195a-b.

5. *Aurangzeb's measures for defending Mir Jumla's
Karnatak dominions.*

In reality Aurangzeb took all necessary and possible steps to guard the Karnatak from the flood of dangers rushing through the gap created by Mir Jumla's departure. He gave adequate instructions to Qabad Beg, Mughal *hajib* at Golkonda, to see to the setting up of the *dakchauki* from Haidarabad to Sidhout. He ordered *diwan* Murshid Quli Khan and a veteran officer, Muhammad Tahir, to warn the *gomastas* of the local *tuyuldars* of the consequences of impeding its work. He made it plain to the aggressive Sultan that he would not allow any change in the *status quo*, any obstruction in the existing administrative arrangements and the enforcement of the *dakchauki*, pending the arrival of the Mir at Delhi. To occupy the Karnatak without imperial sanction, Aurangzeb pointed out to him, would not only be hasty but also unwise. It was bound to generate fumes of trouble, especially because Mir Jumla might adversely construe it before the Emperor. So Aurangzeb urged the Sultan to withdraw his men from the Karnatak frontier, and await imperial orders. But when the Sultan, incited by Dara, and ignoring Aurangzeb's warnings, continued to hinder the *dakchauki*, and did not recall Abdul Jabbar from the Karnatak, even after its bestowal on Mir Jumla, the latter was greatly worried over the consequent disorders in transmission of news. At the orders of the Emperor, with whom the Mir had discussed the matter, Aurangzeb urged the Sultan to recall his men under Abdul Jabbar leaving only a few men for the administration of *mahals*, and sent a contingent under Ismail Beg to organise the *dakchauki*, and to take a letter from the Sultan in the name of Abdul Jabbar and fetch the commander back. Mir Jumla persuaded the Emperor to depute Muhammad Sharif to Haidarabad to regulate the *dakchauki* and also requested Aurangzeb to send a letter to the Sultan through that messenger. Accordingly Aurangzeb warned the Sultan, both by a letter and through Muhammad Sharif (August, 1656), not to neglect the imperial *farman* and defy recent orders.

Again, at Mir Jumla's request, Aurangzeb dismissed Qabad, who was held responsible for the delays in the working of the *dakchauki*, from his post of *hajib*, and appointed in his place Ahmad Beg Najmsani, who was expected to act according to orders and send authentic reports to the Emperor about "the events, the intentions and the needs of the Sultan." Towards the end of 1656 Aurangzeb declared the *dakchauki* of Mir Jumla to be a part of the imperial system as being the best way to safeguard communications.

When Aurangzeb proposed to settle the affair of Kambam, Qutb Shah requested his son-in-law that Ismail Beg might not be despatched there. The Prince forwarded the letter to Aurangzeb, but warned his father-in-law that "any disturbance in the affairs of that country would be the cause of a shaking of your own territories."¹²

Aurangzeb strongly reprimanded the Sultan for inciting the Hindu revolt and exhorted him as follows:—"Write letters of caution to the *zamindars* recall your officers, otherwise you will bite the finger of shame with the teeth of repentance in vain." Learning of the imperial grant of the Karnatak to Mir Jumla, Aurangzeb at once despatched appropriate letters to all persons concerned through Haji Shafi, viz., the Rayal, the *zamindars*, and their generals in the Karnatak, the Mughal officers there (Qazi Muhammad Hashim, Krishna and Khawaja Muhammad Arif, Qabad Beg) and Qutb Shah. A Mughal contingent under Krishna and some officer of Aurangzeb went to Sidhaut and, together with the army of Qazi Muhammad Hashim, defeated Abdul Jabbar. For sometime the Shah, "restrained himself in despair and in loss," Once again, the *dakchauki* began to run as before.

Towards the end of 1656 Aurangzeb threatened Qutb Shah with invasion, if he did not desist from inciting the *zamindars* and recall his officers, from a few *mahals* of the empire which they had seized and send them along with Kamgar Beg.

¹². *Ibid.* 58b, 59a-b, 59b-60a, 193b-194a, 69a-b, 87b, 88b-89a, 190b-191b, 63a-64a, 82b-83a, 83a-b, 86a-b, 82b.

specially appointed for the purpose. He also asked the Sultan to help Kamgar in the realisation of the revenues already collected by his men before.¹³

With regard to Bijapur, Aurangzeb, even before getting on 21st June, 1656, a letter of Mir Jumla containing an account of the Sultan's activities, had arranged that Maluji, whose brother Mir Jumla had recommended before the Emperor for imperial favour, would fight the *qiladar* of Jinji and had asked Maluji's son as well to be on his guard. Realising that charges against Bijapur in the imperial court would be of no avail, Aurangzeb proposed to Mir Jumla to correspond in cypher. He also warned the Sultan through the Mughal *haji* at Bijapur.¹⁴

While Aurangzeb was engaged in taking appropriate military action and writing letters of threat to the Deccani powers, to dam the flood of their activities in Mir Jumla's *jagirs*, he did not neglect to adopt suitable tricks of diplomacy. He kept up a busy but secret correspondence with Shahji Bhonsla, by the advice of Mir Jumla, whom he kept informed of the progress of negotiations. Shahji was to be utilised in protecting the Mir's Karnatak *jagirs* in return for some preferment in order to counter Dara's secret intrigues with the Sultans. He also wrote to him about checking the Hindu revolt, promising rewards, and asked Mir Jumla to write to him personally if he thought necessary. As Shahji expressed willingness to help the Mughals, Aurangzeb requested Mir Jumla to inform him of the orders of the Emperor on Shahji's petition. Probably an attack on Adil Shah's flank by Shahji was contemplated, for Aurangzeb concludes the letter with the following. "It is not my concern at all if the injury on this perfidious person (Adil Shah) becomes irremediable; rather it is very desirable."¹⁵

^{13.} *Ibid*, 62b-63a, 190b-191b (7 letters), 88b-89a, 193b-194a, 87b, 86b, 59b-60a, 63a-64a.

^{14.} *Ibid*, 82a-b, 86a-b.

^{15.} *Ibid*, 88b-89a, 86a-b, 87a-b, 193b-194a.

6. *Mir Jumla's suspicions unjustified.*

Munshi Qabil Khan's assertion that Aurangzeb's measures in the Karnatak dominions of Mir Jumla were too many to be narrated in a letter is not fulsome flattery, but well-merited praise of the Deccan viceroy. In the light of these available materials, the actual steps taken by Aurangzeb, sometimes on his own initiative and sometimes at Mir Jumla's dictation, and the confident and sincere tone of the explanatory assurances offered by Aurangzeb and his *munshi*, one cannot but conclude that Mir Jumla's suspicions of Aurangzeb's good faith were not only unbecoming but baseless too, and that he showed lack of appreciation of the difficulties of Aurangzeb. It is easy to explain the suspicions by the long distance and the inevitable delay in getting news, which must have aggravated the sense of danger in the mind of the Wazir. It is also easy to see that his mental tension remained unrelieved, as the letters, few and far between on account of disorders of the *dakchuki*, usually crossed one another on the way. But it is impossible to justify them. They were, to a large extent, due to the policy followed by the Emperor and the Wazir. Both of them wanted the Viceroy of the Deccan to take the initiative in the matter of Karnatak defence, because he was the man on the spot. But whatever he did, either in the field of diplomacy or military action, was necessarily in the nature of temporary expedients. They were palliatives, not cures. And this was so, because they lacked the sanction of force. For one thing, the army of occupation of the Karnatak was necessarily reduced in strength on the departure of Mir Jumla. For another, circumstances beyond his control were working against him. As we have seen before, Dara's secret abetment of the ambitious designs of Qutb Shah, emboldened him to "stand firm in the field of obstinacy" and to flout Aurangzeb's repeated exhortations and threats. Both the Deccani Sultans were stirred to defiance of Aurangzeb's warnings by Dara's encouragement, the knowledge that the Emperor had no confidence in Aurangzeb and the exaggerated nature of the reports of the Emperor's demand of explanations from him. Aurangzeb

plainly admitted before Mir Jumla: "My speeches and writings are unavailing". He further stated to the Wazir that there was no chance of the fulfilment of the hopes of the successful working of the *dakchauki*, partly because of the obstruction of the *jagirdars* between Indur and Burhanpur and partly because of the lack of sincerity of the men of the *dakchauki*.¹⁸

7. *Scheme of a second Golkonda Campaign rejected by
Mir Jumla.*

In this way, throughout the second half of the year 1656, Aurangzeb tried to disarm Mir Jumla's mind of suspicions as regards his management of the Karnatak. The Viceroy of the Deccan rightly held that the real remedy must come from Delhi. At first he wanted Mir Jumla to "manipulate the affair before the Emperor", by inducing him to send orders to the two Sultans warning them off their evil designs. But gradually the situation passed beyond the stage of showing "mere threats", and the time for applying the direct method of invasion came. He, therefore, emphasised on the Wazir the necessity of adopting a policy of reprisal against the hostile Deccani powers, and of securing the necessary imperial sanction by proper inducements and countermoves against Dara. To crush the formidable Hindu revolt Aurangzeb wanted Mir Jumla to persuade the Emperor to send an *imperial* force for driving away the Qutb Shahi army under Abdul Jabbar from the Karnatak, as "*a mere threat*" would not do. When the situation became precarious, and the Mughal messenger, Haji Shafi, could return from the Karnatak only with great difficulty, Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to seek the Emperor's sanction to come to the Deccan at once before it was too late.

Finally, Aurangzeb suggested to Mir Jumla the plan of downright extirpation of Qutb Shah and so requested him to

¹⁸. EPI. X. 91 (army); *Adab*, 87b, 86a-b, 85a-86a, 87a, 82b-83a; 83a-b.

come at the head of an imperial army. Till then Aurangzeb proposed to raise an army in the Deccan, and if possible, to send it under a reliable captain to Qazi Muhammad Hashim so that they might reach the Karnatak quickly.¹⁷

It is thus clear that Aurangzeb urgently wanted Mir Jumla to lead an invasion of the Deccan. The course of events,—Qutb Shah's interference in his dominions in defiance of successive imperial *farmans* and orders and viceregal *nishans* and threats, the Sultan's instigation of the Hindu revolt, and planning of a large-scale assault with the help of Bijapur, and the difficulty of guarding his jagirs with the small army of occupation,—too, must have made it clear to Mir Jumla, that either he should persuade the Emperor to sanction Aurangzeb's plan of invasion or lose the fruits of his 12 years' toil and endeavour. Having agreed on the fundamental policy of launching an invasion of the Deccan, the two conspirators differed as to the plan. While Aurangzeb wanted Mir Jumla to deal with the Karnatak first, Mir Jumla wanted to begin with Bijapur. Evidently there arose some friction between the two allies on this point. In his suspense the Wazir became worried over what he considered to be the viceroy's hesitation or lack of response. The latter hastened to explain that he had repeatedly acted up to the Wazir's advice. He assured him in the following terms : "How is it possible to show negligence in such an object whose value is beyond calculation ? Besides, how can I agree that such a vast country (the Karnatak) will pass out of hand, causing elation of enemies and your mortification ? God forbid this thought may find a place in my mind. Surprised to know that you have taken this for granted."¹⁸

Thus when it appeared that the problem of the ownership of the Karnatak would again give rise to another offensive in

¹⁷. *Adab*, 86a-b, 87b, 86b-87a ; 192b-193a ; 88b-89a, 194b-195a. The fear of Qutb Shah of an attack on Hyderabad and the Karnatak was thus justified. See Tabrezi 141b-144a [Pr. IHC. (1941), 606-9], 144a-145a.

¹⁸. *Adab*, 88b-89a ; 61a. See Section C for Bijapur.

the Deccan, the death of the Bijapuri Sultan gave a new turn to the affairs and diverted the tide of invasion only against Bijapur.

8. *The Karnatak during Aurangzeb's invasion of
Bijapur in 1557-'58.*

Reserving himself for the Bijapur campaign, Mir Jumla induced the Emperor to sanction the deputation of Shah Beg Khan to the Karnatak to suppress the Hindu revolt, and to overawe the Deccani Sultans by the threat of sending Mir Jumla against them. At the Mir's advice Aurangzeb ordered the Khan to start at once with whatever forces he had then at his disposal, without delaying over collection of the entire army, to gather men on the way and to effect a speedy junction with Qazi Muhammad Hashim and the *gomastas* of Mir Jumla. Shah Beg set out from Bir on 30th November, 1656, reached Indur on 15th December, and proceeded to his destination, avoiding plunder of the Qutb Shahi ryots and injury to the standing crops of Mir Jumla's territories. To relieve the Wazir's anxiety, Aurangzeb sent him the latest despatch of the Qazi in original, together with a report of his own instructions to Shah Beg Khan, who was expected to reach the Karnatak by January 7, 1657.

The deputation of Shah Beg proved effective. Abdul Jabbar retired to Haidarabad. The activities of the "accursed Rayal", whom Aurangzeb wanted to neutralise, and of the other *Zamindars*, were now shifted from Mir Jumla's Karnatak to Bijapuri Karnatak.¹⁹

In the meantime the situation in the Karnatak had become complicated by some boundary disputes between Qutb Shah and Mir Jumla, arising out of the conflicting claims of their respective officers for realisation of revenues in certain places. The Sultan complained to the Emperor that Mir

¹⁹. *Adab*, 91b-92a, 195b-196a, 159a-b, 159b, 195a-b, 159b-160a, 89b-90b, 90b-91a, 89a-b; *Tabrezi*, 144a-145a (Qutb Shah's explanation; Mir Jumla to be sent to the Deccan).

Jumla had not kept his promise of either paying him 4 lakhs of *huns* (20 lakhs of rupees) or allowing him to realise the revenues from his jagirs at Ellore and Rajmandri and other places south of the Kistna, and sought the Emperor's permission to collect the revenue with his own officials.

Mir Jumla was then at Delhi, trying hard to secure the Emperor's approval to the plan of invasion of Bijapur. He now presented a befitting *peshkash* to the Emperor, worth 15 lakhs of rupees (26th Nov. 1656), containing one big piece of diamond weighing 9 *tangs* equivalent to 216 *Surkhs* (or *ratis*) priced at 2,16,000 rupees, besides other valuable jewels and 20 elephants. The Emperor confirmed the Sultan of Golkonda in the possession of the fort of Udgir and its dependencies but asked him not to encroach on Mir Jumla's territories, as the latter had remitted to the Sultan "the revenues of those places and spent a large amount for the upkeep of the forts". The Emperor added: "There are many diamond mines, located the Karnatak..... and of those excavated there, the Khan has made a present of a big diamond weighing 9 *tangs* to me. You have never presented such a diamond as *peshkash* to me. Hence I confer the ownership of those places on him..... You should, therefore, give up the claim of ownership over the Karnatak and its mines. Inexperienced people are unable to protect this country from Adil Shah and the infidels of the Karnatak" In case of transgression of imperial orders, the Emperor proposed to despatch Muhammad Amin Khan with a large army to govern the jagirs of his father, to protect them from the *zamindars* of the Karnatak and to reward him with those countries which he would conquer from them.²⁰

Not satisfied with the Emperor's decision, Qutb Shah took advantage of the Bijapur campaign to renew his aggressions on the Karnatak. He represented to Aurangzeb that Mir Jumla's men wanted to occupy some *mahals* of Udgir and

²⁰ GD. 65-9b (Shah Jahan to Qutb Shah); JBORS. Dec. 1940. pp. 276-77; Waris, 118a; *Storia*, I. 237.

Ellore (81° 12'E. 16° 42'N) is 46 m. S.W. of Rajahmundry; Rajahmundry (81° 48'E 17°N) is on the Godavari; both are in dt. Masulipatam, including the Godavari delta. (ASL Sh. 24, 25).

Kambam, which belonged to Qutb Shah from before and had been assigned to him by the Emperor. Aurangzeb therefore asked Shah Beg Khan (i) to reach the Karnatak soon, and according to the Mir's wish, (ii) to advise Abdul Mabud, an experienced and honest *Bakhshi* and *Waqianavis*, to send a report after enquiry into the dispute, (iii) to settle the matter, with the help of Qazi Muhammed Hashim and (iv) to arrange the *dakchauki* of Mir Jumla. But, when Mir Jumla complained to Aurangzeb that Qutb Shah's officers had shifted their boundary 160 miles into Mir Jumla's *jagir* in the Karnatak, Aurangzeb directed Shah Beg Khan not to send Abdul Mabud at all, but to conduct the enquiry himself. If the Mir's complaint was true, Shah Beg was to see that "not even a *kos* of village remained under the Sultan's occupation."

By July, 1657, Shah Beg found that the Sultan's complaint was false and that "no territory of Udgir, not even a single village had come under the occupation of Mir Jumla." It was only a ruse on the Sultan's part to capture some territories of Mir Jumla in violation of imperial orders. Accordingly Aurangzeb ordered Shah Beg to inform him of the amount of the revenues of the places occupied by the Sultan's army, to restore to Mir Jumla's officers all villages and to disallow any Qutb Shahi men to remain at Udgir except its *qiladar*.²¹

In the meantime Shahji Bhonsla, taking advantage of the preoccupation of the Mughals in Bijapur and the Karnatak, sneakishly endeavoured to snatch away some portions of the Karnatak with the help of Siddi Jauhar, the Abyssinian *qiladar* of Kurnool. But he met "defeat after defeat" at the hands of the imperial officers and Mir Jumla's men, due to the defection of Siddi Jauhar, alarmed by the Mughal victories in Bijapur.

The Bijapur campaign had its repercussions on Mir Jumla's Karnatak dominions in another way. It prevented him from providing adequate succour to his forces near Madras, then dangerously besieged by the local *zamindars*. Fortunately, however, Mir Jumla's general, Tupaki Krishnappa Nayak, made a surprise attack on the Rayal's plundering cavalry. The Rayal

²¹ *Adab*, 160a-b, 89b-90b, 91b-92a, 160b-161a, 161a, 70a-b, 161a-b.

and his "adjutant" Shahji had to retreat to Arni Fort near Jinji. They tried to reinforce their army with the Bijapuris, but could not achieve much success owing to the counter-moves of Tupaki.

With the perceptible improvement in the situation in the Karnatak, Aurangzeb ordered Shah Beg to return, after disposing of the affairs of Kokkanur and Gorumkonda, where Qazi Muhammad Hashim and other imperial officers had been stationed by Aurangzeb.²²

The part played by Mir Jumla in shaping Aurangzeb's policy and actions with regard to the Karnatak was not inconsiderable. True, he showed great nervousness over the whole affair; but while his feelings of suspicion of Aurangzeb's sincerity were—as we have seen before—unjustified, his nervousness was probably natural. No doubt Aurangzeb, being the man on the spot, took the necessary preliminary measures at the approach of every new danger. But Aurangzeb was in a sense afraid of the Wazir and was always keen in giving effect to his suggestions. It was Mir Jumla, who suggested to him the necessary diplomatic tricks (e.g. intrigues with Shahji) and directed him about the movements of troops and postings of officers and prescribed punishments to incompetent officers (e.g. Qabad Beg). Finally, with regard to all measures requiring imperial sanction, Aurangzeb was able to do nothing independently and had perforce to rely on Mir Jumla for inducing the Emperor to approve of an aggressive policy against the Deccan by counteracting the machinations of Dara, always friendly to the Sultans, and opposed to the Viceroy and the Wazir and who wielded a great influence over the Emperor. The task required infinite patience, considerable diplomatic skill and tact, great powers of persuasion, accurate knowledge of the Deccan affairs, and above all, limitless wealth, enabling him to outbid all other offers. Mir Jumla possessed all these

²² *Ibid.* 161b; Tabrezi, 144a-145a; for the Hindu siege of Mir Jumla's men, Madras to Surat (10 Sept. 1657), EFL. X. 136.

Kokkanur is in modern Lingsagar district of Madras. Gorumkonda (78° 40'E, 13° 50'N) is at the southern end of Cuddapah district.

in full measure and he may be regarded without much exaggeration as the brain of the Mughal policy towards the Karnatak in 1656-57.

9. *The Karnatak during the War of Succession and after.*

On the eve of the War of Succession Mir Jumla was collusively imprisoned at Daulatabad by Aurangzeb and his property and artillery were confiscated (January, 1658). His Karnatak dominions, too, were now transferred to the government of Aurangzeb. This change in the theoretical position of the Karnatak was at once attended with an improvement in the state of its internal security. So, before marching northwards (February) Aurangzeb warned Qutb Shah that he must not molest the people, ruin the peasantry and create any disturbance there during the absence of the Mughal army, so that along with the theoretical transfer, the administration of the province might be effective in practice. Aurangzeb also exhorted the Sultan to guard the frontiers of the Karnatak from enemies.²³

But, during Aurangzeb's preoccupation in the north, Qutb Shah wrested Gandikota and Sidhout from Mir Jumla's men, weakened by Aurangzeb's appropriation of his artillery, and completely disorganised the Karnatak. It was only after making himself "the supreme ruler in Hindustan,"²⁴ that Aurangzeb became comparatively free to turn to the Karnatak. He now sharply reprimanded the contumacious Sultan for his hasty and impudent action and ordered him to restore all the captured territories of Mir Jumla, who was about to be released from his mock-prison and appointed viceroy of Khandesh. The Sultan was further ordered not to hinder the *dakchauki* of the Khan running from Haidarabad to the Karnatak and set up according to imperial orders.²⁵

²³. *Adab*, 65a-66b, 71b-72a; *Tabrezi*, 35a.

²⁴. *Aurangzeb*, II 473; first coronation of Aurangzeb took place on 21st July, 1658 (*op. cit.*, 615).

²⁵. *Adab*, 67a-b; *GD*. (Sultan Muhammad to Qutb Shah): *MM*. 92b-94.

Yet Qutb Shah persisted in his aggression. He sent reinforcements to the defenders of the castle of Poonamallee, who had rebelled in August, 1658, but had been besieged and subdued by Mir Jumla's general, Tupaki Krishna. Thus in October, the Golkonda Commander, Quli Beg, not only inflicted a serious defeat on Tupaki, who was wounded and taken prisoner, but even subdued the whole district round Madras, including San Thome.²⁶

After defeating Dara at Ajmir (March, 1659), and during the war with Shuja, Aurangzeb had again to take the Sultan to task for not having given up the idea of occupying Mir Jumla's estates in the Karnatak. The Emperor threatened to depute the Mir at the head of an army to the South after the end of the war in Hindusthan and to annex Golkonda together with the Karnatak. "The Karnatak has been conferred on him (Mir Jumla)", so ran the imperial fiat, "as a reward by way of imperial favours . . . and it cannot be taken away by any one by means of deceits The time has come of uprooting you You will wash your hands of your country." When Shuja left Rajmahal for Tanda, Aurangzeb sent Mir Ahmad Khwafi, entitled Mustafa Khan, to the fort of Gandikota for controlling and administering the Karnatak.²⁷ Thus Aurangzeb's policy towards Mir Jumla's Karnatak pulsated with his needs, preoccupations and fortunes during the war of succession.

After Mir Jumla's appointment as Mughal Wazir and consequential departure from the Karnatak, his agent "Tapa Tap" (? Tabatabai) remained as the custodian of Mir Jumla's interests and property at Masulipatam and Golkonda. Friction arose with Qutb Shah's officers over their seizure of goods on Mir Jumla's ships at the port. To the Emperor's remonstrance against it, on the eve of the Bijapur invasion, Qutb Shah replied : "In accordance with (my) repeated exhortations not one officer of the port has the power (? audacity) to seize, on the plea of 10% duty, the property and goods of Mir Jumla,

²⁶ Fort St. George to Bantam (28 Aug. 1658), and HT. (Series I, Vol. xxiii, 639) in EFI. X. 176.

²⁷ *Adab*, 66b-67a ; AN. 440 ; MA. 27-28.

which are on his ships and which belong to the imperial government, and to wrangle about the matter." The Sultan, however, pleaded that the realisation of customs on the merchandise found on the ships of Mir Jumla and of others was a long standing practice and wished that it might be continued.²⁸

In Golkonda, too, "Tapa Tapps" tried, after his master's death, to evade escheat of his property by the imperial government, by removing some "household stuffs and goods" from Mir Jumla's warehouses, before they were sealed by Aurangzeb's ambassador at Golkonda.²⁹ So great was Mir Jumla's influence in Golkonda, that even four years after his death, his son Muhammad Amin was highly respected there and his agent or broker, "Mier Mameth Hosseyn Taffa Tappa" (Mir Muhammad Husain Tabatabai ?) virtually acted as master of the port.³⁰

²⁸. Tabrezi, 144a-145a.

²⁹. EFI. X. 273-4.

³⁰. Bernier, 195 ; Dutch records in EFI.

In 1661 Krishnappa Nayak, Mir Jumla's governor of Pooleseere Pondicherry), was considered by the Dutch to be powerless to protect them against Shahji, who captured Tegnapatam in 1660-61. BDR. 16th May, 1661. p. 126 quoted in SG. 146.

Section C.

THE BIJAPUR CAMPAIGN OF 1657-58

1. *Initiative in launching the Bijapur expedition taken by Mir Jumla.*

It was during the Wizarat of Mir Jumla that the plan of the Bijapur campaign of 1657-58 was hammered out. True, the details regarding it, like those of the Golkonda campaign of the preceding year, were settled by Mir Jumla and Aurangzeb together. But while the initiative in the case of Golkonda was taken by Aurangzeb, that in the case of Bijapur came from Mir Jumla. We have already seen in the last chapter how Aurangzeb wanted Mir Jumla to secure the Emperor's sanction for an invasion of the Deccan and to deal with the Karnatak first in order to chastise Qutb Shah for his aggressive activities there and to satisfy his suppressed ambition of conquering Golkonda. But the frequently repeated urgent summons of the Viceroy to come at the head of an army to wrest the Karnatak from Qutb Shah were wasted on the Wazir. Mir Jumla thought that Qutb Shah and the Rayal were exhausted volcanoes, not serious enough to deserve immediate attention, that Bijapur was the enemy par excellence, which should be crushed first, and that the chastisement of its Sultan was the necessary pre-requisite for ensuring the defence of the Karnatak and peace in the Deccan peninsula. Probably that is why Mir Jumla advised Aurangzeb to inform the Emperor of the real motives of both the Sultans, so that he might convince the Emperor of the urgency of sanctioning the Bijapur campaign and counteract the peace-moves of Dara. The fact that the Wazir induced the Emperor to send Shah Beg Khan to dispose of the pressing matters in the Karnatak instead of himself going there shows that he reserved himself for the Bijapur campaign on which he had set his heart. Towards the close of October, 1657, Aurangzeb wrote to Mir Jumla : "in this matter, from beginning to end, I have acted on your advice and done nothing.

against it, and after this, the beginning of other matters, too, will be made on your advice,” Again, while it became subsequently necessary for Aurangzeb to conciliate Adil Shah, he observed in a letter to him: “At Mir Jumla’s wicked advice I had attacked your kingdom as well as Golkonda”

Aurangzeb could not but depend on the advice of his confidant and ally, Mir Jumla, because he possessed an unrivalled knowledge of the Deccan affairs. Having risen to power in the Deccan, he was fully conversant with the ins and outs of the Deccani courts and administration and the exact means of winning over the local officers.

Indeed, the two conspirators had, for some time past, been contemplating the subjugation of Bijapur as it was implicated in the subversive activities of Qutb Shah in Mir Jumla’s Karnatak dominions. Even before the death of Muhammad Adil Shah, they had been carrying on correspondence about the necessity of an eventual chastisement of the Bijapur Sultan, for which they thought of preparing the ground by winning over the Bijapuri officers and generals, and securing imperial sanction. The full story of Mir Jumla’s efforts to persuade the Emperor is not known. It is, however, certain that it took about 4 months for him to induce the Emperor to give up his idea of recovering Qandahar from the Persians, and section the plan of his leading an expedition to the Deccan after the death of Adil Shah.¹

2. *The tasks before Mir Jumla.*

Learning of the death of Muhammad Adil Shah (4th November, 1656) and the elevation of his son, Ali Adil Shah II, from Muhammad Aman, the Mughal *kajib* at Bijapur, on 10th November, Aurangzeb at once informed the Emperor of it, soliciting his permission to launch an expedition against Bijapur. To Mir Jumla he wrote: “If the news about (the death of the Sultan of) Bijapur proves to be true, and the plan of that side, which is necessary for the success of that big

¹ Mir’s reasons, *Adab*, 89b-90, 88b-89a, 200a-b, 162-3, 88a-b. cf. MU. III. 535. Persuasion of the Emperor, *Adab*, 88a; Qandahar expedition postponed, *Storia* I. see *ante*, p. 90 & n; EFL. X. 73, 64; Ball, I. 395-6.

undertaking be such that the matter may be well-accomplished, you will place these matters before the Emperor and do what is necessary for this work."

Thus the task before Mir Jumla was now twofold. He had to induce the Emperor to sanction the plan of invasion by counteracting Dara's moves, and also secure for Aurangzeb that complete authority and control over men and resources which the Viceroy had demanded. Indeed, Dara, fearing that Aurangzeb's position would be strengthened by the adhesion of the invading army under Mir Jumla, wanted to take away the plank from beneath Aurangzeb's feet by suggesting that the Emperor should lead the Deccan expedition. When Aurangzeb's plan of summoning the army of Malwa, then under Shaista Khan, was foiled by Dara's intrigues, the Viceroy requested Mir Jumla to dexterously persuade the Emperor immediately to send the Malwa army or to bring at least a part of it with himself, the rest coming with the Emperor. "It is necessary", he wrote to Mir Jumla, "to bring the army of Malwa". Aurangzeb's exasperation is clearly expressed in his appeal to the Wazir to come: "Such sorts of hindrances can be remedied very easily. But to neglect to make *tadbir* (careful manoeuvring) to remove the cause of the big hindrances is not wise. See that *you* are included in the imperial army; rather it is difficult to prosecute the matter without you. Without you it would not be possible to continue this work, and obtain its results."

So Aurangzeb held that the speedy arrival of Mir Jumla in the Deccan was the first requisite for the success of the campaign. In letter after letter Aurangzeb exhorted the Wazir to come quickly without delay so that the opportunity might not slip away. About the middle of December, 1656, Aurangzeb again wrote to the Mir: "My eagerness to meet you is indescribable. Come soon, as it is not desirable to defer the disposal of this matter and time is passing away. The sooner it is done the better."²

² Waris, 118a; *Adab*, 88a-b, 88a; *Storia*, I. 238 (Dara's suggestion), 89b, 89a-b (Aurangzeb's views), 195a-b; GD. (Aurangzeb to Qutb).

The second condition of success in the Bijapur invasion was the possession of an efficient artillery. In accordance with the Emperor's orders, Mir Jumla informed Aurangzeb that a few cannon should be sent to the frontier of Bijapur from the forts of the Deccan. As there were big pieces of artillery only in the Daulatabad fort, Aurangzeb ordered Mir Shamsuddin, *darogha* of imperial artillery, to inspect them there. He informed Aurangzeb that there was only one big cannon which might be of use, but it was very difficult to bring it and even in that case it would not be of much effect. Moreover, the artillery of other forts in the Mughal Deccan was also considered to be insufficient to demolish the fortifications of the Golkonda fort and some other forts. So Aurangzeb requested Mir Jumla that, if he really "wished to prosecute this matter" and come to the Deccan, he should bring his own artillery with him with the Emperor's permission. The Mir was also asked to communicate to him the Emperor's views on the matter. Indeed the Wazir's artillery was an indispensable material for success in this enterprise and as it had not then passed beyond Nander, it could be easily brought back from there. Later on, after getting news of Mir Jumla's arrival, Aurangzeb asked him to send his artillery towards Dharur.

It was also necessary to have in the army captains of tried loyalty and efficiency. Realising that "no reliance could be placed on friendship of anyone now", Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to bring some officers along with him. viz., Shah Nawaz Khan and Mirza Muhammad Mashhadi, who had been summoned to court, and whose connection with Aurangzeb was not unknown to the Mir, and also Saifuddin (son of Tarbiyat Khan deceased), *darogha* of the imperial *gur-khana*.²

3. *The Bijapuri officers and army seduced by Mir Jumla and Aurangzeb.*

Meanwhile Aurangzeb was busy seducing the Bijapuri officers. Though Mir Jumla had not yet arrived in the Deccan,

² *Adab*, 89b-90b, 89a, 194b-195a, 90a. Dharur (76°10'E, 18°45'N.) is in the Nizam's dominions (ASI. Sh. 36).

his experience in intriguing at the Deccan courts stood Aurangzeb in good stead in this matter. First of all, the Bijapuri Wazir, *Khan-i-Khanan* Muzaffaruddin Ikhlas Khan, was easily won over.

But Mulla Ahmad Natia of Bijapur proved a harder nut to crack. As early as July, 1656, Aurangzeb had asked Mir Jumla, who had a great friendship with the Mulla, to placate him. As the Mulla was "after misleading his master", and was opposed to any diplomatic overtures with the Mughals, Mir Jumla wrote some letters to the Mulla to persuade him to adopt a pro-Mughal attitude. About December Aurangzeb not only assured Mulla Ahmad but took the help of Ikhlas Khan and it was at the latter's advice that the Mulla visited the Mughal ambassador at Bijapur and expressed a desire to join Aurangzeb. However, Aurangzeb distrusted him and decided to wait till the coming of Mir Jumla. "What you think seasonable after your arrival will be done", he wrote to the Mir.

Moreover, Siddi Jauhar of Kurnool, who had ravaged some villages of Mir Jumla's Karnatak dominions (? Kokkanur and Gorumkunda), expressed repentance and agreed to join Aurangzeb.

Towards the beginning of December, 1656, Aurangzeb informed Mir Jumla of his measures for winning over Shivaji. The latter's agent waited on Aurangzeb, proposing that if the Maratha leader was allowed to hold the Bijapuri Konkan which was under him and given a good *mansab* and that country was given as its *tankhwa* (pay), he would transfer it to the empire. Aurangzeb agreed to his requests on certain conditions and also informed Shahji of the same terms. He also assured Mir Jumla that he would inform him on getting his reply. "If they followed our commands," wrote Aurangzeb, "well and good, otherwise, they would suffer punishment at the hands of the imperial army."

The dissensions among the Bijapuri officers following the death of Muhammad Adil Shah enabled the Mughals to easily win over the Bijapuri soldiers. "My whole endeavour" Aurangzeb wrote to Mir Jumla (on or some time after 23rd

December) "is to see that the Bijapuris come to this side by any means, so that the famous generals will themselves come over to us even with a little encouragement." Ghazi Khan, son of Randaulah Khan, Abdul Qadir Dhaktu and Shaikh Mustafa Junaidi, Haji Khan Miapa, Yasowant, Mustafa Khan and several other leading captains of Bijapur promised to join Aurangzeb, who hoped to seduce several other high nobles with the help of Mir Jumla after his arrival.⁴

The necessity of seducing the Bijapuris as a convenient means of scattering the Bijapur army naturally raised the question of finance. "It is imperative," Aurangzeb urged, "to conciliate the deserters from Bijapur; without money such big matters cannot be accomplished, and without exciting their cupidity they cannot be won over." Aurangzeb therefore sent an account of the state of the public money in the Deccan to Mir Jumla. The Emperor had forbidden and expenditure from the reserves of 20 lakhs in the Daulatabad and Asir forts; and the 30 lakhs stored in other forts would not suffice to meet even a year's expenditure of the Mughal Deccan. So the Viceroy asked the Wazir, as one who knew "this affair better than any one else," to secure the Emperor's permission to spend the Golkonda indemnity of 10 lakhs of rupees, then stored at Daulatabad, in defraying the cost of "some urgent works" i.e., to use the amount for offering bribes to the Bijapuris.⁵

4. *Mir Jumla starts for the Deccan.*

The tactful Wazir acted adroitly according to Aurangzeb's advice and succeeded in baffling all the hostile moves of Dara. The Wazir gave a suitable present to the Emperor, and convinced him that the conquest of the Deccan would be an easy task by personally undertaking the responsibility for it. Lured by the dazzling prospects of possessing the diamond mines of the Deccan, the Emperor over-ruled the objections of

⁴ For Khan Muhammad, *Adab*, 91a-92b; for Mulla Ahmad, *ibid*, 193a-b, 87b-88a, 91b-92a; *Aurangzib*, I. 263-4; for Siddi Jauhar, *Adab*, 87b-88a, 89b-90b; for others, *ibid*, 90b-91a, *Aurangzib*, I. 235-6.

⁵ Golkonda indemnity collected by Haji Ahmad Said (about Dec. 1656). *Adab*, 195a-b; 191b; *Waris* 121b; *Aurangzib*, I. 339-40. n.

Dara and Jahanara. Instead of leading the expedition himself as suggested by Dara, the Emperor sanctioned the invasion on November 26, and allowed Aurangzeb full power to proceed in the matter as he thought best.

Mir Jumla gained Aurangzeb's point against Dara even as regards the despatch of the Malwa army. The Emperor ordered Khan Jahan Shaista Khan to hasten to Daulatabad and await the arrival of Aurangzeb there. The Wazir was one of those officers, *amirs* and *mansabdars* who got permission to reinforce the Viceroy direct from the Emperor.

On the same day the Wazir's son, Muhammad Amin, was ordered to officiate as *diwan* till the return of his father with his rank (of 3,000 *Zat* and 1,000 *Suwar*) increased by 1,000 *Zat*.

Thus Mir Jumla's victory over Dara in the game of diplomacy seemed to have been complete. But the Crown Prince's eleventh hour manoeuvres considerably dimmed the lustre of his opponent's success. The Wazir had to leave his son, Muhammad Amin and the rest of his family as hostages at Court. Again, if we believe Manucci, three days before Mir Jumla's departure, Dara bought off 80 of his European artillerymen⁶.

Mir Jumla left Delhi for the Deccan on December 1, 1656, and arrived at Aurangabad on January 18, 1657. His slow advance was largely due to the fact that the *mansabdars* did not promptly join him. Aurangzeb advised Mir Jumla not to wait for the reinforcements from Northern India, as the majority of the auxiliaries were not expected to reach Aurangzeb before 19th February, 1657.⁷

Aurangzeb was getting perturbed over Mir Jumla's delay. Feeling that he could not wait for him any longer without missing his chance, he asked the Wazir to come quickly as the time for his march on Bijapur was near at hand. In his reply

⁶ *Storia* I. 238 (objections of Dara and Jahanara); 239n; 226; ZNA. 15; Waris 118a, b; EFL. X. 73, 74 (Mir's presents to the Emperor); SHN; *Adab* 195b-196a (case of Rayal's presents to the Mir), 152b; Tabrezi 141b-144a.

⁷ *Adab*, 117b-118a, 145b, 152b, 89b-90b, 90b-91a, 91a-b, 92a; *Aurangzeb*, I. 238.

to Mir Jumla's letter of 24th December, written from Kularas, Aurangzeb stressed the desirability of immediate action so as to take full advantage of certain factors then working against Bijapur, viz., (i) mutual jealousies among the common soldiers and captains of Bijapur especially between Khan Muhammad, Afzal, Fateh Sarnaubat and the sons of Bahlol, (ii) the advance of the *Zamindars* of the Karnatak, who had released their own territories from the control of Bijapur, and (iii) the rebellion of Shahji Bhonsla, who, with a view to establishing his own authority, had created disturbances and occupied some *mahals* of the Karnatak, and had entered into a league with Sri Ranga Rayal. "I am unable to make any further delay", the Viceroy urged upon the Wazir, "such an opportunity will not come again. Come very quickly, so that we together might accomplish this task. Do not delay. Remember I am ardently looking up for your arrival here." Indeed, in his intense eagerness to meet the Wazir, Aurangzeb asked the astrologers to fix dates for his arrival and urged on him to come accordingly.⁸

5. *Aurangzeb decides to march against Bijapur.*

The inability of Mir Jumla to arrive in time left the Viceroy of the Deccan in great suspense regarding the possibility of carrying out the Emperor's orders. The astrologers had fixed 8th January as the date of Aurangzeb's march against Bijapur. By the middle of December it became clear that Mir Jumla would not be able to join Aurangzeb in time. Nevertheless, Aurangzeb, doubting whether "such a chance would come again", wanted to conquer Bijapur first and punish Qutb Shah subsequently for snatching away the Karnatak territories of Mir Jumla, as Golkonda might be seized whenever he desired. The Viceroy did not consider it prudent to start alone. He informed Mir Jumla that he would engage in hunting (at Ramdwah towards Bijapur frontier) till his arrival and might postpone the date

⁸ *Adab*, 91a-b, 91b-92a; 196a-b; (either 18th or 23rd January or any other convenient date).

of expedition in case of the Wazir's inability to arrive in time. About the middle of January, 1657, Aurangzeb learnt that Mir Jumla would arrive on 18th January, and at once informed him that the direction of expedition would be fixed after consultation with him. Aurangzeb proposed that, on the very day of his first interview with Aurangzeb, Mir Jumla should start and accompany the prince on hunting and discuss the matter on the way. If it was settled to go towards Bijapur, well and good; otherwise they would turn towards Golkonda.⁹

6. *Role of Mir Jumla in the Bijapur Campaign.*

On 18th January, 1657, Mir Jumla arrived at Aurangabad and on the very same day proceeded, along with Aurangzeb, to invade Bijapur. The advance of the imperial army, encumbered with heavy artillery and siege materials, was slow. They reached Andur on 28th February, and leaving Wali Mahaldar Khan there to guard the road and arrange for provisions, encamped near the fort of Bidar.¹⁰

The impregnable fort of Bidar, control over which was "the key to the conquest of the Deccan and the Karnatak," was defended by its veteran *giladar*, Siddi Marjan, and he had effectively strengthened its battlements and fortifications, and regulated ingress and egress. Along with Aurangzeb Mir Jumla inspected the fort, and threw up entrenchments outside. In the teeth of deadly artillery fire from the fort on their defenders, Mir Jumla succeeded in carrying the cannon in two days to the edge of the ditch and began to fill it up. The Bijapuris

* *Adab*, 89b-90b (Emperor's instructions), 196b-197a (date of starting for Bijapur), 197a(hunting), 117b-118a, 145b, 152b.

¹⁰ AS. 2b. Chandor in the text is 70 miles N.W. of Aurangabad and entirely out of the way in proceeding towards Bidar. The place is evidently Andur, c. 10 miles west of Bidar (ASL Sh. 33). See *Adab*, 109b, for the date of arriving here.

The Sultan of Golkonda, apprehending that the invasion of Mir Jumla was directed against himself, made a pathetic appeal to the Shah of Persia for help, on ground of religious affinity, and offered to pay the expenses of a Persian contingent. Tabrezi; 141b-144a.

successively attacked the entrenchments of the invaders, but were repulsed with heavy casualties. Finally the Mughals damaged two bastions by their artillery discharges and destroyed the battlements of the lower part of the walls. On 29th March, 1657, Muhammad Murad scaled the walls of the tower opposite Mir Jumla's *malchar*. Wounded by the explosion of a powder-magazine, on which had fallen a spark from a rocket thrown by Mir Jumla's artillerymen, Siddi Marjan surrendered the fort.¹¹

After the capture of Bidar Mir Jumla remained with Aurangzeb when Mahabat Khan was deputed to ravage Bijapur territory and clear the road of hovering Bijapuris. Leaving Bidar on 27th April, Mir Jumla came with Aurangzeb to Kalyani, 40 miles west, on 3rd May. The same day they inspected the bastion and fortifications of the city and invested it. In spite of the artillery discharges of the enemy, Mir Jumla and other nobles began raising the entrenchments and *damdama* (raised battery) and were determined to reach the fort by any means. The defenders launched a heavy attack on Mir Jumla's entrenchments but had to retire after sometime with several casualties. Their hail of *top* and *tufang* took a heavy toll on Mughal soldiers. But Mir Jumla with great care, effort and supervision, carried the trenches to the edge of the ditch and thereby weakened the position of the defenders (12th May). At the same time the ditch was steadily filled up during night. By 23rd May, three-fourths of the ditch were filled up and the fort was on the point of being captured. As Aurangzeb concentrated on capturing the fort, the Bijapuris endeavoured to divert the attention of the besiegers from it. When a force of 30,000 Bijapuris advanced to 4 miles of the Mughal camp, Aurangzeb marched upon them on 28th May, leaving a screen of tents round the fort. The Mughal Van under Mir Jumla, Najabat Khan, Sujan Singh Bundela, Dilir Khan and others faced the Adil Shahi Van under the valorous sons of Bahlol, fighting obstinately. As the Mughals firmly stood their ground in the face of a

¹¹ AS. 2b-3a : BS. 365 ; *Adab*, 110a-b ; ZNA. 15-16.

general attack on all sides, the Adil Shahis attempted to advance against them but were barred by the dashing Mughal cavalry. In the meantime Mir Jumla, along with Shah Nawaz Khan, Rao Chattarsal, Shamsuddin Kheshgi, and Mahabat Khan, had attacked the enemy from right and left, and, by dexterous charges broke the enemy's rank.

The protection of the siege trenches demanded that the Mughals should return to the fort in the evening. For, the garrison, "by hurling down lighted gunpowder and burning naphtha and grass (bundles) reduced the plants (with which the ditch was filled) to ashes; the work of bridging the ditch had to be begun anew; the assault was delayed." Orders were given for filling up the ditch with stones and mud. On 22nd July, 1657, Aurangzeb sent his eldest son with Mir Jumla, Najabat Khan, Rao Chattarsal, Mirza Sultan, and Dilir Khan against a resolute band of Adil Shahi defenders, undaunted by defeats. Sighting the enemy's banner after an advance of 48 miles, the Mughal corps darted like lightning on the centre of the Adil Shahi force and, driving them back, pursued them for 4 miles. As the victors marched, they burnt and looted all the villages on both sides and at the end of day they reached the *gasba* of Kulbarga where they swept the whole country "with the broomstick of plunder", but spared the tomb of saint Sayyid Gisu Daraz.

At last the ditch was filled up with stone and mud, the bastions were destroyed by Mir Jumla's artillery fire on 9th July, and the imperialists scaled a tower. Dilawwar Habshi, the defender of the fort, capitulated on 31st July and on 1st August, 1657, he delivered the keys of the fort to the victors.

The Emperor suitably rewarded Aurangzeb and several officers. Mir Jumla was honoured with a special robe and was confirmed in the possession of some *mahals* of the Karnatak province, yielding a revenue of 4 crores of *dams*.²

¹². AS. 3a-5a, 5b (rewards to Mir Jumla); MM. 86a-87a; ZNA, 15; BS. 465; *Storia* I. 239; EFL. X. 135-6. *Aurangzib* I. 248.

Section D.

MIR JUMLA HURLED FROM OFFICE

1. *Mir Jumla removed from the Wizarat.*

While the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan and his ally, Wazir Mir Jumla, were nearing the meridian of their victory in Bijapur, certain events had been brewing at Delhi which were destined to arrest their advance. The seesaw of Mughal court politics had begun to work. The Bijapuris had appealed to Dara, whose jealousy of Aurangzeb had been rising in proportion to the latter's success. The Emperor, who had sanctioned the campaign at the persuasion of Mir Jumla, now ordered peace at the intercession of Dara. The imperial order fell like a bomb-shell on Aurangzeb, whose ambition was once more throttled at the hour of victory, as in the preceding year, as well as on Mir Jumla, whose work of wiping out the kingdom of Bijapur was undone. By the treaty of August, 1657, the Sultan of Bijapur agreed to pay an indemnity and to cede Parenda together with its dependencies and the forts of the Nizamshahi Konkan and the *mahal* of Wangi. It was arranged that Mir Jumla was to establish *thanas* (military outposts) in Parenda, the Nizamshahi Konkan and Wangi and then to come back to the imperial court after the realisation of the indemnity to be collected by Qazi Nizama. Aurangzeb was ordered to return to Bidar after deputing Mir Jumla to take charge of the forts of the Konkan.¹

A worse humiliation was in store for Mir Jumla. Shah-jahan fell ill (6th September) and nominated Dara as his successor. Dara could no longer afford to retain the trusted adherent of his rival as the Wazir. Towards the end of September, 1657, Mir Jumla was removed from the exalted office of the Wazir for having acted against certain orders.

¹ AN. 83; AS. 5b; *Adab*, 112b, 198b; MU. III. 536; EFI. X. 118-119.

His son, Muhammad Amin Khan, who had been acting as his deputy as diwan was forbidden to go to the office. While some officers like Mahabat Khan and Rao Chhatarsal were ordered to come back immediately from the Deccan to the court, Mir Jumla was commanded to return after securing the surrender of Parenda.²

2. *Mir Jumla sent to Parenda.*

Dara could hurl Mir Jumla from power but not from Aurangzeb's confidence. In fact, Aurangzeb, tormented by anxiety and perplexed by contradictory projects, had now to depend totally on Mir Jumla, just as an old and decrepit person leans on his staff. Before retreating from Kalyani to Bidar on 4th October, 1657, Aurangzeb sent Mir Jumla towards the fort of Parenda on 30th September to take delivery of it, and instructed him to supervise Qazi Nizama's collection of war-indemnity at Bijapur and to recall those jewels and elephants already paid to him till then for calculation of their value.

Before leaving for Parenda, Mir Jumla advised Aurangzeb in long and private deliberations "on every possible contingency in anticipation". Even after his departure Aurangzeb corresponded with him almost daily and confidential officers and servants like Shaikh Mir, Abul Fath (Qabil Khan), Muhammad Sharif and the page of Krishna served as the intermediaries in the lively exchange of oral and written messages between the two allies.³ Aurangzeb instructed Mir Jumla to arrange for the administration of Parenda after its occupation and also to defend Bir against Shivaji's sudden raids, when that district was left vacant by Nasiri Khan's departure for Delhi. Towards the end of October, 1657, Aurangzeb solicited Mir Jumla's opinion as regards sending an army against Shivaji, whose men had driven back to

² AS. 6a, b, 7b, 10a, b; ZNA. 16; AN. 29; MA. 3.

³ Adab, 157a, 169a, 92a-b, 92b, 199a-b 200a-b; Aurangzeb, I. 253, 311-8.

Junmar its new Mughal faujdar, Muhammad Yusuf, who, advancing to a place beyond Kalyani by a forced march, had beheaded a rebel leader named Habsh Khan, aided by Shivaji.⁴

Mir Jumla's task was far from easy and Aurangzeb's initial hopes of a smooth and early occupation of Parendā were soon belied. The latter's retreat from Kalyani emboldened the Bijapuris to attack isolated Mughal bands and their general, Afzal Khan, crossed the Bhima river with a view to recovering the Kalyani and Bidar districts. The Mughal collectors at the *mauzas* of Naldrug, especially at Muzamgaon were attacked by the men of the fort (8th October). Thereupon Abdul Hamid Deccani, *thanadar* of Ankalkot, came to Alland. Such activity of the Bijapuris frightened the Mughals. So Aurangzeb favoured the continuance of the *thanas*, and suggested that the Mir should ask Ibrahim Khan and Ikhlas Khan to control the Bijapuris for some days till the conclusion of the collection, when the *mahals* would be returned. If Mir Jumla did not approve of the course of maintaining the *thanas*, Aurangzeb would withdraw the imperial troops. The Bijapuris even intercepted near Naldrug Aurangzeb's letter to Mir Jumla and the deciphered copy of a secret letter of the Viceroy's Delhi agent, and so came to know of the true state of Shahjahan's health and of Dara's attitude towards his younger brothers. Thus they could bide their time with impunity, knowing fully well that Aurangzeb, preoccupied with preparing for a contest for the throne, would not be able to put adequate pressure on them.

The difficulties caused by the interception of news by the Bijapuris were aggravated by the absence of a regular system for transmission of messages. Even some of Mir Jumla's couriers proved "foolish and short-sighted", worthless or unreliable, who either gave false news to Aurangzeb or disclosed secrets. They were accordingly punished and superintendents were appointed over Mir Ghazi and another *harkara* and also over Mir Abdul Hasan for exercising strict censorship. All

⁴ *Adab*, 150a, 157a, 92a-b, 199a-b.

these factors considerably hampered Mir Jumla's task of securing the enforcement of the peace-terms. Hence he suggested to Aurangzeb the imperative need of establishing a *dakchauki*. Aurangzeb approved of the proposal and executed it, especially as it became more necessary than before to get news of the surrounding places.⁵

3. *Mir Jumla as the guide of Aurangzeb.*

Having perfect confidence in Mir Jumla, Aurangzeb was resolved never to deviate from his advice in any matter and not to begin the struggle for the throne without his counsel. Indeed, as Aurangzeb's attention was divided between Delhi and Parenda, his instructions to Mir Jumla pulsed with the news of Delhi, sent by Isa Beg, the court agent of the Viceroy. If Shahjahan's condition was worse, he urged on his ally to leave Parenda to join him at once. If Shahjahan was better, he permitted Mir Jumla to persevere further at Parenda. When, however, Aurangzeb received no news of Shahjahan he was left in utter suspense and, fearing that the worst had happened, appealed to Mir Jumla to advise him on all matters and come to him immediately to his rescue.

Receiving no news of Delhi for about 25 days (c. 17th Sept.-12th Oct.) and apprehending the death of the Emperor, Aurangzeb decided to endeavour to get the throne without further delay, and asked Mir Jumla (mid-October) to quickly dispose of the Parenda affair by winning its *qiladar* "through any means". While giving Mir Jumla the distracting news of Shahjahan's loss of control of affairs by a *nishan-i-khas* of 15th October, Aurangzeb urged him in no case to drag on for more than two or three days, as there was none by his side. But he still deferred to Mir Jumla's discretion, saying "Whatever you decide is right."⁶

⁵ *Ibid*, 197a-b, 202b-203a. Naldrug is 27 miles n.e. of Sholapur. Allund 76 40' E. 17°34' N (ASI. Sh. 33.) Popularly known as Aladi, it is 22 m. n. w. of Gulbarga. For a view of Naldrug fort, ASR. XIV. Pl. X; ARADND. 1917-18 (Pl).

⁶ *Adab*, 201a-202a (dependence re : throne) ; 197a, 197a-198a, 193b. 199a, 199a-200a ; *Aurangzeb* I. 318-9.

Harassed by anxiety at the news of Shahjahan's worsening condition and just bereft of his wife, Aurangzeb left Bidar on 18th October in conformity with Mir Jumla's advice given at the time of parting and asked him to send Muhammad Sultan to Ahmadnagar. In a highly perturbed state of mind Aurangzeb again pressed on Mir Jumla (19th Oct.) to expedite the capture of Parenda. The Viceroy admitted that he was almost at his wit's end, as affairs had passed out of his control. "My mind," he expressed, "is so distracted that I can decide nothing, I can formulate no plan. I have no friend and confidant but you. Next to God's grace, I count on your well-wishing and guidance along the right path. It is your duty to inform me always of your opinion regarding every matter so that I may act accordingly."

On receiving (October) a secret message from the Collector of Agra, Aurangzeb concluded that "Shahjahan was either dead or a helpless invalid." In either case "the great design" should be accomplished before it was too late. Therefore he exhorted Mir Jumla to come away even before securing Parenda, as it was "not advisable to delay in such an emergency, in expectation of one, which bristled with difficulties". In case Shahjahan recovered and demanded an explanation, Aurangzeb hoped to give a plausible one for not having secured possession of Parenda.

Learning (22nd October) of Dara's assumption of power at Delhi, Aurangzeb thought of sending Muhammad Sultan with an army to Burhanpur to prevent imperial officers like Nasiri Khan from proceeding north at the imperial summons, to call up the local *zamindars* and raise a new army. But since this would be an open and deliberate defiance of imperial authority, too difficult to be explained away, if Shahjahan recovered, Aurangzeb sought Mir Jumla's opinion about the despatch of Muhammad Sultan to Burhanpur. "If", Aurangzeb wrote to the Mir, "you consider it useless to persist in a matter, where defects have cropped up—like hammering a cold iron—and waste further time, give up the

war, negotiate an *ahdnama* and return to Aurangabad, so that after consulting you, I may devote myself to the accomplishment of 'the great design'. My army is going to Pathri with Muhammad Sultan. I hope to get your letter by then. If you agree, Muhammad Sultan will go to Ahmadnagar and I will go to Aurangabad, otherwise Muhammad Sultan would go to Burhanpur and I will wait there till you return. Reply quickly, giving your opinion."⁸

4. Failure of Mir Jumla to secure delivery of Parenda.

Aurangzeb's complete dependence on Mir Jumla's counsel and implicit faith in his judgment concealed a fundamental difference in the aims of the two collaborators. Throughout these months of hopes and anxieties, plannings and vacillations, Aurangzeb's supreme object was never to allow the Parenda affair to prejudice and destroy his chances for accomplishing his "great design" of securing the throne of Delhi. On the other hand, Mir Jumla, undaunted by any difficulty and unmoved by any other consideration, tenaciously persisted in the task of securing the fort. At first Mir Jumla followed the policy of winning over the *qiladar* of Parenda. In accordance with Mir Jumla's suggestion of 14th October, Aurangzeb wrote a *nishan* to the *qiladar*, sent it to Mir Jumla on 17th October and asked the *qiladar* not to cause any difficulty in handing over the keys of the fort to the Mir. After leaving Bidar Aurangzeb again asked Mir Jumla, an "expert in administration", to "win over the *qiladar* by any means." At Mir Jumla's suggestion, too, Aurangzeb wrote a *nishan* to Muhammad Aman, the Mughal *hajib* at Bijapur, but Aurangzeb asked the Mir to write to the Bijapuri prime minister, Ikhlas Khan what was necessary.⁹

But the policy of using the golden key failed. Mir Jumla then resorted to force. Condemning Aurangzeb's suggestion to send Muhammad Sultan to Burhanpur, the Mir asked the Viceroy to send him together with his own army from Pathri to

⁸ Ibid, 200b-201a, 200a-b, 201a-202a (Mir's property to be guarded).

⁹ Ibid, 92a-b, 197b-198a, 198a-b, 198b-199a, 199a-b.

"Parenda" in the hope that this show of force might cow the Bijapuris. Mir Jumla's proposal did not appeal to Aurangzeb. In the first place, it would involve a division and hence weakening of his armed strength. "Where are soldiers", Aurangzeb asked, "that some might go with him (the prince) and some with me? of those who are already here, it is not settled whether they would remain with me or not, after the arrival of the order (of recall), real or fictitious. On the supposition that the small army of Muhammad Sultan go to that side and that even I detain by force those who want to go to Hindusthan, with what army shall I be able to accomplish this design? Again, of what use will it be to send Muhammad Sultan without a strong army? Of what avail will it be if I send him with the army at his disposal?" Secondly, Aurangzeb held that the policy of employing force towards Bijapur would prove futile in view of the rapidly worsening political situation consequent on Dara's assumption of power.

Sceptical of the wisdom of Mir Jumla's advice though Aurangzeb was, he praised it as "well-conceived", just to gratify him. Ignoring its attendant difficulties, he sent Muhammad Sultan to Parenda with a hastily collected force on 4th November, and exhorted his son to follow the Mir's advice in every respect.

Most probably Mir Jumla expressed in his letters to Aurangzeb some apprehension of incurring imperial displeasure for his failure to secure Parenda in time, for we find Aurangzeb assuring the Mir that the Emperor must have been aware of the attitude of the Bijapuris and the vacillation of the *qiladar* of Parenda. Ascribing this to the very fact of the recall of the officers to Delhi, Aurangzeb wrote, "Peace be on you, Nawab! when the *farmans* had been issued, and the nobles had taken the road to the Court, you were pretty aware of the result of this affair. This group (the Bijapuris) had prayed to God for such an event and for this reason repeated exhortations had been sent (by me) to you not to labour after the affair as you did, as it would never come to pass but would cause loss of time". However, Aurangzeb now

expected Mir Jumla to do everything possible to be free to meet him.¹⁰

Mir Jumla's policy of using force also failed. Within a week of the arrival of Muhammad Sultan Mir Jumla admitted his mistake in a letter to Aurangzeb (9th November). Even the indemnity could not be collected from the Bijapuris, who had received encouraging letters from Dara. However, Aurangzeb sounded Mir Jumla as to the policy to be adopted towards the Bijapuris and the planning of the struggle for the throne, "as the secrets of the army of the empire, and the movements of the local troops, and the account of the revenue, the plan of attacking the enemy, the time, the condition and the opportunity" were best known to him.¹¹

5. *Mir Jumla to wind up the Parenda affair and
conciliate the Bijapuris.*

During all these months of suspense and anxiety, of patient but futile toil, Aurangzeb had kept the Mir fully informed of the developments at Delhi, the events in Gujrat and Bengal and also of his own preparations to enable the latter to give him the proper advice regarding the future line of action.¹² Very likely Mir Jumla suggested to Aurangzeb the policy to be followed with respect to Murad¹³ and Shuja, though we do not know what detailed advice he gave.

The recall of imperial nobles from the Deccan, and the publication of the news of the Emperor's loss of control over all affairs at Delhi and of Dara's assumption of power, sufficed to convince Aurangzeb that the Parenda affair could not be settled even by force. Aurangzeb naturally became anxious to complete his preparations for contesting the throne. But this he could not hope to accomplish without acknowledging

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 201a-202b, 202b-203a; 203a-204a.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 92b; AN. 83.

¹² *Adab*, 92b-93a, 201a, 202a, 204a-205a, 265a-206a, 202b-203a.

¹³ of the following: "By advice of that Politician Emir Jumla, he dissemblingly Submits to his brother Morat Backe....." (Bowrey, 137). There is a brief reference to this in the *Poem*, 16.

discomfiture. Aurangzeb entreated Mir Jumla to solve his dilemma. If his quick return was indispensable so as not to let slip "the chance of accomplishing the really necessary matter", he must put a bold face even over his retreat. The conciliation of the two Deccani Sultans was the indispensable pre-requisite for "strengthening the foundation of prosperity"—as Aurangzeb wrote, at the end of October, 1657. Aurangzeb shrewdly endeavoured to conciliate Adil Shah by shifting the responsibility for the invasion to Mir Jumla and even representing to him that it was "at Mir Jumla's wicked advice that he had attacked Bijapur as well as Golkonda." He also expressed his desire that "the fort of Parenda and its dependent territory, the Konkan and the *mahal* of Wangi, which have been annexed to the empire, together with that portion of the Karnatak which had been granted to the late Adil Shah—except the forts and the *mahals* which, after the transfer of Mir Jumla, had been incorporated with the *Khalsa i Sarkar*"—should be left to him as before.

Realising however, that the best man to conciliate the Bijapuris was Mir Jumla, Aurangzeb instructed him to wind up the Bijapur affair. "On the whole", he wrote to Mir Jumla, "give up all ideas of collecting *peshkash* and conquering territories. Only see that, by dint of your good treatment, we may be relieved of them (Bijapuris)". And he again communicated to him, "My real object is that the Bijapuris, being favoured by your kind acts and assurances, may not think of creating trouble and in this way, by your conciliatory steps, a new army should be enlisted. There is no time to accomplish the matter by force. In this extreme situation you should try to make apparently sincere professions of friendship. Do whatever is possible without losing time." ¹⁴

The *modus operandi*, suggested by Aurangzeb, was a curious mixture of threat and diplomatic conciliation. Mir Jumla was to publish the news of the arrival of Prince Muhammad Sultan and of Aurangzeb and so overawe the

¹⁴. *Adab*, 162b-163a, 202a-b, 200b-201a.

Bijapuris to yield. He was to win over the pro-Mughal Bijapuri prime minister, Ikhlas Khan, and explain to the Bijapuris that Mir Jumla and Ikhlas Khan were mediating before Aurangzeb for ending the war despite the latter's orders and that the Mir would renounce the claim to indemnity and the territories on condition that the Bijapuris would "honour this exemption" and not claim Bidar, Kalyani and other adjacent regions and not wage war against the Mughals.¹⁵

But this move, too, ended in smoke, owing to the murder of Ikhlas Khan on 11th November at the instigation of Mulla Ahmad Natia, a bitter enemy of the Mughals. So Mir Jumla now followed a policy wholly divorced from ethical considerations and entirely guided by exigencies of the moment. He sought to effect a speedy settlement of the Bijapuri affair by winning over the instigator of the murder of the Bijapuri Wazir. Seeking Aurangzeb's opinion on the matter, Mir Jumla forwarded a letter of Mulla Ahmad Natia, written to himself, to the Viceroy on 18th November, 1657. In a cautiously-worded reply, Aurangzeb practically approved of Mir Jumla's policy.¹⁶

6. *Mir Jumla's retreat from Parenda.*

Realising Mir Jumla's further stay with the Prince at the foot of the fort of Parenda to be inadvisable lest the Bijapuris might cause further trouble, Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to come away, postponing the delimitation of the frontiers to a subsequent and convenient date. To lure the Mir, Aurangzeb suggested a campaign against Qutb Shah for the sake of recovering Kambam. Mir Jumla could send Muhammad Sultan to Ahmadnagar, after detaining him there for sometime longer, if he thought it desirable.

On the other hand, Mir Jumla asked Aurangzeb (18th November) to come to him to punish the Bijapuris.

¹⁵ Ibid, 202a-b, 201a-202b, 202b-203a; *Aurangzib* I. 263.

Mir Jumla probably suggested to Aurangzeb the necessity of winning over the nobles and peasants of the Deccan.

¹⁶ *Adab*, 92b-93a; 204a-205a; *Aurangzib*, I. 263-4.

Aurangzeb, while agreeing that their chastisement after "such a nefarious action (murder of Khan Muhammad) on their part" was over-due, considered it useless to go there personally. "Even during the lifetime of Khan Muhammad", observed Aurangzeb, "the Bijapuris did nothing but practise deceit and falsehood. Mulla Ahmad, from the very beginning, tried his utmost to spoil this matter. It can never be accomplished. The army of this province, after a year's hard campaigning, has lost heart on hearing of their Emperor's illness and has been unsettled in various ways. They are in greater trouble than can be described." So Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to come back to Bir without "wasting time over a spoilt affair."

After lingering on at Parenda, in expectation of the Viceroy's reply to his own letter, Mir Jumla arranged to go to Bir with Muhammad Sultan. Aurangzeb, learning of this arrangement from the Prince's letter of 26th November, asked the Mir to halt at Bir, if he had already started; and if not, he might stay on (i. e. at Parenda) for a fortnight with the Prince if he considered it advantageous to do so.

In reply to Mir Jumla's letter in cypher, Aurangzeb informed him of his perplexing anxieties and explained why he had been pressing for his hurried return: he would lose his chance for the throne if the Bijapur affair was protracted and his scattered forces could not be concentrated.¹⁷

About 6th December, Aurangzeb summoned Muhammad Sultan from Parenda in order to send him to chastise the contumacious *Zamindars* of Burhanpur and to purge the country up to the Narbada of rebels. Aurangzeb sent Prince Muhammad Muazzam to Parenda and advised Mir Jumla to stay with him at Bir, and to make another effort "to bring the Bijapuris to their senses" with the help of an army to be sent by Aurangzeb. Here, about the middle of December, Mir Jumla had three confidential interviews with Aurangzeb's secretary.¹⁸

17. Adab, 92b-93a, 93a-b, 93b-94a, 94a; Aurangzeb I, 328, 329-30.

18. Adab, 94a-b. See *infra* sub-section 8.

7. *Mir Jumla recalled to the Court.*

In the meantime, Mir Jumla, getting an inkling of Dara's machinations at the Court from Muhammad Amin Khan's letter (of 6th November) had sought Aurangzeb's advice before replying to his son. On or after 9th November Aurangzeb asked the minister to counteract Dara's moves, adding : "It is not necessary to teach wisdom to Lukman. Whatever will strike him will be according to the canons of wisdom. In reply to the order of the Eldest Prince (Dara), it seems expedient to write a judicious preamble and to counterbalance falsehood with falsehood, according to your far-seeing knowledge and inherent wisdom and dictates of your illuminating discretion. Write whatever seem desirable."

But Mir Jumla's attempt to baffle Dara's moves failed. Aware of Aurangzeb's alliances with Murad and Shuja, early in December, 1657, Dara sent letters of recall in Shahjahan's name to Mir Jumla and other remaining generals, as their continued stay in the Deccan was likely to prejudice his own cause and strengthen Aurangzeb's military position. Aurangzeb received the imperial *farman* on 19th December, and the Mir got it from him on the 22nd.

The order threw Aurangzeb to the lowest depths of despair. "Friend", so ran the Viceroy's plaintive message to the minister, written in his own handwriting, "God assist you ! What shall I write about my own troubled state or describe how the days pass over me ! I have no remedy save patience."¹⁹

8. *Mir Jumla arrested by Aurangzeb.*

The time for action had at last come for Aurangzeb. Apprehending that the conjunction of Mir Jumla, an experienced, able, intelligent and shrewd officer, a past-master in diplomacy, a veteran general, and above all, owner of immense wealth, with the Crown-Prince would spell disaster for himself,

¹⁹ *Adab*, 203a-204a (Dara) ; Dara's reasons for recall in *As*, 10b ; *ZNA*. 18-19 ; *Aurangzeb I*. 326.

the Viceroy of the Deccan at once made up his mind to foil Dara's latest move. Aurangzeb asked the Mir to leave Bir about 27th December along with Muhammad Muazzam and not to set out for Delhi before seeing him. In a most flattering letter to the Mir, the Viceroy described him as his best friend and most devoted well-wisher and profoundly lauded his wisdom. "I know", he remarked therein, "you are faithful to your word. Your intention in going to Hindustan was and is no other than to increase my power and grandeur and to make me succeed in my heart's desire. You have often said within my hearing, 'I wish for life only that I may see the master of mankind (Aurangzeb) on the throne; and in realising this aim I value not my life or property.' Now is the time to display your devotion. I do not need others in making the necessary equipment for this business, while you are alive. I care not for those (officers) who have been estranged from me by reason of my partiality to you. Come to me, so that with your advice I may engage in preparations for the work of gaining the Crown."

Mir Jumla arrived at Aurangabad about 1st January, 1658, but was arrested by Aurangzeb soon after and sent as a prisoner to Daulatabad. All his property, the acquisitions of his life-time, were confiscated. His army together with the excellent artillery, manned by Europeans, now passed under Aurangzeb's control. To Aurangzeb, then in great need of money, these "supplied at that critical moment the much-needed means for his march towards his goal."²⁰

9. *Mir Jumla's part in the Episode.*

The order of recall came as a supreme test of Mir Jumla's diplomacy. For him it revealed the eternal conflict between duty and self-interest. In particular, it meant a clash between loyalty to his master, the Emperor, and loyalty to

²⁰ As. 10a-b; ZNA. 18-20; *Poem*, 15-17; AN. 83.4; GD (Sultan Muhammad to Qutb); *Adab*, 205b; *Aurangzeb* I. 332. Mir Ahmad, Aurangzeb's hajib, sent a wakil to confiscate Mir Jumla's goods stored at Masulipatam. Its havaladar Fathulla Beg was ordered to prepare an inventory of his goods and send it to Aurangzeb's Court. Tabrizi, 35a.

his ally, the Viceroy. The problem was complicated by the fact that Mir Jumla was the ally of one, whose rival had virtually usurped the authority of the Emperor. It was clear that, at that particular moment, Mir Jumla's obligations to the Emperor, obligations to the Viceroy and family considerations seemed irreconcilable. No doubt, as the ally of Aurangzeb, Mir Jumla could never like the idea of going to the imperial court. But for an imperial officer, which he legally was, staying behind without any cogent reason was impossible. It would be an act of open rebellion. Moreover, it would expose his family, left as hostages in the Court, to Dara's vengeance. The problem before Mir Jumla was how to keep his loyalty untarnished, his honour with his ally bright and yet to save his family.

Indeed it would have been a baffling problem to anyone made of softer stuff than that of Mir Jumla. His shrewd diplomacy helped him to rise to the occasion. On arrival at Aurangabad (about 1st January, 1658) he gave out that he was going to Agra in obedience to the imperial mandate. Feigning fear of Aurangzeb's designs, he refused to see him saying, "As I have been ordered by the Emperor to go to him, I have no choice but to obey." Aurangzeb then deputed his son Muhammad Sultan to the Mir with instructions to bring him over to himself anyhow. Aurangzeb sent through the Prince a friendly message to the Mir, to remove his suspicions. He noted that, as he considered him his well-wisher, he should spare a while to attend to some urgent matters before proceeding to Agra and carry an important oral message for the Emperor. The Prince duly delivered the message to the Mir and induced him to visit the Viceroy. Then, as soon as the Mir entered the private apartment (*Khishwah*) of Aurangzeb, he was arrested.

According to the official history, *Alamgirnama*, it was Aurangzeb, who was obliged to detain Mir Jumla for "political reasons", as the latter's intention of going to the court was conducive not to his own interests of getting the throne but to those of the Deccan. The *Aurangnamah*

however, states, that Aurangzeb asked the Mir to join him in the projected advance against Dara and then it was the Mir who suggested that Aurangzeb should imprison him and confiscate his property, appropriate his entire army and then, together with Murad, advance against Dara. The astute minister observed that by means of such trickery, Aurangzeb's purpose would be easily accomplished and his own family also would be saved. Mir Jumla overbore Aurangzeb's hesitation to imprison a Sayyid, by saying that as he was volunteering, no harm would befall the Viceroy. Thereupon, Aurangzeb imprisoned the Mir. But a secret understanding of this sort between the two could not possibly have been made so late in the day. Indeed, with his inherent power of discernment, Mir Jumla must have anticipated beforehand that his recall was inevitable. His son, as we have seen, had informed him of Dara's manoeuvres. The subsequent correspondence between the Mir and the Viceroy and the mission of the latter's secretary to the former at Bir (December, 1657) suggest clearly that the two conspirators were devising plans to thwart Dara's moves. The report of the mission of Qabil Khan to Mir Jumla is couched in such terms, the issues are left so vague, as to create the suspicion in the mind of the reader that something very secret was settled, and that the cautious secretary did not even consider it safe to put it down on paper but reserved the matter for an oral communication to Aurangzeb. Thus there is no doubt that the imprisonment of Mir Jumla by Aurangzeb was done at the Mir's own advice, and that it was outcome of a preconcerted plan between the two to secure their respective interests through it, though there may be difference of opinion as regards the time when it was actually engineered.²¹ Dara shrewdly suspected that the two were in league and collusion, reported it to the Emperor and even took his sanction to imprison Muhammad Amin Khan Bakhshi on a false charge of neglect of duty, and arrested him in Dara's own house. Shahjahan released him after 3 or 4 days knowing him to be innocent.

It would thus appear that Mir Jumla's diplomacy succeeded marvellously well indeed. He managed the whole affair so

cleverly that the episode appeared to the Emperor as being due to the injustice and irregularity of Aurangzeb. Shahjahan wrote a letter to Aurangzeb, condemning this unjustified arrest and the unbecoming confiscation of the property of "two innocent Sayyids"—who had been preparing to comply with the imperial summons to proceed to Delhi, and urged the Viceroy to release them.²¹

10. *Mir Jumla released by Aurangzeb.*

But before receiving the imperial remonstrance, Aurangzeb had sent a false explanation to the Emperor that he had imprisoned Mir Jumla because he had "smelt something of defiance from his behaviour" and because otherwise he would have joined the Deccani generals. The explanation even caught hold of popular imagination. An English factor observed (26th January, 1658) that the Nawab was imprisoned "for practising with the king of Golkondah to start a broyle and come in for a share of the crowne".²²

When, after the defeat of Dara, further confinement of Mir Jumla was not necessary, but he could be more usefully employed in the impending war against Shuja through his release, Aurangzeb set him free from his mock-prison. A formal apology on his part is referred to by Munshi Qabil Khan. "I detained you", Aurangzeb is said to have written "for some reason..... The time has come for my apologising to you..... It is highly imperative that a sincere well-wisher, versed in business like yourself, should

²¹. ZNA. 19-20; AS. 10b; *Adab*, 168b (*Qabil's* interview with the Mir); *Poem* 15-17; AN. 84; MU. III. 537-8; *Aurangzeb* I. 333. According to Manucci (*Storia* I. 249-50), during the interview Aurangzeb showed exuberance of affection towards the Mir, calling him 'father' and asked him to espouse his cause against Dara, whereupon Mir Jumla was highly incensed and publicly reprehended the Viceroy, so that his loyalty might be reported by spies to the Emperor and Dara.

²². AN. 84 (Dara imprisons Muhammad Amin); AS. 10b; MU. III. 538.

²³. ZNA. 20; AN. 84; *Adab* 95a, 67b., EFL. X. 263a.

remain in my court." In another letter Aurangzeb is said to have expressed: "That I imprisoned you was not due to any disloyalty on your part. Only you showed remissness in exertion and insisted on going back to the Court at an inconvenient time and it was inadvisable to allow you to do so. However much I have tried to make you realise that, I have failed. So I was obliged to detain you, much against my will. Now, by God's grace my wish has been fulfilled and a new life has come in the garden of kingdom and religion. My enemies have been humiliated. It is inhuman to detain you longer. I do not want to keep an intelligent man like you unnecessarily without work."²⁴ But this apology is nothing but a clever cloak to hide from others the well-contrived plot of the Mir and Aurangzeb. Aurangzeb sent an order to Muhammad Muazzam, releasing Mir Jumla from his mock-prison of Daulatabad and restoring to him all his goods lying at Burhanpur, and granting him one lakh of rupees in cash, to meet the necessary expenses of administration. Muhammad Muazzam was further instructed to house Mir Jumla suitably in the Mahakot fort till the end of the rains.

Informing Mir Jumla of the arrival of his son, Muhammad Amin Khan, on 29th May, 1658, Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to remain grateful for the favours conferred on him. Holding out hopes of greater favours on his arrival, Aurangzeb instructed him to be ready to come to the Court and to take another sum of Rs. 50,000 from Mahakot and whatever was possible of his goods. After suitable arrangements regarding his goods had been made by the Prince, Mir Jumla was asked to hasten to Aurangzeb.²⁵

But Mir Jumla, though urgently summoned by Aurangzeb, was personally anxious to proceed to the Karnatak in order to

²⁴. *Adab* 95b, 95a-b. Khafi Khan (ii. 9) writes: "Aurangzeb imprisoned Mir Jumla at Daulatabad as a stroke of policy to prevent his ill-repute." Kambu writes (10b); "Muazzam Khan, the best of officers and the head of this affair, through some evil manner, which was inconsistent with wise conduct and knowledge, wanted, without permission of Aurangzeb, to go to the Emperor."

²⁵. *Adab*, 95a-b, 95b, 235a;

recover his forts and *mahals* from Qutb Shah's hold. Learning of the Mir's intention from his son, Aurangzeb pointed out to the Mir that this could not be carried out unless he remained there for some time and ordered Qutb Shah to withdraw his men therefrom. Towards the end of October, 1658, Mir Jumla was appointed *Subahdar* of Burhanpur in the rank of 6,000 *Zat* and 6,000 *Suwar* and given the *mahas* of the province of Khandesh as his *jagir*, in place of Wazir Khan, sent to Aurangabad. Mir Jumla was advised to settle duly his personal affairs in the Karnatak and elsewhere, and also those of Burhanpur, to collect together the ships and articles lying scattered, to restore the *dakchauki* from Burhappur to the Karnatak, to conciliate the local *zamindars* and officers, to organise and improve the army and exercise strict control over all matters.²⁶

²⁶. AN. 218-19 ; *Adab*, 95b-96a ; 235a ; MS. III. 528-9.

Section E

MIR JUMLA'S RELATIONS WITH EUROPEANS¹

(C. 1656-58)

1. *Effect of Mir Jumla's appointment as Wazir.*

With the appointment of Mir Jumla in Mughal imperial service, followed by the bestowal of the Karnatak as a personal *jagir* on him, a definite change came over his relations with the English. So long he had utilised the English East India Company as an instrument for realising his commercial and political ambitions and usually maintained with them, outwardly at least, an attitude of friendship. But now any further wooing of the Company became unnecessary on his part. At the same time, however, his departure from the Deccan, a scene of unstable political equilibrium, his territorial and economic interests being left under the charge of his lieutenants, the reduction of his armed forces there, and the uncertainty of his coming back to or of his exercising effective control over the Karnatak, generated certain factors which aggravated the friction between Mir Jumla (and his representatives) and the English factors in Madras, and probably emboldened the latter to carry on their private trade in a greater degree than before.²

¹ Further details have been given in my articles on *Mir Jumla and the English* (1655-58), in JBORS. Dec. 1940, pp. 323-40 and March, 1941.

² *Ibid.*, XXVI. 325-6. The English factors at Agra endeavoured to gauge his attitude towards the E. I. C. On 27th June, 1656, Jesson, one of the local factors, saw him with presents worth Rs. 150. Mir Jumla promised to do for the Company whatever was possible for him. But, being informed by Hafiz Nasar, Governor of Surat, the Mir did not consider the claims of the English regarding insurance to be justified. EFL. X. 68-69, 69-71.

2. *Alleged complaints of oppression on the Fort St. George factors by Mir Jumla's officers.*

To a large extent, this friction was due to the complaints of oppression on Fort St. George factors and of hindrances to their trade alleged to have been caused by the Mir's governors since the time of Sayyid Ibrahim. Matters became unbearable in the time of Bala Rau, governor of Poonamallee.

Mir Jumla is represented in the English factory records to have threatened to deprive the English of the fort and government of Madras, and to have agreed to the suggestion of Bala Rau that the latter "might sell the corn that grew in his Dominions in Madras and that the government thereof might be under him". When Agent Greenhill objected to the junction of Poonamallee and Madras, Bala Rau left Madras, keeping one of his agents there with instructions "to breed distractions both in the government of the town and in the Company's affairs." He also made repeated allegations against the English to Mir Jumla to fan his wrath against them, and also interfered with the normal business activities of the Company in several ways. Thus Bala Rau sought to utilise his office at Poonamallee to control production and distribution in Madras, "surrounding and feeding" the English "from hand to mouth", so as to compel them to bow to his will.³

3. *Retaliation of the English Factors.*

The complaints of the English factors to Mir Jumla and to Mir Sayyid Ali, the newly appointed governor of the former's Karnatak dominions, made in the hope of securing an early and effective redress went in vain, and Bala Rau was emboldened to "insult the English all the more"; he seized the entire paddy purchased by the English agents even from outside Mir Jumla's jurisdiction, and also stopped at Terra-

³ This account is based on (1) *the Chamber's Narrative*, Love I, 189; EFL. X. 41-2 (2) Letter of Greenhill and Chamber, Nov. 10, 1656, Love I. 165-66; EFL. X. 93; see JBORS. XXVI. 340; XXVII. 96-98 for details.

walawashe (? Tiruvanavasi) the consignment of bell-metal (*Ganza* from Pegu), transported with Mir Jumla's sanction to Warangal, causing great loss to the English.⁴ The gravity of the losses and troubles suffered by the Fort St. George factors led their Agent Greenhill to think of retaliation. It took the shape of the seizure of the Nawab's Red Sea (Mocha) junk, a large country vessel, and the capture of 4 pieces of ordnance from it (August, 1656). The opportunity for all this came with the Hindu revolt in the Karnatak.⁵

The seizure of the Mir's junk was undoubtedly a challenge to his authority and proved to be a source of infinite troubles to the English, first in the East Coast and subsequently both there and in Bengal. They had resorted to that "unwarrantable" procedure, believing that, on their capture of the vessel and its contents, Mir Jumla would come to a satisfactory agreement with them. But they were disillusioned. Mir Jumla was made of too strong a stuff to come down to such a humiliating compromise. Though he was then preoccupied with his own affairs and his governors were very much distracted due to the Hindu revolt, he knew how to bide his time. As a matter of fact, the subsequent sieges of Madras by his troops formed in a sense strong measures of reprisal against this opportunist policy of the Company's factors at Madras.⁶

4. Counter measures of Mir Jumla's Governors.

Being unable to persuade the English by peaceful negotiations to surrender the junk, Mir Sayyid Ali gave orders for the siege of Madras. Bala Rau at first resorted to an economic blockade of Madras by wholly stopping the import of provisions there and enforcing it by placing guards round the place.⁷ This was followed by the siege of the town by Mir Jumla's forces under Lingum Nayak (18th Dec. 1656), to capture some leaders

⁴ Love I. 189-90; EFL X. 41-2.

⁵ Love, *op cit.* 184-5; 165-7 and n, 190; EFL X. 92-4, 288.

⁶ EFL X. 184; Love I. 185.

⁷ EFL X. 95-97; Love I. 190.

of the Hindu revolt (Koneri Chetti and Vengum Raja), sheltering in Madras. It was attended with burning of houses, plunder and seizure of cloths and goods of the Company and the flight of the injured Hindu inhabitants from the Company's settlement in Madras. The departure of Mir Jumla's army was not followed by immediate restoration of normal business activities there, and trade dislocation continued to the next year.⁸

5. *Attitude of the Dutch and the English.*

If the English at Fort St. George suffered from Mir Jumla's forces, the Dutch at Pulicat, in spite of their strong fortifications had to bear the brunt of a siege conducted by the forces of the Raja of Chandragiri. As a matter of fact, despite the temporary estrangement of Mir Jumla from the Dutch during 1650-'55, the latter were inclined to espouse his cause in case of a Hindu attack on Pulicat. On the other hand, Mir Jumla was definitely alienated from the English about the middle of 1655.⁹ They had "much more reason to rejoice than complain" at the Hindu revolt in the Karnatak and had full sympathy and possibly some support for the Hindu Raja, anxious to recover a portion of his dispossessed territories. But though favourable towards their late benefactor, the Raja of Chandragiri, the English did not want to give any offence to their new master, Mir Jumla, by openly defying his authority, if it could be avoided.¹⁰

⁸ EFL, X. 97-99; Love, I. 167, 168, 190-1.

⁹ EFL, X. 37-38; Love, I. 160.

¹⁰ See JBORS, *op cit.* Dutch refusal to procure for Rayal Mir Jumla's riches stored at Pulicat and pledge to help Mir Jumla in siege (Dutch records in EFL, X. 99); English assistance to Hindu general, Koneri Chetti and eagerness to see Rayal recover his territories (EFL, X. 94, 98, 97, Love, I. 167); Greenhill requested Koneri to release Mir Jumla's Governor Bala Rau and housed the latter (Love I. 190; EFL, X. 95); The English wanted to retain the factory at Viravasaram (under the Rayal) as a place of refuge, if their position became unbearable at Masulipatam (under Mir Jumla), EFL, X. 39-40; Greenhill to continue as President of Fort St. George in view of growing differences with Mir Jumla, EFL, X, 37-38; Love I. 160.

After a fortnight's negotiations between Mir Jumla's men and the English, it was agreed that the English should restore all the detained goods of Mir Jumla, evidently including the junk, and enjoy their privileges as before. Still, as a measure of precaution the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, reinforced the "slender British garrison" by enrolling Eurasian and native soldiers, formed a hired civic militia for use in case of an emergency and made a pathetic appeal to the Company for strengthening the defences of Madras.¹¹

6. Fresh troubles in 1657 after Mir Jumla's dismissal from the Wizarat.

Fresh troubles for the English arose in 1657, especially after Mir Jumla had been hurled from the Wizarat. He attacked the town of Madras on the ground that the English had assisted the Raja of Chandragiri in his "War against the Mogul" and had been hostile. The second siege or blockade of Madras (Sept. 1657—April, 1658) was conducted by the Mir's general, Tupaki Krishnappa Nayak and his Governor, Bala Rau, under orders of Mir Sayyid Ali.¹² On the refusal of the English to grant passports to Mir Jumla's sea-going junks, his forces stiffened the siege. But without artillery, which had been appropriated by Aurangzeb early in January, 1658, they could not seriously damage the defences of Fort St. George. Moreover, as food supplies could be easily brought by sea, the blockade became ineffective. Various considerations forced Tupaki Krishnappa Nayak and Aiyappa (Japa) Nayak to order Bala Rau to raise the siege (19th April) and to suspend hostilities till the arrival of Mir Jumla. According to an important agreement of April, 1658, between Tupaki Krishnappa and Agent Greenhill, Mir Jumla gave up his "interest" in the revenues and customs of Madras on payment of a consolidated annual rent of 380 pagodas by the English, and the latter were left in undisturbed control of the Fort and the town.

¹¹. EFT X. 96, 98, 104, 174; Love, I, 167, 169 (Dutch records).

¹². The exact relationship between Bala Rau and Mir Sayyid Ali is not clearly ascertainable from English factory records.

This was followed by the occupation of Pulicat by an army under Chinnatambi Mudaliyar sent by Mir Jumla's General, Tupakki Krishnappa Nayak. Both the Dutch and the English lent Mir Jumla's men large sums of money, the former 10,000 *pagodas*, and the latter 2,000, besides sending cloth worth 1,000 *pagodas*.¹³ The Portuguese settlement of San Thome was also sacked by Mir Jumla's forces.¹⁴

¹³. Love I. 191-2, 168-9; EFL. X. 133, 136-137, 173-4, 176, JBORS. *op cit*.

The annual rent of Madras remained fixed at 380 *pagodas* till 1672, when it was raised to 1,200 *pagodas*. This was finally remitted by Muhammad Ali, Nawab of the Carnatic.

Aiyappa Nayak was Brother of Damarla Venkatappa from whom the original grant for Fort St. George was secured. EFL. X. 175n.

¹⁴. Love. I. 174 and n.

CHAPTER V

THE WAR OF SUCCESSION

Section A

THE BATTLE OF KHAJWA

1. *Mir Jumla meets Aurangzeb at Kora.*

At the end of September, 1658, Aurangzeb entrusting the pursuit of Dara to his generals, had to return from the Punjab to the capital to oppose the advance of Shuja. The Emperor summoned Mir Jumla to come to him immediately, leaving Khandesh under some trustworthy person, to guide and counsel him in his war with the lord of Bengal and bring it to a successful close. Towards the end of November, Aurangzeb sent a strong force under Sultan Muhammad from Agra towards Allahabad to bar Shuja's path. Advising the Prince not to hasten an engagement but to wait till the arrival of his own wazir and himself, the Emperor himself started (21st December) and joined the Prince and the imperial army at Kora-Gautampur, eight miles west of Khajwa on 2nd January, 1659. Shuja had reached the little village of Khajwa (30th December) and occupied a large artificial lake in the midst of a great plain. But finding his path blocked by the Prince, he had remained entrenched there with his efficient and well-organised artillery, largely manned by Europeans. Mir Jumla, too, advancing from Khandesh by forced marches, arrived at Kora with a small army "two days before the battle" i.e. on 3rd January.¹

¹ AN. 242; *Adab*, 236a, 237a; MA. 12; TS. 101a, b; 112a; *Poem*, 122-125; ZNA. 74-75; AS. 19b; MU. III. 538-9; *Storia*, I. 329; EFL, X. 168.

The date of Mir Jumla's arrival is stated to be 4th January in *Poem* 124-5, ZNA. 76, *Storia* I. 329; and 2nd January (the same day as Aurangzeb) in MA. 12 and *Adab* 237a. But according to the *Alamgirnama* (242), confirmed by Ma'sum (112a) Mir Jumla came "two-days before battle" i.e. 3rd January.

2. *Mir Jumla at Khajwa.*

On the arrival of Mir Jumla, preparations on the imperial side were speeded up. On 3rd January, Aurangzeb, probably acting on Mir Jumla's advice, arranged his battle order, and allocated to each division its respective position. Next day, after exchanging an ineffectual fire with the imperialists, the Shujaite artillery retired in the evening from its position on an elevated ground to the army base. Mir Jumla, with the instinct of "a born general", immediately captured the deserted place so as to command Shuja's camp. Then, drawing up 40 guns to it after hard toil, he kept them ready for action against the enemy on the next morning. Ordered by the Emperor, every general kept his army in a state of preparedness. During the early part of the night Mir Jumla went round the camp to superintend the entrenchments and urged the guards to be vigilant.²

During Jaswant Singh's treacherous attack on Aurangzeb's camp towards the close of the night of 4th January, it was Mir Jumla, if we believe Manucci,—who "counselled Aurangzeb to reanimate his men" and advised him to write an intriguing letter to Alawardi Khan, Chief Adviser of Shuja, promising to reward him in return for inducing his master to dismount from his elephant during the battle. But Bhimsen states that Mir Jumla managed to pump out of Jaswant his plans in an interview with him and communicated them to the Emperor. In any case Mir Jumla minimised the gravity of the danger arising from Jaswant's treachery.³

The battle order of the previous day was retained by Aurangzeb, except that Islam Khan replaced Jaswant as the commander of the right wing and that Saif Khan was put in independent charge of its front section. Nevertheless, Aurangzeb empowered Mir Jumla to introduce whatever changes he thought necessary according to the exigencies of war.⁴

² AN. 248, 252, *Storia*, I. 328; *Adab*, 239b; *Aurangzeb*, II, 479, 480-1.

³ *Storia*, I. 328-30; ND. 14b-15b.

⁴ *Aurangzeb*, II. 485.

The battle of Khajwa (5th January) was pre-eminently an artillery duel, in which cannon, rockets, muskets and hand-grenades were freely exchanged on both sides. On the day of battle Mir Jumla was seated on an elephant just behind the Emperor's, ready to advise him in decisive moments. When Sayyid Alam of Shuja's Right, driving three infuriated elephants, routed the Imperial Left wing and the panic-stricken army fled away, "even veterans of the Deccan wars" and old imperial servants followed suit. The enemy attacked the Emperor at the centre, guarded by 2,000 troopers only. The battle had reached a critical stage. The flight of the Emperor then would have meant the bewildering retreat of the entire army. But he stood firm, cool and undaunted, taking care to chain the legs of his elephant so that it might not run away. In this way he saved the situation. Then the Emperor veered round to relieve his hard-pressed Right, but only after taking due precaution not to create an impression of a *volte face* to his army. This was followed by a simultaneous advance of the Right, Centre and Left divisions of the imperial army, which enveloped Shuja's Centre.⁵

In the highly contested battle of Khajwa, Aurangzeb's advantage, due to his numerical superiority over Shuja (by 2 to 1), was further augmented by treachery in the latter's ranks. The desertion of the Shujaite officers, Murad Kam Safavi (Mukarram Khan) and Abdur Rahman Sultan (son of Nazar Muhammad Khan, ex-king of Balkh) is described by Kambu as "a surprising event", which placed the victory

⁵ For battle of Khajwa, AN. 257-65; TS. 102b-105b; AS. 19b-20b; ZNA. 75-84; *Poem*, 128-33 (Bakhtan Beg commander of right wing of imperial artillery and his son killed); MA. 14; *Aurangzeb* II. 486-95; RA, (Tr. by J. H. Bilimoria), letter No. XCI. pp. 87-9, Balasore letter, March 2, 1659, EFL. X. 279 and n; Manucci (*Storia* I. 332) says that when the driver of the Emperor's elephant was killed, and he was about to get down from it, Mir Jumla, "doing his duty as a good leader (and from him nothing else could be expected)", loudly shouted out 'Qaim, Qaim' (Stand fast, Stand fast). At this, Aurangzeb stopped, on the elephant and endured the severe assault.

in Aurangzeb's hands, because under their guidance Aurangzeb re-attacked Shuja's army. The English factory correspondence (Balasore letter of 15th December) ascribes Shuja's defeat to his deficiency in "certain kinds of fireworks made of bamboos, which were; deadlier than grenades," as compared to the imperialists.⁶

But a dispassionate and critical study of the Persian chronicles together with the account of Manucci suggests that Mir Jumla made creditable contributions towards turning the scales against Shuja. Being in constant attendance on the Emperor during the battle, as his right-hand man, he offered him timely advice regarding the tactical moves and instilled hope and courage into his mind during critical moments.

⁶. As. 20b (Verse); ZNA 79; EFL X, 279 and n, 280; cf. Kambu's reference to hand grenaders (*hukkadaran*) dashing like wind (19b-20a).

Section B

THE WAR IN BIHAR

1. *Mir Jumla starts in pursuit of Shuja.*

After his defeat at Khajwa on 5th January, Shuja fled away towards Bihar in desperate haste and deep depression, with "neither the feet on the saddle, nor courage in his heart". But despatching Prince Muhammed in his pursuit that very afternoon so as not to give him any rallying time, Aurangzeb stayed on at Khajwa for a week longer.

Mir Jumla, too, remained with the Emperor. On 11th January the Emperor rewarded him for his services, by elevating him to the rank of the commander of 7,000 (*haft hazari haft hazar suwar*),¹ and by giving him some choicest presents. Next day the Mir accompanied the Emperor on his return march from Khajwa to the bank of the Ganges. Before his departure for the capital on 14th January, the Emperor deputed the Mir to undertake the pursuit of his fugitive brother and the conquest of Bihar and Bengal from his hands and asked him to become the *atalik* (guide) of his son. Indeed, though in theory they were sent as joint commanders in accordance with the usual Mughal military custom, Mir Jumla was made the "real commander and vested with the supreme power of control, dismissal and appointment".² Mir Jumla undertook to accomplish the task in profound submission, stating that he would "snatch away the ring and the crown from the enemy".

Sometime after 14th January, Mir Jumla proceeded to reinforce Muhammad Sultan and the imperial force swelled

¹. The *Alamgirnama* (267) states that, as after his release, Mir Jumla had not been in any high *mansab*, he was now appointed commander of 7000. But we have already seen in the last chapter that Mir Jumla had been appointed Governor of Khandesh in the rank of Commander of 6000 (*Adab*. 95a-b).

². AN 266, 267 and 269; *Adab*, 241a (Mir Jumla rewarded); ML⁷ (E and D. VII. 249); MU. III. 539. For deputation of Mir Jumla, *Poem* 134-138; ZNA. 91; AS. 20b; MA 14; *Storia* I. 333. cf. Ball I. 272; TS. 112a. b (relation with Muhammad Sultan); Bernier, 79-80 (Muhammad Amin kept as hostage).

to 30,000. The *Alamgirnama* mentions 27 generals who accompanied Mir Jumla : (1) Zulfiqar Khan (Tabrezi), (2) Islam Khan (Badakhshi), (3) Kunwar Ram Singh (4) Daud Khan (Qureishi), (5) Fidai Khan (Bakharzai), (6) Raja Indradyumna Dhamdbera, (7) Rao Bhao Singh Hada (son of Rao Chattarsal), (8) Ihtisham Khan, (9) Fateh Jang Khan (Ruhela), (10) Rao Amar Singh Chandrawat, (11) Ikhlas Khan Khesghi, (12) Khawas Khan, (13) Ekkataz Khan (original name Abdullah), (14) Rashid Khan (Ansari), (15) Lodi Khan, (16) Sayyid Firoz Khan Barha, (17) Sayyid Sher Khan Barha, (18) Sayyid Muzaffar Khan Barha (Khan-i-Jahan), (19) Zabardast Khan (Ruhela), (20) Ali Quli Khan, (21) Qizilbash Khan, (22) Iskandar Ruhela, (23) Kakar Khan, (24) Dilawar Khan, (25) Neknam Khan, (26) Niazi Khan, (27) Qadirdad Ansari and others. The Emperor instructed Mir Jumla to take along with him the brave Rozbihani soldiers,—Rasul, Muhammad and Chiragh ; every one of them was experienced, fast runner and unflinching in devotion. Ahmad and Muhammad Murad were brave and skilled skirmishers.³

2. *Khajwa—Patna.*

Shuja fled away from Khajwa to Bahadurpur, 5 miles east of Benares, via Allahabad and Jusi, the commandant of Allahabad having surrendered it to the imperialists (12th January).

³ AN. 269, supplemented by the *Poem*, 135-6, TS. 112b ; ZNA. 91 ; FA. 41a, b. We get some other names not mentioned in the *Alamgirnama* from other sources :

- (i) Bahadur Khan (ZNA, FA. RS.)
- (ii) The famous eldest son of Rashid Khan Ansari (*Poem*).
- (iii) Son of Sayyid Shuja'at Khan (*Poem* ; TS ; ZNA).
- (v-vii) Shahbaz Khan, Salabat, Salar Firoz, Sayyid Nasir (*Poem*).
- (viii) Raja Sujana Singh Bundela (*Poem*, ZNA).
- (ix) Raja Debi Singh.
- (x-xii) Sayyid Shihab Khan, Mughal Khan, Raja Anirudh Singh Gaur (FA.).

There were several Islam Khans. Besides Islam Khan Badakhshi there were Islam Khan Chisti (TS.) and Islam Khan Khesghi (ZNA.). Durr Khan (*Poem* and FA.) came to reinforce the Mir at a later stage of the war.

Meanwhile Mir Jumla, without making any delay on the way, had joined Muhammad Sultan at Allahabad. The Prince heard of Shuja's high entrenchments at Benares, mounted with 7 guns from Chunar, but could not cross the flooded Ganges near Bahadurpur for want of boats. The Mir advised the Prince to advance by way of Chunar. Hence, marching back upstream, Muhammad Sultan forded the river near Allahabad, and, proceeding *via* Kheri and Kuntit, reached Chunar on the 4th day. At the same time Fidai Khan, Governor of Awadh, was marching from Gorakhpur towards Patna along the northern bank of the Ganges, according to the imperial mandate. Highly alarmed at the prospect of being engulfed by this 'pincer movement' of the imperialists, Shuja precipitately withdrew from Bahadurpur towards Patna; but, without entering the town, he halted at Jafar Khan's garden (10th Feb. 1659). The Prince inspected the deserted entrenchments at Benares, halted there for two days and then started for Patna under Mir Jumla's guidance.⁴

3. Patna—Monghyr.

Mir Jumla speedily arrived within 20 miles west of Patna. Feeling insecure in the 'great open plains' of that area, Shuja moved further eastwards and on 18th February reached Monghyr, and decided to make a resolute stand there against his enemy (19th February—6th March). He strengthened the fortifications on the approaches to the town, repaired the old wall there running between the Ganges and the foot of its southern hills, and supported his high entrenchments by a very powerful artillery and formidable war implements. Stationing small pickets of Europeans at strategic corners, Shuja entrusted the defence of the skirt of the hills (*damin-i-koh*) to Raja Bahroz of Kharagpur.

⁴ Shuja's flight, in AN. 285-6, 491-2; TS. 105b, 101a; ZNA. 91, 74, 80-2; *Poem*, 132, 139; Balasore letter (12th Feb. 1659) in EFL. X. 279; *Storia*. I. 33; Bernier, 80. Mir Jumla's pursuit, AN. 491, 493; TS. 113a; *Poem*, 138-41; ZNA. 91-92, 73-74, *Storia*, *op. cit.* 327. Kheri is in the Khyragarh dt; Kuntit is near Bindhyachal, 10 m. west of Mirzapur. *Ind. Atlas*, 88.

The imperialists reached Patna about 22nd February, 8 days after Shuja's departure therefrom, and were joined by Fidai Khan. After eight days' halt during which Mir Jumla appointed Daud Khan Governor of Bihar, the imperial army started for Monghyr and learnt of the enemy's strong defence there at Jakepoorah.⁵ Finding the road to Monghyr well-blocked (early March), the Prince took counsel of Mir Jumla, regarding the plan of advance. Mir Jumla at once recognised the utter futility of any attempt to storm Shuja's defences there and decided to cut Shuja's communications in the rear. Winning over Raja Bahroz by means of a letter of "hope and fear" and by the power of gold, Mir Jumla made a detour through the difficult route to Rajmahal running through the Kharagpur hills, then known as the 'Bar Jangal' i.e., extensive or terrifying woods, abounding with ferocious beasts and inhabited by the hillmen. Thus Mir Jumla gained his end by strategy rather than by huge waste of men and material. Along with Zulfiqar Khan, he cut his way through with the help of thousands of wood-cutters. Then, emerging out of the woods after a week and going up, he reached the plains east of Monghyr, followed by the Prince.⁶

4. Monghyr—Garhi.

Finding himself betrayed by his trusted *zamindar* and outflanked at this unexpected strategy of the imperialists, Shuja fled from Monghyr, in a state of alarm (6th March) to a place beyond Teliagarhi, mentioned in the *Alamgirnama* as

⁵ "Chakra or Jekra" in the text (*Poem*, 142). It may be identified with Jakepoorah, about 100 yds. s. e. of Suragegurra, Rennell, sh. 15. Is is kajra near kiul ?

⁶ ZNA. 92 ; AN. 493-5 ; 286 (Daud Khan) ; TS. 113a b ; *Poem*, 141-5 ; Bernier, 80-81 in ; Ball, I. 124 ; *Storia*, I '333-4 ; EFL. X. 279, 280-1. (distorted version), 283 ; *Aurangzib*, II. 568 ; MU. III. 539 : Masum (TS. 113b) states that Muhammad Sultan, finding the road to Monghyr blocked, decided to reach Burdwan through Jharkhand and then reach Rajmahal. This is a curious anticipation of a subsequent move of the imperialist army. The same mistake occurs in a Balasore letter of 12th April (EFL. X. 281-2) Bernier's statement (81) that Mir Jumla sent a part of the army down the river as a feint cannot be accepted, as he was then lacking in boats.

Rangamati.⁷ Here he halted for 15 days (10th-24th March) in guarding the river route by a *nawwara*, and fortifying Garhi, i.e., Teliagarhi. He asked Khwaja Kamal Afghan, the *zamindar* of Birbhum and Chatnagar to oppose another detour of Mir Jumla through the hills stretching from the Ganges to Birbhum.

Mir Jumla heard of Shuja's retreat from Monghyr at Pialapur,⁸ 40 miles east of it. Leaving Muhammad Sultan together with a part of the army there for occupation of those parts, Mir Jumla himself advanced to Monghyr, took possession of it (9th March) and arranged for its administration by appointing Muhammad Hossain Salduz temporary commandant of the fort till the arrival of an imperial officer. On return, he learnt the news of Shuja's entrenchments at Garhi and picking up Muhammad Sultan's force at Pialapur, marched at the head of the entire imperial army towards Rajmahal in order to cut off Shuja's retreat.

On hearing of Shuja's strong defences at Garhi, Muhammad Sultan enquired of Mir Jumla whether he would launch a direct assault on Garhi and force the defiles. Mir Jumla is said to have replied satirically: "It is not unfit for you, as you have no parallel in bravery and are a descendant of Timur to do so, but it would involve a huge loss of men and such a war should never be conducted. Why should you allow men to be slain in a task, which can be accomplished by strategy? Tasks there are, which can be performed not by war but by wisdom and policy."⁹

5. *Mir Jumla's turning movement near Garhi.*

As before Monghyr, so now too, Mir Jumla "resolved to add policy to strength". Once again did he adopt the same

⁷ Rangamati is Lalmati, midway between Teliagarhi and Sakrigali, and 1/2 mile south of Sahebganj Station (*Ind. Atlas* Sh. 112).

⁸ Pialapur, shown 60 miles east of Monghyr in Rennell, Sh. 15 does not suit here. Sir J. N. Sarker thinks that Tarrapour, about 22 miles s. e. of Monghyr is more suitable. Can Pialapur be a copyist's error for Paharpur (Rennell, Sh. 15)?

⁹ AN. 495-6; 336-7 (month Jumadi I wrong, should be Jumadi II); *Aurangzeb*, II. 570; *Poem*, 145-8; ZNA. 92; EFI. X. 281-3; both Bernier (81-2) and Manucci (*Storia*, I. 334-5) are misleading.

turning movement against Shuja and with the same decisive results. Once again gold of the imperialists disturbed Shuja's plans. To catch up his rear and bar his escape, Mir Jumla won over the *zamindar* of Birbhum with the same case as the Raja of Kharagpur, and "purchased a safe passage" through the former's lands. The way lay through hills south-east of the Monghyr district, infested with carnivorous animals, interspersed with marshes and swamps, devoid of fruit-yielding trees, and of any other article of food except rice and water. Satisfied with these two articles, Mir Jumla advanced towards Jharkhand, with Raja Bahroz as his guide who supplied to the imperialists, materials and corn, collected by his own men.

The general plan of advance was as follows : Wood-cutters and *beldars* (hatchetmen, diggers, delvers and pioneers), assisted by an elephant corps and numerous swift led horses, felled the trees and constructed a road, which was demarcated by two flags on either side under the supervision of Mir Jumla and Zulfikar. The army advanced during day time over the newly constructed road and halted at night. The route *via* Jharkhand was of several stages with narrow mountain passes, difficult of journey, undulating and lacking in any trace of vegetation. Though the march was toilsome, that vast army moved in as perfect order as possible, thanks to the discipline of the Mir,—in right, left, front and rear : Zulfikar with Van ; Islam Khan with right wing ; Fidai Khan with left wing ; Mir Jumla, together with Kunwar Ram Singh, Ikhlas Khan Khesghi and Rao Bhao Singh Hada, Sayyid Muzaffar Khan accompanied the Prince, with 15 horsemen in front ; Daud Khan formed the left reserve ; and Rashid Khan the right reserve. Crossing the jungle in 12 days the party reached the plains of Birbhum, Ukhla (Ukhra) in the *zamindari* of Khwaja Kamal, and passed along Suri, the chief town, on 28th March.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Poem*, 148-151 (plan of advance) ; AN, 496-7 ; ZNA. 92-93 ; EPI. X. 282 ; Ball, I. 272-3 ; MU. III. 539 ; RS. 220, 221 and n ; *Aurangzib*, II. 570-1 ; TS, 113b. Ukhra is now in Burdwan dt. Rennell. Sh. 9.

6. *The Rajputs desert Mir Jumla.*

Mir Jumla could overcome the impediments presented by nature, but he could not prevent those created by the credulity and cowardice of selfish men. At the end of March the Rajput generals like Kunwar Ram Singh (son of Mirza Raja), Rao Bhao Singh (son of Raja Chattarsal Hada), Amar Singh, Chaturbhuj Chauhan, and others deserted Mir Jumla and proceeded towards Agra by way of Jharkhand. The reasons of this unexpected development, which reduced the numerical strength of Mir Jumla's army, are stated differently by different authors. The Shujaite historian Masum ascribes it to Mir Jumla's refusal to meet the demands for expenses made by the Rajputs. The Mir is said to have replied: "You are *jagirdars* of the Emperor and receive handsome pay. There is not money enough to spare. Wherefrom shall I give it? After sometime when the countries will be occupied and *daroghas* will be stationed, you will get what you demand." The Rozbihani follower of Mir Jumla attributes the incident to Aurangzeb's policy of persecution of the Hindus. The Rajputs like Ram Singh and Bhao Singh hearing that Aurangzeb, who had destroyed temples and built mosques, wanted to execute the Hindus, became apprehensive of their lives and decided in a meeting to desert the imperialists. But these explanations are not adequate. The facts that *all* Rajputs did not desert Mir Jumla, that Raja Indradymna remained loyal, and that two Muhammedan generals, Sher Beg and Syed Shujaat Khan, joined the deserters, all go to divest the incident of its exclusive Rajput character and show that causes, deeper than mere financial discontent and narrow sectarianism, were at work. The true reason is that mentioned by Aqil Khan, Aurangzeb's equerry, and supported by the official history, *Alamgirnama*. A false rumour of Dara's victory at Ajmer (Dejrai, 12th-14th March) and of Aurangzeb's flight to the Deccan had reached Mir Jumla's army at Pialapur, and had demoralised a section of it. The Rajputs, in particular, secretly brooded over the possible vengeance of Dara on their homes in Rajputana. They suspected Mir

Jumla's detour to be a secret scheme to escape with Prince Sultan Muhammad to the Deccan.

Without wasting any time in a vain endeavour to dissuade or punish the deserters, Mir Jumla with the remnant of the army, still 25,000 strong, double the strength of Shuja, steadily advanced against him, so that the task of cutting off the enemy's retreat might not be delayed by a single moment.¹¹

7. *Mir Jumla occupies Rajmahal.*

Meanwhile, hearing of the treachery of the *zamindar* of Birbhum and of the advance of the imperialists through his lands, Shuja evacuated Rangamati and hurried to Rajmahal (about 27th March), where he entrenched for a time. The imperialists turned to the north-east in order to strike the Ganges near Murshidabad and bar Shuja's retreat to Dacca. Their arrival at Belghata, 30 miles from Shuja's position, hastened the desertion of the latter's wavering followers.

Learning of the encampment of the imperial army on the bank of the Ganges under the command of Mir Jumla, Shuja no longer regarded its right (or western) bank to be safe for him. Acting on the advice of a Council of War of amirs, led by Mirza Jan Beg, entitled Khan Zaman, Shuja planned to remove his headquarters and family to Tanda (4 miles west of the fort of Gaur) and to prolong the war with the help of his flotilla and artillery cannonade, so that "the tide might return". So, on 4th April, 1659, Shuja left Rajmahal, crossed the Ganges at Dogachi,¹² 13 miles south, and arrived at Firozpur with his family in order to reach Tanda. He collected the entire flotilla of Bengal at Baqarpur

¹¹ AN, 497-8; ZNA. 93; TS, 115b, 116a; *Poem*, 151-3; *Aurangzib*, II. 571-3. Acc. to the *Poem*, a fruitless effort was made by Mir Jumla and Zulfiqar Khan to find out the deserters, but Mir Jumla is said to have prevented the Prince from executing the fugitives on the ground that "it was unbecoming of the prince to fight with servants."

¹² For Dogachi, see *Ind. Atlas* Sh. 112. There is another Dogachi, 2 miles south of Dunapnr, but that is not meant here. Ferozpur, 1 mile s.w. of Tanda, is shown as 1 mile north of the Pugla R. *Ind Atlas*, Sh. 119.

and threw up entrenchments at several places on the eastern or left bank of the Ganges.

The news of Shuja's evacuation of Rajmahal reached Mir Jumla at Belghata, and he at once dashed northwards to capture the deserted capital. Preceded by the Van under Zulfiqar Khan, Mir Jumla, together with the Prince, entered it on 13th April and arranged for its government. Zulfiqar Khan was appointed its governor and asked to hold it, with 5,000 men and assisted by Sayyid Firoz Khan, Zabardast Khan, Raja Indradyumna and Raja Debi Singh. About 4,000 Shujaites who could not cross the Ganges, returned to Rajmahal and were induced by Zulfiqar Khan to join imperial service. The *Alamgirnama* tells us that the occupation of the town, which still contained Shuja's goods and officers, was characterised by a spirit of fair justice and an attempt to conciliate the Shujaites on whom no oppression or plunder was allowed to be committed. The fortifications of the town were sought to be strengthened at the orders of the Emperor and these were completed after about 3 years under Etwar Khan. Thus Mir Jumla occupied the whole country on the right bank of the Ganges from Rajmahal to Hugli. The English factors now came to regard him and the Prince as conquerors of the country.¹³

¹³. AN: 495-501; ZNA 94-5; TS, 116a. b; *Poem*, 153-4; *Aurangzib*, II. 573-80; EFI. X. 281-3; Bernier 81-2 (account different).

Section C

THE WAR ON THE GANGES

1. *Mir Jumla's difficulties in the new theatre of war.*

With Shuja's evacuation of the western bank of the Ganges the war entered an altogether new phase. So long it had been pre-eminently a land operation, decided by Mir Jumla's turning movements and overwhelming superiority in numbers. That is why Shuja could not dare face the imperialists even once. But now, with the Ganges separating the rival forces, the war became essentially a naval contest, in which Shuja had certain decided advantages over his pursuer. In the first place, the lord of Bengal, the land of waterways, had a powerful *nauwara* or flotilla. He now either seized the private boats, or sunk and burnt them, to prevent their capture by the enemy. On the other hand, Mir Jumla's army was nothing but a land force, a "flying army" as the English factors called it. He had not brought boats with himself and could not hope to easily procure any in Bengal because of Shuja's "scorched earth" policy. His initial efforts were paralysed by his pitiable lack of a naval arm. In the second place, Mir Jumla was also very weak in artillery, having dragged only light pieces with him from Khajwa. But Shuja had a vast store of big pieces of artillery, admirably manned by the European (Portuguese) and half-caste (or *mestico*) gunners of Hugli, Tamluk and Noakhali. By offering them high pay and making generous promises for the future as regards money and freedom to establish churches, Shuja succeeded in enlisting in his service thousands of Portuguese, who had taken refuge in Bengal, after having been ousted by the Dutch from Ceylon and Jafnapatam. With his base at Tanda, and by means of entrenchments, flotilla and artillery, Shuja defended various places on the eastern bank, like Baqarpur and Firozpur, opposite the imperial front extending from Rajmahal to Suti. By properly co-ordinating the two arms, by mounting his "great guns" on the boats, Shuja could even use his mobile artillery with deadly

effect anywhere against Mir Jumla's positions on the western bank of the river. Master of the Ganges, Shuja could defend himself splendidly despite his hopeless paucity of men, though he was unable to launch an offensive against the imperialists. What he evidently wanted was to try his utmost till the last moment. His strategy in taking refuge behind the river was thus based on a clear grasp of the relative strength of the rival forces, and it was undoubtedly the most advantageous under the circumstances. It considerably delayed his pursuit, by multiplying Mir Jumla's difficulties. The English factors of Balasore, though unaware of Mir Jumla's likely stratagems, shrewdly and rightly diagnosed the situation, when they observed (30th April, 1659) that if Mir Jumla was to succeed that year, he must win before the advent of the rains.¹ But this was rendered impossible by his deficiencies in boats and artillery. Baulked in some of his initial enterprises, unable to cross the Ganges and helplessly confined to the western bank, Mir Jumla was compelled to suspend the chase, when, taking advantage of the rains, the fugitive Prince even assumed the aggressive and wrested Rajmahal from Mir Jumla's men. It was only when a diversion had been slowly effected against Shuja by a vast turning movement of the imperialists on the heart of Shuja's defences at Tanda that the centre of gravity shifted away from a theatre of war, where Mir Jumla's position was inherently weak, and he could once again take up the field against Shuja.

The history of the next one year, from 13th April, 1659, when Mir Jumla occupied Rajmahal to 12th April, 1660, when Shuja reached Dacca, was the story of how Mir Jumla, after alternate success and failure, finally frustrated Shuja's grand strategy. It was indeed a drama which unfolded itself in three acts, in which events moved like the swinging

¹ For Shuja's command of the Ganges, artillery and his plan, Balasore letters of 30th April, 18th May and 15th December, 1659, in EFL. X: 282-4 ; TS, 117 (Shuja's capture or sinking of boats near Rajmahal) ; *Aurangzib*, II. 578-81, 593 ; *CHI*, IV. 225 ; Bernier, 82 and *Storia*, I. 335, for Portuguese support ; AS. 20b.

of the pendulum of a clock. The first act, in which Shuja played a defensive game, was staged on the river Ganges: it ended on 8th June, 1659 with Prince Muhammad Sultan's flight to Shuja. In the second act the pendulum oscillated to the western bank: Shuja assumed the offensive, recaptured Rajmahal but could not retain it. In the third act, the final phase of the war, Mir Jumla regained his offensive and the pendulum turned from the western to the eastern bank, and Shuja, almost encircled from three sides, had to leave the eastern bank for ever.

2. *Mir Jumla's first naval coup at Dogachi.*

Without losing heart at the difficulties arrayed against him in the new theatre of war, Mir Jumla steadfastly endeavoured to tide them over. His first concern after the occupation of Rajmahal (13th April) was to secure boats, as it was impossible to advance a single step without them. A fortnight's persistent search in remote and obscure spots was rewarded with a modest collection of a few boats.

Meanwhile, without wasting time at Rajmahal, where no action was possible without a vast flotilla, Mir Jumla accompanied by the Prince, had proceeded (14th April) to Dogachi, 13 miles farther south, and took up his quarters there. There was a high island in midstream opposite his camp, forming a half-way house to Baqarpar on the other bank, where the Shujaite general, Sayyid Quli, had entrenched with his artillery, with Shuja himself in the rear and a flotilla cruising along in front. With his characteristic keenness, the Mir at once grasped the strategic value of the island. But as he had no boats till then, a Shujaite detachment stole a march over him, seized it one night and began to entrench and erect *damdama* (raised batteries) in order to cannonade against the imperialists.

Then, with his boats ready at hand, Mir Jumla planned to wrest the island from the Shujaites and, if possible, to cross over to the eastern bank. But, before launching the expedition, the experienced general advised the Prince to erect on the bank an entrenchment, equipped with cannon,

musketeers and rocketmen, as a precautionary measure. In many secret journeys, conducted after midnight under Mir Jumla's skilful management and personal inspection, the boats transported to the island about 2,000 personal followers of Mir Jumla and some imperial officers like Zulfiqar, Fateh Jung, Rashid Khan Ansari, Lodi Khan, Sujan Singh Bundela, Taj Niazi, with their respective followers, 200 *beldars* and a few guns. In the morning the Shujaite, discovering the invaders, rowed away with their guns, and their deserted entrenchments were hastily occupied by the imperialists.

Next day the Shujaite admiral, Fidai Khan, pitted his entire flotilla including many Europeans in a severe assault on the imperialists. Behind the smoke-screen of artillery fire on both sides, he effected a landing on one side of the island and was hastily entrenching, when he was charged by Taj Niazi and his Afghan fighters. For sometime the issue seemed to hang in the balance. Mir Jumla, watching this deadly, hand-to-hand duel from the bank, grew so alarmed as to pray to God for victory. At last the Shujaite were hurled back and some of their boats were sunk. Finally, the imperialists secured undisturbed possession of the island by repulsing yet another attempt of the Shujaite to recapture it with fast boats and artillery during which "the roar of the guns was so great that even the fish became restless in the river."²

3. *Mir Jumla's naval enterprises at Suti.*

This first stroke of Mir Jumla was in reality a daring and well-conceived one. He had shown remarkable promptness in securing boats. He succeeded in stealing a march over Shuja evidently because the enemy, over-confident in the strength of his entrenched position, had underrated Mir Jumla's capacity and had not anticipated any such move. Warned by the loss, Shuja now became more vigilant. While

2. AN. 501-503; TS. 118a (boats collected): *The Poem* (154-167) gives the name of the leader of the imperialists who defeated Fidai as Salabat Khan.

his cruising flotilla defended his western front, exchanging fire with the imperialists between Rajmahal and Dogachi, he massed his men and artillery opposite Mir Jumla. Again, the river was as wide here as at Rajmahal. Hence Mir Jumla rightly realised that it would be hopeless for him to transport his men and arms in his few boats or land by surprise on the opposite bank in the presence of such a strong and watchful enemy, and that it would be impossible to defeat the enemy there even after a protracted struggle. This inevitable stagnation necessitated a change of tactics on Mir Jumla's part. Modifying his previous arrangements he bided his time. He distributed the imperial army along the whole western bank between Rajmahal in the north and Suti (28 miles south-east of it) in the south; Rajmahal under Muhammad Murad Beg; Dogachi (opposite Shuja's camp) under the Prince, together with Zulfiqar Khan, Islam Khan and most of the army; Dunapur, about 8 miles further south, commanded by Ali Quli; while Mir Jumla himself took post at Suti, with 6 or 7 thousand men to cross the river.

Mir Jumla's choice of Suti was marvellous, determined by the deficiency of boats. The river was narrow here and easily fordable, as some local men had informed him. Its fording would have compensated his previous reverses by giving him quicker victory. The Prince, too, accepted the Mir's valuable advice. To prevent boats and forlorn Shujaites from crossing over to Shuja and thus disclosing his plans to the enemy, Mir Jumla closed all ferries and passages. So strict was the embargo, and so high was the penalty, that even stealthy crossings were impossible, not to speak of open attempts; any culprit detected while crossing had his nose and ears cut off.

The day after encampment at Suti, Mir Jumla attempted to cross the river. Unfortunately, the divers could not sound the depth of the river. He regretted his reliance on the words of local men. In fact, there was "a sudden rising of the waters in the Ganges" about 14 days earlier than usual. This accident saved Shuja from another immediate discomfiture.

Anticipating danger, Shuja deputed Nurul Hasan to oppose Mir Jumla at Suti and Isfandiar Mamuri against Dunapur, while his eldest son, Zainuddin, carried his family to Tanda for safety.³

Mir Jumla now planned to transport his men to the other side as secretly as possible and then to go personally and entrench there. In feverish haste he set about gathering boats. He sent his officers to several places like Hugli, Cassimbazar and some others for the purpose. He called upon men to supply boats of any kind available, *Kisti* or *Ghurab*, threatening to desolate their country and property with the help of the soldiers in case of failure. The threat had the desired result. Within 10 to 15 days about a hundred boats of various sorts (*kusas*, *Khaluahs*, *rahwaras*) were placed at the disposal of the Mir. Zulfikar, too, sent 40 boats. With this hastily collected flotilla Mir Jumla could now guard his front against sudden swoopings by Shuja's mobile boats. The latter could now rove up and down for a distance of 40 to 50 leagues only along the eastern bank.

Losing command of the western bank, Shuja now set up a high battery of 8 large guns for cannonading on the imperial lines across the river. To put a stop to the consequent damage to his men and cattle on the bank, Mir Jumla sent one night an expeditionary force on 10 boats to capture the battery. But it was detected and repulsed. So Mir Jumla changed the time and, next mid-day, sent a party, consisting of 20 imperial troopers and many of his own retainers. His very audacity contributed to his success. Swiftly sailing across along with the wind, which had thrown the defenders off their guard, his men swooped on the

³ New arrangements, AN. 503-504; *Aurangzib*, II. 582-3; ZNA. 95; Mir at Suti, *Poem* 162-65; ZNA. 95; TS. 117b. EFI. X. 283. At Suti Mir Jumla resided in the house of Muhammad Shah, son of Shah Murtaza deceased. MH. 209-12; Unsuccessful fording *Poem*, 165 EFI. op cit. AN. 504; ZNA.

battery, drove nails into the port-holes of 2 guns and came away with the other six, without suffering any loss.⁴

4. *Mir Jumla's signal failure on 3rd May, 1659.*

Spurred on by success, Mir Jumla planned another *coup* on a much larger scale. But Shuja was more vigilant now. Terrified at the heroic stroke of his adversary, he had replaced the negligent commander, Nurul Hasan, by an able and devoted officer, Sayyid Alam of Barha (Khan-i-Alam). Leaving the trenches and batteries on the river bank lightly manned, Shuja concealed his picked troops and fierce war-elephants under Sayyid Alam and Muhtasham Khan behind camouflaged ambushes.

Mir Jumla's preliminary or reconnaissance boat-raid on Sayyid Alam on the night of 2nd May, 1659, miscarried. At dawn (3rd May) 73 boats of Mir Jumla carrying a mixed force of Mughals, Sayyids, Afghans and Rajputs, numbering in all 2,000, led by Qasim Khan and Shahbaz Khan, started to effect a landing on the opposite bank and entrench there. When the first two or three boats reached the other side, Ihtimam Khan and his men, unaware of any lurking danger, occupied the enemy entrenchments by over-powering their scanty guards. Suddenly the Shujaites emerged from the ambush with their war-elephants and completely enveloped the small party of the imperialists who had to put up a gallant defence in the captured redoubt. Mir Jumla, witnessing the reverse from the western bank, could do nothing to turn the tide; the fugitive and frightened crew refused to return to help their brethren despite his entreaties. He suffered heavy casualties: about half of the troops, "the very pick of the..... army" perished, including 3 or 4 captains; of those wounded or captured, numbering 500, some were sent to Firozpur, Malda and other places and the rest were put to death. The moral effect of the disaster was greater than the loss in manpower and

4. *Poem*, 165-7; TS. 118a; ZNA. 95; EFL. X. 283-4; AN. 504-5; *Aurangzib*, II. 585-4.

materials. He was highly mortified; "the disaster", indeed, "dimmed the lustre of his hitherto victorious career". But he screwed up courage to make fresh efforts. He also learnt to be "extremely cautious" and careful for the rest of the campaign.⁵

The cause of Mir Jumla's tragic reverse has been accurately diagnosed by Masum, the Shujaite historian. He observes; "Even though this (move) was an act of wisdom and courage, it must be admitted that it would have been wiser on his part first to enquire of the enemy's strength and conditions and then start on the boats Muazzam Khan, without due discernment and eye to future.... had launched the expedition, hoping to fall on the enemy unawares" In other words, Mir Jumla had not taken the usual precaution of reconnoitring the enemy's dispositions and taking stock of his strength. Evidently this negligence arose from his over-confidence, born of egotism and elation at his previous success. Sir Jadunath Sarkar pithily observes that Mir Jumla "committed the fatal mistake of despising the enemy". Mir Jumla himself admits his mistake in a soliloquy attributed to him by his Rozbihani follower: "I am now 70 years old.....At last in my old age, by some fruitless thought, I have suffered a reverse....." The English factory records ascribe the failure of the imperialists to the fact that they were "in small boats", whereas the Shujaites were in jellares (*jalia* or *jalba*) or large boats.⁶ Shuja's boats did include, we learn from the *Alamgirnama*, many fast boats (*kosas*); while since about 1,000 imperialists were carried in 6 boats, it can not be said that all the boats of Mir Jumla were small. Still

⁵ Graphic description in AN, 506-509 (Preliminary boat attack of 2nd May): TS, 118a-119b; *Poem*, 167-174; ZNA, 95; MH, 209-12; Miserable plight of the imperialists in *Aurangzib*, II, 584-6.

The imperial expeditionary force is numbered 2,000 by Masum (118a, b) and 3,000 by Aqil Khap. Masum's estimate is borne out by the English factory records which state that Mir Jumla lost about 1,000 men i. e., half of the army (Balasore to Masulipatam, 18th May; letter of Edmund Foster at Kassimbazar, 8th May, EFI, X, 284).

⁶ TS, 118a, b; *Poem*, 172-3 (Mir Jumla's soliloquy); EFI, X, 284. *Aurangzib*, II, 584; ZNA, 95.

It must be admitted that the difference in the relative size of their respective flotillas contributed somewhat to Mir Jumla's failure.

5. *Mir Jumla's preparations for a fresh offensive*

Mir Jumla now began his preparations for launching a fresh offensive. To make up the deficiency of boats was a pressing task for him, demanding his constant attention. He endeavoured to collect these and other materials for a naval war from Hugli, Murshidabad and Burdwan. His agents ran about in search of carpenters to build boats and to summon as many boatmen as possible. All big boats coming down the river were stopped and seized ; and none could pass beyond Muxadabad (Murshidabad). To counterpoise Portuguese support to Shuja, Mir Jumla began to make a diplomatic use of his position as Mughal general in Bihar and Bengal in his relations with the Dutch and the English factors there. Being only 35 miles from Kassimbazar, he requisitioned the Dutch gunners and physicians. While the English did not see him, the Director of the Dutch, Mattheus Van den Brouke, proceeded from Hugli to meet him. It was rumoured that the imperial commander-in-chief offered the government of Hugli to the Dutch in return for a sum of two lakhs of rupees. Early in July, 1659, the Director promised to give all possible help to Mir Jumla, who ordered him to have the river guarded by mounting all great guns ready on their sloops.⁷

Mir Jumla was also engaged now in extending Aurangzeb's authority into Orissa. The Mir tried to secure the adhesion of towns near Balasore to the imperial cause by sending officers and issuing orders to other towns. He also sent private letters to the Shujaite Governor of Balasore asking him to visit Sultan Muhammad. But though the latter was still afraid to desert Shuja, the English factors expected that Mir Jumla would soon occupy Balasore and that its Governor would "willingly embrace the surer side".⁸

7. For collection of boats, TS. II9b, 120a ; *Poem*, 173-4 ; AN. 509, For stoppage of boats and Mir Jumla's relation with the Dutch and the English, EFL. X. 284 and n. 286, 288 n. Vide Section F. § 2 *Infra*.

8. EFL. -X, 285, 287.

Mir Jumla realised that a mere frontal attack, however well-organised it might be, would not succeed in dislodging Shuja from his entrenched positions across the river. He must track the lion in his own den. He must create a diversion which would set Shuja flying to protect his rear. In other words, Mir Jumla planned to hem in Shuja from the north, the east and the west. For the execution of this master-plan Mir Jumla had to depend on Daud Khan, the Governor of Bihar.

Referring to his discomfiture at Suti in a letter to Daud Khan, Mir Jumla urged upon him to recruit soldiers and "open the door of the treasury", to summon rich nobles like the valiant Hadi and Abdul Maal, Ali Khan and the Kakars along with their respective retainers and to collect as many boats (*kisti* or *ghurab* i. e. gunboat) as possible, and to equip each boat suitably with artillery. To avoid being impeded by floods, Daud was asked to march at once against Shuja as rapidly as possible with all the collected force and later on to send the war-boats to Mir Jumla. Further, Daud was advised to instruct the Rozbihani force under Chiragh Beg and Rashid, sent by Mir Jumla (at Suti) and Muhammad Sultan (at Dogachi) respectively, to cross the Kosi. Thus the combined army of Daud Khan, Rashid and Chiragh would attack Shuja on the left bank of the Ganges, and then Mir Jumla would cross it with Daud's boats, join in the grand assault on Shuja, and so "strike at the root of the enemy's power".⁹

⁹ *Poem*, 172-8; AN. 513. Abdul Maal is to be identified with (Mirza) Abu-l-Maali, *faujdar* of Tirhut and later of Darbhanga. MU. Tr. I, 136-7, Text, III. 557-560.

The *Alamgirnama* states that the strategy of a two-pronged offensive against Shuja originated with Aurangzeb, who ordered Daud Khan to advance from Patna eastwards. But it would be impossible for the Emperor, hundreds of miles away from the theatre of war, to devise strategy best suited to the military situation, unless the suggestion went from Mir Jumla, the man on the spot. The Rozbihani author explicitly states that the initiative of this master-strategy to effect diversion against Shuja was taken by Mir Jumla immediately after the failure of the frontal assault scheme from the south-west of 3rd May. (Contd.)

6. *Flight of Muhammad Sultan to Shuja.*

While Mir Jumla was endeavouring to heal the wounds, caused by the severe mauling of 3rd May, he had to suffer another unexpected loss, which stupefied his army for a while. His associate commander, Prince Muhammad Sultan, deserting his post at Dogachi, fled to Shuja on the night of 8th June. It was a terrible ordeal for Mir Jumla. It would have ended fatally but for his splendid courage, presence of mind and control over men.

The flight of the Prince¹⁰ was due,—besides his ambition of getting the throne, his love towards Shuja's daughter, and the tempting overtures of his uncle,—to his resentment against Mir Jumla's tutelage, fanned by allegations of some mischief-mongers, and his apprehension of his arrest by the Mir at imperial mandate. The Emperor's suspicions of his son were deepened by either, as the Shujaite historian says,—Mir Jumla's written accusation against the Prince for his "pretended ignorance and negligences", contributing to the failure of the coup of 3rd May, or,—as the *Poem* tells us,—by the adverse comments against the Prince made by two spies, deputed by the Emperor to report on the loyalty of the army. At this the Emperor wrote to the Mir: "All affairs, in general and particular, both there and here, are guided by your opinion. If my son do not follow your advice, and—if you do not consider his stay desirable, quickly send him back." The imperial message, purporting to be an order for arresting the Prince and packing him off as a prisoner, was intercepted

There is a lacuna in the *Poem* (ms) for the total strength of the army required by Mir Jumla: Daud received the letter brought by an express courier in 3 days. He thus got about a week's time to start.

The Kakars were an Afghan tribe (distinct from the Gakkars) settled in North Bihar after Sher Shah.

¹⁰ For the Prince's flight, AN. 509-12, 406-7; TS. 120b-124a; ZNA. 96-7; *Poem*, 183-194; AS. 20b; Ball's Tavernier, I. 273-4; Bernier, 82-3; *Storia*, I. 336; *Aurangzib*, II. 586-9, MU. III. 540-1.

by his road patrols. The Prince lost all patience, but, confident of a sure asylum across the river, he escaped that very night.¹¹

Mir Jumla, then at Suti, was taken aback at this turn of events. Firmly keeping his own men pacified, he rode to the Prince's camp at Dogachi the next morning. On the way he was relieved to learn the true cause of the flight from Aurangzeb's spies, who had escaped from the surveillance of the Prince's guards during the confusion following the event.

Mir Jumla found the camp at Dogachi in utter disorder. Everywhere the Mir found defiance, indecision and despair. But Mir Jumla, "a born leader of men", knew how to deal with such desperate situations. Before a council of war, attended by all soldiers, great and small, he delivered an impetuous harangue. At first he won their confidence. Then he challenged them in a spirited manner. Refuting the argument that further fighting would be futile, he appealed to them: "You are fearing an enemy, who has fled like a jackal! he has fled from us, not we from him." Then he instilled courage into their hearts by observing "Even if the enemy is bright like the sun, I am, you know, like a cloud; and I would envelop him like a cloud.....I will drive him towards the group of *firingis* (Portuguese)". Pointing out that the desertion of the Prince was immaterial he thundered: "The Emperor has made me commander. It is only for consultation that the Emperor sent him (the Prince) with me". Next, moderating his tone and reposing his confidence in his audience, he unfolded to them his contemplated strategy during and after the rainy season, and assuaged their groundless fears.

Mir Jumla's address, vibrating with anger, reason

11. For strained relation between the Mir and the Prince, AN. 511; *Storia* I. 336. For Emperor's suspicions and letter to Mir Jumla, TS. 120b-121a, corroborated by the *Poem*, 183-188; Ball, I. 360-1. It seems possible that the Emperor sent the spies to verify Mir Jumla's accusation.

and hope, produced the desired result. It completely won over the faltering and rebellious hearts. All welcomed it as a counsel of perfection, and agreed to obey him as their sole head. Mir Jumla, beaming with joy, now tactfully promised to recommend the generals to the Emperor for promotion and grant of suitable rewards. He also ordered the treasurer to give the soldiers three months' pay.

Having won over the soldiery, Mir Jumla drove away a Shujaite raiding party designed to carry away the provisions and stores and men, left behind by the Prince. He also confiscated the deserter's property and treasure in the name of the Emperor and enlisted his men in imperial service. Thus, through Mir Jumla's heroic efforts the leaderless army was infused with new hopes and courage, and weathered the storm. "It lost", as Aqil Khan remarks, "only one man—the Prince".¹²

Leaving Fidai Khan and Islam Khan at Dogachi and sending Zulfiqar back to Rajmahal, Mir Jumla returned to Suti, and on 10th June he despatched Rashid Khan to Daud Khan, then at Qazi Keria.

When the heavy rains of Bengal hampered all military activities, Mir Jumla sent the army to cantonments. He now followed a policy of withdrawal and concentration. Withdrawing the posts at Dogachi, Dunapur and Suti, he concentrated the army only at two places. He himself remained with 15,000 men at Masumbazar (Murshidabad), an elevated ground having abundance of provisions. Zulfiqar Khan, together with Islam Khan, Fidai Khan, Sayyid Muzaffar Khan, Ikhlas Khan, Raja Indradyumna, Qizilbash and others, stayed at Rajmahal.¹³

¹² For Mir's speech and confiscation of property, *Poem*, 188-94; EFL. X. 289; ZNA, 96. The repulse of the Shujaites could not have taken place before the restoration of order, as Aqil Khan says; again the Mir came on the second and not on the third day of desertion. See *Aurangzib*, II. 588.

¹³ ZNA. 96-7; *Poem*, 194-5 (deputation of Rashid to Daud); AN. 512-13.

Section D

THE WAR MOVES WEST OF THE GANGES

1. *Mir Jumla's increased difficulties.*

Prince Muhammad Sultan's desertion of Mir Jumla was a turning-point in the history of the War. With it the offensive which had remained with Mir Jumla ever since his capture of Rajmahal passed to his opponent. So long Shuja had pursued a purely defensive strategy. Now, for the first time in the war, which, unhappily for him, was also the last, he assumed the offensive.

The defection of the Prince undoubtedly multiplied the difficulties of Mir Jumla. True, the numerical strength of the imperial army remained unaffected, but its morale did not. Mir Jumla's loss was Shuja's gain. In the Prince, conversant with the secrets of Mir Jumla's army, Shuja had undoubtedly a trump card to be thrown at his enemy. The rains and the floods isolated the two imperial camps by making the road between them extending for sixty miles almost impassable, and there was now constant danger of the Shujaites cutting off the imperial army's communications and supply of provisions.

Not only did the war enter a new phase but the scene of it changed too. The exultant Shuja planned to launch a direct assault on Rajmahal on the western bank of the Ganges. Its recapture would revive his prestige. Relief would be difficult either from Daud Khan in the north-west or from Mir Jumla in the south. His flotilla would not be able to launch a direct assault on the upland cantonments of Mir Jumla at Murshidabad. Again, he feared that the European Companies at Hugli and Kassimbazar, who were lukewarm in their loyalty to himself, would help Mir Jumla.¹

Shuja's strategy consisted in not only starving the imperialists at Rajmahal to submission by an effective blockade of the town but also in preventing Mir Jumla from receiving

1. *Aurangzib*, II. 589 ; *EFL*. X. 289 (Prince, a trump card) *AN*, 512 *TS*. 124b.

supplies from the European companies at Hugli. The provisions sent by Mir Jumla from Murshidabad to Rajmahal on water were intercepted by Shuja's flotilla. By winning over many *zamindars* in Bihar and western Bengal, Shuja endeavoured to intercept goods and messengers on land. Thus Harchand, the Raja of the Majwa hills, subsidised by Shuja, waylaid every merchant (*banjara*) transporting to Rajmahal even a bullock's load of grain. A Kassimbazar letter of 5th July tells us that Shuja gave a free hand to the *zamindars* to rob any merchant or soldier of his money, horses and goods on condition that they would side with him and supply him with whatever elephants they could capture. Naturally they had already begun closing the way between Hugli and Kassimbazar so effectively that no merchant could dare pass with goods for fear of being robbed on the way and not even a peon could pass safely with a letter.²

2. *Shuja recovers Rajmahal.*

Mir Jumla could do nothing to relieve Rajmahal. Handicapped by his hopeless deficiency in boats, he had perforce to remain the silent but uneasy spectator of the growing isolation of that water-locked city, effected by the enemy's powerful flotilla mounted with artillery. Shuja's blockade was so successful that no grains sent by Mir Jumla reached Rajmahal. A graphic description of this man-made famine at Rajmahal, has been left by the Shujaite historian, Masum, an eye witness. He writes: "Grain rose to the price of gold. Coarse, red, bad-smelled rice and *dal* sold at nine seers a rupee"... "In the agony of hunger, men took morsels of poison." The butchers sold meat at a rupee a seer. If the poor wanted to take meat, they had to take their (own) meat. If the mouth had tasted any meat it was the flesh of their lips." Having no stock of grain, Masum had to spend 20 to 30 rupees a day. The empty

2. ZNA. 98; TS. 126a; EFI. 289, 290 (bet. Hugli and Kassimbazar) AN. 515-6. The Majwa (87° 37' E, 25° 2' N) hills stretch westwards of Rajmahal, *Ind. Atlas*, Sh. 112.

houses stood awaiting their owners' return : dogs and cats sat in the shops : the places of worship were deserted : the wine shops were without wine. "The flame of famine shot up, and smoke seemed to come out of earth and time." But even this description, hyperbolic though it is at places, does not,—he cautions the reader,—suffice to adequately express the gravity of the situation, for, "whatever is said is like a grain lifted from a heap of rice." Mir Jumla's Rozbihani follower also admits that the famine was so severe both in the town and in the villages that "one piece of bread became the source of life." Aqil Khan, too, observes : "Men began to sustain themselves by the blood of their liver in place of food." The ravages of flood and famine and the consequent loss of their horses and draught cattle reduced Mir Jumla's men at Rajmahal to dire straits : and when the discord among their generals brought the cup of distress, disorder and depression to brimful, they had no alternative but to evacuate Rajmahal.³

The right moment now arrived for Shuja to strike. Without any opposition from the imperialists, his admiral, Shaikh Abbas, captured a hilly tract, named Patura, south of Rajmahal, and made it his base for launching boat-raids to plunder the town. After some time, Shuja became emboldened to cross over to the western bank of the river.

Leaving Serajuddin Jabri, Mir Alauddin, *diwan*, and Muhammad Zaman, *Mir-i-Saman*, at Tanda, Shuja arrived at Patura on 18th August. On 22nd August he suddenly invaded Rajmahal with his war boats. As the imperial commandant, Zulfiqar, occupying the spur of an elevation between the old and the new towns was incapacitated by illness, Raja Indradyumna alone had to offer a strong opposition to the invader. Islam Khan and Fidai Khan, who were entrusted with the duty of watching the town, could not decide upon a common course of action. Finally, they decided to leave the town and withdraw to Mir Jumla.

³ TS. 126ba-131a ; *Poem*, 201 ; ZNA. 98 (exaggerated) ; EFL. X. 289 ; *Aurangzib*, II. 590 ; AN. 515-6.

Proceeding along a causeway, coming from the skirt of the hill to the new town, the two generals advanced against the enemy but reeled at Shuja's heavy artillery fire and gave up fighting even though the pressure from the enemy was not very great,—as the official history admits. At night the imperialists beat a retreat to Murshidabad, deserting all their important strategic positions, and leaving all their property to be seized by the enemy. Thus Shuja regained Rajmahal and restored his authority on the right bank of the Ganges.⁴

Mir Jumla administered a stern rebuke to his generals who had come to him pell-mell. "Wretches", he roared, "you are unfit to conduct war It behoves you to put on silken attire, to drink goblets of wine, and to relax in the garden with a singing damsel Man's greatness consists in valour. The law of the valorous is majesty. It cannot come from old jackals. You have fled from an enemy, who has no strength and no soldier....." The General's taunt evoked an angry protest from Zulfiqar. He remonstrated that it was not befitting for the General to denounce so many distinguished officers as unmanly cowards. Zulfiqar himself had won renown in the war against Jaswant Singh, against Dara and Shuja too, and explained that he had retreated with the entire army not for fear of Shuja but only because the dearth of provisions threatened it with starvation. Noticing Zulfiqar's righteous indignation, Mir Jumla consoled him by recognising his bravery and observing how, being the victim of Shuja's deception, he had given up without effort the town which the Mir had captured after great exertion. He also assured the Khan and the rest of the army not to grieve over the loss, by expressing that it had been predestined, and that he was confident of wresting it from Shuja.⁵

4 AN. 516-19; TS. 125; ZNA. 99; *Poem*. 201-2; Ball's Tavernier, I. 275; *Aurangzib*, II. 590-I; EFL. *op. cit.* 289. Patura is shown as Putoorah, 5 miles south of Rajmahal, *Ind. Atlas*, Sh. 112.

5. *Poem*. 202-6.

Shuja had achieved the first of his objects with surprising rapidity and ease. But he failed in his plans in isolating Mir Jumla in the south. In fact, Mir Jumla did not remain idle at his rainy season cantonment of Masumbazar. His vast numerical strength enabled him to spare a contingent for the purpose of sweeping clear the southern routes to Hugli and even the hinterland beyond it, of the roving bands of the retainers of the Shujaite *Zamindars* of south-west Bengal. Early in July he deputed a *faujdar* (? Muhammad Sharif) with 500 horsemen to clear the way between Kassimbazar and Hugli to conquer Hugli again and even occupy Midnapur. Shuja, in his turn, commissioned Mirza Isfandiar (Major Splindar of English factory records), his governor of Engilee (Hijili) to advance towards Hugli with 6,000 infantry and 500 horsemen and some gelliares (*jalbas*) in order to reinforce the governor of Hugli. But evidently he could not reach the scene in time. Though the English factor at Kassimbazar apprehended that Mir Jumla's men would have to face unexpected danger, finally they succeeded in occupying Hugli and when early in September they occupied Midnapur, Shuja's force had only arrived at Narayangarh, about 17 miles south-east from Midnapur.⁶

3. Battle near Belghata and Giria.

Shuja now decided to take the field himself against Mir Jumla and his vast army, soon after the rains, because the defeat of Mir Jumla would render Daud's advance utterly futile. Nevertheless he did not altogether ignore Daud Khan, against whom he deputed his general Fidai Khan, and admiral Khwaja Mishki (Itibar Khan). At the close of the rainy season Shuja started from Rajmahal *via* Dunapur, Dogachi, and Suti,

6. EFL. *op. cit.* 290 and n.; 291 and n. The Kassimbazar-Hugli letter of 5th July suggests that Mir Jumla had conquered Hugli before but that it was recovered by Shuja, probably after the former's failure at Suti and now again, Mir Jumla wanted to reconquer it.

Hijili (Port Angeli) is the coastal tract on the western side of the Hugli estuary, including Tamluk in the north and bounded by Jallasore and Midnapur in the west. See Ingellee (10m, east of Contai) and Narangur in Rennell, Sh. 7.

and reached Belghata in two months. His army consisted of 8,000 mail-clad warriors. A flotilla of *kusas* and *ghurabs* sailed down the river abreast of the army on land.

Mir Jumla quickly arranged the army in battle array: the Van was led by Zulfiqar Khan, the Right by Muzaffar, the Left by Fidai (Khan Koka), and the artillery was under Muhammad Murad Beg. Advancing 20 miles from Masumbazar he entrenched behind a deep *nala* near Belghata on the bank of the Bhagirathi. Throwing two bridges over it,—one very near the army and the other a mile off,—he fortified their heads. Ekkataz Khan was placed in charge of the right bridge. To prevent the retreat of generals from the field on the pretext of the flight of their elephants, Mir Jumla ordered them to ride on horses only. Anyone violating the prohibition would be trampled to death by elephants.⁷

With the rival forces separated by the *nala*, a battle⁸ of artillery began on the 6th December about 1½ *pahars* of the day. After a few days of cannonading and skirmishing, Shuja pretended to retreat towards Rajmahal, in order to deceive the imperialists. But, when Mir Jumla's army pursued and encircled the enemy, the Shujaite Van under Muhammad Sultan suddenly veered round and swooped down on Ekkataz Khan guarding the head of the right bridge with only 400 men (15th December). The overpowered guard appealed to Mir Jumla for reinforcements. Accordingly, the latter asked Zulfiqar to send a mixed force of his Aghar (Uighur) and Rozbihani contingents, numbering 7,000, with instructions to pursue the Prince in case of victory. But Zulfiqar soon reeled at the latter's terrific fire, and together with the wounded Ekkataz, fled to their own side the *nala*, burning the bridge to prevent pursuit.⁹

The moment had come for Mir Jumla to stir. Of the three generals of Shuja, the Prince, leading his van, who had past

7. For Shuja's strategy, and disposition of respective armies, *Poem*, 325-35; Mir Jumla's prohibition, *Poem*, 334; AN. 514 (Shuja at Tanda) 519-20; ZNA. 99; TS. 131a-b; EFL. *op cit.* 292.

8. For the entire campaign at Belghata and Giria, AN. 520-24; TS. 131b-133b; ZNA. 99-101; *Poem*, 336-48.

9. TS. 131b; AN. 520-21; Shuja's strategic retreat in ZNA. 99-100; *Poem*, 336.

experience of the imperialists, was preoccupied at the right bridge. So Mir Jumla planned his characteristic flanking movement in order to encircle Shuja and attack him from the rear. Leaving Zulfiqar Khan in charge of the imperial army, Mir Jumla crossed the *nala* by the left bridge. His march, hampered by jungles and mud, was slow. Near Giria, on the bank of the Bhagirathi, he wheeled round Shuja's rear, commanded by Mir Isfandiar Mamuri, entitled Khanzad Khan, and dispersed it by volleys from cannon rockets, elephant-swivels and camell-swivels. So hard pressed was Shuja at the Mir's terrific onset that the Prince had to come to his relief. Leaving Ibn Husain, *darogha* of artillery, to oppose Zulfiqar, Shuja sallied out to face Mir Jumla "with a small force but great hopes."

After 3 *pahars* of the day had passed, Shuja faced the imperialists in battle order. His artillery commander, Mirza Jan Beg, stood like a solid wall with his regrouped pieces of cannon, which were fired simultaneously with shells of 10 and 15 seers. Mir Jumla's men, advancing like waves, were mown down by this furious cannonade. His plans were upset. For some time, he "could neither advance nor retreat". The imperial troops shrank back in great disorder. The *Alamgir-nama* ascribes it to the defiance of Mir Jumla's orders by the captains, and the consequent separation of the different divisions, which prevented a general charge against the enemy. No decisive hand to hand fighting took place¹⁰

Both sides were now exhausted. Shuja did not charge Mir Jumla, though the latter was reduced to great straits in spite of his superiority in numbers and materials. The Shujaite historian says that if he had done so, he could have defeated Mir Jumla. But the explanation is not far to seek. Whatever success Shuja had gained in the last two engagements, at the right bridge and in the rear-guard action at Giria,—was due to the splendid execution of his artillery. Mirza Jan's terrific cannonade had, however, exhausted his ammunition, and without an artillery cover he could not risk a hand to hand

10. AN. 522-4 ; ZNA, 99 ; *Poem*, 339-45 ; TS. 132a, 133b ; *Aurangzib*, II. 592.

fighting with the numerically superior imperialists. On the other hand, Mir Jumla, pulling his men back from Giria with great difficulty but with care and skill, and probably unaware of Shuja's shortage of ammunition, could not stage a bold night-attack on Shuja's position with officers, whose morale had been shaken by enemy gun fire.¹¹

Mir Jumla now bided his time. Having already asked Daud Khan (then at Monghyr) to expedite his diversionary march across the Kosi towards Tanda at the end of the rains, he expected Shuja everyday to suddenly give up the war and fly back to the eastern bank of the river in order to defend his own base. Weak in artillery and eagerly looking up for Dilir Khan to bring reinforcements from the Emperor, he did not deem it politic to waste his man-power and dwindling ammunition in any more fruitless skirmishes. So he quietly retired from the *nala* towards Murshidabad.¹²

Emboldened by Mir Jumla's retreat and unaware of the danger lurking in his own rear, Shuja designed to cut him off from Murshidabad. Crossing the Bhagirathi, he marched parallel to Mir Jumla down the other bank to the ferry of Nashipur (Nasirpur), 12 miles north of Murshidabad, and hoped to cross the river again and cut off the Mir's retreat. Here a cross-river artillery duel continued for several days. On the night of 26th December, Shuja was about to cross the river when he received the grave news that Daud Khan, after having forced a passage across the Kosi by defeating his own admiral, was rapidly converging on Tanda.¹³

4. *Daud Khan's advance from Patna towards Malda.*

To understand this miraculous turn in the tide of Shuja, it is necessary to take a brief review of Daud Khan's activities

11. TS. 133b; *Poem*, 344-5; ZNA, 101; *Aurangzib*, *op. cit.*, (Shortage of ammunition). Thus it is not impossible (*Aurangzib*, II. 593n) to reconcile Aqil's version with AN. and TS.

12. AN. 524-5; *Aurangzib*, II. 593; *Poem*, 345-48 (Mir Jumla holds a council of war and summons physicians for Ekkataz, who, however, dies).

13. AN. 525-6; TS. 134a; *Poem*, 349-50.

since his receipt of Mir Jumla's instructions and the imperial mandate in the month of May. Daud took immediate action on the Mir's letter. By offering to appoint his generals in imperial service and giving three months' pay in advance, he soon collected a large force. He summoned two *pahalwans* of Mehsi and Darbhanga with their men, money and materials, the Mankali family and three Kakar leaders. Next he purchased some boats (*kisti* or *ghurab*), from the local *majhis* (boatmen) and equipped each of them with 10 gunners and artillery.¹⁴

With these preparations and leaving his brother's son, Shaikh Muhammad Hayat, as his deputy, Daud started from Patna at the head of 1,500 cavalry and 2,000 infantry on 13th May. Crossing the Ganges there on a bridge of boats and sailing down the flooded rivers, the Saraju and the Gandak, after overcoming great obstruction from the enemy entrenchments on them, he reached the village Qazi-keria (opposite Bhagalpur) in about three week's time and then sent 90 boats to fetch the Rozbihanis, who had then arrived at Bhagalpur. But he was forestalled there by the Shujaite admiral, Khwaja Mishki (Itibar Khan) who had a large flotilla, consisting of *kusas* (fast boats) and *ghurabs* (gun-boats).¹⁵ At the end of the first day's battle, which was a mere indecisive artillery duel, Daud placed 10 equipped boats each with 10 armed pickets to guard the river at night. It was only after Khwaja Mishki's defeat on the second day that Rashid, deputed by Mir Jumla (10th June) with a Rozbihani force under Chiragh, met Daud and conveyed to him the news of Sultan Muhammad's flight and Mir Jumla's instructions to him not to leave Qazi-Keria till the end of the rains. As a matter of fact, the floods on the Kosi,

14. See ante Section C. *Poem*, 17-18; The Mankali was an Afghan family which had opposed Akbar's conquest of Bengal (*Akbarnama*, III. 169, 186, 191).

15. *Poem*, 179-80; ZNA. 95-6; Daud's associates, AN. 513-4. There have undoubtedly been great changes in the course of rivers since then. Pickering's letter from Patna (16th May) gives the number of Daud's army as 5,000 horse, and Chamberlain's letter (17th May) gives the date of Daud's departure as 17th May. EFI. X. 285.

the Kalindi and the Mahananda rivers brought Daud to an absolute halt here. Acting on Daud's instruction, Rashid entrenched from bank to bank and successfully held his own against enemy cannonade. Next day, after a futile effort to attack Daud's party with mobile kusas, Khwaja Mishki had to retreat to Bhagalpur. Here he captured a *faujdar* of Mir Jumla. But the Shujaites were, in turn, routed by the nephew of Ali Quli (Shamsher), also deputed by Mir Jumla with 100 men to secure the release of the *faujdar*, and the imperialists captured war materials and collected *Kharaj*.¹⁶

About this time, Shuja, flushed with his victory at the recovery of Rajmahal (22nd August), ordered his general, Fidai Khan, to go to Monghyr and fight the imperialists in the area extending from Bhagalpur to Surajgarh, occupy all villages and roads and control all ferries with his own men. He was also required, in co-operation with Khwaja Mishki, to attack Daud, who had then crossed to the right bank between Bhagalpur and Colgong. Ali Quli's nephew, Shamsher, did not risk any battle with the numerically superior force of Fidai, and so, leaving Bhagalpur, retreated to Jahangira (near Sultanganj). After a bold and rapid night march from Bhagalpur, deserted by the imperialists, Fidai captured Jahangira from its commander, Ismail, with all cash and materials, placed *tarafdars* and *rahdars* in every village, controlled the ferries and awaited Shuja's further instructions. Ismail, wounded in the artillery duel there, had to be carried to Monghyr where he died.¹⁷

But Shuja did not feel safe till Daud was disposed of and the country brought well under control. Moreover, Monghyr was then well-guarded,—the fort by Muhammad Hossain and its environs by his five associates, Rasul, Mirza, Hasan, Shamsher and the brother of the deceased Ismail. So forbidding Fidai to advance towards Monghyr or Surajgarh, Shuja asked him to occupy all ferry crossings from the *dehkans*, to collect revenue from the country acquired, and to conduct a

16. *Poem*, 180-201 ; AN. 514 (halt at Qazi-Keria).

17. *Poem*, 201-17 ; TS. 124a-125b ; AN. 514.

naval war with Daud. He also instructed Fidai, in case of victory, to slay Rashid, Abdul Maal, Hadi, Yusuf and all others except Daud, and send their armies to be utilised by Shuja against Mir Jumla. Accordingly, leaving Jahangira under guard, Fidai, advised by Khwaja Mishki, immediately embarked on his flotilla in order to encircle Daud.¹⁸

The second phase of the naval war with Daud now began. In spite of much firing on the first day, Shuja's artillery-men could not, owing to distance and bad aim, inflict any serious damage on Daud's men, who were strongly entrenched. Next day, Rashid and Chiragh put the enemy's flotilla to flight by boldly plunging their horses into the river, in the teeth of intense enemy cannonade and against Daud's orders. Even after one week's naval battle, the Shujaites failed to slacken the morale of Daud's party, when the ebbing flood water compelled them to retire with their 700 boats to Jahangira. Shuja, greatly disheartened, remarked that the tide of fortune was turning against him. About September (?) he recalled Fidai Khan in order to advance from Rajmahal against Mir Jumla, then at Masumbazar, and placed Khwaja Mishki with his boats at Jahangira to occupy the ferries and prevent Daud from coming to Rajmahal.¹⁹ About this time Daud received a letter from Aurangzeb, ordering him to cross the Ganges near Monghyr and there await the arrival of Farhad Khan with money and reinforcements, 1,000 Uzbeks and Uighurs, 50 Rozbihanis under Abdun Nabi, arms and ammunition,—to give three months' advance wages to the soldiery, place 40 cannon on boats, clear the path for Mir Jumla by swooping down on Fidai and Khwaja Mishki and then send Farhad Khan with men and treasure to Mir Jumla and follow his advice. Daud, in reply, promised to abide by these instructions and prayed that, in view of the incessant warfare for five months, the Emperor might be pleased to reward the Khans. The Emperor agreed with this

18. *Poem*, 218-23.

19. *Ibid.* 223-38.

suggestion and conferred immediate favours on the Rozbihanis, led by Chiragh. Daud's rank was increased by 1,000.²⁰

Starting from Qazi-Keria early in December, with one-half of the army under himself on boats, Daud asked Rashid to hurry on horse-back towards Monghyr with the other half along the left bank of the Ganges and to help him, if attacked. Khwaja Mishki barred Daud's way at Jahangira with a flotilla, largely manned by Europeans (possibly Portuguese) and mesticos but was expelled by the Rozbihanis under Rashid, sallying out of his camp at Gogri (opposite Monghyr). Repulsing Khwaja Mishki again with the help of Chiragh Beg, Daud reached the left bank of the river at Monghyr with great difficulty and crossed over to the right bank in 3 days and 3 nights under cover of defences which proved too strong for the Shujaite admiral. Muhammad, the *havaladar* of the fort, obstructed the enemy's advance by cannonade; 40 boats of Rozbihanis under Chiragh, anchored on the left bank, and entrenchments were thrown upon the right bank by Hasan, Mirza, Shamsheer and other Shaikhs and Pathan leaders. The Shujaites had to retreat to Jahangira with a loss of 40 cannon and 10,000 rockets. But even Jahangira they had to desert soon before the simultaneous advance of Daud's army from Monghyr in two lines, the cavalry being under himself on land and 700 boats sailing down the river. Daud now despatched Farhad (who had arrived at Monghyr) together with Abdun Nabi, Hasan, Mirza, Shamsheer and Muhammad Rasul and other reinforcements sent by the Emperor to Mir Jumla. However, Khwaja Mishki continued to vex Daud on water there. And so when Mir Jumla instructed him to cross the Ganges immediately, march on Tanda, capture the enemy's goods, pearls and treasure, wait till his own arrival at Rajmahal, and endeavour to capture Shuja, if he crossed to the left bank, Daud replied that there might be delay in complying with all these. At Bhagalpur, Daud, forewarned by spies deputed the Rozbihanis under Chiragh to frustrate Shujaite Yusuf Khan's plan of night attack and captured stores, camel-swivels

20. *Ibid.* 238-52 (Rashid's rank also increased)

elephant-swivels, guns, rockets and horses. Mir Jumla praised Daud for his successful exploits and admired his firmness and loyalty.²¹

On the eve of his advance to Colgong, Daud was intercepted by Khwaja Mishki with 700 boats. But the latter had to retire to Pialapur and so failed to check Daud at Colgong. Proceeding towards Tanda, Daud found at Garhi (Teliagarhi) that the route along the river towards Rajmahal had been blocked there by Sayyid Tajuddin of Barha, Khwaja Mishki and Jamal Ghorī, who had been commissioned by Shuja to that task. Not risking a battle there with a well-equipped and strongly entrenched enemy, Daud engaged some *beldars* to dig a canal for the passage of his boats. But though the enemy appeared too soon, from two sides, it had to retire before Daud's three divisions under his son Hamid, Qadir and Chiragh and to entrench on the Kosi. In the battle on the Kosi, Jamal was killed. Khwaja Mishki fled and entrenched on Samdah (opposite Rajmahal) with big pieces of cannon. Daud, crossing the Kosi with Mughals, Shaikhs and Pathans, and informed by a horseman from Purnea, deputed his *bakhshi*, Fathulla, with 500 men to seize 30,000 *dirhams*, 20 *kusas* with cannon, elephant-swivels and rockets from the Shujaite *faujdar* of Purnea, who was taken in imperial service.²² Thus clearing the river of the Shujaites and capturing enemy materials, Daud advanced irresistibly. Crossing the *daria-i-sia* (the Kalindi) at Akbarpur, east of Sikrigali, he awaited the arrival of reinforcements before advancing further.²³

5. *Mir Jumla chases Shuja out to the eastern bank of the Ganges.*

The vanquished Shujaite admiral, Khwaja Mishki, now appealed to his master for additional help to be able to defend

²¹ *Ibid.* 252-95 ; AN. 524 (reinforcements). For Emperor's letter and Khilat to Mir Jumla. *Poem*, 269-76 ; Mir's reply; *ibid.* 276-9 ; Mir's letter to Daud, *ibid.* 280-2.

²² *Ibid.* 296-316 ; AN. 514, 526.

²³ *Poem*, 316, 350 ; by 20th December, acc. to Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, 11 594.

the big *char* (island) of Samdah against an impending assault by the imperialists. Surrounded by water on all sides, it was the last entrenched post, which stood between Shuja's chain of defences and the invaders. Its loss would open the latter's way to Tanda with all its stores of cash and materials and endanger the safety of Shuja's family sheltering at Malda. In great alarm Shuja held a Council of war. Sending reinforcements to Khwaja Mishki would mean depleting his own army and courting sure defeat at the hands of Mir Jumla. So, postponing a final encounter with him, Shuja decided to immediately withdraw to Malda, entrench at Samdah and oppose Daud. He left Nashipur towards the end of 26th December, crossed the Bhagirathi, and advanced towards Suti in order finally to fall back on Tanda.²⁴

Mir Jumla, who had long been waiting for this diversion, marched forward in pursuit. Wiser by his experience at Giria, he issued a proclamation that any person staying behind "would know that he wore the shroud of the coffin." Starting on the morning of 27th December at 9 A. M., and advancing three miles, he spotted the fugitive Governor of Bengal nestling behind a *nala*,²⁵ flanked with bogs on three sides with the artillery guarding his front. Mir Jumla could hardly make any headway in such a swampy land. So he halted and kept up a fruitless artillery duel till evening, when he returned to his camp, taking care to leave his army in the field to face the Shujaites. Mir Jumla got at that opportune moment reinforcements in men and other materials of artillery from the Emperor. On 28th December, Shuja fled from his position. In the morning the imperial general continued the chase by skilfully crossing the *nala* and the swamps together with artillery and men. The couriers brought the news that Shuja wanted to cross the ferry opposite Tartipur. After proceeding two miles towards it, Mir Jumla heard that Shuja had gone

24. For Khwaja Mishki's appeal and Shuja's Council of War, *Poem*, 348-53; for Shuja's retreat to Suti. TS. 134a; *Poem*; 354; AN. 526 ZNA, 101. For Samdah and Tanda (Tarrab) see Rennell, Sh. 15.

25. This seems to be the Bansli Nala joining the Bhagirathi at Belghata. See Rennell, Sh. 11.

towards Suti. When this was verified by Ikhlās Khan after due reconnaissance, Mir Jumla, too, advanced towards Suti. After 5 miles he halted at Fatehpur. The artillery under Muhammad, Murad Beg came up during night. Next morning Mir Jumla resumed the pursuit, and advancing half a mile beyond Suti, faced Shuja, then halting at Chilmari.²⁶

Shuja was obliged to engage the imperialists in artillery action till evening, when about 100 Shujaïtes darted at the Imperial Right wing under Zulfiqar Khan, and were attacked with swords by Abdul Majid Deccani, Pir Muhammad Uighur and others. The battle ended after one hour of the night. Nurul Hasan, finding Shuja's cause to be a losing one, joined Mir Jumla. The latter's only concern was to frustrate Shuja's plan of crossing the river there. This accounts for the stalemate which now hung over the battle field, scouts and patrols having daily skirmishes. Abandoning his plan of crossing the river there, Shuja went northwards to Dunapur towards the end of night of 1st January, 1660. Thence he fled to Dogachi, after having broken one of the two old bridges on *nalas* at Dunapur. Mir Jumla followed him in hot pursuit but was obstructed by bad roads, *nalas* and damaged bridges. At Dunapur, for instance, Mir Jumla had to fill up with mud the *nala* with the broken bridge and carefully conduct his artillery and men across. Here he came upon a boat and some materials of artillery, 10 pieces of cannon and 200 rockets, deserted by Shuja.²⁷

At Dogachi Mir Jumla threw up an entrenchment for defence. Shuja now endeavoured to combine the stratagems adopted before, at the mid-stream island opposite Dogachi and also at Giria, which had proved so eminently successful. Arranging his artillery, he concealed his men with instructions

26. AN. 526-8 ; *Poem*, 354-61 (Mir Jumla's proclamation). Tartipur is shown as Turtypour, about 3/4 mile east of Suti on the eastern bank of the Ganges (Rennell, Sh. 15)

27. AN. 528-30 ; *Aurangzib*, II. 595

Dogachi is shown as Jourgatchy, 3/4 mile north of Downapur, Rennell Sh. 15. This satisfies the description of parallel march of the rival forces on either side of the *nala*, and opposite it is the island midstream.

to remain inactive but to fire all together only when the enemy would come near. The discreet imperial general did not allow himself to be duped by this trickery of his opponent, of which he learnt from the *qarawals*. He refused to assault the enemy emplacements without his heavy artillery, still lagging behind, and before due watch and reconnaissance. But against his warning, his hasty lieutenants, Fateh Jung and Islam Khan, without making enquiries, advanced to the *nala* of Dogachi with the vanguard. So when the Shujaites, turned at bay, started a sudden and simultaneous cannonade from their guns placed behind the *nala*, the imperialists could not advance.²⁸

Mir Jumla now rushed in with Fidai Khan and Zulfiqar to reinforce his hard-pressed lieutenants, and even, if possible, to cross the *nala*, overpower the enemy by the sheer weight of numbers and capture him before his escape. But the imperial officers shrank from forcing a passage in the face of the intense enemy cannonade. Though equipped with only light artillery, Mir Jumla was obliged to engage in an unequal contest with Shuja from the end of the day to mid-night during which Shuja's determined cannonade took a heavy toll on the imperialists. Yet Mir Jumla had to subject his army to this terrible ordeal, so as to allow the enemy no respite, and no opportunity to escape.

At long last Mir Jumla's heavy artillery came up and was at once put into action. It began to inflict heavy casualties on the Shujaites. This meant the end of the skirmish. About midnight Shuja's artillery stopped. Mir Jumla, too, retired to his camp but kept the artillery directed against the enemy.²⁹

28. *Poem*, 361-4 (Shuja's stratagem) ; AN. 530 ; ZNA. 101-2.

29. AN. 530-1 ; *Poem*, 364-65 ; ZNA, 101-2.

Once during the crisis caused by dwindling ammunition, Mir Jumla prayed to God to save "the honour of his white beard" and fired the demoralised troops with zeal to stand their ground. Mir Jumla's tenacious fight against such heavy odds drew forth praise from Shuja (*Poem*, 365-73).

Next day (2nd January) Mir Jumla marched towards Rajmahal along the western side of the *nala*, as Shuja advanced parallel on its eastern side. The latter was now in a nice fix. To cross the Ganges so near the enemy was not an easy task. If he attempted to cross it first, he would be deserted by his army, and if the latter were transported before him, there was the risk of his being captured by the enemy. Therefore, digging a deep moat round his camp, Shuja threw up entrenchments and mounted guns on them. Suspecting Muhammad Sultan now, he sent him to Tanda. In vain did Mir Jumla try by frequent artillery volleys to frustrate Shuja's attempt to throw a bridge of boats over the Ganges. On 9th January, 1660, Shuja crossed the river on the bridge and carried away its boats too,³⁰

30. AN. 531-2; TS. 134a; Aurangzib, *op. cit.*, for Shuja's dilemma, *Poem*, 373-4; 423; ZNA. 103; See Rennell, Sh. 15 for the *nala*.

Section E

THE WAR EAST OF THE GANGES

1. *Preparations for crossing the Ganges.*

With Shuja's final evacuation of the western bank of the river Ganges and Mir Jumla's recovery of Rajmahal, the War of Succession in Bengal entered its final phase. In obedience to the imperial mandate that the river Ganges must be crossed as soon as its western bank had been cleared of the enemy. Mir Jumla lost no time in making preparations for it. Suitable arrangements were made for defending its right bank against the enemy's sudden reprisals. On 10th January he held a consultation with his nobles at Dogachi and deputed a column of 3,000 under Farhad Khan to open the riverside road *via* Rangamati and Garhi to Monghyr, so long closed by the enemy. On the 11th the General started for Rajmahal. On his way he received the news that Dilir Khan (with 2,500 Afghans), deputed by the Emperor, had crossed the Ganges (9th January) at Kadamtola ferry on boats supplied, according to Mir Jumla's advice, by Daud Khan, then at Akbarpur. The government of Rajmahal was placed under Islam Khan who was to be assisted by several officers and a contingent of 10,000 horse. Entrenchments were thrown up on the river bank, and information was kept of the enemy's movements so as to prevent him from attacking Rajmahal. Officers and agents were sent to every *pargana* and *chakla*. Rasul beg Rozbihani was appointed *thanadar* of Rajmahal. *Thanas* were also set up between Dogachi and Suti; Dogachi was guarded by Islam Khan himself with a force of 5,000; Ali Quli Khan was placed in charge of Dunapur. The country between Rajmahal and Teliagarhi, including Rangamati together with the hinterland of Bara Jungal, was to be guarded by Raja Kokalat Ujjainia while that between Teliagarhi and Monghyr by Raja Bahroz.¹

1. AN. 532-534; TS. 134a-b; ZNA. 103; *Poem*, 374-77, 379, 380, 424, 316-20 (for Dilir Khan). Kadamtola (25°9' N, 87°59' E) is shown as 9 m, due n. n.e. of Rajmahal (Ind, Atlas, Sh. 112).

Hastily completing his arrangements, Mir Jumla, accompanied by several nobles including Zulfiqar Khan, Raja Bahroz and Raja Kokalat, encamped at Pirpahar, the northern extremity of Rajmahal on the 11th January. Next he encamped at Kadamtola (alias Dodha) north of Pirpahar. Mir Jumla now deputed an officer, Sayyid Nasiruddin Khan, to bring 17 lakhs of rupees from Monghyr for the expenses of his campaign. He returned with $14\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs to Samdah about the middle of February, 1660.²

It only remained for Mir Jumla to give effect to his plan³ of encircling Shuja, who had his defences at Samdah, Chauki-Mirdadpur, Tanda and Malda,—a plan which had taken eight months to mature.

2. *Mir Jumla at Samdah..*

On the 13th January, Daud's son, Shaikh Hamid, brought his flotilla of 160 boats to Dodha (alias Kadamtola) where the Ganges was split up in three streams. Mir Jumla crossed the first narrow stream on 15th January by a bridge of boats. Then the boats were transported to the second and wider stream and the men, too, were distributed in such a way as to reach the big island of Samdah between the second and the third streams (opposite Rajmahal). Last of all Mir Jumla himself reached Samdah by crossing the second stream with a bridge of boats on 17th January.

2. AN. 533-4, 545; *Poem*, 379-80. The *Poem* (377) says Mir Jumla encamped at the foot of Bar Kankal". It may be identified with Burgungall of John Marshall (72, 117), about 18 m. n. of Rajmahal.

Pirpahar is about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles n. e. of Rajmahal (Rennell, Sh. 15), though the A.N. gives the distance as 18 miles. Dodha, 8 miles north of Pirpahar, acc. to A.N. is not traceable in Rennell's map. The *Ind. Atlas* (Sh. 112) shows one Dodherajtola ($25^{\circ}4'N$ $87^{\circ}57'E$) across the Ganges 9 m. n. n. e of Rajmahal. There is a place, Innarah, 8 m. north of Pirpahar, and 4 m. south of Sikrigali, which is just opposite Akbarpur (Rennell, Sh. 15).

3. Sir J. N. Sarkar (*Aurangzib*, II. 597-9) gives a summary of Mir Jumla's plan of campaign.

The quick advance of Mir Jumla upset the plans of Shuja. He had proposed to send Muhammad Sultan with guns and boats across the Mahananda against Dilir and Daud Khan. But now he collected his boats together, recalled those sent to the Prince and deputed *garawals* to purloin the boatmen of Bengal residing at Samdah.

Mir Jumla, too, tried to counteract these measures. He speeded up the construction of a bridge of boats on the third stream. He deputed a contingent to forestall Shuja's *garawals*. At the same time he set up a *thana* at Samdah with a force of 1,000 to prevent the local boatmen from joining Shuja. He held a consultation with his lieutenants, Dilir, Daud and Rashid, who had come forward from the other side of the river (Akbarpur) to meet him at Samdah in the afternoon of the day of his arrival and take his advice.

Mir Jumla's difficulties in this theatre of war consisted not only in his lack of boats, but also in the dense jungles and the countless *nalas*, that delayed the advance of his vast army, numerically superior to Shuja's. "The place is so bad," observed Mir Jumla, "that there is a stream at every corner."

Though unable to face the imperialists in the open plain, on account of his hopeless inferiority in numbers, Shuja presented a stubborn resistance along the Kalindi and the Mahananda. He constructed a wall and a double line of entrenchments along the Kalindi (here a branch of the Mahananda), barring Mir Jumla's direct route to Tanda, and placed Sayyid Taj and Khwaja Mishki in charge of the entrenchments along the Mahananda. Shuja himself remained at the *ghat* of Chauki-Mirdadpur opposite Samdah, along with Prince Muhammad Sultan.

Mir Jumla had to shape his strategy with due discretion and caution. With the enemy strongly entrenched with heavy artillery along the Kalindi, only 4 miles distant from the imperial post of Samdah, Mir Jumla did not consider it advisable to desert Samdah, and advance further eastwards. For this would have meant the fall of Samdah and exposed the imperial base at Rajmahal, too, to the danger of assault. So, though he was anxious to expedite the crossing of the third

stream, he kept his headquarters at Samdah for sometime to come (till 29th February).⁴

Moreover, any attempt on the part of the imperialists, to force a passage through the Shujaite trenches along the bank of the Mahananda guarded by Sayyid Taj and Khwaja Mishki was bound to be futile. So Mir Jumla planned to cross the Kalindi above its junction with the Mahananda and then to cross the latter (the Mahananda) by acting on the expert advice of Daud and Dilir. But, to deceive the enemy and keep their attention engaged, he ordered the two Khans along with Farhad to throw up entrenchments, mounted with artillery on the bank of the Kalindi in front of the enemy.

While the work of entrenching was in progress, Mir Jumla (at Samdah) opened an artillery attack on Shuja (at Chauki-Mirdadpur). Even after the completion of the trenches, the artillery duel continued incessantly for about a week. When the enemy was thus desperately preoccupied, Mir Jumla set about discovering a suitable ford on the easternmost branch of the Ganges. He inspected the entrenchment on the river bank at Samdah and cruised along, his swimmers sounding the depth of the water. But it was unfathomable.

Soon afterwards, Mir Jumla's spies brought the happy news of the discovery of a ford in the upper course of the Mahananda at Gunrakha.⁵ On the night of 31st January, 1660, the General sent Farhad Khan with *qarawals* and *beldars* to cross the river and entrench there so as to prevent the enemy from blocking the way. Next day (1st February), leaving the army at Samdah under Zulfiqar, by way of feint, Mir Jumla himself crossed the easternmost branch of the Ganges with a bridge of boats after $1\frac{1}{2}$ *pahars* of day had passed.

Mir Jumla then proceeded towards the ford together with Dilir, Daud, Mirza Khan and Rashid Khan. Here, under Mir

4. AN. 534-37, 546; *Poem*, 424-7; *Aurangzib*; II, 599-600.

5. According to AN, 538, it was distant 8 miles from the imperialists by one way, and only 4 miles by another; it was surrounded by jungles inhabited by many savage rustics.

Jumla's personal supervision, about 5,000 imperialists, including *beldars*, *garawals*, *Uzbeks* and *auxiliaries*, crossed the Mahananda (50 yds. wide there) in 3 days (February 1st-3rd), the horses swimming across. At Mir Jumla's command about 30 sunken enemy boats were salvaged and either used as cannon-carriers or for a bridge. Thanks to Farhad's entrenchments and the artillery shots of Pir Muhammad's valiant *garawals*, an enemy picket, watching the ferry, was rendered powerless to obstruct the crossing and its leader, Amir Quli, was killed. Entrusting the task of guarding the trenches of Dilir and Daud (opposite those of Sayyid Taj and Khwaja Mishki) to the hands of Abdullah Khansarai, Sayyid Salar Khan, Miana Khan and Jamal Dilzak, Mir Jumla himself came back to Samdah, where the major part of the army lay, in order to prevent the enemy's crossing.⁶

The outflanked Shujaite generals, Sayyid Taj and Khwaja Mishki, evacuated their trenches in alarm (3rd February) and retired to their master. Shuja could neither take any immediate action nor risk any face to face battle. His drooping spirits were revived by the return of Sayyid Alam with Zainuddin, 1,500 cavalry and infantry and 200 guns from Dacca. Planning to hold on in his water-girt fortress till the advent of the rains, he concentrated on his defences opposite Samdah.

On the 5th February the imperialists under Dilir and Daud came near the deserted entrenchments. But Dilir's Rozbihani scouts under Chiragh failed to discover the bridge used by the fleeing Shujaites on account of enemy firing, though they found several boats on the other side. To supervise and facilitate the fording of a *nala* of the Mahananda, 2 miles distant from the camp of Dilir and Daud, Mir Jumla crossed the third or easternmost branch of the Ganges and the Mahananda too, together with elephants, fast boats and troopers, and reached the bank of the *nala*, which was bridged (7th February). Next day he sent a detachment under Sayyid Salar Khan towards

6. AN. 536-40 ; TS, 134b, 135a : *Peem*, 384-6 (Dilir Commander across the river), 425 (one month's duel) ; *Aurangzib*, II, 599-600.

Malda to surround Shuja on the east and intercept his only route of withdrawal in the south, his west and north being already barred by the imperial out-posts from Rajmahal to Suti and from Samdah to the Mahananda respectively. Shuja was now on the verge of ruin. The Shujaites deserted Malda. At the command of Mir Jumla, Daud Khan, Amir Khan, Rashid Khan and all his own auxiliaries began to throw up an entrenchment between the Ganges and the Mahananda.⁷

3. *The return of Prince Muhammad Sultan.*

At this crisis in Shuja's career Prince Muhammad Sultan deserted his father-in-law and returned to the imperial camp. It was Mir Jumla who, by his diplomatic trickery, reminding us of Aurangzeb's similar stratagem during the rebellion of Prince Akbar, caused estrangement of feelings between Shuja and Prince Muhammad Sultan. At the Emperor's instructions, Mir Jumla wrote a letter to the Prince, pleading that the latter had used his stay with Shuja as a means of furthering the interests of the Emperor and advising him to continue doing so until occasion arose to fulfil his promise to his father. As intended by the Mir, the letter fell into the hands of Shuja, who began to harbour suspicion against the Prince. Once Shuja's confidence was shaken, the Prince, too, came to be distrustful of his father-in-law, now a losing partner. From Tanda he began to correspond secretly with Islam Khan. The arrival there of Khan-i-Alam with reinforcements from Shuja's son Din Muhammad at Dacca wounded the vanity of the Prince, as he considered himself to have been completely ignored, while the sounding of the drums on the occasion fanned the anger of the penitent Prince, as it implied a violation of the traditional prerogatives of the Mughal Emperor. With his heart sore against his uncle and father-in-law, he stole away as lightly as he had joined him

7. AN 541, *Poem*, 387-93, 456-7; TS. 134b, 135; *Aurangzib*, II. 600.

with his heart sore against his father and his father's general. On the evening of 8th February, the Prince left Tanda and, on his arrival at Dogachi, was welcomed by its commandant, Islam Khan.⁸

Fast messengers carried the news to Mir Jumla the same midnight. The General returned from the eastern bank of the Mahananda to Sandah on 12th February and duly welcomed the Prince, ordering the drums to be sounded and dismounting from his horse in his honour. He kept the necessary requisites from government stores for him and gave him many valuable presents. But these outward manifestations of honour seem only to be a clever cloak for luring the Prince to put himself at the hands of his relentless father. Mir Jumla, to whom the Prince had gone for having his case recommended before the Emperor, could do no more than ask him to wait till the arrival of the imperial mandate. The Emperor expressed pleasure at his son's return and at Mir Jumla's activities, but ordered his commander-in-chief to send the Prince under proper guard. Nevertheless, Mir Jumla tried to put heart into the hapless Prince by asking him not to worry, as the Emperor was merciful, and on 29th February, despatched the Prince, closely guarded by Fidai Khan, towards the imperial Court.⁹

4. *Mir Jumla's advance on Tanda.*

It only remained for Mir Jumla to draw his net closer round Shuja, —to force a passage across the Mahananda and then cut off Shuja's retreat to the south. Learning from some local zamindars of the existence of a ford in its lower course

8. Mir Jumla's trick, Ball's Tavernier, I. 275, 362; *Storia* I. 337; Bernier, 83; F A. 47a; Prince's feelings, AN. 542; ZNA. 103; AS. 21a; *Poem*, 402-9, 414-5, 426-7, 435 (sounding of drums on arrival of Khan i Alam); Shuja's grief, 406-15; TS, 160a.

9. Prince's return and death in AN. 544, 546; *Poem*, 415-34; ZNA. 103-4; *Storia* I. 337-8, II. 150; Ball I. 276, 363, AS. 21b; MA, 30, 33; Bernier, 83n; ADM. 109b; *Aurangzeb*, II. 600-1.

near Baglaghat (Bholahat).¹⁰ the direct ferry-route of enemy supplies, Mir Jumla ordered the detachment at Malda to go there during night and dig trenches. But the imperialists were forestalled by Shuja's son, Buland Akhtar, and his general, Sayyid Alam, guarding the right bank of the river.¹¹ Apprehending an attack from the Shujaites concentrated there, Mir Jumla reinforced the Malda troops and appointed Dilir Khan commander of all operations in the Malda-Baglaghat sector. Leaving his stores at Malda, the Khan (27th February) advanced south, routed a Shujaite contingent under Mirza Beg at Sitalghat, and entrenched at Baglaghat opposite Sayyid Alam and Buland Akhtar on the other side of the Mahananda.

The news of this discomfiture reached Shuja when he was guarding the southern bank of the Kalindi opposite Daud Khan's army. Commissioning his son, Buland Akhtar, and Khan-i-Alam to hold the passages across the Mahananda in the east, Shuja concentrated on his defences opposite Samdah as its fall would mean the annihilation of his army and the loss of his kingdom.¹²

But, like the one-eyed deer of Æsop's fables, Shuja committed the fatal mistake of staking his all on the Samdah front. Mir Jumla frustrated Shuja's strategy by deceiving him with a screen of men opposite and himself making a wide detour to the more vulnerable eastern bank of the Mahananda. Indeed, for Mir Jumla the only strategy lay in fording it, a task which demanded his personal presence. So, leaving Daud Khan as a commander-in-chief of the entire northern front, and Sujan Singh with 1,000 horsemen and 500 musketeers at Samdah, Mir Jumla finally left the island on 29th February, crossed the Mahananda next day and proceeded towards Malda (2nd March). On 6th March he came to Mahmudabad, a few miles south of Malda, and next day proceeded to inspect Dilir Khan's

10. Both the AN. and the *Poem* write of Baglaghat, 5 kos from Malda. Masum (TS, 160b) evidently speaks of this ford, 10 or 12 miles below Malda. It is to be identified with Bollehaut (i. e. Bholahat), 7 miles south of Malda, Rennell, Sh. 15.

11. AN. 544-5; *Poem*, 435-6.

12. AN. 545-7; *Poem*, 446-57 (graphic description of skirmish at Sitalghat).

artillery-mounted entrenchments at Baglaghat, across which stood Buland Akhtar.

Mir Jumla now endeavoured to cut off supplies to the enemy from Dacca. Of the three land-routes to that place, two (i. e. *via* Malda and *via* Baglaghat) were already controlled by the imperialists. So Mir Jumla deputed a contingent under Lodi Khan to close the third route through Sherpur and Hazrahati.¹³

The end of the duel between Mir Jumla and Shuja was now in sight. Mir Jumla adopted the same diversionary tactics, characteristic of him in the past. To keep the attention and strength of Shuja engaged in the north, he asked Daud Khan to endeavour to force a passage across the Kalindi against Shuja's entrenchments. He himself remained at Mahmudabad for a month, during which a cross-river artillery duel raged. He forsook comfort and rest, exerting himself unceasingly, in order to bring his war with Shuja to a successful conclusion before the advent of the rainy season. But Mir Jumla found it impossible to force a passage across just in front of the strongly entrenched enemy, "assisted by water, artillery and flotilla".¹⁴

At long last, after many reconnaissances and enquiries, an obscure and ill-guarded ford, four miles below Baglaghat, was discovered by Dilir Khan, thanks to the services of a local raja. Mir Jumla at once acted on the information given by his lieutenant. Leaving his camp and stables standing at Mahmudabad, he started therefrom at 3 A. M. on 5th April with an army 10 to 12 thousand strong, picked up Dilir Khan from Baglaghat and reached the ford at dawn. A small enemy picket, guarding the opposite bank with a few guns, was completely taken by surprise.

13. AN. 547-48. *Poem*, 459 (Daud as commander).

Hazrahati is shown as Hazryhutty on the eastern bank of the Ganges, 5 miles south of Surdah in Sherpur (Rennell, Sh. 6 and 16). The description in the AN. that it is on the Mahananda; 8 miles below Baglaghat is wrong.

14. ZNA. 103 (Daud to force the 'Kalindi'); AN. 548 (Mir Jumla's exertion); TS. 160a-b (artillery duel); MU. III. 542-3 (Shuja's advantages); *Aurangzib*, II. 601.

Without losing a moment, Mir Jumla ordered his men to ford. The leaders, Dilir Khan, Ikhlas, Mukhdīs and Muzaffar, showed the way, driving their elephants into the water. Next the cavalry plunged in. The water was shallow only over a narrow strip but very deep on both sides. Owing to haste and enemy-fire the fording was not properly done, and the apportioned water-route was lost, and about 1,000 imperialists were killed. But to Mir Jumla it was not too high a price for this decisive step in the campaign. The Shujaite guards were soon overpowered and fled, leaving their guns and materials in the trenches. Reinforcements under Sayyid Alam and Prince Buland Akhtar came too late. Despite their opposition, the imperialists forded the river, and some even crossed it on the bridge constructed with a few boats procured there.¹⁵

The last engagement of the War of Succession was also a crowning stroke of Mir Jumla. Prince Buland Akhtar fled distracted to Tanda while Sayyid Alam conveyed the grave news to Shuja at Chauki-Mirdadpur by noon. Shuja, opposite Samdah, cannonading against Daud, was now surrounded on three sides and the only means left to escape capture was to swiftly flee by way of river. On the advice of Mirza Jan Beg, he set out at nightfall from Chauki-Mirdadpur and reached Tanda at dawn of 6th April. The same afternoon at 4 P. M. he left for Dacca in a number of war-boats.¹⁶

5. Tanda—Dacca.

Shuja could find time to escape because Mir Jumla was detained at the ford for picking up the corpses of the soldiers in fishing nets and giving all the dead a burial and could not make an immediate dash on Tanda.

Mir Jumla had to remain very busy on 6th April. Early in the morning he started from the ford for Tanda. On the

15. Fording the Mahananda, AN. 548-51; TS. 161a; *Poem*, 454-69 (author present); FA. 47a-b; *Aurangzib*, II. 601-3.

The losses on the side of the imperialists are estimated differently by the various sources, e. g. more than 1,000 (AN. 550); about 2,000 (TS. 161a); nearly 3,000 men (ZNA, 104); and 3,500 (*Poem*, 462).

16. TS. 161a-162a; AN. 552; *Poem*, 470-80 (Shuja's intention to go to Medina and Mecca); ZNA. 104.

way he diverted to the left with a light division to cut off Shuja's retreat at Tartipur on the Ganges. Seizing Shuja's 400 loaded boats, he left a contingent of 600 musketeers under Nurul Hasan and Mir Azir, diwan of the army as *Waqianavis* there. Then, making a forced march, he reached Tanda with only 400 men at mid-night.¹⁷

The arrival of Mir Jumla was at once followed by the restoration of order (7th April) after a period of utter confusion and terrible plunder. He confiscated to the government all available property and strenuously exerted to recover the articles looted by the hooligans of the army. Women left behind by Shuja were protected; the *harem* was well-guarded and its officers and eunuchs were asked to be fully attentive to their usual duties. The same afternoon Daud Khan reached Tanda *via* Mirdadpur.

Mir Jumla remained at Tanda 12 days in settling its affairs and arranging for a system of administration for the conquered areas. To snatch away property and stores from the fugitive prince, Mir Jumla deputed men along the river bank southwards. They seized two treasure-laden *ghurabs* at Tartipur; Lodi Khan captured 30 boats of Shuja's flotilla including officers and men at Sherpur and Hazarahati. They now surrendered to Mir Jumla on 9th April and were employed in imperial service.¹⁸

From Tanda Mir Jumla wrote to the Emperor, giving the details of the war, making a special mention of Dilir Khan's services and informing him that Shuja would not remain at Dacca, but would go to Arrakan. Further, the general sought advice if he would send the war-materials to the imperial court. The Emperor was highly pleased to receive the letter on 20th April. He rewarded the General and asked him to leave no arrears as regards payments to the soldiers, send the

17. AN, 551-552; *Poem*, 480f; TS. 161b (picking up of dead bodies); *Aurangzib*, II. 602-*nn*; 604-5.

Tartipur is at the junction of the Ganges and the river Bogrutty, which flows east and south of Tarrah (Tanda). Rennell, Sh. 15.

18. AN, 554-5; *Aurangzib*, II. 605; MU. III, 543.

materials to Delhi, and then to go to Dacca and drive Shuja away.¹⁹

On 19th April Mir Jumla left Tanda for Tartipur. From here he sent Mukhlis Khan to Rajmahal as its *faujdar* in place of Islam Khan, who having some friction with Mir Jumla, had started from there towards the imperial court without permission of the Emperor.²⁰

Leaving Tartipur on 20th April, Mir Jumla came to Hijrapur on the land route to Dacca. He was accompanied by Dilir Khan, Daud Khan, Rashid Khan, Sayyid Nasiruddin Khan, Raja Narsingh, Farhad Khan, Uighur Khan, Qarawal Khan, Abdul Bari Ansari. Next day he hastened to Dacca to prevent Shuja from staying there. Too weak either to chastise the *zamindars* who deserted him or to face the advancing general of the Emperor, the fugitive prince forsook his eastern capital, for ever on 6th May, in expectation of help from the Raja of Arrakan. Mir Jumla reached the outskirts of Dacca on 9th May. All war materials, stores and property left behind by Shuja were sent to the Emperor. The entire Hindusthan now came under him.²¹

19. *Poem*, 480-6 (for Mir Jumla's letter); 487-93 (instructions to Mir Jumla); AN. 476 (date).

The *Poem* says (487-93) that Aurangzeb's *farman* appointing Mir Jumla Governor of Bengal was sent to Tanda. But the *Alamgirnama* (476, 483) makes it clear that Mir Jumla got the *farman* at Dacca; the Emperor sent the *farman* on 20th April and Mir Jumla left Tanda on 19th April and reached Dacca on 9th May.

20. AN. 555; ZNA. 104.

21. AN. 555, +83 (date of arrival at Dacca); ZNA. 104-5; *Poem*, 495-496; Bernier, 108-9; AS. 21b; CHI IV, 226.

Except in the *Poem* containing incidental references, Mir Jumla's route from Tartipur to Dacca is not described in any source. From Rennell (Sh. 6, 16) it appears that he followed the landroute running parallel to the Ganges from Nabobgunge. Hijrapur is Hoodrapour, south of Tartipur and north of Nabobgunge (Sh. 15). Is the *Rud i Awal* of the *Poem* (496f) the first river that he had to cross (at Surdah)? In that case it may be identified with the Burreel R. (Sh. 6). Probably from Jaffeergunge he did not follow the southern route as it involved the crossing of numerous streams, but diverted to Gwalpara and proceeding through Pialapour and Saapour crossed the Dauleserry R. and then the Buriganga to reach Dacca from the north. (Sh. 6, 16, 12). The *daria-i-Aundal* of the *Poem* cannot be Buriganga, it may be Dulleserry.

Section F

MIR JUMLA'S RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEANS¹

(c. 1658—60)

1. *The Junk episode still unsolved.*

The agreement of April, 1658, did not finally settle the question of Mir Jumla's junk which had been seized by the English during the agency of Greenhill. The latter sold it to Edward Winter, who had it refitted for his private use. Apprehensive of the evil effects of the protracted incident on account of the growing importance of Mir Jumla in the Mughal State, the Surat authorities urged on the Madras factors (27th November, 1658) to demand the price of the junk from Winter. Unless satisfaction was given to Mir Jumla, the Company's trade at Masulipatam and elsewhere, stood in danger of being hindered and even stopped. But for various reasons it became very difficult for the coast factors to provide for satisfaction. The Committee of New General Stock (13th September, 1658) disclaimed any responsibility in the matter and warned the factors of the evil consequences of interfering in local political disputes in future.²

Further, on the strength of a *farman* granted by Emperor Aurangzeb for the recovery of Mir Jumla's vessel, Mir Muhammad Husain Tapa Tapa (Tabatabai ?) the agent of Mir Jumla, demanded the restoration of the junk from Winter, and on his refusal, from the Masulipatam factors; and also pressed for the release of Qazi (Muhammad Hashim ?), a general of Mir Jumla, who had been probably captured by the English. To all this were added threats of reprisals on the Company and its factors.

1. The results of an independent study of this subject in a more exhaustive and detailed manner have been published in an article of mine, entitled '*The Last Phase of Mir Jumla's Relations with the Europeans* (1658-68), JIH. XXIV, 22-48.

2. EFL, X, 98, 106, 134, 186-7, 243-5, 264-72. Love, I, 185n.

Placed between the two horns of dilemma,—Mir Jumla's renewed demand and the stern rebuke of the Committees in England, Agent Chamber, the successor of Greenhill, was at his wit's end. At his formal orders, Winter surrendered the junk to Mir Jumla's Masulipatam agent but subsequently recaptured it.³

2. *Deputation of Mir Jumla to Bihar and Bengal.*

An additional element of complexity was introduced into the junk episode by Aurangzeb's deputation of Mir Jumla to Bihar and Bengal to conduct the war against Shuja. Though the English factors were mortally afraid of Mir Jumla, their attitude towards the settlement of the incident was characterised by a sense of opportunism and drift and pulsated with the changing fortunes and preoccupations of Mir Jumla and the shifting course of the War of Succession in Bengal. Moreover, while the Bengal factors regarded themselves as free from any responsibility for the actions of the Coromandel Coast factors, Mir Jumla fastened the responsibility on the E. I. Company as a whole, and held that the Bengal factors could not claim immunity from the effects of the junk incident. Thus, one of his earliest acts in Bihar was to prevent the English from procuring saltpetre. Chamberlain, the English factor at Patna, had two interviews with him. At the second interview (21st February, 1659), Mir Jumla spurned at the offer of a present worth Rs. 600, described the English factors as "no better than pirates and robbers", and refused to grant them *dustucks* for transport of goods before receiving compensation for his ship and goods seized on the Coast. At the same time he affirmed that he had done Chamberlain a great favour in not imprisoning the factors and seizing their effects in Patna.⁴

The success of Mir Jumla over Shuja made it urgently necessary for the English to pacify the former as soon as

3. EFL. X. 263, 264-5, Love, I. 183-5.

4. EFL. X. 280, 264, for Bengal factors, Hedges, III. 189; EAEB. I. 33; JBORS. (March, 1939), 49.

possible. Chamberlain's promise that the junk would be returned or compensation paid, that the arrangement should be confirmed by the Coast factors within 4½ months, his appeals to the Agent at Fort St. George through Balasore factors, and the mediation of friends,—all led Mir Jumla to grant the English license to trade in Patna and to consider the incident as finally settled on receipt of papers certified by his agents.⁵

Mir Jumla summoned the Dutch factors from Kassimbazar to his camp at Suti in order to get their help in the provision of artillery. As the English did not voluntarily wait on him, he ordered the closing of their factory at Kassimbazar. But this was avoided, and its chief, Ken, had two interviews with the Nawab in the month of May. Mir Jumla refused to accept the customary presents, demanded the return of the junk and Rs. 40,000, for the payment of which he agreed to wait for two months, and granted several days' time to Ken to secure the permission of the Hugli and Balasore factors. In case of non-compliance, Mir Jumla threatened to stop all trade of the English and seize their saltpetre as partial compensation.⁶ Towards the end of May, Matthias Halstead came to Mir Jumla from Hugli with a letter of intercession for the English from a local official, whereupon Mir Jumla partially conceded to the demands of the English. The Balasore and Hugli factors concurred in fixing the payment of Rs. 25,000 as compensation to the Nawab. Early in June Halstead and Ken had an interview with Mir Jumla, when he agreed to grant his *dustuck* to the English for their trade, provided they gave him a written pledge to make good all his damages within about a month.⁷

The Dutch Director, Mattheus Van den Brouke, was then on his way to meet Mir Jumla, who had ordered the Dutch to guard the river with sloops mounted with their guns, and had not stopped their trade. There was a rumour about

5. EFL. X 280-2, 281n.

6. *Ibid.*, 286-7; *vide*, *ante* Sec. C. §. 5.

7. *Ibid.*, 287-8.

the Dutch getting the government of Hugli in return for a large sum of money. But the English, taking advantage of Prince Muhammad Sultan's desertion of the imperial army under Mir Jumla, did not settle the junk incident even by middle of June. In the beginning of September Ken was at Murshidabad in compliance with Mir Jumla's summons, to wait there till the arrival of Agent Trevisa from Balasore. But, owing to the uncertainty of the issue in war, the latter was unwilling to part with any money, and followed a policy of "wait and see". He expressed his eagerness to interview the Nawab, and forwarded to him a letter from President Andrews of Surat and another from Mir Jumla's agent at Masulipatam⁸.

3. *Mir Jumla's reprisals against the English.*

Mir Jumla was not the person to be conciliated by vague promises. He had waited long. He had shown due civility and consideration to the factors. His patience had been exhausted and he would be satisfied with nothing but "immediate payment." He ordered the Governor of Balasore to send up Trevisa to Hugli and to levy a duty of 4% on all English exports, besides anchorage duties on their ships. By end of November, the trade of the English was almost at a standstill; the articles of that year's investment were purchased by them with money borrowed at high rates of interest as the *banians* feared to lend money to the factors in the face of Mir Jumla's threats to seize the Company's goods for not getting due satisfaction. Thus the Hugli factors had to face "extraordinary troubles" and incur "great expenses" in procuring goods for that year, while the risk of Mir Jumla's placing an embargo on the Company's shipment was still present. Settlement of the "unhappy and troublesome" junk episode was necessary before the English could hope to derive the fullest advantage of the Bengal trade, then considered "the risingest trade in India."⁹

8. *Ibid.*, 288, 292-3; 408-9; *vide ante*, Sec. C. §. 5.

9. *Ibid.*, 294-7.

Indeed, alarmed at Mir Jumla's stoppage of the saltpetre trade of the English at Patna, the Surat authorities had ordered the Madras factors to make full and immediate restitution to Mir Jumla for his losses (3rd June, 1659) and send a peremptory order to the latter (12th October) to restore the junk and to pay Mir Jumla out of Greenhill's estate. Early in November, the Madras factors had advised their colleagues in Bengal to ascertain the maximum demands of the Nawab as a necessary prelude to the final settlement. But, relying on rumours of military disasters to Mir Jumla, the Madras factors boldly advised their brethren in Bengal to hold out a threat to Mir Jumla that they "had power to vindicate themselves", if his actions prejudiced the interests of the Company. But those rumours were false, and to the Bengal factors, "acutely conscious of the power of the offended Nawab, such advice tendered from the security of Fort St. George, must have seemed a bitter mockery".¹⁰

At last, on 1st December, Trevisa left Hugli together with Ken for Mir Jumla's camp to negotiate with him for settlement of the junk affair. He came to an agreement with the Nawab on the following terms:

(i) the junk was to be returned to him together with all captured articles, (ii) the question of compensation was to be referred to his Masulipatam Agent, "Tapatap" (Tabatabai ?), and Messrs. Wm. a Court and Wm. Jersip (Jearsey) for final arbitration within four months. Trevisa feared that the Nawab would not grant the English freedom of trade before receiving satisfaction of all his demands.

10. *Ibid.* 263-66, 273, 389. At the end of February, 1660, the Surat factors also advised those in Bengal to pursue a policy of force, of playing the fox and the lion. As Mir Jumla's influence over Aurangzeb was so great as to embolden him to continue his abuses on Bengal factors and inflict losses on the Company on the score of the junk episode, in spite of their petition to the Emperor, the factors were asked by the Surat authorities to be prepared to leave the place and seize Mughal shipping. *Ibid.* 392-3 ; JIH. XXIV. 38-40.

But, thanks to the reasonableness of Mir Jumla, he granted Trevisa his *dustuck* or *parwana*, confirming (7 Jumada II. 1070 (O.S.)=9th February, 1660) the privileges, previously granted to the English by Shah Jahan and Shah Shuja.¹¹

11. *Ibid.*, 298, 390-1 (*parwana*). For the wrong account of Mir Jumla's granting freedom of trade to the English, as a result of the English physician Gabriel Boughton's (Bowden) activities, see, Bowrey, 233-34; Stewart, 251-2. Arguments against, in Hedges, III, 183, 167-8; EAEB, I. 23-39; EFL, VII xxxv-xxxviii.

CHAPTER VI

MIR JUMLA AS GOVERNOR OF BENGAL

1. *Mir Jumla appointed Governor of Bengal.*

On receiving (24th May) the news of Shuja's flight to Arrakan and Mir Jumla's entry into Dacca, Aurangzeb ordered the celebration of festivities for ten days. In recognition of Mir Jumla's good services during the last sixteen months in the face of numerous odds, Aurangzeb appointed him permanent Governor of Bengal.¹

The *farman*² of appointment contained an explicit statement of the reasons for it. This great victory, of which any powerful ruler might be proud, proved the valour and loyalty of Mir Jumla as well as his efficiency and skill in conducting the war to a successful completion in a manner consonant with the Emperor's desires. Again, the province of Bengal,—as Mir Jumla had stated in his letter to his son,—did not possess any sound administrative organisation; and the appointment of an able Governor was therefore an imperative necessity. "On the whole," Aurangzeb wrote to his general, "the laxity in administration, slackness, disobedience and rebellion, which have become rampant there for several years, are not unknown to you.....In every district the din of rebellion is rife and ringleaders have raised their heads in tumult." Mir Jumla had declined the offer of governorship of Bengal on an earlier occasion, on the ground that his colleagues would be alienated from him and attribute selfish motives to his actions. But the Emperor felt that the administration of such an important province as Bengal could not be entrusted to anyone except Mir Jumla, reputed as a man of lofty integrity, impartial justice and as a cherisher of the subjects.

1. MA. 30 (date) ; AN. 483 ; Sir J. N. Sarkar says that the *farman* of appointment was issued in June, 1660. *Aurangzeb*, III, 156.

2. FA. 48a-50a.

Mir Jumla's *mansab*, by addition to the original, was fixed at *haft hazar*; i *haft hazar Suwar*, of which 3,000 *Suwar* were *seh aspa du uspa*. The *mahals*, conferred as *tankhwah* on previous governors,—the choicest and most fruitful *jagirs*,—were given separately as salary amounting to one crore of *dams*. A good *Khilat*, 10 fast horses, Iraqi and Arabi, the best of all the special horses of the Emperor, forming part of the presents offered by the Turkish Emperor of Constantinople to the Emperor (Shahjahan) in his 31st *Jalus* (year),—together with 40 Turkish horses and elephants of the imperial stables and female elephants were also given to Mir Jumla. Further, if he considered any *mahal* bad, he was authorised to inform the Emperor of it and get whichever *pargana* he desired. Besides, a belt, together with a special bejewelled sword, whose handle was made of agate, was given to Mir Jumla.³

Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to devote himself to the efficient administration of the province by pacifying the people, chastising the unruly, regulating the artillery, and especially the *nawwara* (flotilla), securing the safety of traffic on the roads and highways and issuing well-calculated regulations concerning various other matters. The Emperor wrote to him : "The hand of the strong over the weak, of the oppressor over the oppressed should be removed. And in all affairs you should not transgress the laws of the *shariat* and limits of world-adorning justice. Your whole attention should be devoted to the well-being of all creatures of God and the peace of mind of foreign travellers and the inhabitants, and the safety of the boundaries. Act in such a way that all people can pursue their work of cultivation in an atmosphere of security from the persons whose profession is oppression".

Mir Jumla was also charged with the effective chastisement of the rather refractory *zamindars* of the province, and also particularly the rulers of Assam and of the Maghs, who ill-treated and oppressed the Mussalmans. He was asked to consider their punishment as an urgent duty for safeguarding the interests of religion and brotherhood in Islam. Aurangzeb

3. See AN. 483 ; *Poem*, 491-3 ; MA. 32.

a claim against another, or of the recovery of stolen property, the clerks of the police-stations used to collect for the State 1/40th of the amount as "a fee for exertion". The plaintiff and the defendant presenting themselves at the magistracy, were detained in prison till the disposal of their case, and the summons-servers used to take daily allowances from them and pay the amount to the state.⁹

Quite naturally Mir Jumla exercised almost unrestrained authority in Bengal administration as its Governor.¹⁰ He also exercised some degree of control over Bihar and Orissa.¹¹ As regards Bihar the facts are as follows: During 1660-61, Mirza Lutfullah Beg, Diwan of Patna, in order to monopolise the sale of saltpetre for the benefit of imperial revenues, forced the dealers, in spite of their contracts with the Dutch, to deliver their saltpetre to him. The Dutch Director at Hugli, Mattheus Van den Brouke complained to Mir Jumla and to the English, alleging that these actions were secretly instigated by Chamberlain, the English factor at Patna, and his broker, Gangaram, who had promised to purchase saltpetre from the Diwan. The English Agent, Trevisa, disclaimed these allegations and agreed with the Dutch Director not to deal with the Diwan, but to purchase directly from the dealers as before. Mir Jumla forbade Lutfullah by a *parwana* to hinder the Dutch.¹²

In the autumn of 1659 Mir Jumla, having established his authority in W. Bengal, had deputed Ihtisham Khan to assume charge of the governorless province of Orissa, then in a state of anarchy. Probably it was then that Mir Jumla, in

9. *Cont.* 131b ; SAR, 176.

10. As early as May, 1659, the English factors observed . What hee (Mir Jumla) saies (says) is a law". (EFI. X. 286) In April, 1660, they noted : "his (Mir Jumla's) power over all this new kings dominions being so greate that his word the Kinge obeyes" (*Ibid.*, 305). cf. Bowrey, 144-5

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12. BDR. 1661, in EFI. XI. 69-71.

Mir Jumla's *mansab*, by addition to the original, was fixed at *haft hazar-i haft hazar Suwar*, of which 3,000 *Suwar* were *seh aspa du aspa*. The *mahals*, conferred as *tankhwah* on previous governors,—the choicest and most fruitful *jagirs*,—were given separately as salary amounting to one crore of *dams*. A good *Khilat*, 10 fast horses, Iraqi and Arabi, the best of all the special horses of the Emperor, forming part of the presents offered by the Turkish Emperor of Constantinople to the Emperor (Shahjahan) in his 31st *Jalus* (year),—together with 40 Turkish horses and elephants of the imperial stables and female elephants were also given to Mir Jumla. Further, if he considered any *mahal* bad, he was authorised to inform the Emperor of it and get whichever *pargana* he desired. Besides, a belt, together with a special bejewelled sword, whose handle was made of agate, was given to Mir Jumla.³

Aurangzeb asked Mir Jumla to devote himself to the efficient administration of the province by pacifying the people, chastising the unruly, regulating the artillery, and especially the *nauwara* (flotilla), securing the safety of traffic on the roads and highways and issuing well-calculated regulations concerning various other matters. The Emperor wrote to him : "The hand of the strong over the weak, of the oppressor over the oppressed should be removed. And in all affairs you should not transgress the laws of the *shariat* and limits of world-adorning justice. Your whole attention should be devoted to the well-being of all creatures of God and the peace of mind of foreign travellers and the inhabitants, and the safety of the boundaries. Act in such a way that all people can pursue their work of cultivation in an atmosphere of security from the persons whose profession is oppression".

Mir Jumla was also charged with the effective chastisement of the rather refractory *zamindars* of the province, and, also particularly the rulers of Assam and of the Maghs, who ill-treated and oppressed the Mussalmans. He was asked to consider their punishment as an urgent duty for safeguarding the interests of religion and brotherhood in Islam. Aurangzeb

3. See AN. 483 ; *Poem*, 491-3 ; MA. 32.

a claim against another, or of the recovery of stolen property, the clerks of the police-stations used to collect for the State 1/40th of the amount as "a fee for exertion". The plaintiff and the defendant presenting themselves at the magistracy, were detained in prison till the disposal of their case, and the summons-servers used to take daily allowances from them and pay the amount to the state.⁹

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Mir Jumla also helped Khan i Dauran in subduing Bahadur Khan, the rebel *Zamindar* of Hijili. The latter had escaped from the prison into which Shuja had thrown him and reasserted his authority in his estate. European factory records state that Mir Jumla wanted to reconquer it, and demanded ships for the purpose from the Dutch, the Portuguese and the English. But this enterprise was stayed for some time after the appointment of Khan i Dauran as Governor of Orissa. Subsequently Mir Jumla induced the Emperor to transfer the district from the jurisdiction of Orissa to that of Bengal, requisitioned an English sloop and a Dutch galliot, and made preparations to subdue Bahadur. Thanks to the assistance of the Dutch, Hijili was conquered. Kamal Khan, brother of

13. Deputation of Ibtisham, SAR, 224; MH, 143 (Nilkantha Dev), 78—80 (Shaikh Abul Khair), 49-53 and 141 (Orissa revenues). A *dakchauki* was established from Orissa to Rajmahal (*ibid.*, 110-114), but the exact time for it is not definitely known.

14. EFI. XI. 288-9. Prac. IHC. (Cuttack; 1939), p 297.

reorganising the navy, Mir Jumla abolished the old system of management; but before he could start a new one, he undertook the Assam campaign. Many naval officers and men died in the course of it and the flotilla was utterly ruined at the death of Mir Jumla. On the resignation of its admiral, Ibn Husain, Mahmud Beg was appointed its superintendent and asked to send a report after ascertaining the quality, the number and the true state of the Bengal flotilla. Its decline led to an aggravation of the menace of the piracy of the Maghs and the Portuguese. Early in 1664 the cruising admiral (*Sardar i Sairab*), Munawwar Khan, unable to face them with "the relics of the *nawwara*, a few broken and rotten boats", fled in confusion. Hence Shaista Khan had virtually to create a new flotilla.²¹

3. *Mir Jumla's commercial and economic activities in Bengal.*

The basis of Mir Jumla's economic system in Bengal, as well as in the Karnatak, was monopoly. As Governor of Bengal, he endeavoured to become the sole stockist of all articles of necessity and then sell them at fanciful prices. About 1660, Mir Jumla offered to supply the English factors every year as much saltpetre as they would require. In the opinion of the Madras factors he did so for his personal profit. About the same time the English factors at Patna were indebted to him for supply of 30,000 bags (6,000 mds.) of saltpetre.²²

An instance of an extraordinary levy of Mir Jumla in Bengal is given by a Dutch record of November, 1661.

21. The flotilla accompanying Mir Jumla to Assam numbered at least 323. Many Ahom ships also formed part of Mir Jumla's Assam plunder (see Ch VII). After his death, the number of the boats was not so large (600) as was claimed by Ibn Hussain, nor so small (25), as was the contention of Daud Khan. *Cont.* 112a-b, 113a (decay of flotilla), 122a, 137a; SAR. 191, 194.

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According to it Mir Jumla demanded Rs. 50,000 from the grain merchants of Dacca, as something like an excess profits tax of modern times, on the pretext that the latter had made a profit of twice the amount due to the continued presence of the Governor's large camp (on the eve of the Kuch Bihar and Assam Campaign). They paid Rs. 10,000, but the unsatisfied Governor adopted severely coercive measures, as a result of which they contributed in all Rs. 25,000. A sum of three lakhs was offered by the city bankers, forewarned by such severity.²³

In 1658 the Governor of Hugli demanded from the English an annual payment of Rs. 3,000 in lieu of customs on the ground that the imprisonment (June, 1658) of Shahjahan and assumption of power by Aurangzeb had made all imperial grants null and void. Next year the Governor of Balasore began to demand exorbitant charges for anchorage from them. The English factors declined to pay either, and a dispute thereupon arose between them and the government of Mir Jumla. In 1660, the English Agent at Hugli, exasperated at the Mir's "oppressions," audaciously seized one of his country vessels as a security for the recovery of debts. Highly incensed at this, Mir Jumla demanded reparation and threatened to destroy the out agencies, to seize the factory at Hugli and expel the English from the country. Advised by the Madras authorities, Agent Trevisa restored the boat and apologised to the Governor. But the latter continued to exact the annual payment of Rs. 3,000.²⁴

Every year Mir Jumla was in the habit of utilising the services of the English and their ships in sending his articles (viz. gumlack) to Persia without paying any freight or customs. The Madras factors advised their brethren at Gombroon that "in view of his power in Bengal, the Company's dues (on a parcel of gumlack) should be remitted." At the same time they held (May, 1662) that this not only went a

23. BDR. Nov. 1661, referred to in AA. 292.

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Certain Muscovites served in the Mughal army in Mir Jumla's Kuch Bihar and Assam campaigns.³³

The junk affair was not settled during Mir Jumla's life time, even though in 1661 the English factors promised to restore the vessel to his Masulipatam agent, Tappa Tap (Tabatabai?). In 1662, on its way from Quedda to Mallacca it met with a fierce storm and was laid up at Mallacca, with no hope of recovery. For the sake of preserving the friendship with Mir Jumla, the Madras Council decided to exchange it for another vessel. At the same time they advised the Masulipatam factors to inform Alle Beague (Ali Beg), the successor of Tappa Tap, of the condition of the junk and to request him to intercede on their behalf for moderation of the claims. After the death of Mir Jumla, they hoped (December, 1663) that his son, Muhammad Amin, had forgotten all about the matter or that at least it was not to be considered again. Early in 1665 the Madras factors informed the Company that the question of any claim on account of the junk had not cropped up, that all the papers of the late Nawab had gone to Emperor Aurangzeb and that the letter of Trevisa, containing his agreement to give him satisfaction had probably been miscarried. All this, they felt, would mean the end of the affair.³⁴

5. *Effects of Mir Jumla's death.*

"Mir Jumla's death", Bernier writes, "produced, as might be expected, a great sensation throughout the Indies." Bowrey, too, observes that Mir Jumla died "to the great grieve of all wise and Eminent persons in these kingdoms, not a little dolefull to the poore and the great losse these kingdoms sustained is

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34. Surat proposal to capture the junk for restoring it, EFL. X, 393; XI, 40-1, 148-9, 151 (Ali Beg), 400-1 (Claim not made). Question of Mir Jumla's boxes, EFL. XIII. 174, 299, 302-4, 309, 312-14, 317.

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The removal, by death, of Mir Jumla's strong personality was followed by a general wave of laxity and disorder in the government of the province of Bengal. The selfish desires of men, so long kept in check by "the awe of the deceased Khan i Khanan," got an outlet. "Everyone began to beat the drum of arrogance". Officials and ambitious men began to give a free play to their selfish designs. The acting governor, Ihtisham Khan, became tyrannical; Dilir Khan, superior in prestige and rank to him, was dissatisfied, though he did not outwardly show his resentment. In the general atmosphere of prodigality and nepotism, each turned to his patron for some preferment or other. Displaced *Zamindars* had their estates restored to them. Shihabuddin Talish applies the term "Days of Nature"³⁷ to this period, and observes: "Strange were the revolution and the disorder that had taken place after the death of Mir Jumla."³⁸

35. Bernier, 173; Bowrey, 144-5.

36. News, FI. 172; MA. 45; Aurangzeb's reaction, *Storia*, II. 102; Bernier, *op. cit.*; Bowrey, 144-5; escheat, EFL. XI. 273-4; Bernier, *op. cit.*; *Storia*, II. 98-102; Official changes, FI, *op. cit.*, *Cont.* 106a-107b, 108b, 109a. Mahmud Beg is stated to have been ordered to go to the imperial court with the dependents of Mir Jumla (*Cont.* 107b).

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without securing the Emperor's prior sanction.² But the fact is that Aurangzeb, in his *farman*, appointing Mir Jumla Governor of Bengal (June, 1660), had commissioned him to conquer the Rajas of Assam and Arrakan after the settlement of the affairs of Bengal. The primary task of Mir Jumla was, therefore, to capture the fugitive Prince Shuja in Arrakan. But it was Mir Jumla who secured the Emperor's permission to postpone the Arrakan campaign and to lead an expedition against Kuch Bihar and Assam.³

Indeed there were cogent reasons why Mir Jumla took that decision. As Governor of Bengal, he must chastise the contumacious rulers of Kuch Bihar and Assam in the interests of maintaining imperial prestige and securing safety of the imperial dominions. The political turmoils consequent on the illness of Shahjahan in 1657, and the absence of Shuja from Bengal had placed the Mughal dominion of Kamrup, extending from the Monas to Gauhati and including Hajo, between two fires. (March-April, 1658). From the west came the Koch minister, Bhavanath Karji, oppressing the ryots and the Moslem women. The Ahoms, coming from the east under their frontier governor, Bargohain Tangchu Sandhikui, occupied Pandu and Srighat, and rejecting the belated Koch proposal of an alliance against the Mughals, drove the Koch general Bhavanath beyond the Monas, and, advancing unopposed beyond Baritala, established a military outpost in Hatshila (near Karibari, only 5 stages from Dacca), refused to allow the Mughals to resort to the local market, and swept Mughal Kamrup with the "broom of plunder".⁴

2. PB. (IsC. 1928, p. 332n, 343) ; JIH. V. 374-6.

3. FL. 25-26 ; For *Farman*, see ch. VI. § 1. A Dutch letter of 10th October, 1661, refers to a report that Mir Jumla had been ordered to invade Cooch Bihar (EFL. XI. 79) ; PAB. 119.

4. FL. 6-8 ; AN. 676-9 ; BKK. I. 653-65 (market) ; SMAB. 89-91, xxi ; B. VIII. 82-85 ; B. MSA. 195, 197 ; PB. (IsC. 332 and n) ; KB. Ch. 7 ; AB. 14-18 ; PAB. 115-117.

The Koch offer of alliance against the Mughals and partition of Kamrup is mentioned in SMAB. 90, BKK. 656-7.

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38. *Cont.* 106a, 109a-b.

without securing the Emperor's prior sanction.² But the fact is that Aurangzeb, in his *farman*, appointing Mir Jumla Governor of Bengal (June, 1660), had commissioned him to conquer the Rajas of Assam and Arrakan after the settlement of the affairs of Bengal. The primary task of Mir Jumla was, therefore, to capture the fugitive Prince Shuja in Arrakan. But it was Mir Jumla who secured the Emperor's permission to postpone the Arrakan campaign and to lead an expedition against Kuch Bihar and Assam.³

Indeed there were cogent reasons why Mir Jumla took that decision. As Governor of Bengal, he must chastise the contumacious rulers of Kuch Bihar and Assam in the interests of maintaining imperial prestige and securing safety of the imperial dominions. The political turmoils consequent on the illness of Shahjahan in 1657, and the absence of Shuja from Bengal had placed the Mughal dominion of Kamrup, extending from the Monas to Gauhati and including Hajo, between two fires (March-April, 1658). From the west came the Koch minister, Bhavanath Karji, oppressing the ryots and the Moslem women. The Ahoms, coming from the east under their frontier governor, Bargohain Tangchu Sandhikui, occupied Pandu and Srighat, and rejecting the belated Koch proposal of an alliance against the Mughals, drove the Koch general Bhavanath beyond the Monas, and, advancing unopposed beyond Baritala, established a military outpost in Hatshila (near Karibari, only 5 stages from Dacca), refused to allow the Mughals to resort to the local market, and swept Mughal Kamrup with the "broom of plunder".⁴

2. PB. (IsC. 1928, p. 332n, 343); JIH. V. 374-6.

3. FI. 25-26; For *Farman*, see ch. VI. § 1. A Dutch letter of 10th October, 1661, refers to a report that Mir Jumla had been ordered to invade Cooch Bihar (EFI. XI. 79); PAB. 119.

4. FI. 6-8; AN. 676-9; BKK. I. 653-65 (market); SMAB. 89-91, xxi; B. VIII. 82-85; B. MSA. 195, 197; PB. (IsC. 332 and n); KB. Ch. 7; AB. 14-18; PAB. 115-117.

The Koch offer of alliance against the Mughals and partition of Kamrup is mentioned in SMAB. 90, BKK. 656-7.

Apart from these immediate events, the previous activities of the Ahoms like the capture of Sa'yyid Abu Bakr and Abdus Salam in the reigns of Jahangir and Shahjahan respectively, had gone unpunished. The accession of Aurangzeb and the appointment of Mir Jumla as the Governor of Bengal meant that quick retribution was inevitable. Mir Jumla was actuated not only by imperialistic designs, but,—as his trusted *Waqi a navis* tells us,—also by a desire for "a holy war with the infidels of Assam", and "an ardent passion for releasing Mussalmans (prisoners of war), rooting out idolators, lifting up the banner of Islam and destruction of the customs of unbelief and error."⁵

2. *Mir Jumla's War Preparations.*

Hearing of Aurangzeb's victory and of the war preparations at Dacca, both the offending Koch and Ahom kings longed for peace. The Ahom king Jayadhwaj pleaded that he had seized Kamrup to guard it from the Koches and offered to restore it to the Mughals. So Mir Jumla, anxious to invade Arrakan after the end of the rains, deputed Rashid Khan with an army in 1661 to take delivery of Kamrup from the Ahoms. But he was not inclined to forgive disloyalty on the part of a vassal, Pran Narayan of Kuch Bihar, and sent another army under Raja Sujan Singh, subsequently re-inforced by Mirza Beg Shujai, to chastise the Koch ruler. The latter's envoy, who had come to pray for pardon of the Raja, was imprisoned and the letter of a Mughal noble he had brought with him was not even read by the inexorable General.⁶

But these overtures of peace were only a clever ruse on the part of the Rajas of Assam and Kuch Bihar to gain time for completion of preparations. Rashid Khan had to halt at Rangamati before advancing further against the well-equipped

5. FI. 7-8 (retribution), 18-19 (holy war).

6. FI. 8-9; B. VIII. 88; AB18-19.

Ahoms, while Raja Sujan Singh could not advance against the Koches beyond Ekduar, commanding the entrance to Kuch Bihar (May-June, 1661), when the advent of the rainy season suspended all activity.⁷

Resolving to conduct the war in person, and to take the field first against Kuch Bihar, and then, if necessary, against Assam, Mir Jumla made several administrative arrangements in Bengal before setting out on the expedition.⁸

On the night of 1st November, 1661, Mir Jumla and Dilir Khan started from Khizrpur with a powerful army of 12,000 horse, and 30,000 foot, together with a vast flotilla of war-boats numbering at least 323. The most powerful of them were the *ghurabs* or floating batteries in charge of the Dutch, each towed by 4 *Kusas* (long row-boats) and carrying 14 guns and a crew of 50 or 60 men. Besides the Portuguese (and *Mesticos*, half breeds), the highest naval officers. there were some English and Dutch sailors too.⁹ Mir Jumla had a very good opinion of

7 FI. 9; BKK. 665.

Ekduar was a fortified gateway made of lime and brick, with a spacious and high top, full of tall and stout trees and wide and deep pits. Probably Ekduar is to be identified with Ekmooka (26° 16' N, 89° 23' E) 6 m. s. w. of Cooch Bihar (Survey of India Map, Cooch Behar, 78 F).

8. FI. 10; *Vide ante*, Ch 6.

9. FI. 11; AN. 694 (from Khizrpur), 696; Glanius 144-47, 167; *Storia*, II. 98; FI. 3; '89 (10 or 12 thousand horse); BKK. 668 (30,000 foot); Gait. 127, n. 128. Exaggerated figures of Cavalry in Ahom Sources; BKK. 668 (40,000), SMAB. 91 (60,000); also in *Storia*, *op. cit* (40,000); Glanius, 145 (3,00,000 horses. 5,000,000 foot).

The Mughal fleet comprised 323 ships when it reached Lakhau (9th March, 1662) after the naval battle above Kaliabar; 159 *kosas*, 48 *jalbas*, 10 *ghurabs*, 7 *parindahs*, 4 *bajras*, 50 *pattelas*, 2 *salbs*, 1 *palil*, 1 *bhar*, 2 *balams*, 10 *khatgiris*, 5 *mahallgiris*, 24 *palwars* and other small ships; total 323, (FI. 43; JASB. 1872. p. 73). Some boats carried provisions and munitions, while the barges bore the ladies of the *harem*. (Glanius, 144), Mir Jumla asked two Dutch carpenters to construct a stately vessel from his own model (*Ibid.*, 148-9, 183). The English sailors probably included Captain John Durson (Mr. Dortson) and his companions. EFI, XI. 70n; X. 193.

the European fighters, especially the Portuguese and the Dutch gunners and also of the Armenian horsemen. There were again several "Muscovites, all extraordinarily well-mounted." The Dutch were conscripted, but the English and the Portuguese were volunteers.¹⁰

3. *Mir Jumla conquers Kuch Bihar.*

Arriving at Baritala, an imperial outpost on the frontier of Kuch Bihar, Mir Jumla selected neither of the two well-known routes from Mughal territories to that country; the one *via* Ekduar was closely guarded by the Raja, as that place was the sole fortified post between the invaders and Kuch Bihar; the other *via* Khuntaghat, passing near Rangamati, was very narrow, intersected by *nalas* and flanked on both sides with dense jungles. With his characteristic prudence he selected for his advance an obscure way, left unguarded by the Raja, and running along an *al* or embankment much lower than other roads,—news of which was brought by his scouts. The fleet guarded the *nala* flowing from Ghoraghat to the Brahmaputra.

On the news of the approach of the imperial general together with Sujan Singh near the *al* or embankment, the boundary of Kuch Bihar, the Koch sentinels fled away (13th December, 1661). Next day Mir Jumla reached the *al* and had to cut his way through jungles. Riding a pony, he supervised the construction of the road and shared the sufferings with the meanest soldier. At a place three stages from the capital, he learnt that the Raja had fled to Kathalbari at the foot of the hills of Bhutan and the minister to Maurang. Crossing the

10. Glanius, 167-8 (Armenians), 145-146 (Muscovites), 148.

One author equates the Muscovites with Turks. BPP. 1925. P. 14n. But there is ample evidence of Russian contact with India in 17th Century (*Hindusthan Standard*, Puja number, 1945, 237-9). It might be that a Russian contingent accompanied Mir Jumla.

jungles, and fording a river, Mir Jumla entered the capital unopposed on 19th December.¹¹

4. *Mir Jumla's administration of Kuch Bihar.*

Mir Jumla annexed Kuch Bihar to the Mughal Empire. His administration was vigorous but conciliatory. At his bidding the *azan* or call to prayer was chanted from the terrace of the royal palace by Sadr Mir Muhammad Sadiq. To remove the chances of rebellion in future, the fortified gateway of Ekduar was demolished, the jungle within a radius of 100 yards of it was cut down, and an open plain formed. All captured war materials, were confiscated to the imperial government; 106 pieces of cannon, 140 *Zamburaks*, 11 *Ramchangis*, 123 muskets and other articles of the arsenal were sent to Dacca, while some goods of the Raja were reviewed by Muhammad Abid, the escheat officer. The name of Kuch Bihar was changed to Alamgirnagar. Till the arrival of Askar Khan, appointed permanent *faujdar* by the Emperor at the General's suggestion, Isfandiyar Beg (now styled Khan), son of Allah Yar Khan, officiated as *faujdar* of the country, and was assisted by Qazi Samui Shujai as *diwan* and Mir Abdur Razzaq and Khwajah Kishor Das *mansabdar* as *amins*.

If Mir Jumla exhibited firmness in the settlement of the country, he showed wisdom and moderation in dealing with the ryots, and protected them from plunder at the hands of

11. FI. 10-12 (Route from Maurung); JASB. 1872, 65 and n; Glanius, 147. Khuntaghat, n.w. of Jogigupha, in Gauripur estate, Goalpara Dt. Gaz. 117.

Baritala is near Chilmari near the right bank of the Brahmaputra, opposite Hatsilah in Karibari *pargana*. Probably the *nala* running through Ghoraghat is to be identified with the Dharali, and the river on way to the capital with the Neelcoomer. Kathalbari is Cantalbury of Rennell, Sh. 5.

Chronology: Raja Sujan Singh joins Mir Jumla (12th December); Mir Jumla reaches the foot of the *al* (13th December), and the *al* (14th December), encamps on the environs of the capital (18th December), enters it (19th December).

marauding soldiers. Even before reaching the capital, he had issued a proclamation forbidding plunder of household furniture and other property of the ryots, present or absent, and inflicted severe penalties on the first offenders. A few soldiers, who had stolen a goat or a cow, or some plantains from the houses of fugitive ryots, were paraded round the town and the camp, with their noses pierced with arrows and the stolen articles suspended from their necks. This deterred other miscreants, and encouraged the people to return to their homes and cultivation.¹² A Mughal mint was established at Alamgirnagar and one coin of Aurangzeb issued from this mint, was described by the late Mr. R. D. Banerji as "the only Mughal coin in which the legend is written in Bengali characters, although the language is Persian or rather Arabic".¹³ It may be regarded as an instance of Mir Jumla's policy of following, as much as possible, the line of least modification of local traditions.

The Raja's son joined the Mughals, embraced Islam and even offered to arrest his father. His Wazir, Bhavanath, was surrounded from two sides by Isfandiyar and Farhad Khan, and ultimately arrested by Reza Quli Beg Abakish, and imprisoned. But Mir Jumla failed to capture the Raja, who had withdrawn from Kathalbari at the foot of the Bhutan hills to their summit. The pursuers returned only with one elephant, a few horses and draught bullocks and their Bhutia keeper. The Nawab confiscated the animals to the imperial government but spared the life of the supplicating Bhutia, gave him some cash and sent him with a written order to Dharmaraja, the 120 year old ascetic ruler of Bhutan, asking him to deliver the fugitive Raja of Kuch Bihar or at least expel him. But the Raja of Bhutan nobly refused to drive away his "unbidden guest". Mir Jumla, having no time to lose, could not chastise the Raja of Bhutan and

12. FI. 12 (szan), 16 (occupation), 18 (officers), 15 (ryots); AN. 694; MA. 40.

13. JASB (1920), 85-86, Pl. xiii, no. 8; ML. II. 153; E & D VII. 265.

proceeded to Assam (4th January, 1662) after a sixteen days' stay in Kuch Bihar.¹⁴

During the rainy season of 1662, the Raja of Kuch Bihar came down from the hills, recovered his country, by taking advantage of popular resentment at the introduction of the Mughal land revenue administrative methods. He killed Muhammad Salih, the opposing *mansabdar* at Kathalbari, and prevented the coming of provisions to the followers of Isfandiyar Khan, who fled to Ghoraghat. Askar Khan reached there, but was unable to recover the country.¹⁵

14. FI. 15-16; AN. 688 (Raja's son Bishnu Narayan). But see MNEFP. 306-7n.

15. FI. 80-81.

Section B

TRIUMPHAL MARCH INTO ASSAM

(a) RECOVERY OF MUGHAL KAMRUP

1. *Mir Jumla sets out against the Ahoms.*

On the approach of Rashid Khan in 1661, the Ahoms abandoned Hatishala and Dhubri and retreated beyond the Monas river. Rashid recovered the western end of Mughal Kamrup up to Rangamati¹ from the Ahoms, but suspecting a snare, halted there for reinforcements from Mir Jumla before advancing further. In fact, the Ahom King had caused the two Phukans (Dihingia and Lahui Phukans), responsible for the retreat, to be arrested and imprisoned, and had appointed Manthir Bharali Barua, a Hindu Kayastha of Bejdoloi family, commander of the Lower Assam army.² Jogi-gupha had been strengthened at the mouth of the Monas and a new fort constructed at Pancharatan (by the Ahom Captains Ahataguria Lahan Phukan and Kandu Khamon), on the opposite bank of the Brahmaputra. The Ahom chiefs in Kamrup now sent an envoy to Rashid Khan, insolently enquiring of the reason of Mughal advance, and the messenger was sent by the Khan to Mir Jumla at Dacca. Nevertheless Mir Jumla expressed his willingness to desist from invading Assam if the Raja restored the whole of Mughal Kamrup together with the captured materials, sent his daughter with a suitable tribute and promised not to attack imperial territories in future. But when Jaynarain of Ghila Bijoypur deserted the king of Assam to escape from punishment for his failure to redeem some boastful promises, and joined Mir Jumla, the latter considered the situation

1. Rangamati, west of the Monas R. *Ind. Atlas*, Sh. 124.

2. The BKK. (665-66) states that the Baduli Phukan was made Neog Phukan. This seems unlikely in view of his subsequent appointment as such (FL. 91-92). Moreover, the SMAB (93) clearly states the circumstances of the appointment of Manthir Bharali Barua.

favourable for invasion, and suggested to the Emperor postponement of the Arrakan campaign to next year after the conquest of Kuch Bihar and of Assam. He wrote to Aurangzeb: "Assam has occupied Kamrup, and is contemplating to invade us. My scheme of subduing the country of the Maghs cannot be completed within a short time. So in the meantime I propose to invade Cooch Bihar and Assam. I am awaiting the orders of the Emperor." Aurangzeb ratified his General's plan. As for the Assam King, he advised the Phukans not to surrender Kamrup, as it had been acquired from the Koches and not from Mughals. They did not care to send any reply to Mir Jumla's proposed terms even after his conquest of Kuch Bihar.³

2. *Mir Jumla's initial difficulties.*

Mir Jumla continued his difficult march from Kuch Bihar towards Assam (4th January, 1662) through the jungly route *via* Khuntaghat and joined Rashid Khan's army at Rangamati. The *naumcara* proceeded up the Brahmaputra therefrom, co-operating with the land force, each arm giving cover to the other. The hardships of his journey were augmented by his lack of local topographical knowledge. But his strong determination helped him to overcome the difficulties presented by Nature and man. Despairing of getting correct information and guidance from the local *zamindars*, the General very wisely decided to follow the course of the Brahmaputra and utilise the fleet. Hence he ordered Dilir Khan, the commander of his Van, and Mir Murtaza, *daroga* of the imperial artillery, to follow the river bank and to cut a way forward through the jungles. The exertions of that old and resolute Nawab, whom Talish describes as the "Chief of Men", were so strenuous, that his work of supervision extending from sunrise to sunset, was suspended only during

3. FL. 25-26; BKK. 665-67; SMAB. 91-93, xxi, xxii; B VIII. 87-88; Gait, 126-27; Riyaz, 224-5. For Jaynarain, SMAB. 90-91, B VIII. 85-87; AB. 17. PAB. 117-118. For Mir Jumla's letter to Emperor, SMAB. 91; IHQ. V. 470, 474; IsC. 1928, p. 343.

prayers. The road was duly constructed in spite of enormous impediments. The thick and strong *khagra* reeds were crushed by footmen and elephants, the pools and marshes were filled up with reeds and grasses, and most of the *nalas* were made fordable for the men and the beasts of burden.

The unspeakable hardships which all members of the expeditionary force had to suffer, and which the General shared with the humblest soldier, have been graphically delineated by Talish. The jungle-cleaners collapsed while taking rest after hard labour; men paid the penalty of careless steps by stumbling to death; the barbed head of the broken *khagra* reed pierced the foot of men; horsemen were hurled down to death by the silent but sharp and strong stroke of the bamboo; musketeers and foot-archers alike became fatigued, ill or infirm; the undulating intricacies of the ground took a heavy toll, while mud paralysed riders as well as pedestrians. In one whole day not more than one narrow lane could be constructed because of these hardships and in the crowd and pressure of advance, men and animals jostling together and pushing and knocking each other, many died of attacks by bewildered and infuriated animals,—“the hockey stick of the tusk” of an elephant, “the whiff of the kick” of a horse, the push of a camel, and the horns and the legs of a bull, all served to throw persons under “the revolving wheel of the mill of death”.

These difficulties, caused by the dense jungles and numerous *nalas*, as well as the tardy advance of the imperial fleet from Rangamati made Mir Jumla's progress slow. His daily march did not exceed 4 to 5 miles.⁴

3. *Mir Jumla's advance up to Gauhati.*

On 17th January Mir Jumla halted 5 miles west of Jogigupha, a spacious and high fort, situated near the junction of the Monas and the Brahmaputra. A wall built on the summit of a hill adjoining the latter river blocked the path of the

4. FI. 18-21; MU. III. 547; MA. 40 (date wrong); AN. 694-95. For the route from Rangamati to Jogigupha, see Rennell, Sh. 17.

invader from the west. In accordance with their usual custom of strengthening their mud forts, the Ahoms (under Baduli Phukan) defended the western environs of this fort with *phanjis* or sharp bamboo stakes fixed on the ground as well as inside the numerous pits. The north of the fort was protected by pits, hills and jungles. The defending garrison having been depleted by the outbreak of cholera, the Ahom Dangarias decided to evacuate the fort, and Mir Jumla captured it without fight (20th January).

Crossing the deep and violent river Monas, Mir Jumla divided the land force into two sections : he himself with the main army proceeded along the northern bank of the Brahmaputra ; Sayyid Nasiruddin Khan marched along the southern bank with a contingent, while the fleet kept pace with the land forces.

This three-pronged advance of Mir Jumla was eminently successful. Learning of the loss of Jogigupha, the Ahom king hastily sent reinforcements to Srighat (held by Rajshahur, the father-in-law of the Raja), so as "to make a combined attack on the enemies." This fort was more elevated and spacious than that of Jogigupha and was protected by big *phanjis*, pits and palisades of strong timber. But Mir Jumla, occupying the "chowki of Khatta" with two forts,⁵ arrived at Srighat before the Ahom reinforcements. Then bypassing it, he encamped at the environs of Gauhati (Shahburj) on 4th February, and deputed Rashid Khan to encircle Srighat by a northern whirling movement. The panic-stricken Ahom army escaped it only by a hurried night flight up the river to Kajli. Next day (5th February) Mir Jumla had the palisades of Srighat demolished with the help of some elephants under the direction of Haji Muhammad Baqr Ispahani. Next Mir Jumla moved two miles, and recovered Gauhati, the capital of Mughal Kamrup, which then stood on the north bank of the Brahmaputra.

The imperial forces south of the river wrested the fort of Pancharatan from the Ahoms (under Phulbarua), who, losing

5. MU. III. 547 ; Assam Chokey and Chanankotta of Rennell Sh. 5.

their "first battle" with the Mughals, retired to Samdhara. The Mughals also captured the fort of Pandu, opposite Srighat and equal to it in strength, without fight. Many retreating Ahoms were slain by Yadgar Khan Uzbek. A fort at Beltala, east of Pandu, fell during a night attack and its garrison was slain. The fort of Kajli, at the mouth of the Kallang, 14 miles east of Pandu, and not inferior to it or Srighat in strength, was deserted by the Ahoms, who retreated to Kathalbari, leaving a few *Zamburaks*, muskets and powder to fall to the invaders.⁶

6. FI. 21-24; BKK. 666-670 (naval advance, 667; some resistance at Jogigupha); SMAB. 93-94; B. VIII. 89; AB. 19; AN. 696-702 PAB. 121; the unnamed Dutch sailor (Glanus, 147, 58), Bernier, 172; Manucci (*Storia*, II. 98) all speak of Mir Jumla's easy conquest of Azo or Hajo, a small fortress in the Kamrup dt. of Assam.

(b) FROM GAUHATI TO GARHGAON

1. *Mir Jumla enters Assam proper.*

The victorious General waited for two days at Gauhati. But receiving no reply to his terms from the Ahoms even there, he invaded Assam (7th February). For protection against their dangerous stratagems and night attacks, he ordered all men to be on the alert and all guards to keep watch at night, armed and with their horses saddled. Mir Murtaza remained vigilant with guns. Communications were safeguarded by setting up *thanas* on the way. As Garhgaon, the Ahom capital, was situated on the southern bank of the Brahmaputra, Mir Jumla crossed it (15th and 16th February) with the whole army at a place half way between Gauhati and Samdhara.¹ Ignoring an evasive reply from the Ahom king at this stage, Mir Jumla moved towards Simlagarh. He had already (after the fall of Kajli) received the submission of the Raja of Darrang, on the north bank of the river and now the Raja of Dimarua on its south sent his nephew to wait upon him and sided with the imperialists.²

2. *Simlagarh and Samdhara.*

The only strongholds that now lay in Mir Jumla's path to the Ahom capital were Samdhara at the mouth of the Bharali river and Simlagarh opposite to it on the southern bank of the Brahmaputra. The Raja decided to fortify these two places and strenuously endeavoured to arrest the further progress of the victorious general at Samdhara, which held the key to his dominions. He replaced his old commanders by new ones, and divided his army into two sections. The northern army,

1. The place is evidently Burchola (92°25'E, 26°37'N) of *Ind. Atlas* (Sh., 142. NE). and Boreholagaon of Robinson. *Vide Darrang Dt. Gaz.* 177.

2. FI. 26-28. (ships upset and horses jumping into water during a hail storm; Mir Jumla's Bakhshi, Mir Beg Shujai killed, 16, 27); 24 (Darrang); B. VIII. 88-89; PAB. 121. For Ahom night attacks and strategic retreat, FI. 58; JBORS. I. 188.

guarding Samdhara, was placed under General Ghora Kobrak, assisted by Baduli Phukan, Barukial Bargohain, Kenduguria Barpatra; the southern army, stationed at Simlagarh under General Bahgaria Buragohain, assisted by Sairingia Raja, Bhitaraal Gohain, Barchetia Namniyal Rajshahur Barphukan.³

Occupying a highly strategic position between the Brahmaputra and the southern hills, the strong, spacious and high fort of Simlagarh was protected on two sides by high walls with battlements, mounted with cannon. A ditch and the pits with bamboo spikes made access to the fort difficult. Its defenders, "as numerous as ants and locusts" had kept the materials of defence in a perfect manner.

On 20th February Mir Jumla encamped on the bank of a *nala* flowing westward from the south of the fort. A *zamburak* ball from it passed over his tent. Since storming the fort would have taken a heavy toll on life, he decided on a siege. At his command the nobles kept guard at night under the able superintendentship of Mahmud Beg, imperial Bakhshi. Cannon were mounted on entrenchments thrown up within gunshot by Dilir Khan and Mir Murtaza, leading the Van, but they produced no impression on the thick walls of the fort. Dilir Khan, with a few men of Mir Jumla, carried their stockades by way of a safe lane, close to the fort walls under heavy fire "from morn to eve and dusk to dawn", and repulsed, with difficulty, a night sally on those barriers.

The prolonged siege of the fort obliged Mir Jumla to revise his strategy. He now planned to encircle it and attack it simultaneously from two sides. Farhad Khan reconnoitred its rear and selected its southern side, where the jungles were sparse, as the place of assault. Taking the son of an Assamese Chief, who offered to lead the Mughals to the place, "where the height of the wall, the width and depth of the holes, full of bamboo stakes were the least," Dilir Khan, together with the

3. FL. 28; SMAB. 93-94; PAB. 121, and BKK. 670-72 (differences in personnel); B. VIII. 89-90. AB. 19 (king's father-in-law dismissed and Tamuli Dalai appointed naval commander).

artillery, and 1,500 Nawab's horsemen, set out on the midnight of 25th February, to deliver the final assault on the unwary Ahoms at dawn. Leaving a detachment under Mir Murtaza and Miana Khan to fire at the centre of the wall and break open the gate,—so as to divert the attention of the defenders from the real place of assault,—Dilir himself advanced, but was betrayed by the guide and led to a spot, where "water, morass, pits and assembly of the wretches (Ahoms) were greater than elsewhere." Undaunted by the sharp hail of arrows and heavy artillery fire, during which the false guide was fatally hit, Dilir Khan, whose elephant received 25 arrow-shots, most gallantly forced his way, and after a stubborn contest, scaled the wall. Mahmud Beg Bakhshi went to pursue the Ahoms who fled into the jungle along a path towards the southern *nala*, slew some and captured a few others. Mir Jumla entered the fort the next day (26th February), and expressed wonder at the strength of its fortifications.⁴

The storming of Simlagarh so unnerved the defenders of Samdhara that they evacuated that almost impregnable fort without even waiting to be attacked.⁵

3. *Mughal naval victory above Kaliabar.*

Resting with his army for three days, Mir Jumla left Kaliabar⁶ on 2nd March. The bank of the river being hilly, the army followed a more level route, 6 miles away. The Ahoms, having felt the irresistible power of the combined land and naval forces of the Mughals, planned to destroy the land

4. FL. 28-36; AB. 20; PAB. 122 (Ahom losses 4,000).

Patakalang (26° 29'N, 92° 55'E, *Ind. Atlas*, Sh. 124) besieged by the Mughals for "six days and nights" (BKK. 673; SMAB. 94) is to be identified with Simlagarh. B. VIII (89-90) evidently speaks of this siege as "the second battle", lasting for five days. *Vide Nongong Dt. Gaz.* 32n for remains of Simlagarh.

5. SMAB. 94; Glanius, 180-1; Bernier, 172; MU. III. 548-9.

6. Kaliabar (26° 32'N, 92° 59'E) is south of Bishnath, on the opposite side of the Brahmaputra, *Ind. Atlas*, Sh. 124.

army by cutting off its supplies. So, taking advantage of the isolation of the Mughal fleet, and of the accidental absence of its admiral, Ibn Husain, they schemed to crush it. An armada of 700 or 800 ships (under the Bargohain) suddenly swooped down on 100 imperial boats, anchoring near Kukurakata, after the evening prayer on 3rd March. The Ahoms also surprised the Dutch ships of the fleet, and their crew, then at table, had "a dish of meat carried away by a cannon bullet." The Portuguese vessels were saved from the imminent danger of being "swallowed up", only by the force of the current, which carried the Ahom fleet far down the stream. The imperial crew under Munawwar Khan heroically held their own in that unequal contest till the arrival of reinforcements at two *prahars* of the night, which enabled him to send immediate succour to the distressed Dutchmen. Even at day-break, "the whole fleet, of which the Dutch and the Portuguese led the Van, were in good order", and advanced against the Ahoms, as fast as the wind permitted. But owing to contrary currents, the Dutch had to be towed by "Moors," who got down to the shore.

In the meantime, Mir Jumla, on hearing of the night-long cannonade, had deputed Muhammad Mumin Beg Ekkataz Khan to relieve the hard-pressed fleet, especially the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese ships, wrongly reported by a Moorish informer to have been lost. "Owing to the absence of habitations, want of firm ground, abundance of jungles and heaps of mud," Muhammad Mumin could not arrive near the fleet during the night. He did so early next morning, along with 10 or 12 horsemen and ordered the trumpets to be blown.

This decided the fate of this stubborn contest. The Mughals were now encouraged to press on, while the disheartened Ahoms took to their heels, some on boats, others on land. The Mughals captured, besides powder and lead, 300 or 400 ships, each containing "big guns". As the smallest ship carried 70 men, at least 21,000 men were made prisoners of war. Many were slain by the pursuing columns, who had instructions not to give any quarter; and the 50 Ahoms who escaped were condemned by the Raja to suffer most severe punishment.

The Ahom admiral, taken prisoner in spite of his disguise, was released at the intercession of some of the chief officers of Mir Jumla. The remaining 300 Ahom vessels anchored about a mile distant from the camp of Mir Jumla, who next day sank most of them with artillery fire. The rest fled to the other bank and some were captured. Effectiveness of the Assamese navy was completely destroyed.⁷

In the naval battle above Kaliabar, the Ahoms had overwhelming superiority in numbers. Being upstream, they also had the current in their favour. At one stage the imperial crew were frightened and all seemed to have been lost. But the heavy Ahom *bacharis*, manned by 60 or 70 men, were less mobile than the light *Kusas* of the imperial fleet. This factor, as well as the close co-operation between the Mughal and European admirals, and their courageous and desperate fighting enabled the imperial fleet to hold its own during the crisis. The timely deputation of Muhammad Mumin Beg by Mir Jumla turned the scales in favour of the Mughals. According to the unnamed Dutch sailor, the Ahom admiral neglected to carry out the Raja's order to lay in ambush and attack the imperial *nawwara* above the strategic point of Gauhati and thus cut off the Mughal transport of provisions. An old wounded Ahom told Talish that "the Mughal fleet could never have withstood one collision with the Ahom fleet" and Talish himself admits

7. Naval battle in Glanius, 154-161; FI; 37-39; AN. 711-15; SMAB. 94 (Kaliabar); BKK. 673, 675 (Ahom policy: Bargohain); AB. 20; *Storia*. II. 98-99.

Talish says that the imperial boats were taken unawares by the Ahom armada. But, according to the unnamed Dutch Sailor, the naval battle was preceded by a tempest 2 or 3 days before, and a ship of Mir Jumla capsized, and 4 Dutchmen and 24 Muslim sailors died. Mir Jumla, furious at the loss of his vessel, ordered the Dutch reporters to join any ship, as a naval encounter was expected (Glanius, 150-153). After 2 days the Admiral, together with the fleet, started in search of the Ahoms, and heard the roar of guns, inferring that the land army was engaged. This suggests that the Mughals had planned to attack the Ahoms both on land and water (*ibid.*, 153-4). This is corroborated by BKK. 675. Both the land and naval forces of the Ahoms retired discomfited to Canla (*ibid.*, 676).

that Mughal advance would have been "difficult or rather impossible," but for the close co-operation between the Mughal fleet and the army.⁸

4. *Mir Jumla arrives at Lakhau.*

The fall of Simlagarh, the evacuation of Samdhara, and the crippling of the fleet of the Ahoms destroyed their morale. Awaiting the advent of the rains to flood the land, they withdrew to the hills. Never daring to face the Mughals in an open engagement, they took recourse to guerilla tactics,—organising surprise raids and night attacks, hindering enemy supplies and killing any stray person searching forage or firewood. As is done according to the modern 'scorched earth' policy, they destroyed stores of powder and paddy and boats to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Mughals. Thus the northern Ahom army destroyed the store of gunpowder at Samdhara before evacuating it. Retreating eastwards to Solagarh they laid the country waste and compelled the people north of Tilan river, to forsake their villages, and thereby deprive pursuing Mughal bands of provisions. The Ahoms at Janmung burnt the dwellings in the fort.⁹

Undeterred by these harassing tactics of the Ahoms, Mir Jumla steadily but inexorably advanced, along the southern bank of the Brahmaputra, into the heart of Assam. When he occupied the rock fortress of Solagarh, which the Ahoms had evacuated so as to "draw the Mughals farther into the country" he received the peace offer of the Phukans. But he rejected them as his previous overtures had been left unanswered and as he thought that the object of the present feeler was to gain time and to weaken the invaders' vigilance.¹⁰

8. Glanius, *op. cit.*; FI. 39; JASB. 1872, p. 81.

9. FI. 39; *Storia*, II. 99. BKK. 674-5; AB. 20 (Mughals at Dijo).

10. FI. 39-41; Glanius, 161. Solagarh in Nowgong dt. at the mouth of the Bharali above Kaliabar.

Ahom contingents were stationed at Barduar, Sairing, and all Baruas and inhabitants of deserted villages at Taimung. BKK, 682.

The Raja ordered his commanders (e.g. Bargohain Bhitaraal Phukan, Dihingia Phukan of Duariya family) on both banks to concentrate all the scattered forces at Lakhau. But an Ahom envoy was captured by Mir Jumla's men, and, guided by Ahom deserters, the General entered Lakhau at the old junction of the Dihing and the Brahmaputra, on 8th March. The Raja now made another peace offer through his Brahman *guru* and the Tambuli Phukan, and agreed to pay *peshkash*. But Mir Jumla rejected it, replying that he would soon be in Garhgaon, where alone he would act according to circumstances."

Betrayed by his father-in-law and deserted by many of his men, the helpless Jayadhwaj now resolved on flight. Leaving Burha Gohain and the Dangarias at Garhgaon, and transporting his property as far as possible,—because one thousand boats which he required for the purpose could not be procured,—the king fled to Charaideo, and then to Taraisat, and, decided, in consultation with his ministers and followers, that it was impossible "to get victory over the vast hosts of Musalmans." After the rejection of his peace offers, the Raja retreated further inland to Tipam, and endeavoured to collect 1,00,000 archers¹² in expectation of a future contingency.

5. Capture of Garhgaon.

Joined by many Ahom deserters, Mir Jumla left Lakhau on 12th March. The fleet stayed behind, as it could not go up the shallow Dihing. Necessary articles were, however, transported in small boats available in the army. Proceeding with his

11. FI. 41-42; AN. 716-17; BKK. 683; Vol. II. p. i; PAB. 23. SMAB. 95.

In the 17th century the Dihing, now joining the Brahmaputra north of Sibsagar, did so further west at Lakhau. (JBORS. IV, 484); for changes in the course of the Brahmaputra, Gait, 132. Lakhau or Lakhagarh is 27 m. due east of Bishnath, on the n. bank of the Brahmaputra near the western point of the Majuli island.

12. BKK. 679-83; SMAB. 94-95; AB. 20; Gait, 132; PAB. 123. Charaideo (94° 55'E. 26° 55'N) is east of Garhgaon. Tipam (95° 29'E, 27° 16'N) is near the old fort of Jeypoor. *Ind. Atlas*. 129.

land forces along the direct road to Garhgaon, *via* Dewalgaon (13th-14th March), Gajpur. (15th March) and Trimohani (16th March), and fording *nalas*, too numerous to be mentioned in detail, Mir Jumla finally crossed the Dikhu *nala*, entered Garhgaon on 17th March, and encamped in the eastern wing of the Raja's palace.¹³

The Raja of the Nagas now sent envoys to the Mughal General agreeing to help him with men against the Ahoms. The General declined the offer but assured him of Mughal protection in case he did not assist the Ahoms.¹⁴

Unable to escape to the Naga hills, the Ahom King had to seek shelter in the penal settlement of Namrup, notorious for its pestilential climate. In that eastern extremity of his kingdom, at 14 days' arduous journey from his capital, the 'Bhaganiya Raja' or the Deserting king, surrounded by a small retinue of 4,980 followers and nobles, patiently awaited the advent of the rains. The Bar Gohain took refuge in Tiru, and the Phukans and a large concourse on the big *char* island of Majuli.¹⁵

13. FI. 43-46 (Mir Jumla's speech before an assembly on 16th night); SMAB. 95-96; Glanius, 161; *Storia*, II. 98-100 and n; MA. 40; AN. 719, 728; Gait, 133; PAB. 123-124 (Peace offers rejected at Dewalgaon and Gajpur).

Dewalgaon (= Debergaon. 94° 3'E, 26° 43'N), 14 m. due n. of Golaghat and nearly the same distance west of Jorhat (*Ind. Atlas*. 130 N.W.); Gajpur (94° 19'E, 26° 46'N), 1 m. east of Jorhat (*Ind. Atlas*), Trimohani (16 miles west of Garhgaon) was situated at the confluence of the Dikhu and the Dibing. Garhgaon (26° 56'N, 94° 45'E), 8 m. s.e. of Sibsagar town (*Ind. Atlas*, 129 S.E.) and on the right bank of the Dikhu. For the palace, ASR. XXII. 64-65. XXVIII. 42, XVIII. 7.

14. Glanius, 165; FI. 70, The man-eaters or the Antropophages of the unnamed Dutch sailor are to be identified with the Nagas, who used to kill men and collect skulls (JASB. 1872 Pt. 1, p. 19); BPP. 1925, 21 n.

15. FI. 70; SMAB. 95; B. VIII. 90; AB. 20-1; JIH. V. 369; *Storia*, II. 100. Dispositions of Ahom forces in BKK. 683-94; Tiru (94° 57'E, 26° 55'N), east of Garhgaon, *Ind. Atlas*. 129. It was on the way leading to the Naga hills.

Muhammad Amin, son of the historiographer Muhammad
Mumin, rightly boasts

(Verse)

Khan-i-Khanan, commander-in-chief,
From whose intention the War came to its end,
When he conquered two kingdoms we saw (it),
Time spoke (its) secrets slowly.
Few events happen in one year
(Like) the conquest of Kuch Bihar and Assam.¹⁶

16. FI. 46 (Verse); MU. III. 549; MA. 40. Mir Jumla claimed to have explored the way to China which he expected to conquer next year. The Emperor rewarded his victorious general by bestowing on him a special *Khilat*, a *mahal* yielding one crore *dams* and a *tuman-i-tugh*, AN. 740-1.

(c) MIR JUMLA'S ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY
ARRANGEMENTS IN KAMRUP AND ASSAM

1. *Establishment of military rule.*

To maintain communications with Bengal, to retain hold over the conquered country, to counteract Ahom raids, and to conciliate the local ryots, Mir Jumla established military outposts as he advanced. Each of these was placed under an officer and a garrison. He appointed Muhammad Beg and Sayyid Nasiruddin Khan faujdars of Gauhati and Kaliabar respectively, and Ataullah, Hasan Beg Zanganah, Sayyid Mirza, Ali Reza Beg, Anwar Beg, Mir Nurullah and Muhammad Muqim *thanadars* of Jogigupha, Kajli, Samdhara, Dewalgaon, Gajpur, Trimohani and Ramdang respectively. Under the command of admiral Ibn Husain in charge of the fleet of 323 ships and assisted by Jamal Khan, Ali Beg and other officers, Munawwar Khan and other *Zamindars* of Bengal, Lakchau became a naval and military base against the Ahoms concentrated at Majuli island. Steps were taken to guard the royal palace at Garhgaon against trespass by ordinary people.¹ At Garhgaon Mir Jumla opened a mint and struck coins in the name of the Emperor.²

Mir Jumla had to be very strict and careful about getting correct information. A Moorish messenger, who gave incorrect information during the Kaliabar naval battle, had his tongue cut off and was struck with a whip, "every lash of which cut as deep as a razor".³

The capture of the Ahom capital did not mean the end of Ahom resistance. Despite the establishment of *thanas*, the line of Mughal communications could not be fully safeguarded against surprise attacks of roving bands of Ahoms. Some

1. FI. 21, 24, 36, 42-43, 44, 45, 46; SMAB- 95-96; PAB- 124.

Ramdang is a village between Trimohani and Garhgaon.

2. FI. 73.

3. Glanius, 158.

time after Mir Jumla's arrival at Garhgaon, six Mughal boats laden with gold and silver and provisions were captured on the way to Garhgaon and their crew mostly slain by the Ahoms. In fact, the Raja's officers and guerillas continued to harass the Mughals on all sides,—stationing pickets to cut off transport of food and supplies, burning everything and blockading Garhgaon,—till the advent of the rains.⁴

That year the rains started earlier than usual. Mir Jumla had originally planned to spend the rainy season at Lakhan in order to avoid the risk of scarcity or want of provisions. But lack of transport facilities would have made the timely removal of the captured goods to that place an extremely difficult task, and time was required to break the wild elephants for proper marching. So he encamped with the main army at Mathurapur,⁵ 7 miles S. E. of Garhgaon (31st March). Situated on an elevated and pleasant site, it was suitable for encampment during rains and it also abounded with fruit trees and paddy fields. Due precautions were taken to prevent sudden raids of the Ahoms, scouts being sent everyday to watch their movements.

Garhgaon, with its artillery, elephants, stores and property of the army, was guarded by Mir Murtaza, Raja Amar Singh and 50 horsemen and a few musketeers. The requisite pieces of artillery were kept there and the rest were sent to Dacca. Mir Sayyid Muhammad, *diwan-i-tan*, was deputed to conciliate the local ryots. Muhammad Abid, escheat officer, had to examine the register of the Raja's articles and arrange for payment of the soldiery and send the balance to Dacca. Muhammad Khalil was appointed *amin* and Muhammad Ashraf overseer of property.

Both Garhgaon and Mathurapur were protected by establishment of outposts on different sides. Thus Mir Jumla occupied about 100 villages in all, including Sairing, Silghat,

4. B. VIII. 91; *Storia*, II, 100; Gleanus, 161-2.

5. Mathurapur, near the ancient capital of Charaideo, at the foot of the Tiru mountains.

Taukak, Charra, Raokham, Sinatoli, largely with the assistance of Ahom deserters. Salpani, on the skirts of the southern hills, was placed under Miana Khan, to repulse the activities of the Bar Gohain; Deopani, between Garhgaon and Salpani, was held by Ghazi Khan; the bank of the Dihing, n.e. of Garhgaon, was guarded by the sturdy Dariabadis under Jalal Khan, while Adam Khan at Abhoypur, guarded the Namrup side. These Mughal outposts held their own against the repeated attacks of the Ahoms.⁶

2. *Mir Jumla's spoils of war in Assam.*

Mir Jumla considered it to be his bounden duty to guard the spoils of war as imperial property and spared no pains in discharging it. Whenever, as at Simlagarh and Kaliabar, war materials like cannon, *zamburak*, muskets, gunpowder, besides elephants, etc., left behind by the Assamese were captured, they had to be collected together and listed by a special officer. While at Dewalgaon Mir Jumla learnt from letters of some Muhammadan inhabitants of Garhgaon that the fugitive Raja, unable to carry with him all his treasure, had left behind his elephants, heavy luggage and "undefined loads" of goods there. Immediately the General despatched from Gajpur a flying column under Farhad Khan and Mir Sayyid Muhammad, the *diwan-i-tan*, to capture them. The energetic and conscientious General himself salvaged many *Zamburaks*, muskets and *Ramchangis*, thrown into tanks (e.g. the Padum pukhri tank) at the capital by the fugitive Raja and the Phukans. During Mir Jumla's stay at Mathurapur, the task of recovery of war materials was assiduously continued by Mir Murtaza.⁷

6. Programme, FI: 71-75 (author at Garhgaon); Gleanings, 162-3 (Mathurapur); BKK, 694-5 (occupation of villages); SMAB, 95-96 (Sinatoli). Silghat (26° 36'N, 93° E), s.w. of Tezpur, *Ind. Atlas*, Sh. 124; Taukak (27° N, 95° 8'E), 26 m. due east of Sibsagar; Abhoypur (27° 10'N, 94° 58'E), 16 m. north of Mathurapur and 18 miles n.e. of Garhgaon, *Ind. Atlas*, Sh. 129.

7. FI, 44-45, 34-36, 47; SMAB, 96; Gleanings, 181 (Mir Jumla himself acquiring Raja's treasure).

The spoils of war taken in Assam were stupendous: 82 elephants, the most valuable part of the spoils, about 3 lakhs of rupees in cash, and all articles left behind by the Raja. The number of guns captured from the start of the expedition till the General's return was 675, of which one was a large iron gun, discharging 3 md. balls; 1343 camel-swivels, 1,200 *ramchangis*, 6,570 matchlocks, 340 mds. of gunpowder, 1,960 chests of powder, each weighing about 2 or 2½ mds; 7,828 (iron) shields; of saltpetre, iron, sulphur and lead "there was no measure"; about 173 stores of paddy, each containing from 10 to 1,000 maunds, constituting "the food of the King and the Phukans for several years," which they had unwisely neglected to burn, and without which Mir Jumla's army would have been deprived of food during the impending state of siege.⁸

The defeat of the Abom armada above Kaliabar did not mean the destruction of all the ships of the Raja. Besides those participating in the naval battle there, many lay in the Raja's *nausals* or dockyards. Mir Jumla inspected two of them, one beyond Lakhau and the other at Trimohani. In the former he found about 100 (*bachari*) ships under the *chhapars* or thatches, measuring 70, 80, 100 and 120 cubits long, extremely strong and decorated. Though the Assamese had burnt 120 sea-going decorated (*bachari*) ships in the dockyards of Garhgaon, unequalled in size by any other ships in Assam, Mir Jumla secured sea-going warships, numbering more than 1,000, manned by 80 or 70 or 60 sailors.⁹

8. FI. 49-50; AN. 40 (208 battering guns, 100 elephants), Ball's Tavernier, II. 277; Bernier, 172.

Ramchang is "some sort of light field-piece", acc. to Irvine, *Army*. 137. Hodiwala (675) regards the word as a variant of *Ramjani* (a pleasure girl) and thinks that the name was given to the weapon on account of its dances (i.e. recoil) when fired off.

9. FI. 43-45, 50; SMAB. 96: B. VIII. 90-1. Description of boats in Assam. "They build warboats, like the *Kosaks* of Bengal and call them *bacharia*. There is no other difference between the two than this that the prow and stern of the *Kosak* have two (projecting horns), while the

Mir Jumla ordered that the Assamese experts in the art of manufacture of matchlocks and gunpowder should be sent to Dacca.¹⁰ He tried in vain to secure even one of the adept elephant drivers of Assam, reputed for their skill in capturing elephants.¹¹

As in the Karnatak, so in Assam, Mir Jumla amassed huge treasure by sacking temples. After the conquest of Kajli, he brought under his control the famous idol temples of Kamakhya Devi, Luna Chamari and Ismail Jogi. The temple of Dewalgaon was pillaged.¹²

During his stay in Upper Assam, Mir Jumla learnt from some Ahoms of the treasure deposited in *maidams* or graves of the Ahom princes and nobles. The exact spots being pointed out to him, he had them opened up and secured property worth Rs. 90,000, including a gold betel casket of a queen buried 80 years ago, and removed even the bones of the buried ones. The Ahom king bewailed: "Misery me, I have not been able to protect even the bones of my ancestors". Referring to the immense quantity of treasures, the unknown Dutch sailor observed: "As for riches, we wanted them not, having found good store in Graves". When Manucci passed through Dacca, he "saw huge boats which Mir Jumla was sending loaded with the booty" taken at Garhgaon and other places.¹³

head and base of the *bachari* consist of only one levelled plank; and as, aiming (solely) at strength, they build these boats with the pith of timber (Qalb-dar) they are slower than Kosahs". (FI. 63-64; JBORS. I. 191-2).

10. FI. 34, 64; JBORS. I. 192.

11. FI. 56; JBORS. I. 186; JASB, 1872. p. 78.

12. FI. 24; MU. III. 548; Ball, II. 278-9, 283; Glanius. 169-70 (golden cow of Deolgaon temple); SMAB. 95.

13. Details of exhumation: Graves of 14 Gohains and those of rajas in Baisakh—Asar, 1584, Saka, SMAB. 96, xxiii; but only 10 vaults, according to FI. 65-6 (JBORS. I. 193; JASB, 1872. p. 82); JIH. V. 369-70; *Storia*, II. 100; Glanius, 175-6 (escheated); for plunder in Hajo, Ball, II. 280, Glanius, 147-8.

3. *Mir Jumla's treatment of the people in Assam.*

All political offenders in Assam were of necessity sternly punished. At Simlagarh Mir Jumla issued strict orders to the soldiers to put all recalcitrant Assamese to death and to imprison even the supplicating ones and bring them to him for necessary action. According to the unnamed Dutch sailor, he offered the Dutch Rs. 50 for "every Head" they "brought him" and Rs. 100 for each prisoner captured alive. The Ahoms captured by Mughal scouts, were cruelly scourged and then beheaded. The object of inflicting such horrible torture on the Ahoms was to force them to join the Mughals.¹⁴

On the other hand those who helped the Mughals or remained neutral were treated very kindly.¹⁵ Again, towards the general populace, not guilty of any political offences, Mir Jumla adopted a policy of moderation and showed solicitude for their welfare. By this means he endeavoured to win the affections of the Ahom peasantry, so that they might not join the guerillas in their surprise raids on the Mughal outposts and might bring supplies to the imperial army. A strict disciplinarian, he sternly forbade plunder of property and rape of women on the part of the soldiery to the utter disappointment of Mughal Don Juans and marauders. This order continued in force till the return of the Mughal army from Assam, and "not a single amir, trooper, soldier or campfollower", could dare cast his lustful eyes on any one's property or women in Assam. And "if, by chance, anyone, high or low," perpetrated such an act or even was suspected of it, he was paraded through the city and severely punished.

Once Farhad Khan "wounded and oppressed" some villagers who had participated in his beleaguering on their return after a temporary disappearance. He had instructed

14. Fl. 34-35; Glanvius, 143 (remuneration), 147 (Raja of Hajo imprisoned), 159-60 (Ahom admiral captured but released at the intercession of some high nobles); for treatment of war prisoners, Glanvius, 163-4, E and D. VII (for Khafi Khan's account).

15 Glanvius, 165.

Muhammad Muqim Beg "to turn upon those villages, undertake the slaughter of the men, the plunder of the property and the reproaching of the women and the children". But Mir Jumla denounced all this and gave orders for releasing the oppressed, and many besiegers, who waited on the Nawab before the rainy season, were assured of safety. Ryots, who had been compelled by the Ahoms to desert their villages, began to return in increasing numbers to the Mughal outposts like Lakhau, and Dewalgaon and, being guaranteed protection, reoccupied their dwellings. Mir Jumla released the Mussalman inhabitants of Kamrup, found in the besieged fort of Simlagarh.

. On reaching Garhgaon he issued a general order of rehabilitation to the effect that the inhabitants of Kamrup should return to their own homes and engage in building and agricultural activities and exempted them from payment of revenue and cesses for one year. By another general order he released all Mughal subjects, Hindu or Muhammadan, kept as prisoners or slaves by the Raja of Assam or distributed among the Ahoms and who had lost all hopes of freedom. They were now allowed to sail down on the Assamese *Kusas* to their homes, together with articles seized in the dwellings of the Ahoms.¹⁶

Mir Jumla's hopes of early submission of the Ahom populace were not easily fulfilled. Shihabuddin Talish regrets that in spite of the Raja's cruelty and Mir Jumla's kindness, the Assamese "did not at all become submissive to the people of Islam".¹⁷ Probably Mir Jumla's sacking of temples and desecration of Dewalgaon temple and digging up of graves caused such a strong revulsion of feeling that it could not be effaced by his measures for the welfare of peasants. But gradually, as a result of Mir Jumla's strong measures against

16. FI. 35-36 (plunder and rape forbidden); 86-87 (Farhad censured); 146, 44-45 (villagers return), 34 and 49 (men of Kamrup), 48-49 (release of Mughal subjects).

BKK. 695, however, states that "the Mussalmans overran our territory and plundered household articles and domesticated animals."

17. FI. 34-36. Any Assamese joining the Mughal and then returning to the Raja was executed by the latter with his family. *Ibid.*

political offenders and of his solicitude for the people and of the failure of Ahom raids on Mughal *thanas* the average villagers came to realise that resistance to him was of no avail. In course of time the villagers in the *Dakhinkol* submitted to the Mughals ; and even the inhabitants of the *Uttarkol* also thought of yielding to the invaders, when the situation was completely transformed¹⁸ by the onset of the "calamitous rainy season" earlier than usual.

Section C

MIR JUMLA'S SAD FLIGHT IN ASSAM

1. *Beginning of Mir Jumla's real troubles.*

The difficulties that Mir Jumla had experienced so long during his victorious advance into Assam pale into insignificance when compared to what he had now to face. The rainy season was to an invader in Assam what winter is in the plains of Russia. "Streams took to the ways of oceans, and *nalas* looked like rivers." The Mughal horse, the terror of the Ahoms, was paralysed in the flooded or muddy ground. They were now emboldened to indulge freely in their harassing tactics. Still avoiding a pitched battle, they concealed themselves here and there, and, mustering from different sides, made night attacks on every *thana* and incited the villagers who had already submitted to the Mughals (as at Dewalgaon). They closed all roads, cut off news and intercepted the transport of provisions by water from Lakhau to Garhgaon. By using "blood-drinking" arrows the Ahoms made movements of the Mughals, even between Mathurapur and Garhgaon, impossible without the protection of a troop of archers. A night attack on Dewalgaon failing due to the vigilance of its *thanadar*, the Ahoms under the Bhitaurial Phukan recovered Gajpur by killing its negligent *thanadar*, Anwar Beg (10th May). By raising entrenchments on the north side of the river Dihing, from the proximity of Trimohani and Gajpur to the environs of Lakhau, the Ahoms prevented the arrival of provisions to the Mughal army. The discomfiture of a Mughal naval escort to Tiok and beyond so emboldened the Ahoms that the transport of Mughal *beopari* (merchant) ships was suspended, involving the stoppage of arrival of provisions. As the floods on the Dihing and the torrents from the hill of Salpani froze the movements of the Dariabadis and the cavalry and infantry of Miana Khan, the Ahoms crossed the river and, descending from the hill, began to surround and even invest Garhgaon, heroically defended by Murtaza without any hope of reinforcements. An Ahom host, 10-12,000 strong under the nephew of Bar Gobain, hopelessly

outnumbered Ghazi Khan, *thanadar* of Deopani, but retreated after the fall of its leader. Since then, the ryots, who professing obedience were living in the environs of Garhgaon, Mathurapur and Abhoypur, began to desert their villages.¹

There were now 'constant skirmishes and murders' between the Ahoms and the Mughals, too numerous to be mentioned. The Raja, burning with rage at the exhumation of the graves of his ancestors, ordered slaughter of all Mughals. The killing of a few did not, however, greatly reduce the strength of the imperial army.²

The isolation of the Mughal outposts proved to be the greatest handicap for Mir Jumla. The entire army was virtually in a state of siege from May to October, 1662. Yet that General's control over his men was so effective that during those fateful months the army was always vigilant and ready to repel the enemy even at the cost of their lives. Talish writes : "It rarely happened that day and night the soldiers drew their legs in the skirt of repose except in the narrow place of the saddle. . . . Persons fastidious of even a particle of dust, became stained with mud from head to foot, men of delicate constitution were plunged in water and burnt by the sun. . . . The saddles were never bare of the riders; the horses' backs were never stripped of the saddles ; masters had no expectation of service from their servants : servants ceased to attend their masters ; but each and all, at the least alarm, leaped up from his post and wielded his sword with both hands."³

2. *Failure of Mir Jumla's efforts to restore communications with the fleet.*

No other Mughal General but Mir Jumla could have saved his army from such dangers threatening it with annihilation.

1. FI. 75 (rains), 75-78 (Ahom activities), 89-91 (arrows, closing of roads), 75-6 (Deolgaon), 79-80 (Deopani and ryots); BKK. 700-1 (Gajpur) 702-3 (Deopani). See also MA. 43; MU. III, 552; Glanias, 171.

2. BKK. 695; SMAB. 97; AB. 20-1; PAB. 125.

3. FI. 93-94; *Aurangzib*, III. 164, 168-9.

It was due to his coolness, prudence, promptitude and organising skill. He promptly despatched succour wherever and whenever it was needed. Rightly did he plan first to reopen his life line, communications with his fleet. Yadgar Khan Uzbek reinforced Ali Reza, the hard-pressed *thanadar* of Dewalgaon and was successful in stamping out rebellion in the neighbourhood. But Sarandaz Khan Uzbek, the new *thanadar* of Gajpur, failed to restore communications with Lakhau, as he could not proceed beyond Tiok owing to flooded *nilas*. So Mir Jumla deputed Muhammad Murad with some ships to help Sarandaz Khan in crossing the streams and be helped by the latter from land. The plan miscarried owing to the negligence of some officers and dissensions between the two captains. The escorting flotilla was captured by the Ahoms without any engagement; Muhammad Murad fled on land towards Trimohani (23rd May) and only a few ships, manned by Dilir Khan's Afghan contingent, hastily rowed away in safety to Dewalgaon. However, Abul Hasan, sent by Mir Jumla, destroyed the entrenchments thrown up by the Ahoms to attack Deopani and slew them. For guarding Garhgaon Mir Jumla deputed a contingent including 50 horsemen of Sayyid Salar Khan.⁴

Mir Jumla now ordered Farhad Khan to fetch provisions from Lakhau, to destroy the Ahom entrenchments on both sides of the way, to restore the *thana* of Gajpur and reinforce those of Trimohani and Ramdang. Farhad was to be assisted by Abul Hasan with a sepoy contingent of Mir Jumla himself. But this stupendous task was bound to fail for paucity of boats. Leaving Garhgaon on the night of 27th May, he crossed the Dikhu, but had to come to a standstill at Tiok (between Trimohani and Gajpur) on account of floods. The field seemed to be larger than the Dihing itself, and nowhere was any road visible. Rains fell from the sky and water heaved up from below; the tents of the flooded encampment looked like

4. FI. 75-76 (Deolgaon); for Gajpur and Tiok, *ibid.*, 77, 78 and BKK, 700-1; for Deopani and Garhgaon, FI. 81.

bubbles on water; the cavaliers sat the whole night on their chargers and the foot-soldiers had to remain standing. In despair Farhad tried to return, along with Sarandaz, to Trimohani, but found the path blocked by the "deep ditches and broad brooks," which the Ahoms had joined to the Diting, and by their trenches on its banks. The Bhitaraal Phukan's boats encircled the Mughals and subjected them to heavy fire. Without ships, without provisions, the beleaguered captain found himself in a hopeless condition for one week, during which he had to eat up his oxen and horses. Muhammad Mumin Beg Ekkataz Khani, coming from the General, was held up at Trimohani by floods, and failed to relieve Farhad. For the same reason, Dilir Khan's plan to send a rescuing party on elephants had to be given up as being impracticable. At last on Farhad's signal, the Rajputs under Sujan Singh feigned to withdraw and tempted the Ahoms away from their boats, so that Farhad captured about 41 ships, mostly *Kusas*. Embarking on them at dawn, Farhad surprised and routed the negligent Ahoms, and reached Trimohani in safety (about 6th June).⁵

3. Garhgaon isolated.

Emboldened by the failure of Farhad Khan's mission, the audacious Ahoms now completely closed all the roads. None could come out of his *thana*; no help could be sent to it from outside. So Mir Jumla withdrew all *thanas*. Adam Khan returned with difficulty from Abhoypur to Mathurapur; other *thanadars* retired to Garhgaon; the Dikhu was to be guarded on the east by Sarandaz Khan and Miana Khan, and on the west by Jalal Khan Dariabadi, Ghazi Khan and Muhammad Muqim, acting under the command of Mir Murtaza. The Ahoms recovered the entire country east of Lakhau except Garhgaon and Mathurapur. They had so closely invested these places that movement without protection was impossible. Mir Jumla had not the slightest ray of hope of getting help and reinforcement. No grain or other necessities of life could find their way from outside into the Mughal camp. The Mughal

5. FI. 81-86; BKK. 701-3 (Bhitaraal Phukan, Tiok and Cina).

soldiers in Assam lost all hopes of ever returning to their homes. So complete was the interception of news that their relations in Hindusthan, hearing nothing of them, performed their funeral rites. Talish does not exaggerate the misery of the imperial army when he states : "In no history has it been read that in any age from the advent of Adam to this time, a force of 10 or 12 thousand cavalry and many infantry and numberless camp followers remained for six months powerless and enclosed like the centre of a circle by brooks and streams, —so that nobody could place his foot outside the circumference of the camp like the (point of) a pair of compasses."⁶

The Ahoms now redoubled the vigour of their activities. The Raja sallied out of Namrup and stayed at Solaguri, only four days' march from Garhgaon. He appointed Baduli Phukan his Neog Phukan, i. e., Prime minister and Commander-in-chief, ordering him to annihilate the Mughal army and to capture Mir Jumla. All Ahoms were ordered to help and implicitly obey the Baduli Phukan. In 2 or 3 days, the Phukan had a wide, lofty and strong wall, 6 miles long, and furnished with turrets, built on the bank of the Dilli, east of Mathurapur, joining the southern hills with the Dihing. His night attacks on Mathurapur, however, ceased after a severe defeat at the hands of Dilir Khan. The Mughals at Silghat retreated before a joint assault by the Baduli Phukan and the Bar Gohain to Boorhat (S. of Namrup), where the assault of the Baduli Phukan failed. The Raja of Sairing planned to attack Garhgaon but was overpowered by Sujan Singh. Minor clashes were too many to be counted.⁷

6. FI. 86-91; Talish's version (p. 89), also quoted in Aurangzib, III, 164n; Glanius, 170-171; acc. to the Ahom Buranjis the withdrawal of *thanas* was done in stages. SMAB. 96-7.

7. FI. 91-92, 93 (Sairing); MA. 40; Glanius, 170-171; BKK. 703 (attempt to capture Mir Jumla), 703-704, 707 (Silghat and Boorhat), 707-8 (Dilir's successful charge on Tamulidalai's fort at Damaraji, 704-5 (Mughal retreat from Sairing to Boorhat, Ahoms encircled Taokak).

(contd.)

4. Fight for occupation of Garhgaon.

The Baduli Phukan next turned towards blockading Garhgaon. As this was the place where all imperial property, provisions, animals, artillery and a few boats were stored, Mir Jumla provided for strengthening its defences, though he was not present on the spot. He despatched a column under Farhad Khan (14th June) to reinforce Mir Murtaza, desperately guarding the capital. A flotilla of 16 *jalbas* and 18 *kusas* was fitted out, the enemy trenches in the garden west of the city were destroyed, a bamboo fort extending to the bank of the Dikhu was set up in the N. W. corner of the city, and suitable guards were posted on different sides. The Muslim musketeers of Assam, recruited from the village of Chachni and stationed by Mir Murtaza on the north, refused to desert their places, when approached by the Ahoms.

The Ahoms launched successive night assaults on the capital. On 8th July, they routed the Baksariya patrols of the northern bamboo stockade and captured half of the fort, causing much confusion and tumult. Farhad was wounded with two poisoned arrows. But due to the exertion of one and all inside the fort, the attack was repulsed. Wiser by experience, Mir Murtaza next day raised a mud wall in place of the bamboo stockade and fortified the place, and made the area in front into a level plain. Within a week he had the whole fort enclosed by "a wide and lofty wall with turrets." Mir Jumla duly appreciated the value of this wall as an effective defence saving Garhgaon. The Ahoms continued their night attacks, but Farhad, wounded though he was, remained sleeplessly vigilant. To guard the head of the bridge over the Dandga nala from the Ahom snipers, Mir Jumla used

Sairing, about 7 or 8 *kos* from Dewalgaon. (FI. 139). The Dilli (modern Diroi) lay north of the Dandga (n.e. of Garhgaon) and issued from the (eastern) hills, passed by Matharapur and fell into the Dihing. (FI. 112, 92). The Diroi is now an affluent of the Disang. Silghat is probably Seelakhotee, n.e. of Garhgaon (JASB. 1861 map, p. 366), and Silakuti of Sibsagar Dt. Gaz. map.

to depute 200 troopers every night instead of stationing a party, lest it would be busier in securing its own comforts than in defence. They also used to participate in the defence of the capital and return to Mathurapur at dawn.

Farhad fully justified the confidence which Mir Jumla had reposed in him. During the grand and simultaneous assault by four Ahom corps on the four sides of the capital in the night of 12th July, it was Farhad's strategy which saved an indiscreet Dariabadi contingent of Sayyid Salar from impending annihilation. Though wounded, Farhad stood on horseback at the centre and sent reinforcements to the different sides. Again, it was Farhad's party including the author Shihabuddin Talish, that dislodged and dispersed the Ahoms from the N. W. corner of the fort.

Deeply concerned at the fate of the defenders of Gargaon, Mir Jumla used to keep his "ears fixed on the (distant) noise" day and night. His watchers, perched on high wooden towers, used to observe if fire ever broke out in Garhgaon. As he remarked to Shihabuddin Talish: "After performing the religious duty (prayer) of the morning and the prostration of thanks-giving, for 4 *gharis* I slept on the carpet of prayer (lay in the posture of prayer). That was all the repose I took in the night and day."

The Ahoms organised three more assaults on 15th, 17th and 18th July but they could never penetrate into the enclosure. Mir Jumla now deputed Rashid Khan to relieve the ailing Farhad. In repeated and vigorous sorties, the new commandant destroyed the Ahom trenches in the neighbourhood of Garhgaon especially those on the Kakujan (23rd July). The demoralised Ahoms evacuated their entrenchments on the bank of the Dilli and ceased crossing the Dandga as well. At long last peace and repose returned to the residents of Garhgaon⁸.

The indefatigable Phukan soon became conscious of the futility of his ceaseless efforts. His night attacks, stoppage of

8. FL 96, 118.

The Kakujan R., north of Solaguri, falls into the Buri Dihing Ind Atlas, 129.

supplies and blockade of the Mughal camp,—all failed to shake the resolution of the Mughal General. The Phukan, either at the command of his king or at his own initiative, had made overtures of peace (June-July) through the mediation of Dilir Khan. Mir Jumla had offered some hard conditions of peace, so that the Ahoms might not consider his attitude as one of weakness. The Raja should present 500 elephants (which had cut their first tusks) and 30 lakh *tolas* of gold and silver, send his daughter to the imperial *harem*, offer 50 elephants with first tusks as annual tribute, and retain only Namrup and the neighbouring hills. The territories already conquered were to be annexed to the Mughal empire. The Phukan also informed Mir Jumla's agent, Khwajah Bhor Mal, in confidence that he was willing to join the Mughals in case the Raja refused the offer. When, however, Mir Jumla left Mathurapur for Garhgaon (17th August) on account of pestilence, the Ahoms refused to agree to Mir Jumla's terms.⁹

5. *Pestilence and famine in the Mughal camps at Mathurapur and Garhgaon.*

In August a terrible pestilence broke out in Mathurapur, which affected the Mughals and the Ahoms alike. In the Mughal camp hundreds died of ague and flux; Dilir Khan's army dwindled to one-third. Among the Ahoms as many as 2,30,000 died. The dead could not be given proper burial. Corpses were carried down in thousands by the Brahmaputra and its water became so infected that the Mughal crew at Lakhau could not use it without boiling.

9. FI. 95-96. The name of Mir Jumla's agent is given as Puran Mal in AN. 798.

The BKK. (699) asserts that in the month of Ahar (June-July) Mir Jumla proposed that if the Bargohain joined him, he would "go away leaving the country in his charge." But the Bargohain refused. Then Mir Jumla sent a force (including elephants and horses, to storm the hill fortress of the Bargohain (? on the Sessa river), but it perished.

Mir Jumla could not withdraw immediately from the pestilence-stricken camp, lest he would have to leave behind provisions and paddy for lack of transport. But food shortage was inevitable. Out of 173 paddy heaps, only 16 could be saved from flood and plunder by the enemy. Mir Jumla reserved 6 of these for the beasts and 10 for the soldiers. All had to take red and coarse rice. At first the men used beef boiled in water or stewed in fat of oxen plundered; later on they had to consume the flesh of horses, camels or elephants. A worse condition followed and men began to suffer agonies for want of their respective delicacies,—wheat, *dal*, *ghee*, sweetmeat, opium, tobacco and salt. *Ghee* sold at Rs. 14/- a seer, vetch (*mash*) at Rs. 1/- a seer, opium at 1 gold mohur a *tola*, a pipe of tobacco at Rs. 3/-, *Mungdal* and salt both at Rs. 10/- a seer. Mahmud Beg Mir Bakhshi made a gift of a few sacks of tobacco to the needy instead of selling it, and reduced his own daily dose of opium to increase the quantity for distribution.¹⁰

In short, life became intolerable at Mathurapur. So Mir Jumla left it on the afternoon of the 17th August and, offering his evening prayers at a palace of the Raja, set out in the midst of violent rains, and reached Garhgaon next dawn. Some artillery carts of Mir Jumla, stuck up in the mud, were safely guarded by Dilir Khan at night and brought there on 18th evening. Three-fourths of the stored paddy could not be taken along despite the General's order. Many sick soldiers also were left behind.¹¹

The Ahoms now renewed their night attacks on Garhgaon but to no purpose. Mir Jumla sent timely help to his captains. During the assault of the moonlit night of 15th September, Mir Jumla's despatch of a corps of his own attendants under

10. FI. 128-32; Glanius, 170-171 (water boiled); *Storia*, II. 100-101. "The Raja had carried away all kinds of provisions and reduced by this means the Emir into a strange extremity." Glanius, 181; SMAB. 97; The Raja burnt *nausal* and paddy stores (*Ibid.*, 96). The OPL. MS. of FI. (125) gives the price of salt as Rs. 30 a seer.

11. FI. 133-5. Probably some iron guns were left behind. JASB (1872), 91 n.

Abul Hasan enabled Raja Sujan Singh in the eastern trenches to repel the Ahoms, while Dhir Khan in the west drove them to the Dandga nala. This Mughal victory so unnerved the Ahoms that they gave up their plan of night attacks.¹²

The refugees from Mathurapur soon infected the garrison at Garhgaon and the pestilence and famine became most acute. Several complex diseases of a fatal type broke out. "The diseases of voiding excrement and dropsy supervened an ague and purging,..... death became the doctor of many.... a patient..... All kinds of food stuffs disappeared, except coarse red rice..... and the ripe and raw lemons on trees ... The grandes fell a prey to hectic fever for eating coarse rice. Poor men did not spare even the leaves on the trees, the grass on the ground or the herbs on the river side. Mir Jumla showed his humaneness by refusing to use his choicest delicacies which he had in plenty, and by sharing the food and woes of his dependants. Remarkable social service was rendered by Muhammad Mumin Tabrez, the historiographer, who did not spare himself in nursing the sick and helping the distressed, till he himself died."¹³

6. *The Mughal navy in Assam.*

During all these months of crisis, the imperial *nawwara* defended itself and protected the army as well. Cut off from Mir Jumla early in the rainy season, Admiral Ibn Husain kept up the spirits of his crew at Lakhar by well-reasoned speeches, and adopted various measures on his own initiative. An equipped flotilla sent under Ali Beg to reinforce Gajpur was overwhelmed on water and from land and had to retire down to Bansbari (between Dewalgaon and Gajpur). Here it united with the ships of Munawwar Khan, also sent by Ibn Husain, and after recovering two Mughal ships from Tamulidalai,

12. FI 135-7; Glanvius, 181-2. According to the unnamed Dutch sailor Mir Jumla's plan of encircling the attacking Ahoms with horsemen was very effective (Glanvius, 71-2). For his plan of collective punishment of abetting villagers, Gait, 134.

13. FI. 137-38.

returned to Lakhau. The admiral had also planned to reopen communications with Mir Jumla by sailing to Garhgaon along an unfamiliar route and joining with Ali Beg's flotilla at Gajpur. But he was wisely dissuaded from undertaking this difficult task by Yadgar Khan, *thanadar* of Dewalgaon, as it would have been highly impolitic to leave Lakhau, which stood at the junction of several rivers and contained the entire baggage and provisions of the army.

Indeed Lakhau was the source of strength and inspiration of the beleaguered army and Mir Jumla was anxious to contact the fleet. Through two Ahom couriers, whom he had won over, the General sent a message to the Admiral, advising the latter not to be anxious at the army's condition, but to be careful about supplies, to concentrate all forces at Lakhau by summoning the contingents from Kaliabar, Samdhara and Dewalgaon.

Ibn Husain assured the General (7th July) of the safety of his fleet and sufficiency of his strength, but objected to the withdrawal of the *thanas* of Samdhara and Kaliabar, as that would have cut off the fleet from Bengal. However, he withdrew the *thana* of Dewalgaon as being useless and it was occupied by the Bhitaraul Phukan advancing from the Majuli island. Ibn Husain set up a bamboo fort, threw up trenches and fortified them to guard against night attacks, and maintained communications with Gauhati on river. For a time Lakhau was blockaded from the west, south and north. But the Admiral brought plenty of paddy from the north bank of the Brahmaputra, and slaughtered many Ahoms of Solagarh (between Lakhau and Kaliabar) in repeated sorties. At this the overawed local peasants made over their own chiefs in chains to the admiral, professed submission (5th August), and were appointed to guard the line of communications westward. Thus the way from Lakhau *via* Kaliabar to Gauhati became perfectly safe. Sayyid Husain succeeded his deceased father-in-law Sayyid Nasiruddin as *thanadar* of Kaliabar (12th August), while Kishan Singh succeeded Sayyid Mirza deceased as *thanadar* of Samdhara. In short, Ibn Husain utilised every moment in the work of keeping hold over the country for the

slightest weakness on the part of the fleet would have so terribly disheartened the men of the army as to lead them "to cut the thread of the hope of their life" and to render their liberation impossible.¹⁴

The Ahoms, baffled in their effort to crush the army at Garhgaon, turned to the destruction of the Mughal fleet. But a midnight raid by the Bhitaraul Phukan on the garrison at Lakhau miscarried, as also other Ahom raids on its environs. By way of reprisal Ibn Husain and his men ruthlessly plundered and slew the Ahom inhabitants. The overawed and distracted natives handed over two of their commanders, Chinglung Luthuri Dayangia Rajkhoa and Bura Gohain, to the Mughal admiral. They also helped the Mughals in repeatedly defeating the Ahoms entrenched between Lakhau and Garhgaon. The Bhitaraul Phukan had to withdraw from Dewalgaon to Rangali Chapari in the Majuli island. Ibn Husain now re-established the *thana* of Dewalgaon and sent the happy news to Mir Jumla through two Ahoms (5th September). Tamulidalai also fled, after being defeated at Bansbari, leaving the way to Gajpur clear.¹⁵

14. FI. 118-126; BKK. 702-3, 706 (Gajpur and Tamulidalai); BKK. II. 3 (Dewalgaon).

15. FI. 126-8; BKK. 707, 709 (midnight raid); II. 3-4 (Dewalgaon and Gajpur); PAB. 126.

Section D

MIR JUMLA'S RESUMPTION OF OFFENSIVE

1. *Mir Jumla breaks the isolation of Garhgaon.*

At long last, by the middle of Safar (20th September, 1662), the crisis which had so long hung over Mir Jumla's army was over. The end of the rains came in sight, the floods receded, the roads reappeared, and news began to move. Since the re-establishment of the *thana* of Dewalgaon, Mir Jumla began his efforts to link up Garhgaon with Lakhau. Mir Murtaza built a wooden bridge over the Dikhu near Garhgaon. On 25th September Abul Hassan proceeded to Sairing and Dewalgaon along a circuitous high embankment from the bank of the Dikhu. Dispersing the enemy on his way with the help of Ahom guides, he set up *thanas* at Sairing (under Ghazi Khan) and Gajpur (under Sayyid Ahmad Jamaatdar). On reaching Dewalgaon he reopened communications with the fleet. Mir Jumla's letters to the Emperor and to Dacca, containing news of the condition of the army, as well as his *parwanās* to the Queen-dowager of Darrang, to the Mughal *faujdar* of Gauhati and to the *thana* of Kaliabar, were delivered to the Admiral for despatch to the proper quarters. Soon afterwards Mir Jumla received the Emperor's *farman*, appointing Ihtisham Khan governor of Assam and Rashid Khan *faujdar* of Kamrup, but each declined to accept the offer. Provisions were sent by the Admiral on boats under escort to Dewalgaon and thenceforth to Garhgaon on dry land-route through porters, *beoparis* (merchants) and pack animals, as the river route there was still unsafe. These reached Garhgaon on 24th October, while another consignment of provisions carried entirely on boats by Abul Hassan arrived there on 31st. "Plenty replaced want and the long-suffering imperial army began to experience unbounded joy."¹

1. FI. 138-42; 143-4 (imperial *farman*); BKK. II. 2 (Sairing and Gajpur). Mir Jumla to Van den Brouke (2 letters), *Storia*, IV. 430.

2. *Mir Jumla's march to Tipam.*

As the land dried up, the Mughal cavalry again became irresistible. The Ahom king retired, as before, to the hills of Namrup. The Baduli Phukan now began to play a double game. On the one hand, he, along with Garhgaoni Phukan, strengthened the entrenchments on the bank of the Dilli, and on the other he approached Mir Murtaza to induce Mir Jumla to make peace. But Mir Jumla demanded unconditional surrender of the Ahoms and refused to consider the proposal so long as the latter did not wait on him. The General now planned to attack the Baduli Phukan's trenches, 20 miles north-east of Garhgaon, simultaneously from two sides. Abul Hassan sailed (10th November) up the Dilli to catch them up in the rear, while Mir Jumla himself left Garhgaon (16th November) and forded the Dandga and the Dilli. The Baduli Phukan evacuated his "strong and spacious fort."²

On 20th November, Mir Jumla reached the Dihing, only to see that the Ahoms under the Burha Gohain had deserted their stronghold on the other bank and retired to Barkata. The Burha Gohain, guarding the area between Taokak on the south, the Dihing on the north and Solaguri on the west, was scared away by the fear of Mir Jumla's name.³

But the terrible hardships and strain of the campaign in the foul climate of Assam had told on Mir Jumla's health and the first onset of the disease of which he was to die came. While recognising the enemy entrenchment, he fell down from his horse and, reclining on the ground, so long as the bed was not

2. FI. 142-146; BKK. II. 4-5 (Mughal advance, Ahom peace offers, retreat of Ahoms); BKK. 707-8 (Baduli defeated at Boorhat; Mughal siege of Damarai; Ahom retreat to Jhanji, east of Jorhat and Tiok); 709 (Baduli III; battle at Charadeo and attack on Mughals at Saffry n.e. of Maitrapur).

3. FI. 146; The Ahom Baranji state that the Burha Gohain fled only after a pitched battle with the Mughals; BKK. 713; II. 5; SMAB. 97; B. VIII. 912; AB. 21; PAB, 125.

Solaguri, a former capital, 18 miles s.e. of Dibrugarh, and 33 miles n.e. of Garhgaon, and on the southern bank of the Dihing, *Ind. Atlas* Sh. 1209.

made, he became senseless, Dillir Khan taking his head on his lap. On recovery of his senses, he was taken to a tent. Shihabuddin Talish came to attend on him ten days later.⁴

On 30th November, the Baduli Phukan, rightly suspected of treachery by the Raja, joined Mir Jumla at Silkhatol along with his three brothers, and offered to bring the Raja a prisoner. Mir Jumla rewarded him and crowned him Deka Raja (lit. the junior king). In effect the Phukan became the Mughal Governor of Eastern Assam in charge of the "the affairs of the villages and towns between Garhgaon and Namrup and the regulation of the land and water routes up to Trimohani."

Guided by the first renegade Phukan, Mir Jumla continued his march in spite of his illness. On 2nd December he deputed Darwesh Beg to extirpate the Ahoms and capture their elephants at Solaguri. On the 6th he himself started for Namrup and reached Solaguri the next day, and crossed the river of the same name on the 8th, being preceded by Darwesh Beg and Baduli Phukan as Van.⁵

On 10th December Mir Jumla took his meal, followed by a bath, for the first time after his illness. But he soon complained of pain in and swelling of the stomach. At night there came a burning fever and pain in the chest. Dr. Karima of Gilan alleviated his suffering, but the patient steadily refused to have his blood abstracted. Pleurisy appeared after two or three days.

Nevertheless, Mir Jumla resolved to advance to Namrup to capture the Raja with the help of the Baduli Phukan. But the dispirited Mughal army, even at the risk of losing their service and property, refused to enter Namrup, whose very

4. FI. 146.

5. FI. 147-8; SMAB. 97; PAB. 125. BKK. II. 6-8 (names of Ahom deserters); B. VIII. 92; Silkhatol is Seelakhotee, n.e. of Garhgaon; JASB. 1861, map. p. 366.

6. FI. 148-50; BKK. II. 8-9 (Ahom dispositions); 713-5. Was the encounter at Solaguri the "another" (and evidently the last) battle between the Ahom under Burha Gohain and Mir Jumla, described in B. VIII. 93?

air breathed death, where no provisions could come by land or water and where rains were expected to start towards the end of January. The apprehension of suffering untold miseries as in the past, and of being isolated and starved by the Ahoms, the fear that the army, already depleted by famine and pestilence, might be insufficient for extirpating the Raja and guarding the road from Namrup to Garhgaon, and the grave possibility that the Mughal cavalry, unable to move in the heights sheltering the Raja, would be encircled by his forces and could have "neither place to stay nor road to retreat,"—all weighed on the minds of the Mughal soldiers. Privates and officers alike plotted to desert their General during the crossing of the Dihing. They were, however, quieted by Dilir Khan, who asked Mahmud Beg Bakhshi to inform Mir Jumla of the situation.

The ailing General was perturbed at the wavering attitude of his army. His physical agony was aggravated, and when, on the 15th December, he set out on a palanquin, he looked "anxious and grave". At last on the 18th, he pitched his tents at the village of Tipam (opposite the pass of Namrup), the farthest point of his advance, and posted Miana Khan to guard the further side of the Dibing.⁷

3. *Conclusion of Peace.*

The defection of the Baduli Phukan and many other notables alarmed the Ahom king. Despairing of further resistance against a General who had no intention of abandoning his resolve, the king and his Phukans considered peace to be the only means of saving their country, and had begun to send envoys and gifts to Mir Jumla. But he had rejected the peace overtures as being insincere (c. 30th November). However, a fortnight later, at one stage before Tipam, the Ahom envoys induced Dilir Khan to persuade Mir Jumla to come to terms. Weighed down by disease, worried about his own shattered constitution, disconcerted by

7. FL. 150-3; SMAB. 97; MA. 43-44; Bernier, 172; PAB. 126.

disaffection in the army, calculating the possible evil effects of rejecting the peace offer, and desirous of releasing all Mussalman prisoners of war, Mir Jumla reluctantly agreed to conclude peace. Circumstances, he held, inexorably drifted to that culmination and a speedy conclusion of peace and prompt return he felt to be "proper and best" for all. But even in that distressed state Mir Jumla wanted to make it clear that he could still advance further and ordered that the preliminaries of peace would be made at Tipam. His envoy, Khwaja Bhor Mal, conferred with the Phukans, the authorised agents of the Raja. The terms of the treaty of peace were finally drawn up through the mediation of Dilir Khan (Treaty of Ghilajari Ghat, January, 1663).⁸

Mir Jumla may well claim to have secured "Peace with Honour". Firstly, the prestige of the empire was kept up, and that of the Ahom Raja humbled. Jayadhwaj agreed to "rule as a vassal" of the Emperor, to send an ambassador to the court of the Mughal pro-consul at Gauhati, and to remain obedient to his feudal lord.⁹ He also agreed to send at once his daughter and the sons of the Raja of Tipam to the imperial court. Secondly, a huge war indemnity was exacted from the king. He was required to pay immediately 20,000 *tolas* of gold, 1,20,000 *tolas* of silver, and make over 20 dressed elephants for the Emperor, 15 for Mir Jumla and 5 for Dilir Khan. Moreover, he agreed to pay next year 3,00,000 *tolas* of silver, and 90 elephants in three instalments. Thirdly, the sons of the Burha Gohain, the Bar Gohain, the Garhgaonia Phukan and the Bar Patra Phukan, the four pillars of the Ahom Kingdom, were to be sent as hostages, pending the payment of the indemnity in instalments. Fourthly, the Raja

8. FI. 148-9; 152-3; SMAB. xxiii; AB. 21-2. Glanius, 174-5 (Dilir's persuasions). Mir Jumla sent some provisions to the Raja, so as to alarm him by showing that he had enough for his army and to spare. The Raja understood the "General's design" but though unwilling to surrender himself, he expressed his willingness to agree to reasonable terms. (Glanius 172-3).

9. B. II (b), 1-5; SMAB, 100.

also, agreed to pay in future an annual tribute of 20 elephants. Fifthly, there was considerable expansion of the eastern limits of the Mughal Empire. The Raja had to cede to the Mughals for the first time more than half of the province of Darrang in the Uttarkol, abounding in elephants, and the kingdom of Nakti Rani, adjoining the Garo hills, Beltala and Dimarua in the Dakhinkol. The boundaries of the Mughal empire in the east were extended to the Bharali and the Kallang rivers in the northern and southern banks of the Brahmaputra, respectively. Lastly, the Ahom king agreed to release the captives carried off from the Mughal dominion in Kamrup and also the imprisoned family of the Baduli Phukan.¹⁰

Mir Jumla sent to Aurangzeb Jayadhwaj's letter of submission. The Emperor ratified the treaty and duly rewarded Mir Jumla.¹¹

There were, however, little chances of full implementing of the terms of peace. Even during Mir Jumla's stay in Assam disputes arose regarding hostages, payment of indemnity including elephants, delimitation of frontiers, and repatriation of Ahoms accompanying Mir Jumla. On 5th January, 1663, the Raja sent the princess, the hostages, gold, silver, and 10 elephants to the Mughal camp, and promised to send the

10. FI. 153-56, (articles drafted by Mir Jumla's *munshi*). The Ahom Buranjia (B. II (b), 1-5 and SMAB. 100) and AN. 808, speak of the daughter of the Tipam Raja, while Talish speaks of his sons. Rahamat Banu, an Ahom princess, was married to Prince Md Azam, MA. 73.

For Nakti Rani, JBORS. I. 182 n; Desh Beltola, south of Pandu and Gauhati, Robinson's map of Kamrup.

For Ahom versions of the peace, see B. II (b), 1-5 (Jayadhwaj's proclamation and account of tributes paid to the Padshah); SMAB. 98-102; B. VIII. 93-4 (many valuable ornaments to be paid by the Raja. Mir Jumla's presents to the Raja worth Rs. 15,000); BKK. II. 9. Baduli Phukan at first advised Mir Jumla not to make peace, but only after having a talk with Ahom envoys. The name of the Ahom king's daughter is given as Nangchen Gabhru in AB. 22; RAB. 127-8.

11. SMAB. 99-100; Mir Jumla's letter to Aurangzeb, in *Sadhona*, II. 117.

balance of 30 elephants before the army's arrival at Lakhau. The Mir was keen on having the hostages as stipulated. The Ahoms had sent the nephew (brother's son) of the Burha Gohain instead of his son. On Mir Jumla's insistence, the letter came but as he was suffering from small pox, Mir Jumla demanded another son of the Burha Gohain (by the Raja's sister). But as he had died a few days before this, Mir Jumla demanded one of the two sons of the Bar Phukan (born of a sister of the Raja). The Phukans refused to yield on this point as it was not stipulated in the treaty, in spite of the persuasion of Dilir Khan and Khwajah Bhor Mal. Mir Jumla thought that the exchange could have been made if Dilir Khan had been more diligent. Dilir Khan personally came to the General and "laboured to file away this baseless displeasure."¹²

¹² Payment of indemnity, SMAB. 100-101; B. II. 5-7; Boundary dispute, SMAB. 102; repatriation of Ahoms, *Ibid*; for hostages, FI. 156-8; for dispute after Mir Jumla's death, BKK. II. 12-14. 18; B. II. 10-11, 18; B. VIII. 97-98.

Section E

MIR JUMLA'S RETREAT FROM ASSAM AND DEATH

1. *Aggravation of the General's illness and his death.*

On 10th January Mir Jumla issued the order of return to Bengal to the intense delight of all. Riding a palanquin, the sick Nawab retreated directly from Tipam to Trimohani, without going to Garhgaon. He felt better on reaching Lakhau (22nd January). But he had a relapse at Kajli fort (2nd February) with occasional difficulty of breathing due to "the agony of pleurisy and swelling and suffocation under the left chest." In the beginning he was treated by the Dutch surgeon, Gelmar Vorburg, who prescribed for him distilled sulphur for a week at the rate of 3 or 4 *mashas* (1/12th of a *tola*) a day. Subsequently on the advice of an English physician, he took daily 4 *mashas* of the best treacle (or theriaca) and oil of fennel. Later still he himself ate Jewish bitumen for a week. The use of all these hot medicines, against the strong protests of Dr. Karima, led to an aggravation of all bad symptoms; difficulty of breathing and palpitation of the heart grew intense, while swelling spread from foot to right arm and stomach, and the patient felt very thirsty. At times there were fits of coughing and drops of blood came out with the phlegm. "The skill of the doctor vanished at the appearance of the ulcer of the lungs and tympany."

At Baritala (28th February), Mir Jumla's condition grew alarming. "An excessive burning fever" and a violent cough indicated the onset of consumption, and "a black burning blood" came out of the lungs with the phlegm, which ultimately changed into pus. He grew so weak that he could not stand, and began to faint. Physicians came, Hakim Zahir Ardistani from Hugli, Hakim Mirza Muhammad from the neighbourhood of Rajmahal, and Hakim Shafia from Dacca. They expressed, "openly and by hints" that the Nawab had lost all power of resistance, and that "endeavour for recovery and search for release", were "outside the 'Canons of Medicine',

unless the Absolute Doctor gives recovery.....and has preordained a second life." All appetite was gone. The doctors importuned him to drink the broth of crabs. This, too, he refused after some days. Hakim Zahir now prescribed goat's milk as the Nawab's "diet and medicine", saying that he might recover if he could digest it, but that death would be hastened if "looseness of the bowels" set in. Eventually the second alternative came to pass.

Mir Jumla conveyed his last wishes to Mahmud Beg, Mir Bakhshi: his slaves were to be liberated, his corpse was to be washed and shrouded, his bones were to be sent to holy Najf, and his many possessions in Persia were to be converted into pious endowments.¹

The doctors suggested a change from Baritala to Khizrpur. The Nawab resignedly agreed, saying, "I am now in your hands like a boy: do whatever appears best for my good." On 27th March, he was placed on a *charpai*, and taken to a boat, which glided down the Brahmaputra. Half an hour before sunset on Wednesday, 2nd Ramzan, 1073/31st March, 1663 (April 11, NS), the "*amir azam, sipahsalar muazzam*", the great noble, great Commander-in-Chief, died on board the boat, 4 miles above Khizrpur, "after having performed the two confessions of faith and whatever else was required by religion." His bodily remains, carried that very night to Khizrpur, were interred the next day by Dilir Khan and Ihtisham Khan temporarily in the vault which had been constructed at the Nawab's order after his starting for Assam. Subsequently they were taken at

1. FI. 159 (return), 160-2, 165 (Kajli), 168-70 (Baritala); BDR. (April 8, 1663) in *Storia*, IV, 430 (Dutch surgeon).

Though all the doctors were agreed that at the beginning the remedy had lain in bleeding, yet they differed on the diagnosis of the disease. Hakim Karima held that it was pleurisy; according to Hakim Zahir hectic fever developed into consumption; Mirza Muhammad diagnosed the case to be one of dropsy and ulcer of lungs. Ordinary people and the Assamese believed that the Nawab was enchanted by the shooting of a magical arrow by the Raja. (FI. 169-70).

the Emperor's orders, to the imperial court by Ihtisham Khan.² History is silent as to whether they were carried to Najf according to his testament. No tomb of Mir Jumla has yet been traced in India.

2. Administrative and Military problems during

Mir Jumla's retreat.

Mir Jumla's retreat was methodically planned and skilfully executed. Indeed with a less consummate General the retreat of the imperial army would have been a disaster. The Ahoms did not treacherously fall upon the Mughals. But the General took all precautions to guard against that contingency; Qasim Beg Baruti formed the rearguard of the army, and escorts were arranged wherever necessary. Subsequent modifications of such original arrangements were, however, inevitable. Stern orders were passed forbidding the Mughal soldiers to oppress the Ahom ryots or to plunder their goods and family during their return.³

2. FI. 170-171, 172 (last rites): *Cont.* 106b; ZNA. 106; AN. 812, Bernier, 173; *Storia*, II. 101; BDR. 1663. p. 424 (Sept. 3) in *Storia*, IV. 430. The exact place where Mir Jumla's death took place is not known. Talish only says that it was 4 miles distant from Khizrpur. Two Assamese sources mention Bagaribari (SMAB. 102) and Hols (B. VIII. 96) but they cannot be identified near Khizrpur. The chronogram of his death is given by Masnad *ar-Rasid* or 'occupant of paradise', A.H. 1073.

3. Contemporary European writers concur in stating that Mir Jumla admirably conducted the army to safety in spite of the grave dangers and difficulties like floods, want of provisions, pursuit by the Raja and slaughter by ambushes of the Ahoms (Bernier, 172; *Storia*, II. 101; Gianius, 181-2). But Talish does not say a single word about these dangers during the General's return, except once in the Kajli wilderness and that also about food shortage. He even plainly admits: "If the Assamese had intended treachery, the men of the *thanas* on the road,—none of whom was at a distance of less than one day's journey—would not have performed the said work (of keeping the roads open)." FI. 161-2, 160 (Qasim Beg and prohibition of plunder).

One of the pressing tasks before the General was the safe removal of imperial property from Garhgaon. Even before his departure he had urged Mir Murtaza to join Ibn Husain speedily and sent instructions to both about the transport of articles. But as the boats sent by the Admiral were insufficient for the purpose, Mir Murtaza had to procure more boats. So he could not meet the Nawab at Trimohani as arranged. Again, Muhammad Murad Beg could not come to escort Mir Murtaza as originally planned. Hence without waiting at Trimohani for Mir Murtaza, Mir Jumla ordered that the *thanadars* of Saining, Gajpur and Dewalgaon should escort Mir Murtaza to Lakhau.

There Mir Jumla waited for a few days (22nd-28th January). Mir Murtaza also came there with all men and property. But the Ahoms did not deliver the balance of 25 elephants of the current year's tribute. So Mir Jumla stationed Dilir Khan and the entire fleet at Lakhau for collecting the elephants within 10 days. In case of the Raja's failure to deliver them, Dilir would return to Mir Jumla and the war would be renewed next year or another year with full preparations.⁴

Mir Jumla could not wait longer at Lakhau. Various pressing problems still demanded his attention and the rainy season was near at hand,—the settlement of the affairs of the newly annexed districts of Darrang, Dimarua and others, the administration of Gauhati, the chastisement of the Raja of Kuch Bihar and its annexation. Arranging that the main army would go on land along the Dakhinkol to a place opposite Baritala and cross the Brahmaputra, the General left Lakhau with the hostages on a boat and reached Kaliabar (30th January), where he interviewed Sayyid Husain (son-in-law of Sayyid Nasiruddin Khan) and Shaikh Muhammad Sadiq. They were asked to accompany Dilir Khan in his return march, together with all elephants caught before or after. Dilir arrived at Pandu with 8 elephants (12th February), leaving some men at Lakhau to bring the remaining elephants.⁵

4. FL 158, 161-3.

5. FL 162 (problems), 163-4 (to Kaliabar), 167 (Dilir).

Another problem was that of the Ahom emigrants to Bengal, and it caused some friction between Mir Jumla and the Ahoms. To the Raja's remonstrance asking Mir Jumla to prohibit them following the army, the latter replied that he was not taking any one forcibly, but that he had not forbidden those who accompanied the Mughal army of their free choice. At Trimohani he witnessed many *Kuas* "full of Mussalmans and Assamese", coming from Garhgaon. Here some ryots of Kamrup, prisoners in Namrup and its environs, and the released members of the family of the Baduli Phukan, joined Mir Jumla. Many Assamese, male and female, voluntarily came along with Mir Murtaza from Garhgaon to Lakhau.⁶

An additional cause of dispute arose over the question of delimitation of frontiers. The Ahoms wanted to follow the terms of the treaty of 1638 and fix the river Asurar Ali in the south and the Barnadi in the north. But Mir Jumla insisted on the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty of 1663, i.e., the Kajli in the south and the Bharali in the north. On 30th January he started from Kaliabar in a palanquin, inspected the annexed portions of Dimarua, fixed the boundaries as above and crossed the wilderness of Kajli, which had not been traversed by any previous Mughal army.

Here with the help of the local people, he had the jungles cleared and a road constructed on which 5 or 6 horsemen could ride abreast. Covering 34 *kos* in 4 days, during which "no fodder could be procured except grass and no food except water", he crossed the Kallang by boat and halted at the foot of the Kajli Fort.⁷

6. FI. 160, 161, 162. PAB. 128. According to Talish, some Mussalmans and a few Assamese of the Namrup area willingly accompanied the Mughal army. We read in SMAB. 102, that Mir Jumla carried with him about 12,000 Ahoms, including the Ahom deserters. This renders the charge of the Assam chronicles that many Ahoms were taken by the Mughals forcibly (B. VIII. 94-95) very weak. The number of boats conveying the army and the Assamese emigrants probably exceeded 32,000 (FI. 64; JBORS. I. 192).

7. SMAB. 102 (boundary dispute); FI. 164 (to Kajli). There were "unlimited and countless herding grounds of strongly built elephants" at Kajli.

Mir Jumla had also to deal with the feudatory chiefs of Assam. At Kajli (2nd—11th February), Mir Jumla granted interviews to the mother of Makaradhwaj, Raja of Darrang, (who had died in Assam) and rewarded her (9th February) for guarding the road against the Ahoms and for her other services rendered to Muhammad Beg, *faujdar* of Gauhati, during the rainy season. The General also put the *tika* of kingship on the forehead of the 12 year old boy of the Raja. On the same day Mir Jumla granted an interview to the mother of the Raja of Dimarua, the most important of all Zamindars of Dakhinkol, but disbelieved her excuse that her son could not come on account of illness. All who had come to see Mir Jumla took leave of him at Pandu.⁸

Despite his serious illness at Pandu (11th February) Mir Jumla arranged for the administration of Kamrup. He strengthened its defences and appointed (12th February) Rashid Khan its *faujdar* and Muhammad Khalil Bakhshi and Wagi'anavis, and placed the hostages in charge of the former. A picket of 500 men and 40 warships were stationed with Rashid, while another small force and 10 ships with Muhammad Beg at Kajli. Mir Sayyid Muhammad diwan was ordered (11th February) (a) to distribute land in the *sarkar* of Kamrup to the ryots, who had been carried off by the Ahoms as prisoners and now released, and to the voluntary emigrants from Assam, and (b) to employ in the imperial service some able artisans, handicraftsmen and artillery-men, as stipend-holders. The diwan was specially ordered to give the Baduli Phukan a *pargana* yielding 3,000 mds. of paddy in one of the *sarkars* of Bengal.⁹

Mir Jumla reached Baritala, commanding the road to Kuch Bihar (28th February), and was joined after 5 or 6 days by the remainder of the Assam army, and also by Isfandiyan Khan, Askar Khan and Raja Bahroz, who had been waiting at the

8. FI. 164-7 (brother's son of the Raja of Dimarua was asked to send his uncle quickly), 140 (services).

9. FI. 167-8; *Storia*, II. 101 (Hajo); Bernier, 173; B. VIII. 95; SMAB. 102 (hostages); AB. 23; PAB. 129.

frontier of Ghoraghat and Kuch Bihar. Though his illness was on the increase, "his sense of honour forbade him to pass by the neighbourhood of that country and to go back to Jahangirnagar (Dacca) without conquest". He got a litter prepared for himself so that whenever he felt better, he would proceed on it to Kuch Bihar. However, as his condition grew alarmingly worse, he was forced to abandon the idea of invading Kuch Bihar himself and selected Dilir Khan for executing that task with the assistance of Askar Khan and Raja Bahroz. The General himself would stay at Baritala until the arrival of the Khan and the completion of the conquest of Kuch Bihar. Subsequently, when he was medically advised to go to Khizrpur, he changed his plan and commissioned Askar Khan to undertake that work.¹⁰

2. *Significance of Mir Jumla's Assam Campaign and causes of his success against the Ahoms.*

The last campaign of Mir Jumla was also the greatest one of his life. It was the first and the last expedition, waged on behalf of the Mughal Empire, which extended its eastern frontier far into Assam. It marked, indeed, the culmination of the north-eastern push attempted by the Muslim conquerors and rulers since the time of Ikhtiyaruddin Muhammad ibn Bakhtiyar. In reality the campaign was a remarkable military exploit. Mir Jumla succeeded where Muhammad bin Tughlek of Delhi and Alauddin Hussain Shah of Bengal had signally failed. Even in Jahangir's reign the Mughal invasion of Assam was initially successful but ultimately a failure. In reply to the Assamese peace offers after the capture of Solagadh, Mir Jumla is said to have answered that the Raja should not regard the expedition as the petty expeditions of former chiefs, whose victory was soon changed into defeat.¹¹ Shihabuddin Talish observes: "In the past no (foreign) king could lay the

10. FI. 168, 170-1.

11. FI. 40-1.

hand of conquest even on the fringe of this country, and no foreigner could tread it with the foot of invasion.¹²

Mir Jumla was able to recover Mughal Kamrup within the brief space of one month and even that mysterious and dreadful country of Assam¹³ fell prostrate before him within barely two months and a half. Indeed, Mir Jumla's advance from Kuch Bihar to the Ahom capital was a sort of a "triumphal march". The Ahom king had mustered his army at Samdhara, "the key to his dominions", thinking that it would be, as it had been in former expeditions, the farthest point of the advance of the imperial army.¹⁴ But Mir Jumla penetrated almost into the eastern end of the country which had, in the past, proved to be the grave of ambition of many a king and conqueror. He even hoped to explore a route to China and Pegu, and it is possible that the reinforcements referred to by the Dutch surgeon¹⁵ were intended for imperialist expansion in those lands. It is true that the imperial army was isolated for six months, during which it had to undergo endless troubles and privations. But that was due to floods, famine and pestilence, none of which Mir Jumla could have averted. This is to be certainly admitted that his army had never to own defeat at the hands of the Ahoms. It is significant that their over-awed ruler was compelled to write a letter to the Emperor of Delhi, acknowledging submission to his authority, a humiliation unprecedented on the part of any previous Ahom king.¹⁶ Mir Jumla's name was long remembered in Assam, as is clear from the couplet associated with it in the Assamese Buranjis.¹⁷

Inspired by the memory of their previous successes, the Ahoms entertained hopes of victory over the invaders. Mir Jumla at first did not expect to get correct information of the

12. *Ibid.*, 57, 59, 52.

13. cf. FI. 3.

14. FI. 28.

15. *Storia*, II. 98; *Storia*, IV. 430.

16. FI. 41-2.

17. "Short and robust Majum Khan, with rounded beard in his face, First will vanquish Cooch Behar, to Gauhati then he'll pace", (SMAB. 92). Cf. *Storia*. II. 101; vide *Aurangzeb*, III. 180-1 n.

country from the local *zamindars*. Yet the resistance of the Ahoms was everywhere feeble: they either declined an engagement or were routed with heavy slaughter: the only pitched battles they fought were at Pancharatan and Simlagarh. True, the Ahoms were put to great disadvantage by the pestilence which broke out among the defenders of Jogigupha and by the delay in the arrival of reinforcements of the garrison at Srighat. But if the defenders had held their own firmly till the approach of the rainy season, the Mughals, as Talish himself admits, would not have been able to capture a single fort.¹⁸

The Ahoms were reputed for their courage and military tactics; they were ever vigilant; like the hearts of their heroes, their forts were "granite-based", and they had men, money and materials necessary for successful prosecution of war. Even Mir Jumla was struck with wonder at the strength of some of their forts especially Simlagarh and at the efficacy of Ahom artillery and gun-powder. But men, arms and ammunitions, provisions and materials did not prove to be of any avail without the guidance of a supreme leader, who alone could infuse a dynamic force into them. The delinquency of King Jayadhwaj of Assam, who fled ignominiously from his capital even before the arrival of the General, earned for him the notorious epithet 'Bhaganiya Raja' or Deserting King. Thus the remarks of Cunningham about the Sikhs during the First Sikh War, may be equally applicable to the Ahoms in 1661-'62: "Hearts to dare and hands to execute were numerous but there was no mind to guide and animate the whole."¹⁹

The evacuation of the well-fortified posts in Kamrup formed no part of a deliberate policy of strategic retreat, but was the direct outcome of defection among the Ahom commanders in charge of the garrisons from the Monas to Gauthati. Incensed

18. SMAB. xxii (hopes of victory); FI. 18-19 (information), 24 (fear among Ahoms).

19. Testimony of Mulla Darvish of Herat regarding the Ahoms as fighters, in FI. 52-3, 60, 65 (JBORS. I. 184, 189, 192-3; JIH. V. 371; Delinquency of the Ahom King, in JIH. V. 371-73; Cunningham, HS. 357.

at the appropriation of the rich spoils found in Mughal Kamrup by the Ahom captor of Gauhati, Tanchu Sandhikui, the Raja had appointed a non-Ahom, Manthir Bharali Barua, a Hindu Kayastha of the Bejdoloi family, commander of the Lower Assam army. So the other Ahom generals remained sullen and inactive and retreated from fort to fort, remarking: "Let the Bejdoloi now come and fight". The greatest malcontent Ahom noble was the king's father-in-law, Rajshahur Barphukan. Rebelling against the king, he secretly helped Mir Jumla in his advance specially in the Nowgong district.²⁰ Deserters began to stream into the Mughal ranks, after the fall of Simlagarh and evacuation of Samdhara and it was the Ahoms who guided the Mughal General on to Lakhau and Garhgaon,²¹ assisted him in the occupation of villages after the capture of the Ahom capital and in the exhumation of the graves. The unknown Dutch sailor in Mir Jumla's army did not greatly exaggerate the case, when, in testimony to the loss of morale of the Ahoms, he observes: "As soon as we were in the Enemy's country, a general consternation seized upon them, and the fame of Nabob's fortune, caused infinite numbers of the Enemy's subjects to come over to his side, as the surest".²²

Mir Jumla's tact, just and humane treatment of the Ahom peasantry and prohibition of plunder by the Mughals on the Ahoms, and his instructions to his *thanadars* to endeavour to reconcile the peaceful local people, served to overcome popular opposition. On many occasions it was the local inhabitants, who, terrified at collective slaughter of the contumacious villagers, willingly handed over several leaders to the Mughals. Absconding villagers, who had abandoned their habitations in pursuance of the Ahom policy of starving the invaders, willingly returned and the Mughals continued to get supplies from them. Thus the Assam war could not become a full-fledged people's war. Sometimes Mir Jumla received valuable information about the Ahom Raja's stores also from Muhammadan inhabitants in Assam, especially those of Garhgaon.

20. SMAB. 93-4, xxii (disaffection among Ahom nobles); AB. 19, 20.

21. For Ahom guides, BKK. 674-5.

22. Glanvill, 150 (loss of morale).

Mir Jumla was ably served by a band of resolute lieutenants, like Dilir Khan Daudzai,²³ who proved to be an "associate of victory" everywhere, the ever vigilant Farhad Khan, the resourceful Ibn Husain, the patient Mir Murtaza, the humane Mahmud Beg, the dashing Rashid Khan, the discreet Yadgar Khan Uzbeg, besides other faithful officers and captains. Again, no other General could have retained such an effective control over his men as Mir Jumla did. His generalship, strategy, discipline, and his sharing of the privations of the war, pestilence and famine with one and all, ensured the unity of command in the Mughal army and general goodwill among the soldiers. His coolness and prudence in times of crisis, his promptitude in the conducting of campaigns and in despatching reinforcements wherever and whenever necessary, his organising skill during the dark days of the rainy season, of 1662, all combined to save the vast imperial army from disaster. Mir Jumla was supremely methodical: there was method in his advance, method in his struggling through the rainy season and method in his retreat. His unshakable resolution foiled the ceaseless activities of the Baduli Phukan and impressed upon the latter the futility of further struggle against him.

Nay, what was more, the Baduli Phukan even deserted his master, joined Mir Jumla, and raising a local levy of 3 to 4 thousand men, guided the General to Solaguri and Tipam. His example was followed by Jagatram Deka, Raghunath Majumdar and his son Manohar, Uddab Duaria and Dangdhara, and others who stipulated to "deliver this country" to Mir Jumla in return of being made "Nawabs along with the Baduli". Mir Jumla tactfully replied: "You shall get what you have desired after I have received tangible proof of your co-operation and support". Even Manthir Bharali Barua himself joined the Mughal General, and promised to make over Jayadhwaj to him after disclosing some secrets. But his conspiracy being detected, he was executed under orders of the King.²⁴

23. MU. Eng. Tr. I. 498.

24. SMAB 97-98, lxix, xxiii; AB. 21, "Half the men left the king", acc. to BKK. II. 6-8 (list of deserters), PAB. 126.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Mir Jumla's success was won at a high cost, and it entailed, as has been already noted, enormous sufferings on the army. Referring to its pitiable condition during the rainy season of 1662, Talish significantly remarks that "imprisonment by water is harder than imprisonment in iron".²⁵ Moreover, the new acquisitions, the fruits of such sufferings, were lost to the Empire after the Mir's death. Though he cannot be blamed for that, his own *waqi'a navis* names his account "Fathiyya iibriyya" (Book of Victories which serve as warning).²⁶

25. *Fl.* 3.

26. *Ibid.*, 5.

CHAPTER VIII

CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENT

1. *Mir Jumla as a man.*

Though there is no detailed contemporary description of the figure and personality of the man, whose history has been traced in the preceeding pages, incidental references in certain contemporary sources enable us to form some idea of these. We read in a general report sent to Aurangzeb by Muhammad Mumin, the Mughal ambassador to Mir Jumla in 1653-54, that he possessed "a pleasing countenance" and "a medium stature". A decade later Assamese accounts described him as "short and robust Majum Khan with a rounded beard on his face". While fighting the battle near Belghata during the War of Succession, Mir Jumla put on a coat of mail and a cap made of Chinese steel and carried two swords, a shield, a quiver and a long bow (*Kaman Kiyan*). When on horseback he, with his wrinkled forehead and an angry mien, looked like Azargashp.¹

Though an adventurer, Mir Jumla was a polished man of high education, well-versed in the Quran and the *Hadith*, and with full command over the Persian language. His correspondence bears clear evidence of his erudition and scholarship. At Golkonda he belonged to the literary circle of its Peshwa, Nawab Allami Fahmi Shaikh Muhammad. Rightly does Shihabuddin Talish describe him "as a master of the sword and the pen". He was an excellent speaker too. Possessed of fine gifts of oratory and a superb mastery over mob psychology, he delivered a spirited speech before the vacillating imperial army at Dogachi after the desertion of the Prince.

1. Adab, 39 a; SMAB. 92, *Poem*, 332 (white beard). For references to portraits of Mir Jumla, see Bibliography, Sec. G.

He modulated his tone of expression to make his arguments effective according to the needs of the hour. He had some knowledge of medicine too, and we find him taking Jewish bitumen himself during his illness.²

Trained in the school of adversity, Mir Jumla developed certain sterling qualities of character which contributed immensely to his future success in life, viz., strong determination, self-reliance, ambition, enterprise, thrift, quickness of apprehension and ability to make the best use of any situation or station in life. A man of varied interests, ranging from shoes to diamonds, and from trade to war and government, and dealing with various peoples, the Hindu Tamils and Telugus, the Muhammadan Deccanis and Mughals, the Dutch, the English, the Portuguese and the Danes, he was polite and amiable in his dealings with others.³ Bowrey truly observes: "He was an absolute lover and a most Indulgent Prince to all Ingenuous men, very charitable and a real lover of the English nation, all in general (that ever knew him) were Enamoured with his perfections, and a great many admired him in a great measure, Esteeminge him as the glorious mirror of all Princely Graces"⁴. Tavernier bears witness to his hospitality and sociability. At Gandikota (3rd September 1652, NS), the Mir received Tavernier and his party well enquiring if they had been "comfortably housed" and supplied with food and fodder for their horses. He offered them betel, two bottles of wine,

2. Correspondence, Tabrezi, 74b, 77b, 78a-b, 79a; Pr. IHRC. (1942), 197; Power of his pen in MM, 9b; Literary circle, HS. 381; Pr. IHC. (1940), 266-7; FI. 2: GD; Speech, *Poem*, 190-4; See *ante*, Ch. V. Sec. C. § 6; Illness, Ch. VII. Sec. E.

3. Thevenot, 102 (ambition), Bowrey, 152n (thrift); *Adab*, 39a (politeness); the English factors sometimes spoke ill of Mir Jumla (cf. "a miserable covetous person, a friend to the Dutch....." EFI. X. 205). But they were, as Sir William Foster truly observes, "prejudiced witnesses" (*ibid.*, 4-5). Indeed Mir Jumla showed due civility and reasonable attitude towards the Bengal factors (*ibid.*, 286, 288). See also *ante*, Ch. 2 Sec. C.

4. Bowrey, 144-5.

one Spanish and the other of Shiraz, which was rare in India, and invited them to dinner and a hunting excursion.⁵

Mir Jumla was a man of deep religious convictions, as is clear from his intention to go to Mecca after the conquest of Gandikota and from his last wishes. The *Poem* describes him as *dinpanah* (protector of religion). We get an inkling of his experiments with spiritualism from his letters to Mirza Jalal, in which he describes himself as his "religious brother" and seeks his guidance. On his return from Mathurapur to Garhgaon in Assam, he halted at a royal palace to offer his prayers. He had a supreme conviction in the existence of God and belief in a future life. After the dreadful loss of lives in fording the river Mahananda south of Bholahat, Mir Jumla is said to have exclaimed: "What justification shall I offer to God and the Prophet? Without God's mercy I shall certainly go to hell". During the critical skirmish at Dogachi, he prayed to God to save "the honour of his white beard," and assured his soldiers that as "a descendant of the Prophet and Ali," he would never flee from the field.⁶ He was a fatalist too. During the above mentioned skirmish, he encouraged and exhorted his soldiers to fight, saying that men would live so long as they were fated to do, and that they could not die of war, unless it was so decreed. His letter of condolence to Nawab Mustafa Khan of Bijapur on the death of the latter's eldest son clearly illustrates his spirit of resignation to divine will. "Time," he wrote, "inflicts some wounds on man's mind. One comes before another is healed up..... Inscrutable are the ways of Providence. We have to be patient..... The decrees of Fate cannot be annulled even with the greatest human endeavour."⁷

There were, however, as is usual with most men, some weaknesses in Mir Jumla's character. He was not altogether free from vanity. On his way from Haidarabad to Delhi in

5. Ball's Tavernier, I, 286-7, 293.

6. Tabrezi, 67a-68a (Mecca), 78a-b (Mirza Jalal); FI, 134 (prayer); *Poem*, 271 (*dinpanah*), 480f (fording), 364-5 (Dogachi).

7. *Poem*, 364-5 (Dogachi), 205-6; Tabrezi, 74b (letter to Mustafa).

1656, Aurangzeb complained to Mir Jumla that Shah Jahan was the father of Dara, while he, on his side, could never find "a kindlier father" than the Mir and accepted him as his guardian or "protector". This language puffed up Mir Jumla, who became "very friendly" with the Prince and pledged his word "to support him with his entire strength and his life." Sometimes his egotism proved to be a cause of his discomfiture. Elated with his initial success in the campaign against Shuja in Bengal, he committed a grave mistake in despising the enemy and not taking due precaution regarding the latter's movements or against his strength, with the result that he met with a signal failure on 3rd May, 1659.⁸

2. *Mir Jumla as a statesman.*

Mir Jumla possessed in the fullest measure all those qualities which go to make a successful minister of state. His intelligence, foresight, penetrating discernment and administrative experience won for him the epithets of the Asaf of the Age (*Asaf ud dauran*), and the 'Plato of the Age' and he came to be compared to Khizr.⁹ A man of infinite capacity, indefatigable industry, and fine organising skill, and master of even the minutest details, he could exercise a careful supervision over different aspects of the administration and be thorough, prompt and efficient in the discharge of administrative duties.¹⁰ In *Maasir ul Umara*, he is justly described as "without a peer among the contemporary nobles" for his great administrative abilities and various other qualities. Tavernier, an eye-witness,

8. *Storia*, I, 236-7 (Mir Jumla won over by Aurangzeb), ch. V. Sec. C. § 3 (failure of May). The Ahom Buranjis also bear evidence to Mir Jumla's vanity (PB. IHQ. V. 475).

9. HS. 530, 535 (Asaf); *Poem*, 142-5 (Khizr); 125, 361 (Plato). John Campbell describes him as "the wisest man in Hindustan". (IA. 1906, p. 133).

10. For industry vide Ch. I, § 3 *ante* (construction of Hayat Mahal Palace) and Ch. V *ante* (exertion at Malda); for prompt discharge of administrative duties, Ch. II, Sec. B. *ante* (trial of criminals at Gandikota).

pays a tribute of admiration to Mir Jumla's consummate ability: "I have had occasion to speak to him several times, and I have admired the firmness and the promptitude with which he responded to requests presented to him, giving his orders in every direction, and signing several despatches as if he had but one sole matter to attend to."¹¹ His rebellion against Sultan Qutb Shah of Golkonda and his advice to Aurangzeb during the Bijapur campaign and on the eve of the commencement of the War of Succession illustrate his marvellous foresight, efficiency, cool calculation and discretion. Shrewd, tactful and possessed of "requisite prudence" and power of concealing secrets,¹² Mir Jumla was indeed a "fit servant" for Aurangzeb.¹³

European writers like Bernier and Tavernier have accused Mir Jumla of treachery.¹⁴ It is true that he deserted two out of his three masters in India. But the mere fact of change of loyalties does not prove that he was innately treacherous. His open desertion of Sultan Qutb Shah was not due to any sinister motive nourished in secret, but to the primary need of self-preservation against a wrathful and capricious master, bent on his destruction. Also, in his failure to respond to the imperial summons, legally tantamount to desertion of Emperor Shah-jahan, he was impelled by the same desire of self-preservation, besides adherence to his pledge to Aurangzeb. There is, however, no doubt, that his actions were sometimes characterised by opportunism, secretiveness and duplicity, but resort to

11. MU. III. 555; Ball, f. 170. Ch. II. Sec. B. § 2 contains further accounts of Mir Jumla by Tavernier.

12. *Storia*, I. 237; cf. Aurangzeb's observation: "I have not seen any efficient person like Mir Jumla. In wisdom he excels Kings; in bravery he resembles Gudarz and Piran". *Poem*, 279-80. Gudarz was one of the kings of Ashkanian dynasty. Piran was one of the generals of Afrasiyab. Dow rightly remarks, (III. 327) "He was calculated for the intrigues of the cabinet as well as for the stratagems of the field".

13. Bruce, II. 33; cf. Dow's observation (III. 182), that Aurangzeb "found him, upon trial, a fit instrument for his ambition".

14. Ball, I. 357-9, 360, 362; Bernier, 169-70, Thevenot, Ch. 8. 102; *Storia*, II, 102, 289.

diplomatic trickery at times of the gravest danger to one's own life, family or property should not be construed as sins of commission, specially when his opponents were unscrupulous and formidable.¹⁵ As a matter of fact, when circumstances were not opposed to him, Mir Jumla was sincere and honest and his promises could be implicitly relied on. Before his estrangement from Qutb Shah, he did serve that Sultan faithfully and the latter also described him as his "chosen and fortunate servant, giving satisfaction to whom would mean keeping the Sultan pleased."¹⁶ Though he loyally served the cause of Aurangzeb since his appointment to the imperial service, he never gave Shahjahan any reason to regret the confidence reposed in him. Further, his fidelity towards Aurangzeb may be tested by the touchstone of the latter's implicit confidence in his counsel and judgment, especially during the Bijapur campaign and the War of Succession. At Khajwa he was the confidential adviser and righthand man of Aurangzeb.¹⁷ Rightly does the Rozbihani follower of Mir Jumla describe him as *Rukn ul Khilafat* (pillar of the Empire) and the "best of all councillors". In a similar strain Talish calls him "the prop of supreme royalty". Indeed, Mir Jumla was honoured with so many titles that he was aptly described as "Independent of Titles" (*mustaghni alqab*).¹⁸

As an administrator, Mir Jumla was undoubtedly handicapped by some unfavourable circumstances beyond his control. Almost everywhere his government was necessarily of a military nature, concerned with increasing the financial resources and attempting to maintain law and order, but otherwise continuing the older system with little or no modification. In the Karnatak he was at first pre-occupied with pressing military

15. Ch. III. ante (for rebellion against Qutb Shah); Ch. IV. Sec. 4 (for defiance of imperial summons); *Adab*, 39 (duplicity).

16. Tabrezi, 35a-36a.

17. EFL. X. 4-5: AN (Khajwa): Ball, I. 170. cf. *Stories*, II, 101-102 (fidelity).

18. *Poem*, 134-8; cf. Aurangzeb's *farman* to Mir Jumla and Mir's reply, *ibid.*, 269-75, 276-79; FL. 2-3. The *Maasir ul Umara*, (III. 555) describes him as the maker of princes.

problems and considerations of self-defence, and subsequently to 1656 he was an absentee proprietor. From Bengal, too, he had to be absent for nearly half the term of his viceroyalty. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that everywhere his government was strict, thorough and methodical. In the conquered countries consolidation kept pace with conquest and Mir Jumla very wisely followed the policy of combining firmness with moderation. By adequately providing for the welfare of the ryots and strictly enforcing his orders against oppression and plunder on the part of the soldiery, Mir Jumla earned a great reputation as a man of integrity and imperial justice,¹⁹ and as a protector of subjects. In fact, the salutary influence of his character and personality contributed to the peculiar excellence of his government. After his departure from the Karnatak there were the "Hindu Revolt" and the friction of his officers with the English factors. His absence from Kuch Bihar was followed by the oppression on the part of the local officers which excited the people there to throw off the Mughal yoke. The removal of his eagle-eyed supervision from Bengal caused a general wave of laxity and disorder in that province. The infusion of a new spirit of discipline and efficiency into the administration was indeed the most remarkable achievement of Mir Jumla, who also deserves much credit for his laudable attempt to secure the reconciliation of the peasants and other subjects to his rule.

Mir Jumla has to his credit some public works of utility, both in the Deccan and in Bengal. Permanent traces of his influence in this respect were comparatively few in Northern India because of his shorter stay there than in the Deccan. Telingana, where he lived long, contained some of his memorials. A tank, a garden and a mansion at Haidarabad bore his name. Saidabad, a village 16 miles distant from Haidarabad grew under his care and patronage and came to be known as the *petta* of Mir Jumla. The Mir not only improved the condition

19. Jesson, the English factor at Agra wrote to the Surat authorities (15th August, 1656) about Mir Jumla, "Tis reported hee does good justice....." EFL. X. 71.

of the road leading to the Gandikota fort, but also constructed some buildings of the fort, including the *Jama Masjid*. A brick-built bridge, constructed under Mir Jumla's orders over the Pagla river near Dacca in Bengal struck Tavernier as "a fine" construction (January 13, 1666. N. S).²⁰

3. *Mir Jumla as a General.*

Great as an administrator, Mir Jumla was also a general of superior calibre. Tavernier describes him as "one of the greatest captains who had ever migrated from Persia to India." The historian Aqil Khan is not guilty of any exaggeration when he writes that the Mir was "experienced in the art of generalship, the chief among the veterans in the realm of command and conversant with the laws of conquering countries." The Rozbihani follower of Mir Jumla rightly calls him the *Sipahdar i pir* and "the best of soldiers." Bowrey describes him as "a great and politic warrior."²¹ Combining intrepidity with wisdom, energy with caution and resolution with efficiency, Mir Jumla made quick decisions and enforced them promptly. The unnamed Dutch sailor, writing of Mir Jumla's campaign in Assam pays a great compliment to his tenacity of purpose and unflinching zeal by observing that "the greatness of the danger served only to heighten his courage." Again disaster spurred him on to make greater effort to realise his aims. After his failure at the frontal assault on Shuja at Suti in May, 1659, Mir Jumla is said to have avowed, "If I fail to avenge my heroes, then I am not a true descendant of the Prophet." His stubborn fight during the skirmish at Dogachi against heavy

20. MU. III. 555; QN. 90; MM. 7a-10b (palace at Haidarabad, 1641, vide Ch. I. ante. fn. 13); Warris, 110a (Saidabad); Crooke's Tav. I. 120-1; Ball, I. 284, and ASR. (1930-34). pp. 42-3 (Gandikota); Ball. I. 128-9 (bridge near Dacca). For the Gandikota mosque, "one of the largest mosques" in the Madras Presidency, vide ASR. 1935-36, p. 25, and pl. VII d; ASR. 1908-9, p. 27. For Mir Jumla's construction of the road from Dacca to Mymensingh and the bridge on it at Tongi, See *Dacca Di. Gaz.* 30; OAILPB. 82-83.

21. Ball, I. 357; ZNA. 105; *Poems*, 142-5, 136-8; Bowrey, 137; MU. III. 555.

odds threw Shuja into despair. The latter is said to have exclaimed in great dismay, if we can believe the Rozbihani poet, "I have not seen such a man in war; he is like Plato in wisdom and like Rustam in bravery.....With such a general, I could have easily conquered the whole world. God has given such a wise guide to Aurangzeb, because He wills to make him Emperor."²² Mir Jumla's Jinji campaign²³ makes it clear that he did not allow his discretion to be overpowered by sentiment or a false sense of honour.

Mir Jumla was a past master of the art of hitting upon right strategical moves. Whenever possible, he preferred to rely more on policy and skill than on open fight. In dissuading Prince Muhammad Sultan from launching a direct assault on Teliyagarhi, he observed: "Why should you allow men to be slain in a task which can be accomplished by strategy?" The plan of encircling the enemy by turning round his flank, as at Monghyr, Sahibganj and in Malda, and also that of a double attack on the enemy, illustrated in the Golkonda campaign of 1655-6, and in the two-pronged offensive against Shuja, are clear proofs of his brilliant strategy in war. But, though averse to unnecessary loss of life, he did not shrink from a plan, involving heavy casualties,—as in the fording of the river Mahananda,—when he was convinced that it was the decisive move of the campaign east of the Ganges.²⁴

Though a strict disciplinarian, Mir Jumla knew how to retain the confidence and loyalty of his captains and privates, by his liberal and sympathetic treatment of them. If he was stern to the negligent or to those guilty of oppression, plunder and rape, he encouraged the dutiful persons by timely praise, promotion and rewards. His courage and presence of mind enabled him to exercise a strong hold over his men as is

22. Glanius, 140 ("a man of dispatch"), 150. cf. Aurangzeb's *Jaiman* in *Poem*, 269-75 (*unfinching*), 167-74 (*Sati*), 365-73 (*Dogachā*).

23. *ante*, Ch. 2. Sec. A. § 3.

24. *Poem*, 147-48 (*Teliyagarhi*); *ante*, Ch. V. Sec. B § 3 (*Monghyr*), § 5 (*Sahibganj*), Sec. E § 2, § 4 (*Malda*); Ch. III. § 5 (*Golkonda campaign*), Ch. V. Sec. C § 5 (*offensive against Shuja*); Ch. V. Sec. E. § 4 (*fording*).

illustrated after the flight of Prince Muhammad Sultan. Indeed, "he was," as Tavernier writes, "both feared and by beloved the army".²⁵

The General was not devoid of humane feelings. After the battle near Belghata and Giria he expressed his grief for Ekkataz, a promising young warrior then about to die of his wounds, and sent for a physician. After fording the river south of Bholahat, the General spent a whole day in giving the dead a decent burial, even at the risk of delay which enabled Shuja to escape from Tanda. On the eve of the Assam campaign, Mir Jumla informed the master of a Dutch ship that he would retain with him three Dutch boys who were "too young to serve in the Army." During that campaign Mir Jumla shared all the privations and hardships with the common soldier. From the beginning of his march from Khizrpur till his return from Assam this "magnanimous" General, the lord of 20 maunds of diamonds, did not ride on any beast except a pony. During the period of famine in the camp, he refused to partake of his additional stock of delicacies, and "like ordinary men ate no article save *dal i mash* (vetch), coagulated milk and boiled rice, and occasionally expressed a desire to take beef, in order that he might be the sharer and partner of his (helpless) dependents in want of privation and suffering."²⁶ Commenting on the greatness of Mir Jumla's character, Sir J.N. Sarkar rightly observes: "No other General of that age conducted war with so much humanity and justice, nor kept his soldiers, privates and captains alike, under such discipline; no other General could have retained to the last, the confidence and even affection of his subordinates amidst such appalling sufferings and dangers".²⁷ The unnamed Dutch sailor aptly describes Mir Jumla as "a wise and valiant captain, the soldiers'

25. Good conduct, *Adab*, 39a; rebuke to Zulfiqar, *Poem*, 202-6; praise, FI. 112; Ball, I, 357.

26. *Poem*, 345-8 (Ekkataz); Ch. V, Sec. E. § 5. (Burial); Glanius. 143 (Dutch boys); FI. 11-12 (pony), 137-8 (famine).

27. *Aurangzeb*. III. 181.

darling and the People's favourite"²⁸. He did not forget to consider favourably the condition of his slaves, for whose liberation he left instructions with the Mir Bakhshi on the eve of his death.²⁹

As a general, Mir Jumla first made his mark in his conquest of the Karnatak, where his almost unbroken record of victories was marred only by his failure at Jinji and during the war with Adil Shah over the partition of the Karnatak. Though the Bijapur campaign of 1657-'8 was launched at his initiative, his rôle was not that of the supreme commander. If he failed to secure the cession of Parenda from the Bijapuris after the conclusion of peace, the fault was not his, for circumstances beyond his control were operating against him. But it must be admitted that he committed an error of judgment in persisting in his efforts to secure that fort. His conducting of the War of Succession against Shuja to a successful close in Bihar and Bengal was brilliant beyond doubt, the only reverse suffered by the Mir being that of 3rd May 1659. In his last but most brilliant campaign, that directed against Kuch Bihar and Assam, he exhibited wonderful feats of fortitude and bravery. Though confronted with the severest odds, his army, ably guided by him, was not even once defeated by the Ahoms.

Mir Jumla's military achievements are succinctly set forth in an ode written by Mulla Darvesh of Herat in praise of the conquest of Assam.³⁰

The rank—shattering warrior, the captor of forts

and conqueror of realms (i.e. Mir Jumla)

Revived anew the forgotten tale of

The "Seven stages" which had been sung

by the Philosopher (Firdausi) in the *Shahnama*

And which had been gone through by Isfandiyar and Rustam,

28. Glanius, 177.

29. FI. 170, *See ante*, Ch. VII. Sec. E. § 1.

30. FI. 52; JBORS. I. 183.

The face of Fortune, the heart of Valour
 and the arm of victory,
 Conqueror of realms, bestower of kingdoms
 and ornament of the world,
 The Khan-i-khanan, Commander-in-chief,
 leader of armies, whom, by way of honour,
 The Emperor gave the title of 'Faithful Friend,'
 That peer of royal dignity, that Sayyid
 possessed of the characteristics of his ancestors,
 The back of Persia, the cheek of India.
 the head of the kingdom of God,—
 He is a Mustafa charged with divine instruction
 and guidance after that (chosen one, Muhammad) ;
 He is a Murtaza (in) the keenness of his
 Sword and spear in the day of battle.

4. *Mir Jumla as a diplomat*

Mir Jumla played a conspicuous rôle in the history of India for about three decades as a business magnate, a minister and a general, and most prominently of all as a remarkably successful diplomat. The unnamed Dutch sailor truly calls him "a great politician".³¹ Like Bismarck performing the juggler's feat of tossing five balls at a time, Mir Jumla could carry on intrigues successfully with several powers, far and near, without in any way compromising his own honour, even during the highly critical period of his rebellion against Sultan Qutb Shah. Yet he could retain his freedom of action and lean on any one power as he thought expedient, could play off one against another, and succeed in improving his own diplomatic position.³²

Mir Jumla's diplomacy was certainly a great factor in Mughal imperial history. Indeed it may be affirmed without any exaggeration that he towered above all his contemporaries in India as regards his diplomatic acumen and sagacity. Even Aurangzeb, so well-known for his astuteness and craft, yielded

³¹—Glanville, 177.

³²—JBRS, XXX. 248; *vide ante* Ch. 3. for Mir Jumla's diplomatic intrigues.

the palm to this Persian adventurer in this respect, and since the latter's enlistment in the imperial service, looked up to him for advice in all matters as his friend, philosopher and guide. It was to the Mir, then Wazir of the Mughal Empire, that Aurangzeb, then Viceroy of the Deccan, appealed for pulling his chestnuts out of the fire of imperial wrath and the Crown-Prince's counter-intrigues. Dara was outwitted at almost every step by Aurangzeb's faithful adherent. It was Mir Jumla who persuaded Shahjahan to confer the Karnatak, then included within the Empire, as a *jagir* on himself. It was Mir Jumla who rejected Aurangzeb's scheme of a second Golkonda campaign, took the initiative in launching the Bijapur campaign, induced the Emperor to give up the Qandahar expedition and to sanction the plan for the invasion of Bijapur and secured for Aurangzeb absolute authority in conducting it, by counteracting Dara's hostile moves. It was Mir Jumla who dexterously succeeded in foiling Dara's manoeuvres to isolate him from Aurangzeb on the eve of the War of Succession, and saved himself and his family from Dara's vengeance. Again, it was Mir Jumla's diplomacy which minimised the danger threatening Aurangzeb from the defection of Jaswant Singh at the battle of Khajwa.³³ Thus, during 1656-58 Mir Jumla dominated the diplomatic history of India like a Colossus, whose one foot was at Delhi and the other in the Karnatak.

The Rozbihani eulogist has tried to indicate Mir Jumla's importance to Aurangzeb by observing that he was to the latter what Aristotle was to Alexander.³⁴ Though Mir Jumla was a very helpful officer of Aurangzeb, yet it is not possible to agree with this over-estimate of his personality. It is also difficult to avoid the conclusion that Mir Jumla failed to be a constructive force in the history of the Mughal Empire. For one thing, he lacked in high idealism, though he had efficiency, wisdom and foresight. For another, it was a distinct loss to

33. ante Ch. IV. Secs. B and C (the Karnatak, Golkonda and Bijapur); Sec. D (War of Succession); Ch. V. Sec A (Khajwa).

34. *Poem*, 415-23, cf. Bowrey, 137.

the State that the Wazir of the Mughal Empire was a partisan; he was nothing but the agent of the Viceroy of the Deccan, who was irreconcilably opposed to the Crown Prince. Thus personal considerations overbore the greater interests of the empire. Moreover, the lack of differentiation between the civil and military functions constantly diverted him, from the arts of peace to the more alluring prospects of war and conquest. Again, Aurangzeb, once established on the throne, had begun to harbour feelings of suspicion against this "over-mighty" subject.³⁵ Thus the conjunction of these two able and intelligent personalities did not usher in any progressive force within the Empire. In all probability, had a longer life been vouchsafed to Mir Jumla, in the pacific years of Aurangzeb's reign the Shiah creed of the Mir would have silently but inexorably made a widening breach between him and his orthodox Sunni master, and reduced him to obscurity if not to nullity.

³⁵ BDB, (3rd September, 1663) in AA, 292a; Bernier, 173; Bowrey, 144-5; Storia, II. 102.

Appendix A

Date of the Karnatak Partition Agreement

In the Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission (January, 1942), I published a letter of Qutb Shah to Shahjahan, contained in Tabrezi's *Golkonda Letters*.¹ It runs as follows: "I have already informed you before that the *Zamindars* of Jinji and Tanjore sought help from me. I hope Your Majesty would order the division of their countries in the proportion of $\frac{1}{2} : \frac{1}{2}$ as arranged in the *ahdnama*.... When the truth of the violation of the agreement signed faithfully by Adil Shah became known to the late Islam Khan..... it was considered advisable that the terms of the agreement might be modified..... The imperial orders are to be obeyed as if they are divine. Previously Your Majesty had gone for *shikar* to Kabul and I had agreed to this division and an imperial *wakil* had gone to the Karnatak for division. Then the above mentioned Nawab (Islam Khan) died and Adil Shah found an opportunity to violate the agreement and sent many wazirs under Shahji to help the Hindus in the Karnatak"

This letter enables us to fix the approximate date of the conclusion of the partition agreement between Bijapur and Golkonda. From *Padshahnama*² it appears that during the Central Asiatic campaign, the Emperor left Lahore for Kabul on Safar 18, 1056 (26th March, 1646). There is a description of *shikar* on the bank of the Chenab on 4 Rabiulawwal (10th April, 1646). The Emperor returned from Kabul to Lahore on 9 Shaban, 1056 (10th September, 1646).

Again Islam Khan, the Mughal Subadar of the Deccan, died on 18th November, 1647.³ Thus it would appear that the partition was made between March-April, 1646. Another

1. Tabrezi, 5a-7a; Pr. IHRC. XVIII. 204-5. n. 55.

2. BI. II. 500-1, 509.

3. Wazir. I. 6a. For Islam Khan Mashhadi, MU. Text. I. 162-7; Tr. I. 694-6.

journey of the Emperor from Lahore to Kabul was made on Safar 18, 1057 (15th March, 1647), but there is no mention of *shikar* now.¹ He left Kabul for India on 30 Rajab, 1057, (21st August, 1647).²

Appendix B

Date of the conquest of Gandikota by Mir Jumla

Tavernier cites 24th August, 1652, as the date of Mir Jumla's occupation of Gandikota. He says that the fort was occupied by Mir Jumla after three months' siege only 8 days before his visit (1st September, 1652).³ But a critical study of European factory records and Persian sources proves the incorrectness of this date. This shows that Gandikota was conquered by Mir Jumla in the spring of 1650. A Madras letter dated 18th January, 1651, states that in September last a Dutch mission was sent to the Nawab "at Gandikota (.....subdued by his resolution, against the opinion of all men, the last spring)." Sir William Foster writes that "notwithstanding the positive statement in the text there is some doubt as to the date of the capture of the fortress. A Dutch letter (Hague Tr. series I, Vol. XVII, no. 518) seems to intimate that, at the time of the visit of Van Wessel, the leader of the Dutch mission, it was still being besieged by Mir Jumla.)"⁴ Qutb Shah in his reply to his envoy at Delhi, Mulla Abdus Samad, observes: "Received your letter written when the Emperor was stopping at Lahore on his way to Kashmir. The complaints which Adil Shah made to the Emperor through Mirza Fathullah were, strangely enough, false. You have yourself seen the copy of the *ahdnama*. Adil Shah had reported that the fort of Gandikota was

1. PN. BI. 637-42.

2. Waris, I. 4a.

3. Ball, I. 284.

4. EFI, IX, 22-23, n.

conquered by Qutb Shah against his order and without his knowledge.¹ The date (March-May, 1651) of the Emperor's going to Kashmir² and the reference to the occupation of Gandikota in this letter show that it must have been effected before March, 1651. This agrees with the evidence of the English records that it was occupied in the spring of 1650, and that in September a Dutch mission was sent to Mir Jumla there and also that about the same time an English mission under Venkat Brahman went to see him, whose plans of commercial partnership with the E. I. C. were incorporated in a letter to Bantam (10th January, 1651) and instructions to Littleton (12th January).³ Moreover, the description of Mir Jumla's activities in Gandikota, as given by Tavernier (e.g. his making of roads, establishment of cannon-foundries, administration of justice, review of army, etc.), makes it difficult for us to believe that the fort was captured just 8 days before Tavernier's visit. It is possible, however, that the date of Tavernier refers to the subsequent occupation of Gandikota by Mir Jumla after his defeat at the hands of the Bijapuri general in the war between the two Sultans over the partition of the Karnatak (1651-2).

1. Tabrezi, 19a-b; Pr, IHRC, XVIII, 205-6.

2. Waris, I, 49a-53a.

3. EFI, IX, 23.

Appendix C

Mir Jumla's family

Mir Jumla had one son, named Muhammad Amin and several daughters.¹ He spent a lot in bringing Sayyid Nizamuddin Ahmad (of Mecca), and Sayyid Sultan (of Najf)² to Haidarabad, and wanted to marry his two daughters to them. On coming to know of this, Qutb Shah resolved to marry them to two of his own daughters. So Mir Jumla was displeased and joined Aurangzeb. Qutb Shah first married one of his daughters to Sayyid Ahmad and then began to arrange the marriage of the second with Sayyid Sultan. But Sayyid Ahmad, having some enmity with the latter, threatened to induce Aurangzeb to wipe out his kingdom. The Sultan thereupon married his daughter to Abul Hasan (closely related to the Shah through his own mother), and a servitor of Sayyid Shah Raju (ancestor of Sayyid Muhammad Gisu Daraz) for 14 years.³

Muhammad Amin⁴ had a son, named Mirza Abdulla.⁵ Manucci says that Mir Jumla, before his death, gave his wife "some magnificent diamonds" for his son and grandson.⁶

1. Ball, I. 165.

2. Sayyid Nizamuddin Ahmad was the son of the sister of Shah Abbas II and Sayyid Masum; he was brought up at Mecca and became distinguished for his education and ability (QN, 92). Sayyid Sultan was the disciple of Sayyid Masum and of higher pedigree than Sayyid Ahmad (*ibid.*, 90). Sayyid Sultan married the daughter of Muhammad Khan.

There is an inscription on an unfinished tomb of Nizamuddin Ahmad, son-in-law of Abdullah and his wife (EIM, 1923-24, p. 31; ARADND (1924-5), pp. 5-6.

3. QN. 90-94; Ball, I. 170-1 and n.

4. For career of Muhammad Amin, see MU. Text. III. 613-20; Tr. I. 241-245.

5. *Storia*, II. 101; FI. 134; *Cont.* 106b, killed in N.W. Frontier, 21st April, 1672. MU. III. 617; TMU. 1083.

6. The jewels of Mir Jumla's widow were plundered by the Pathans. *Storia*, II. 199-201.

He also wrote to Aurangzeb a letter, praying for his "favours to them". Aurangzeb's behaviour towards Muhammad Amin Khan was marked by utmost kindness and liberality; he confirmed the latter in his office of Bakhshi, increased his allowance by 1,00,000 rupees, constituted him sole heir of his father's property, and subsequently deputed him as Viceroy to Lahore. The annual pay of his son Mirza Abdulla was fixed at Rs. 2,00,000.¹

Appendix D

Arrest of Mir Jumla's son

Muhammad Amin, the son and deputy of the absent Wazir (Mir Jumla) was an important personage in the Haidarabad Court, having a considerable following. The reason of his sudden arrest is variously stated in the contemporary sources. If Manucci² is to be believed, Mir Jumla's not obeying the Sultan's repeated summons led the latter to imprison Muhammad Amin. But Manucci's story of his fighting the Sultan from his fortified mansion for 3 days till the arrival of Mir Jumla is inexplicable and is not corroborated by any other source. Qutb Shah, in his letter to the Shah of Persia (c. 1656) wrote that he imprisoned Muhammad Amin as he was not doing good work, in the excesses of pride and egotism, born of successes and as he committed some undesirable things.³ It is true that Muhammad Amin was by nature haughty and reckless. It is possible that, puffed up with his youth and pride at his father's wealth and glory, he committed some improper acts. But what were they? Tavernier⁴ remarks that Muhammad Amin informed his father of the Sultan's plots and that after

1. Storia, II. 101-2; Bernier, 173.

2. Storia, I. 233-5.

3. Tabrezi, 141b-144a; Pr. IHC. (1941). p. 608.

4. Ball, I. 165-6.

receiving his father's reply to his own warning, he boldly accused the Sultan of ingratitude towards his father, "without whose aid he would never have come to the throne," and "somewhat carried away from his ordinary demeanour, used such sharpness of expression" that the nobles handled him roughly and the king, offended by his insolence, had him arrested and imprisoned with his mother and sister. The *Maasir ul umara* says that Muhammad Amin "overstepped the limits of propriety" and one day came drunk to the Court and vomitted forth on the *musnud*, for which the Sultan imprisoned him. But the real reason of his arrest was the leakage of his negotiations with Aurangzeb. This is conclusively proved by the following letter of Aurangzeb to the Sultan: "it transpired from the application of Abdul Latif that you have, in spite of knowing that a letter had been issued to Mir Muhammad Amin, arrested him and without considering it as impertinence, put him and his family in the fort of Golkonda"² A passage in *Shahjahannama* also bears this out: "Kutbul Mulk, the instant he gained intelligence of the matter (Mir's seeking imperial protection), imprisoned Mir Jumla's son....."³

1. MU. III. 531.

2. *Adab*, 56b-57a; GD.

3. SHN. 335; E and D. VII. 109.

Appendix E

Chronology of Mir Jumla's retreat from Assam

(January—March, 1663).

- 10th JANUARY—Order of retreat: Mir Jumla leaves Tipam, follows the bank of the Dihing and crosses the river at Trimohani.
- 22nd JANUARY—Mir Jumla embarks on a boat at Dewalgaon and reaches Lakhau.
- 28th JANUARY—Mir Jumla leaves Lakhau on boat, the army proceeding on land.
- 30th JANUARY—Mir Jumla reaches Kaliabar.
- 30th JANUARY—Mir Jumla starts from Kaliabar in a palanquin, inspects Dimarua, crosses the wilderness of Kajli (34 kos in 4 days).
- 2nd FEBRUARY—Mir Jumla crosses the Kallang by boat and halts at the foot of Kajli fort.
- 9th FEBRUARY—Interviews the mother of Raja of Darrang and the mother of the Raja of Dimarua. Earthquake.
- 11th FEBRUARY—Mir Jumla leaves Kajli and halts at Pandu, opposite Gauhati.
- 24th FEBRUARY—Mir Jumla leaves Pandu in a boat.
- 28th FEBRUARY—Mir Jumla halts at Baritala.
- 27th MARCH—Mir Jumla leaves Baritala on boat.
- 31st MARCH—Mir Jumla dies.

Appendix F

Currency and Weights

The following tables are given as a rough and ready reckoner of value of coins and weight of articles.

(A)

50—80 cowries	= 1 <i>paisa</i> .
Pice (half dam) [copper]	= $\frac{1}{16}$ Re., rising to $\frac{1}{10}$ Re.
Dam (or pice) [copper]	= $\frac{1}{8}$ Re., rising to $\frac{1}{6}$ Re.
Rupee [silver]	= 2s. 3d.
Mohur [gold]	= 31s. 6d. or 14-14½ rupees.
Pagoda, New, [gold]	= 3-3½ rupees.
Pagoda, Old, [gold]	= 4-5 rupees or over.
Fanam [gold]	= variable (12, 15, 16, 18, 24, 32 to the pagoda)

[A *hun* was a gold coin, forming the usual currency in Bijapur and Golkonda and Hindu territories farther south and called *Pagoda* by Europeans.]

Rial of eight (silver, Spanish money)=4s. 6d. or Rs. 2.

Ibrahimi (gold)=about 2½ rupees.

Tuman=variable, average value £3. 9s. (rupees 29½, acc. to Tavernier).

(B)

1 *tola* =about 180 grains troy.

1 *rati* =2.66 grs. troy, ordinarily 1.75 to 1.93.

1 *Man* (maund) =40 *Ser*, but weight of *Ser* varied much. Shahjahan fixed it at 40 dams, giving the maund nearly 74 lb. In the Deccan and the East Coast the maund was equal to about 26 lb.

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(i) *History of the Carnatic* containing several articles (Mack. Coll. Vol. II, Sec. IX, nos. 2-7, 11, 16-20, 22-25, 27, 31, 33, 35-40. pp. (xxxv-xxxvii) of which the ff. are important *ibid.*, No. 16 (Moogral), no. 17 (Pennumurry), no. 18 (Paukal), no. 20 (Goodypaut), no. 22 (Pulloor) no. 23 (Cullore Poliam), no. 24 (Poolycherla), no. 27 (Bamrauze), no. 31 (Calestry), no. 35 (Chingleput), no. 36-40 (Gingee), no. 47 (Purgunnahs in the Payen Ghaat belonging to the Veejapoor Sooba, and to the Hydrabad Soobha).

(ii) *Madura*. An account of the Gentoo kings of Madura Kingdom of Pandyaas. (Mack. Coll. Vol. II, Sec. IV, nos. 2, 3, 5-16, 17, 20, 22, p. xxxii). History of Tirumala Nayak in Ch 8 (*ibid.* no 11).

(iii) *Historical Account of the Sovereigns of Mysore*. (MC II. Sec. III, nos. 17 and 24, p. xxxi).

(iv) *Mohammedan Governments of Dekan* (MC, II Sec XLI, nos 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, pp. clxi, clxii) (a) Adil Shah Kings. (*Ibid.* no 2), (b) Of the Cootub Shaheea or Kings of Tallang. (*ibid.*, no. 4) This contains a brief reference to Mir Jumla's career in Golkonda.

(v) *Andhra, Condavir &c* (Mc. II. Sec. VII nos 8, 9, 15 p. xxxiv).

(a) *Tamil*

Narayana Kon's Carnataka Rajakal Savistara Charitram (complete History of the Karnatak Kings) in Tamil, found in the Mackenzie Mss.

A translation of relevant portions of Section VIII was supplied to me by Dewan Bahadur C.S. Srinivasachari (See his *History of Gingee* (28-31n) for value of this work). It refers to the agreement between the two Deccani Sultans and the struggle over Jinji.

(b) *Telugu*

Dewan Bahadur C. S. Srinivasachari informs me "There is not much of what may be called original material in Telugu literature regarding Mir Jumla in the Golconda Karnatak."

Some incidental references may be gathered from MSS. like XXXII. Ceded Districts, Local Tracts (Telugu), entitled "Account of Gandikotta Hill Fort" in the Jambula Maddugu Dt. (Mack. Coll. Vol. II. p. lxxv)

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(c) *Sanskrit*

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Banerji, R. D.—*Alamgirnagar, a new Mughal Mint.* JASB. 1920. pp. 85-86. A small silver coin (probably minted 1661—Feb. 1663), belonging to the collection of Mr. Prafulla Nath Tagore of Calcutta. (Pl. XIII. no.8).

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2. Amir Jumla amusing himself in his zenana after the engraving from an Indian drawing in Valentyn's *Beschryving*, see Bernier, 170.

3. *Storia do Mogor*, Vol. I. Introduction, p. Lvii; Vol. IV. p. 412.
4. Portrait of Mir Jumla Mir Muhammad Said, exhibited by Rao Bahadur D. B. Parasnis. Pr. IHRC, VII, 1925, p. 119, See BPP, 1925, facing p. 25; also KB frontispiece.
5. Photographic Negatives (12" x 10", 8½" x 6½"), no. 560, 561 prepared from Br. Museum by the office of the Director of Archaeology, during 1920-21, (ARADND, 1920-1).

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
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